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Summary 
This thesis sought to study international conflict from a social psychology 
perspective. Following Social Representations' Theory (Clemence, 2001; 
Doise, 1993; Lorenzi-Cioldi and Clemence, 2001; Moscovici, 1961/1976, 
2001) it is suggested that international conflict should be studied in a specific 
context where the social categories in use are produced and appropriated by 
lay people. The study of the social representation of international conflict 
should include both the common elements that constitute its content but also 
the sources of individual variation or in other words the different positions that 
people occupy in relation to these common elements. Trust/distrust is also 
suggested to be a key element of the representation of the relationship 
whereas power is explored as a key structural source of individual variation. 
Different methodologies were used in order to study different parts of the 
representation of international conflict. These included a qualitative study that 
explored the content of the representation in Greece. Furthermore, following a 
theoretical distinction introduced by Doise and his colleagues (Doise, 1986, 
1993; Doise, Spini and Clemence, 1999; Spini and Doise, 1998; Staerkle, 
Clemence and Doise, 1998) between different types of anchors, i. e. beliefs 
that new information are come to be attached in social life, a questionnaire 
study explored the relationship between different types of anchors and 
trust/distrust in the context of the relationship between Greece and Turkey. 
Finally, an experimental study, explored cross-culturally the understanding of 
a specific type of international conflict and the role of power in shaping such 
an understanding. 
The results suggest that a distinction between the states and the population 
as constituents of the nation state, power, boundaries and homogeneity are 
central in the lay theories of international conflict. They also offer an 
exploration of the meaning of trust/distrust and its relevance to international 
relations. The results support the mediating effect of beliefs related to the 
context of a specific relationship in more general beliefs and types of 
attachment that are related to trust/distrust. Furthermore, the results further 
confirm the key role of power in shaping the understanding of the context of 
conflict, the parties involved and trust/distrust. Finally, cross cultural 
differences support the claims for a contextual study of international conflict. 
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Chapter I 
T his thesis concerns the study of the lay theories of international conflict. It 
is argued that lay theories should be studied in context. Therefore, the 
context of the relationship between Greece and Turkey is used. A part of this 
research sought to explore the lay theories of international conflict in this 
context. Trust/distrust is also acknowledged as an important part of the lay 
theories of international relations. This thesis considers trust/distrust as a 
"themata" that regulates the relationship. As a result, part of this study 
concerns the exploration of the beliefs that the "themata" trust/distrust might 
be anchored. A complex relationship between different types of beliefs is 
proposed. More specifically, beliefs classified under the label upsychological" 
were suggested to be mediated by other beliefs that were classified as 
usocial-psychological". Finally, the third objective of this thesis was to explore 
the role of power and duration of conflict in organising the lay theories of 
international conflict in different countries. 
The current chapter aims to present the outline of this thesis. 
The second chapter introduces the area that this research seeks to explore. It 
discusses destructive conflict as a force that disrupts everyday life and set 
barriers in the development of a society. It further offers a review of the socio- 
psychological theories of conflict resolution that sought to give some answers 
in the issue of international conflict. The key points and the limitations of the 
contact hypothesis and the Self Categorisation models of prejudice reduction 
are discussed. 
The third chapter questions the applicability of these theories to deal with the 
issue of international conflict. It presents international conflict as a specific 
type of relationship that concerns social groups with certain characteristics, 
i. e. nation-states. The chapter argues that the study of lay theories is 
important in the investigation of international conflict Therefore it uses Social 
Representations Theory which is a theory concerning the construction and 
appropriation of lay theories. 
Chapter four puts trust/distrust at a central place of conflict resolution. It 
highlights the theories of trust/distrust developed in other areas of psychology 
and social sciences. The review focuses on existing trust/distrust definitions 
and trust building. Finally, by using the concept of "themata" this chapter 
offers a conceptual isation of trust/distrust in the context of international 
conflict and conflict resolution. 
Chapter 5 presents the rationale for this study. It briefly overviews the points 
developed in previous chapters and it articulates the research questions and 
the research strategy. It also presents the key aspects of the relationship 
between Greece and Turkey which constitutes the context of this research. 
The research explores the lay theories of international conflict and its 
resolution, the role of trust/distrust, the role of power, of duration of conflict 
and of nationality in shaping these theories. It also explores possible anchors 
of trust/distrust and proposes that there is a relationship between these 
different anchors. 
Chapter 6 is the first of the empirical chapters and presents the rationale, the 
design and the results of a qualitative study. 13 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted in Greece and analysed using Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis. The study revealed the key aspects of the lay 
theories of international relationships as they were expressed by Greek 
nationals. The study also explored the role of trust/distrust in international 
relations. 
Chapter 7 presents the results concerning the exploration of the anchors of 
the levels and sources of trust/distrust. Three types of sources of distrust were 
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proposed based on the results obtained in the qualitative study: the actions, 
the assessment of the internal situation and the character of the out-group. A 
range of anchors differentiated into Opsychological' and asocio-psychological" 
following a theoretical distinction made by Doise and his colleagues were 
tested as potential anchors. The hypothesis of mediation of the "socio- 
psychological" in the relationship between the upsychological" beliefs and 
trust/distrust were also tested. The results generally supported this 
hypothesis. 
Chapter 8 presents the results of the experimental study. A scenario of a 
dispute between two fictional countries where power of the country and the 
duration of the dispute were manipulated, was distributed to participants from 
Greece, Cyprus (Greek part), Turkey and Britain. The research tests the effect 
of power, duration of conflict and nationality in shaping the representation of 
conflict. The results supported the effect of power and nationality whereas 
results regarding the duration of conflict were not obtained due to 
methodological issues. 
Finally, chapter 9 reviews the main findings, reconsiders them and gives 
some suggestions for their theoretical and practical implications. At the final 
part of this thesis can be found the list of the references used and the 
appendices of the questionnaires and tables. 
Rodooo) 
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Chapter 2 
T his chapter aims to discuss the social psychological theories that 
sought to provide answers on issues related to the occurrence and 
resolution of conflict. It starts with a presentation of the issue of inter-group 
conflict presenting it as extremely destructive in some cases, but also 
necessary and constructive in other cases. However, this research 
focuses on instances of destructive and intractable conflict. The chapter 
finally offers a bdef introdudon of social psychological theories and 
approaches emphasising their main premises and their limitations in 
relation to the issue of inter-group conflict. 
Inter-group conflict is a field of extreme importance because of its 
catastrophic consequences on social and personal life. It is a phenomenon 
that is difficult to be ignored; even when it occurs in distant places it is 
often the focus of attention in the media, easily becomes part of everyday 
discourse, and has the power to disrupt and change everyday routines. 
Once established, conflict becomes part of everyday life and precipitates 
changes in society. These changes can be observed in the formation of 
practices and beliefs that justify and perpetuate conflict. Furthermore, the 
destructive consequences of conflict are not only experienced by those 
directly implicated in it. Inter-group conflict has the power to divide not only 
those directly involved in it but also the rest of society. War will sustain 
governments or it may initiate their fall. Leaders will be tested in their 
ability to mobilise people in their attempts to launch wars on other 
countries or in their ability to handle internal problems and movements of 
independence and deal with minorities that defy their position. Drawing on 
the resources available in the socio-political context and through 
communication, lay people construct their own theories about conflict 
between nation-states, they take sides and they proceed with action. 
These issues invite social psychological investigation. 
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There are a variety of contexts of inter-group conflict that invite different 
interpretations and approaches. Images of war, for example, have 
changed in the last few decades with respect to the characteristics of the 
parties that are implicated in the conflict, the practices that are employed 
and the involvement of society. Along with inter-state conflicts and the 
struggle for independence of ethnic groups within a nation-state, pre- 
emptive or punitive wars are launched by super-powers in the name of 
humanitarian values, and thus trivialise the establishment of a world order 
governed by military interventions. Conflict may also involve different 
ideologies within a society, some contexts may reflect clashes between 
different ethnic, racial or religious groups, while inter-state conflicts are not 
rare. These are some examples of the types of conflict that are of interest 
in the present research. 
However. it should be noted here that conflict is not always associated 
with disaster and destruction. On the contrary, conflict constitutes an 
inevitable part of human interaction both at the personal and social levels. 
Indeed, in some cases it seems to be beneficial to the parties involved. For 
example, Mugny and Doise (Mugny and Doise, 1978, Doise and Mugny, 
1984) have suggested that socio-cognitive conflict can be a vital element 
in the development of cognitive co-ordinations and that it leads to cognitive 
restructuring and the development of intelligence. In addition, Moscovici's 
(1976) theory of social influence considers that the production and 
resolution of conflicts is directly linked to the processes of social influence. 
Dissension and conflict are at the origins of any innovation and change 
(Moscovici and Doise, 1994) and the power of minorities lies on their 
ability to create and consistently sustain conflict with the dominant majority 
(Mugny 1982). Conflict in decision making has been found to contribute to 
the polarisation of attitudes and its negation contributes to make the 
decisions unsuccessful (Janis 1972). 
Moscovici's idea that the different types of influence correspond to 
different methods of dealing vvith conflict has been formalised and further 
developed in Conflict Elaboration Theory (Perez and Mugny, 1996). This 
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theory puts conflict at the centre of social influence outcomes as it 
suggests that the type of influence (direct or latent) is the outcome of the 
elaboration of the conflict between the source and the recipient in a given 
task. Events that bring two persons to a conflict are welcomed by theorists 
of interpersonal relationships as important for the establishment of a deep, 
mature and trustworthy relationship (Rempel, Holmes and Zanna, 1985). It 
is believed that it is through conflict and its successful resolution that two 
parties come to know each other and establish a functional relationship. 
Conflict may arise because the parties confront something unfamiliar in the 
relationship. A successful resolution of the conflict should make the 
relationship mature and expand it. Ukewise, conflict in some areas (e. g. 
organisations) is recognised as a vital element of the life of organisations 
(Lewicki, Weiss and Lewin, 1992). In addition, in situations of oppression 
and deprivation conflict may be the only means people have to make their 
voice heard and achieve better conditions for themselves (Taifel, 1978). 
Although nobody would disagree on the destructive repercussions of 
conflict, for many it may be seen as an option where the short-term 
damages will be outweighed by long-term benefits. 
Apart from the fact that in some cases conflict might be desired or an 
inevitable consequence of the process of change, people and societies 
may differ in their definitions of conflict. One of the dimensions that 
account for differences between cultures has been the extent they invite or 
avoid conflict (Hofstede, 1980). People may also have different theories 
about what constitutes competition or where conflict begins. It seems that 
in contexts that have produced conflicts in the past competition is more 
likely to be seen as azero surn" and lead to destructive conflict (Thompson, 
2001). Furthermore, a popular representation of the social world, at least 
in Western Societies, is of it being constituted by stable hierarchies. For 
the people that endorse such a construction of the world, "zero-sum" 
competition between groups may be perceived as the norm (Sidanius, 
Pratto and Bobo, 1994). 
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Conflict when satisfactorily managed or resolved, may be rewarding and 
could result in the growth of the relationship. However, it is unlikely for a 
conflict that occurs at an inter-group level to be successfully and 
adequately resolved in a way that would benefit the relationship. Rather, in 
many instances conflict becomes such a destructive reality deeply 
entrenched in everyday life that is difficult to be resolved. In this case, 
conflict penetrates the whole society and creates uncertainty. The 
existence of conflict structures one's beliefs, explanations of the social 
world, interpretations of events and peoples'ways of living and thinking. 
Conflict constitutes a particular type of relationship, with certain 
characteristics, roles and positions of the parties as well as certain 
expectations regarding their actions. Within this context, stereotypes and 
actions based on distrust are more likely to be expected. Indeed, enemies 
constitute a specific out-group more likely to be evaluated more negatively 
than other out-groups, seek information or are predisposed to information 
that confirm the negative image of the out-group (Kemmelmeier and 
Winter, 2000; Bum and Oskamp, 1989; Silverstein and Flamenbaum, 
1989). Also, parties in a conflict can show a tendency toward simplified 
information processing (Jervis, 1976) which increases the possibility for 
stereotypes and prejudice to be used to explain out-group actions. In these 
cases, conflict resolution is a rather complex process that may involve 
deep changes in both the representations of the in-group and the out- 
group. 
Another issue that is associated with the beliefs, explanations and feelings 
present in conflict is that they are functional for the in-group. The main 
function of these beliefs is that they reduce the uncertainty that derives 
from the encounter of something unfamiliar. By assuming that the out- 
group is aggressive and has malevolent intentions, the in-group protects 
itself from the disappointment or disastrous consequences of not being 
cautious and vigilant Under these circumstances, it is very risky and there 
is little motivation for change. Any endeavours for conflict resolution may 
hinge on fears that the other side may be not vAlling to resolve the conflict 
or that it is difficult for a solution to be reached that could leave both sides 
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satisfied. For conflict resolution to be possible in such a context, the 
parties should be introduced to something that can constitute a functional 
equivalent of conflict. 
It is apparent from the above discussion that conflict is associated with 
specific sets of beliefs and can both promote and hinder change. Apart 
from the consequences of conflict, research has focused on factors that 
explain the emergence of conflict. With the assumption that there is a 
direct relationship between personality and expression of prejudice, 
research has focused on a range of personality factors including 
authodtadanism and dogmatism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson 
and Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1988,1998). This perspective has been 
criticised because it reduces the study of inter-group phenomena to 
individual functioning (Turner and Oakes, 1986). It also tends to regard 
conflict as based on irrational individual beliefs (Tumer, 1999). On the 
other hand, a renewed interest in dimensions such as authodtarianism, 
conservatism and social dominance orientation (Sidanius and Prafto, 
1999) has proposed the view of these dimensions as enduring social 
attitudes and ideological beliefs rather than personal traits (Duckitt, Birum, 
Wagne and du Plessis, 2002). 
Campbell (1965) in his Realistic Group Conflict Theory provided a rather 
different account to explain the emergence of conflict. In this theory, 
conflict is always associated with the existence of objective and rational 
interests expressed as competition for scarce resources (LeVine & 
Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966; Sherif and Sherif, 1953; Sherif, Harvey, 
White, Hood and Sherif, 1961). Realistic conflict theory puts goal 
incompatibility, perception of zero-sum objectives and motivation to 
increase one's own gains at the heart of conflict 
However, the acceptance of a causal link between dash of material 
interests and conflict would underplay issues of competition and 
antagonism between groups that are closely associated with symbolic 
conflict. This involves conflict for status, prestige and power. Social Identity 
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(Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Turner, 
1999) and Self Categorisation (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and 
Wetherell, 1987) research traditions sought to explain the existence of 
inter-group conflict in the absence of realistic reasons. The theories 
employ the concept of social identity in order to understand collective 
behaviour including inter-group conflict and discrimination. They support 
the idea that mere awareness of being a member of one group as 
opposed to another has implications for inter-group relations. At the heart 
of the theory is the idea that social comparisons between groups that are 
relevant to the evaluation of one! s identity bigger a process of inter-group 
differentiation to achieve positive group identity. The groups will use 
different strategies to achieve a positive identity. Discrimination is only one 
of the strategies that groups would use in order to achieve a positive 
identity. The strategy to be adopted will depend on the groups! status 
position, their beliefs about the nature of the boundaries, the intensity of 
the identification with the group and the shared beliefs about the nature of 
the social system, and inter-group differences in terms of status, power 
and wealth (Turner, 1999). SCT suggests social identity as the link 
between the interpersonal and inter-group phenomena. The theory further 
assumes a distinction between personal and social identity. Social identity 
i. e. the self definition in terms of a shared membership appropriates a 
certain inter-group categorisation. A consequence of categorisation is the 
minimisation of differences within the categories and the accentuation of 
differences between the categories. In addition, relationships within the 
categories are characterised by positive affect while relationships between 
categories are more likely to be seen in competitive terms. 
By introducing the idea that stereotypes and prejudice can be present in 
the absence of conflict or competition between groups, Social Identity 
Theory has dominated the social psychological research on conflict. The 
concept of inter-group bias that refers to the tendency to evaluate the in- 
group more favourably than another group or derogate an out-group, was 
extensively used to explain conflict. The reduction of bias has been 
implicitly equated with the reduction of conflict. Inter-group bias refers to 
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different levels of people's social behaviour including the cognitive 
understanding (stereotypes) the attitude (prejudice) and its behavioural 
expression as it is observed in the various forms of inter-group 
discrimination (Hewstone, Rubin and Willis, 2002). 
In addition, the study of in-group favouritism and inter-group bias has 
directed the research in situations with groups with no high levels of 
animosity or with participants not highly involved In contexts that usually 
generate the expression of violence in real world settings. As a result 
these studies rarely deal with the expression of out-group derogation 
(Doosje, Branscombe, Spears and Manstead. 1998) and the emotional 
arousal that engenders the prospect of encounters with specific out-groups 
(Stephan & Stephan, 1984,1985; Stephan, Stephan and Gudykunst, 
1999) associated with conflict in real world conte)ds. 
There is also a misconception associated with Social Identity and Social 
Categorisation theories that there is a causal link between identification 
and discrimination without the consideration of contextual features (Turner, 
1999). It needs to be noted though that in-group favouritism is not always 
related to out-group derogation. This means that if the conflict reduction 
intervention aims at the reduction of in-group favouritism, this may not 
result in a more positive evaluation of the out-group (Mummendey, Simon, 
Dietze, Grunert, Haeger, Kessler, Lettgen and Schaferhoff, 1992; Otten, 
Mummendy and Blanz, 1996). In addition, stereotypes are not as rigid and 
stable as they are often assumed to be (Haslam, Oakes, Turner and 
McGarthy, 1995; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty and Hayes, 1992; 
Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty and Reynolds, 1998; Haslam, Turner, 
Oakes, Reynolds, Eggins, Nolan and Tweedie, 1998; Hopkins and 
Murdoch, 1999; Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994). This research 
suggests that the representation of the same group may be different 
depending on the way the relationship is perceived, the context and the 
dimensions of comparison. Stereotypes also involve more than a negative 
evaluation of an out-group. They involve a negative and a positive 
dimension in a sense that one cannot assume the absence of prejudice 
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relying on a positive evaluation of the out-group as this may be used to 
justify and perpetuate differences in a favour of a powerful group (Glick 
and Fiske, 2001). In this case, it is important to specify the conditions that 
make in-group favourifism relevant to out-group derogation. In-group 
favouritism will lead to inter-group discrimination if it is associated with a 
group position that reinforces a sense of moral superiority that it is used to 
justify and legitimise domination and discrimination (Brewer, 1999; 
Sidanius, 1993). Competition over scarce resources may be another 
situation where out-group hostility could be expected (Sherif, 1966). 
This chapter has so far presented a few thoughts about the phenomenon 
of inter-group conflict and the social psychological theories that attempted 
to shed light on the origins of conflicL The different perspectives 
emphasise different levels of explanation from intra4ndividual beliefs that 
are directly associated with conflicL perception of socio-structural factors 
that are likely to produce conflict and socio-cognitive processes that 
underlie the percepbon of the social world. The theories assume that the 
isolation of the factors that are responsible for the eruption of conflict will 
help to prevent and combat it. The issue of the reduction of conflict in 
social psychological research has been marked by the integration of the 
two prevalent theoretical traditions, the contact hypothesis (Ajlport, 1954; 
Amir, 1969; Pettigrew, 1998) and Social Categorisation Theory (Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 1987). 
The contact hypothesis (AJlport 1954; Amir, 1969; Pettigrew, 1998) was 
introduced early in the second half of the twentieth century to provide 
some answers to the important problem of racial discrimination in the 
United States. Having as a starting point the assumption that prejudice 
derives mainly from ignorance, the theory explored the idea that contact 
between people belonging to different groups can be very effective in 
reducing prejudice and discrimination. However, in order for contact to 
have its beneficial effects some key conditions should be satisfied. 
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More specifically. contact should occur under conditions of equal status 
between the groups, it should aim at the achievement of common goals 
under conditions of co-operation and personalised interaction. Finally, it 
should be sustained in duration and supported by laws and norms that 
reward co-operation and punish discrimination. If these conditions are not 
met then contact is more likely to increase rather reduce inter-group 
prejudice and discrimination. Generally, studies that have introduced face- 
to-face interaction between members of district groups demonstrated the 
positive association between contact and the reduction of prejudice. Most 
importantly, this reduction was generalised beyond the immediate conte)d 
of contact (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2000). 
The chapter further presents the conditions of ideal contact and discusses 
some limitations and criticisms that have been attracted. More specifically, 
personalised interaction enables self-disclosure, which in turn promotes 
trust and reduces anxiety that very often characterises inter-group settings 
(Stephan and Stephan, 1985). It also diminishes the anxiety that an inter- 
group situation would evoke (Liebkind, McAlister, 1999; Wright Aron, 
McLaughlin-Volpe and Ropp, 1977). It also promotes empathy, which may 
be generalised to the group as a whole (Batson, Polycarpou, Harmon- 
Jones, Imhoff, Mitchener, Bednar, KJein and Highberger, 1997). Contact at 
the interpersonal intimate level such as friendship was found to be 
associated with lower levels of prejudice (Pettigrew, 1997). However, the 
positive consequences of contact are more likely to be restricted to the 
specific setting or to the specific individuals without being generalised to 
the rest of the out-group. An exception to this may be the case that this 
relationship can serve as a positive example of more tolerant norms for 
interaction with out-group members. In addition, interaction at the 
personalised level that does not acknowledge status differences is unlikely 
to result in a reduction of bias. Indeed, members of rýninority groups 
showed more bias when the contact was personalised rather than task 
focused while the beneficial effects of personalised contact were restricted 
to majority groups (Bettencourt, Charlton and Kernaham, 1997). 
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As far as two of the other components of the ideal contact structure are 
concerned, research on the structure of interdependence between groups 
explores co-operation and goal achievement (Sherif, 1966). Co-operation 
even when the groups do not achieve their goals promotes more 
favourable inter-group relations (Worchel, Andreoli and Folger, 1977). 
However, co-operation and the achievement of common goals are likely to 
provoke a sedes of other issues. For example, when co-operation is 
followed by the acknowledgement of the distinct contribution of each group 
in important for one's identity dimensions is not very likely to result in 
reduction of prejudice and conflict (Deschamps and Brown, 1983). In 
addition, every form of co-operation involves the prospect of being 
exploited by the other and therefore it may make people reluctant to enter 
the relationship (Brewer, 2000a). Furthermore, if co-operation is not based 
on common identity it is more likely to result in more bias rather than 
prejudice reduction (Brewer, 1999.2000a). Again a common in-group 
identity may not always be desirable or may result in conflict at a different 
level (Mummendey and Schreiber, 1983). Moreover. real world situations 
are charactedsed by status differences that are difficult if not impossible to 
be ignored in order to structure the contact situation. In addition, status 
may be an issue of negotiation rather than an intrinsic characteristic of the 
conte)d (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2000; Reicher, 2003). As a result, status 
differences in the actual contact situation may not reflect objective status 
differences (Maoz, 2000). 
Finally, institutional mechanisms, norms and laws that specify the rules of 
proper conduct are important as long as they are accompanied by public 
support (Taylor, 2000). On the other hand, there may be institutions and 
organisations (i. e. army) that support and sustain segregation and conflict. 
Inter-group differences and discrimination against specific out-groups are 
often used by politicians to attract public votes or support certain policies 
(Larson, 1997). 
On the other hand, Social Identity Theory (Taifel, 1978; Taffel and Tumer, 
1979; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Turner, 1999) and Self Categorisation 
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Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 1987) traditions 
have highlighted the cognitive underpinnings of inter-group conflict shifting 
the emphasis to categorisation issues. The integration of these two 
traditions resulted in the emergence of the social categorisation models of 
reduction of prejudice. These models recognise the central role of social 
categorisation in creating, maintaining and reducing inter-group bias. They 
assume that it is possible in some contexts to improve inter-group relations 
by challenging the existing perception of inter-group boundaries. 
More specifically, contact may be able to reduce bias through a process of 
reducing the salience of inter-group boundaries that result in the 
individuation (Wilder, 1978,1986) or personalisation (Brewer and Miller, 
1984) of out-group members. If contact can obscure the inter-group 
distinction then individuation of the out-group members should occur that 
in turn reduces the tendency to differentiate towards the out-group. 
Individuation also increases empathy and perspective taking especially if 
the out-group members are seen as similar to the self (Wilder, 1978). 
Inter-group boundaries can also be abandoned in a way that members of 
the groups meet as individuals with no reference to their former category 
(Brewer and Miller, 1984). This renders group membership unimportant 
discouraging people from stereotypic or group-related information 
processing. As a result, former out-group members may be seen as more 
similar while in-group members may be seen as dissimilar to the self 
(Brewer, 1988; Brewer and Miller, 1984; Miller, 2002). De-categorisation 
does not necessarily imply a perceptual elimination of inter-group 
boundaries (Miller, 2002). Receiving information about multiple category 
memberships of the out-group member enables the unbiased and 
differentiated evaluation of group members. This de-categorisation model 
of prejudice reduction has received empirical support (Beftencourt, 
Brewer, Croack and Miller, 1992; Brewer and Miller, 1984,1988). 
Another example of blurring inter-group categorisation comes from the 
research into cross-categorisation. The cross categorisation model of bias 
reduction is based on a more realistic representation of the social context 
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and represents the idea that categorisation is more complex than a simple 
dichotomous division between in-groups and out-groups. Indeed, some 
group members may be part of the in-group according to one 
categorisation but part of the out-group according to another 
categorisation activated in the context at the same time (Deschamps & 
Doise, 1978). A problem with cross-categorisation is that even though 
multiple categorisations may be available in a given context it is difficult to 
avoid the domination of some types of categorisation over others (Crisp 
and Hewstone, 2001; Hewstone, Islam and Judd, 1993; Smith and 
Schneider, 2000). However, cross categorisation constitutes a very 
promising technique for the reduction of bias especially when its effects 
can be observed in contexts of protracted conflict where domination of a 
single emotionally charged dimension is more likely to occur (Crisp, 
Hewstone and Caims, 2001). 
Cross-categorisation leads to the reduction of bias because similarities 
within the common categories and differences between the different 
categories cancel each other out (Deschamps & Doise, 1978; Marcus- 
Newhall, Miller, Holtz and Brewer, 1993). Brown and Turner (1979) and 
Vanbeselaere (1987,1996) added a motivational interpretation of these 
results by arguing that cross categorisation would lead to the reducfion of 
prejudice provided that this does not threaten the positive evaluation of the 
in-group. However, research has not been consistent in supporting the 
relationship between cross categorisation and the reduction of bias 
(Mullen, Migdal and Hewstone, 2001). Cross or multiple identities will 
result in the reduction of prejudice depending on whether the identities 
lead to a representation of the social world as constituted by a greater 
number of exclusive categories or a representation of one inclusive 
category (Brewer, 1999; Crisp, Hewstone and Rubin, 2001). According to 
Brewer (1999) uncertainty about the in-group-out-group boundaries, 
psychological, economic or political threat or no satisfaction of the need for 
distinctiveness may result in an exclusive definition of categories. 
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An alternative strategy to the elimination of inter-group boundaries has 
been introduced by the re-categorisation model that supports the 
transformation of the boundaries between the categories In a way that 
former out-groups are incorporated into the in-group (Gaertner et al., 1993; 
Gaertner et al., 2000). Inter-group boundaries are very important as they 
define the group and draw a line between where one should expect co- 
operation, affection and empathy (Roccas and Brewer, 2002). 
Relationships within the groups, i. e. between the group members, are 
characterised by mutual obligation and trust (Brewer, 2000). Therefore, 
one should expect that by changing the status of the out-group members 
to in-group members the positive attitudes that characterise relationships 
within the groups would be automatically transferred to the former out- 
group members. Gaertner and his colleagues summarise these ideas in 
the Common In-group Identity Model of the reduction of prejudice 
(Gaertner et al., 1993,2000). In a series of experiments Gaertner and his 
collegues demonstrated that in the situation where participants perceived 
themselves as members of one group, in-group bias was reduced. These 
results have been also replicated outside the laboratory (Gaertner, Rust 
Dovidio, Bachman and Anstasio, 1994; Motola, Gaertner, Bachman and 
Dovidio, 1997). 
However, the formation of a super-ordinate category is not a panacea for 
the reduction of prejudice. Research has demonstrated that participants 
who were categorised exclusively at the super-ordinate level showed 
stronger identification with their sub-groups and higher levels of inter- 
subgroup bias than those that were categorised exclusively at the 
subgroup level (Hornsey and Hogg, 2000). Issues of distinctiveness and 
status differences were found to be related to this finding (Hornsey and 
Hogg, 2002). According to the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 
1991) categorisation at a more inclusive level of abstraction creates the 
need for differentiation and therefore leads toward categorisation at a less 
inclusive level. The same need that makes people assimilate towards a 
more inclusive category to cover their need for inclusion makes people 
seek distinctiveness when the new category becomes over-inclusive 
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(Brewer, 1991). Moreover, re-categorisation to a more inclusive level may 
reduce the conflict between the pre-eAsting groups but may also introduce 
a new inter-group conflict between the common in-group and a new out- 
group or even a conflict about the definition of the common identity 
(Kessler and Mummendey, 2001; Mummendey and Schreiber, 1983). 
Finally, outside the carefully formed laboratory groups in real world 
settings group identities are embedded with meaning that people are not 
necessarily Wiling to negotiate in order to identify at a more inclusive level. 
It has also been suggested that during inter-group contact, group 
membership must be salient in order for the effect of the contact to be 
generalised to the other out-group members (Hewstone, Carpenter, 
Franldyn-Stokes and Routh, 1994; Wilder, 1984,1986). In the case of a 
merger, Dovidio, Validzic and Gaertner (1998) found that reduction of bias 
followed only in the condition that groups were complementary and equally 
valued. When the unique contribution of the two groups is not recognised 
this is very likely to result in a threat to the subgroup identities. In this 
case, increased differentiation and derogation might be expected 
(Hewstone and Brown, 1986). Reduction of bias has also been observed 
in cases where different roles were assigned to the groups that 
participated in the study (Brown and Wade, 1987; Deschamps and Brown, 
1983). In addition, as a prerequisite for contact to manage to improve 
inter-group relations, both groups should experience success at the group 
level and at the same degree in the setting (Hewstone and Brown, 1986). 
Drawing on this, mutual differentiation model (Hewstone and Brown, 1986) 
supports the preservation and acknowiedgement of the sub-group 
categories and the perception of the out-group member as a typical 
member of the out-group as necessary components of the contact 
situation. This model overcomes the limitations of the re-categorisation 
model of prejudice reduction and also the limited scope of the de- 
individuation model that merely reflects inter-personal rather inter-group 
dynamics (Hewstone and Brown, 1986). Reference to the groups' distinct 
character and identity when inter-group contact takes place and 
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generalisation of the positive results achieved in the contact situation are 
the main concerns for the mutual inter-group differentiation model of 
reduction of prejudice. Therefore, the maintenance of subgroup 
boundaries is important 
However, in some cases group identities are defined exclusively in the 
sense that certain out-groups are seen as negatively interdependent with 
the In-group (Kelman, 1999). This perception precludes the harmonious 
and peaceful co-existence of the two groups. Therefore, the preservation 
of the sub-group identities is more likely to impede rather than facilitate 
contact and conflict reduction. In addition, in some cases relationships 
between groups imply a super-ordinate categodsation that defines the 
valued dimensions of the inter-group context according to which the sub- 
groups are evaluated (Hornsey and Hogg, 2000c, Hornsey and Hogg, 
2002). The dual identity model (Dovidio, Kawakami and Gaertner, 2000) 
merges the assumptions of the re-categorisation and mutual differentiation 
models suggesting that the most effective way to reduce prejudice is 
through the maintenance of the sub-group identities under the salience of 
a common categorisation at a more inclusive level. The common identity 
is responsible for the transference of positive attitudes to the former out- 
group members while the recognition of the sub-group identities leads to 
the generalisation of the positive attitudes beyond the contact situation. 
This model of contact may be more relevant to a group context where 
strong inter-group boundaries exist and is characterised by valued and 
fundamental aspects of identifies not likely to be abandoned. 
The last section of this chapter summarised the basic premises of the 
social categorisation models of reduction of prejudice. A further step of this 
review is to evaluate the appropriateness of these models in the study of 
international conflict. Generally, it seems that there is no agreement on 
which short of categorisation would produce the best results. There are 
also no suggestions of how one could produce a certain categorisation if 
the context is not so receptive for such a process to take place. As it will 
be argued in the next chapter, with few exceptions the categorisation 
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models of reduction of prejudice were designed to study actual contact 
between social groups within the same society. Some examples of 
research contexts include multicultural settings within a society Le. schools 
(Gaertner et al., 1994) and mergers of work groups in an organisational 
setting (Terry, Carey and Callan, 2001). In addition, a great part of the 
research has used artificial small groups (Brewer and Miller, 1984; 
Gaertner et al., 1990; Gaertner et al., 1998; Dovidio, Validzic and 
Gaertner, 1998; ). There is also research that has focused on the merging 
of two social groups within a society, i. e. the unification between East and 
West Germany (Mummendey, Mielke, Wenzel and Kanning, 1996). 
Identity dynamics and shifts in the categorical representation of the groups 
have been emphasised to the detriment of issues of perception of realistic 
or symbolic threats in inter-group relations. In addition, these theories have 
been developed to explain relationships between different groups within a 
society. They refer to social situations that apply in specific societies, 
mainly the USA, and they deal with issues of discrimination and prejudice 
within the context of a nation-state. There is a danger here of creating a 
universal group psychology where concepts, that were developed to 
explain phenomena bound up in a specific context, are used to explain 
different phenomena that occur in other societies. Often, social 
psychological concepts constitute a reification of social problems that 
occupy a certain society or context and their use in other contexts may be 
inappropriate (Moscovici, 1972). The following chapter will further discuss 
the categorisation models of reduction of prejudice in their application to 
the large-scale social settings that include relationships between nation- 
states. The purpose of this chapter will be to explore the key points of a 
social psychology of international relationships. 
f)Q 
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Chapter 3 
T he previous chapter presented the social psychological theories that 
have attempted to provide answers to issues of inter-group conflict 
and its resolution. Special emphasis has been given to the Contact 
Hypothesis and the Self-Categorisation models of reduction of prejudice 
that have dominated the research in social psychology. This chapter 
further discusses the appropriateness of the social psychological theories 
of reduction of prejudice and conflict in the context of international conflict. 
It begins with criticisms that contact and the categorisation models of 
reduction of prejudice have attracted and it argues that international 
conflict is a peculiar social phenomenon that its nature has not been 
adequately explored by the current social psychological theories of inter- 
group conflict. It further explores a framework of studying international 
conflict that links the way people understand themselves as members of a 
group in conjunction with theories about the social world and the 
understanding of the social structure within which they situate their group. 
More specifically, emotions related to perceptions of out-groups are 
extremely important. Research has demonstrated that even though people 
may accept the out-group at a cognitive level, they might still discriminate 
at a more emotional level (Sagy, Adwan and Kaplan, 2002). It has been 
suggested that although the cognitive recognition of the out-groups' rights 
was important in social policy related issues, willingness to engage in 
contact with members of the out-group was only related to affect (Esses 
and Dovidio, 2002). Therefore, research should focus on feelings that are 
associated with an out-group. Such an example is the anxiety that 
emanates from the prospect of an encounter with an out-group member 
(Stephan and Stephan, 1985). It should also focus on challenging the 
deeply entrenched and emotionally charged negative images about out- 
groups. 
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The recognition of the affective element of inter-group relations is 
important especially at the stage that precedes the actual contact. 
Research has been consistent in demonstrating the positive link between 
contact and the improvement of inter-group relations. However, what may 
be more difficult is to persuade two groups to engage in contact with each 
other. It is often assumed that two groups would be willing to enter a 
contact situation no matter what is the history of their relationship or the 
limitations of their present situation. On the other hand, research and 
interventions have focused on the structure of the contact situation. 
However, in many cases contact requires the members of different groups 
to overcome an)dety and fear that may engender the prospect of engaging 
in contact with specific out-groups (Brewer, 1999,2000; Hewstone and 
Brown, 1986; Islam and Hewstone, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 1985; 
Stephan, Ybarra and Bachman, 1999). This is very important especially in 
real world settings where strong negative feelings and stereotypes are 
associated with specific out-groups. 
A contact situation may trigger a range of threats (Stephan & Stephan, 
2000). These may include threats to the very existence of the in-group, its 
political and economic power and the physical well being of its members. 
On the other hand, there are symbolic threats that may arise because of 
perceived group differences in values, beliefs and norms. In other cases, 
perceptions of similarity may constitute a threat, which prompts the need 
for differentiation (Henderson-King et al., 1997; Jeften et al., 1996,1998; 
Roccas and Schwartz, 1993). It has been suggested that the perception of 
threat in a context can explain why some motives i. e. the need for 
distinctiveness may lead to destructive conflict in some cases but are 
satisfied with more peaceful strategies in others (Hornsey and Hogg, 
2000c). Whether based on objective or symbolic reasons, the nature of 
these threats is very likely to hinder contact. Thus, the necessity arises to 
develop ways to deal with this threat in order for contact to occur and to 
improve the relationship. 
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As it was explained in the previous chapter, contact manages to improve 
inter-group relationships because it changes perceptions of the 
boundaries between groups. However, in some contexts in-group identity 
may be defined on the basis of the differentiation and exclusion of specific 
others. In these situations the out-group is often thought not to have a 
right of e)dstence (Kelman, 1999; Triandafyllidou, 1998). Another 
phenomenon that is associated vAth situations of protracted inter-group 
conflict is that the out-group is stripped of its human nature (Bar-Tal, 1989; 
Leyens, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, Gaunt Paladino, Vaes and 
Demoulin, 2001). Protracted conflicts are also enduring because they 
penetrate everyday life including politics, education, media and 
intellectuals. Conflict related events are central in everyday life and they 
become salient in public discussions, they concern violent events and the 
differences between the parties involved are seen as incompatible 
(Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998). In these situations, a categorisation process 
that could trigger identification at a common level of inclusiveness is more 
likely to be undesirable. 
Furthermore, if threat constitutes an obstacle of a successful inter-group 
contact, in some case it can become a central part of a relationship. 
Indeed, in contexts characterised with long-lasting conflict most of all, 
distrust has to be overcome In order for any contact, co-operation and 
resolution to occur and have the desired effects. The out-group often is 
seen as having threatening intentions against one's own group. People in 
a society characterised by intractable conflict engage in a process of 
understanding the situation in order to reduce uncertainty. This will result 
in theories and beliefs about the eruption of conflict attribution of 
responsibilities, and evaluations of the intentions of the out-group (Bar-Tal, 
2000). Distrust in these occasions satisfies the need for uncertainty 
reduction. Distrust in turn is associated with certain practises that 
emphasise security. Increased arm expenditures, failure to reach 
agreements because of the disbelief in the motives of others, constant 
monitoring and vigilance can be observed in the whole society (Larson, 
1997). A process that would turn distrust into trust in this context is very 
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likely to be rewarding. Therefore research should focus on the conditions 
that could turn distrust to trust in a conte)d characterised by intractable 
conflict. 
In addition, not all the activities, which in the research are defined as 
contact situations, contain actual inter-group interaction (Maoz, 2002). 
Most importantly, traditional contact paradigms seem to have stripped the 
contact context of the historical and cultural dimension, the power 
dynamics, identity clashes that may take place, and any competition over 
tangible issues that are important as they often objectify the dispute 
(Bekerman, 2002). Dixon and Durrheirn (2003) have suggested that rather 
than focusing on how the ideal conditions would be structured in order for 
contact to occur, it may be more informative to focus on the processes 
through which boundaries that restrain contact are maintained. 
Finally, although the research conducted within the categorisation models 
of reduction of prejudice has been prx)mising, these models have been 
designed to assess situations of actual contact between groups. They do 
not make predictions about non-contact situations (Homsey and Hogg, 
2001). However, immediate contact as it has been designed and 
measured in most of the studies conducted within this tradition (Pettigrew 
and Tropp, 2000) is not very likely to occur when one considers large- 
scale social groups such as nation-states. As a result research and 
interventions that have concentrated a lot on the engineering of the ideal 
contact situation may not always reflect a realistic inter-group setting. 
Apart from the fact that contact may not be a relevant concept for an 
international context, the conditions that precede contact should be taken 
into consideration. 
On the other hand, it seems that the social categodsation models of 
reduction of prejudice do not account for all processes that operate in the 
social world. Without undermining the importance of the social 
psychological processes such as categorisation, research should focus on 
more contextual variables that are responsible for variation in different 
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situations. Beyond symbolic issues of identity and categorisation, research 
should reconsider the study of the context these processes operate. This 
context is often characterised by competition over scarce resources, land 
disputes, violations of treaties etc. As it has been shown in the previous 
chapter, earlier functional inter-group relations theories (Deutsch, 1973, 
2000; Sherif, 1966; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood and Sherif, 1961; Sherif 
and Sherif, 1979) have associated the emergence of conflict with 
competition over objective matters. Such objective issues are very 
important because they are very tangible and can provide an easily 
accessible justification for conflict. However, the relationship between 
objective issues and the occurrence of conflict is not a linear one. The 
existence of competition over scarce resources in a context is not always 
2SSOCi2ted with long term destructive conflict. There 2re a few issues th2t 
have been addressed in relation to this. 
The first issue refers to the history of inter-group relations in a certain 
context. The history of groups is often intertwined. Their relationship may 
change over time. Often a group's identity is defined in opposition to 
specific out-groups (Kelman, 1999; Triandatyllidou, 1998). History is 
written and reproduced through collective processes that strengthen the 
identity of the group. In these accounts, the presence of an out-group may 
have attained the status of a group with hostile intentions towards the in- 
group and that aims to appropriate the limited resources (Esses, Jackson 
and Armstrong, 1998; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson and Armstrong, 2001). 
More specifically, conflicts can be seen as part of a historical process that 
creates a relationship of hostility between two parties. Actions that happen 
in the present can not be seen in isolation without the reference to what 
has happened in the past (Thompson, 2001). Certain out-groups are often 
associated with negative feelings and beliefs. Often, the exclusion of these 
groups constitutes a vital way of defining the self. People are socialised in 
these beliefs. These beliefs become socially shared reality for the group 
members. Thus, the historical context should be taken more into 
consideration when analysing inter-group relations (Bar-Tal, 2000). 
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The second issue that links Oobjective" reasons and conflict is the 
perception of exclusive rights over certain resources and privileges by the 
in-group. Competition over scarce resources and historically constructed 
competitors should be seen in conjunction with a belief that the 
exploitation of these resources is the exclusive right of the in-group 
(Blumer, 1958). This may be the case when one positions one's own 
group as hierarchically superior to others because of its advantage over 
relevant dimensions. This sense of superiority encourages the view of the 
other as different and alien and produces a sense of exclusive access and 
appropriation of certain rights and resources for the in-group. The other is 
very likely to be seen as a threat if they are perceived as challenging the 
dominant groups' exclusive rights to these resources (Bobo, 1998; 1999; 
Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). 
Implicit in this idea is that discrimination and conflict are understood as 
reflecting the positioning of the in-group within the network of inter-group 
relations and the consequences that this might have. According to Blumer 
(1958) prejudice should be understood as a general attitude that involves 
normative ideas about the position of the in-group within the social 
structure in relation to the position of other groups. The sense of one's 
group positioning in the group hierarchy develops as a result of a long- 
term social and historical process of exchange and dissemination of 
shared ideas about where the in-grx)up should stand in the social order 
relative to other groups (Blumer, 1958). There is evidence that realistic 
threat was associated with negative attitudes expressed from the majority 
to the minority group but not from the minority to majority (Corenblurn and 
Stephan, 2001; Stephan, Diaz-Loving and Duran, 2000). Thus, the 
position that a group is situated within the societal hierarchy plays an 
important role in inter-group relations. 
A consequence of acknowledging the importance of the group positioning 
would be to study the way group positions are formed in society and how 
these might influence the perception of the other. Groups are located in a 
network of inter-group relations. This results in variations between groups 
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in terms of status and power (Hogg, 2001; Tan and Moghaddan, 1999; 
Taylor and Moghaddan, 1994). The positioning of a group with respect to 
all other groups has important consequences for the way people 
understand the social world. Positioning in the network of intemational 
relations implies inequalities in terms of status and/or power. Equal status 
on the other hand constitutes one of the key components that may 
determine the successful outcome of a contact venture. Inside the well- 
controlled laboratory environment it might be easy to create conditions of 
equal status and test their effects on inter-group relations. However, power 
and status differences are inherent in the social world and difficult to be 
omitted. Social psychology has repeatedly stressed the importance of 
considering power differentials in the study of inter-group phenomena. 
With few exceptions (Bourhis, 1994; Deschamps, 1982; Ng, 1982; 
Reicher, 2003; Sachdev and Bourhis, 1984,1985,1987,1991) power has 
been neglected in the study of inter-group relations. This is important 
when one considers the evidence that processes of discrimination are 
associated with dominant groups that want to secure their threatened 
position (Reynolds and Turner, 2001). Power needs to be taken into 
consideration in inter-group relations as a quality that positions groups 
within a network of relationships. The category "nation" creates a certain 
subject position for the people belonging to it. This position objectifies the 
power relationships at a specific point in time (Chryssochoou, 2000). 1n 
addition, what should also be explored is peoples! understanding of power 
differentials, the meaning of power and their lay theories of what power 
does. 
Conflict should also be studied as a type of relationship that binds the 
parties producing certain categodes such as enemies and allies, 
perpetrators and victims. It is important to explore how members of social 
groups that are involved in a conflict define themselves and others. In 
addition, it is important to investigate the key aspects of the relationship. 
These may include attdbutions of responsibilities, perceptions of 
interdependence, images of their group and the out-group. The content of 
these representations could be shaped by structural factors such as power 
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differences and the history of the relationship over time. In addition, 
relationships between large-scale social groups such as nation-states 
cannot be restricted in the study of the perceptions of the individuals that 
belong to them. Nation-states are complex entities and they are 
represented by two distinct parts, the state and the people (Bum and 
Oskamp, 1989; Staerkle, Clemence and Doise, 1998). Enemy images 
often produce representations of people as being dominated and 
manipulated by authoritarian governments. These images are important 
and they have provided justifications for military interventions world wide 
(Alexander, Brewer and Herrmann, 1999). 
Although conflicts are associated with a specific event that signifies their 
outbreak, usually these events constitute the culmination of a long-term 
process of communication of hostility and a construction of a zero-sum 
relationship between two groups. Thus, conflicts are part of a historical 
process in which a pair of rivals create and sustain a relationship for some 
period of time. Conflicts of this type are very particular in the sense that 
the context in which they occur is psychologically charged in ways that are 
not necessarily present in other contexts (Thompson, 2001). Therefore 
conflicts cannot be studied outside the context they occur by employing 
participants that do not experience its reality. By assuming that every 
context could produce similar phenomena one runs the risk of constructing 
a universal theory that dismisses the particularities of a specific historical 
context and the different meanings that this may create to the members of 
the society. There is also a danger of applying concepts that have been 
used to explain the problems related to a certain society in a context that 
requires a different approach (Moscovici, 1972). In addition, it is not likely 
to observe a coherent representation of a phenomenon in a context that 
people have not been introduced with it (Wagner, Valencia and 
Elejabarrieta, 1996). 
Another issue that needs to be taken into consideration when one 
attempts to approach a complex socio-psychological issue such as 
international conflict, is the construction and appropriation of social 
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categories. The use of categories without the reference to the processes 
and dynamics that enable them to impose themselves in everyday 
discourse embodies the danger of taking the nature of social categories 
for granted (Chryssochoou, 2000; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). It has 
been suggested that the formation of categories is the process of 
objectification of abstract social relations into concrete and meaningful 
categories (Chryssochoou, 2000). In this sense, the division of the world 
into nation-states refers to the translation of the power relations that were 
established when the notion of nation-state emerged. Categorisation 
implies a whole theory that gives meaning to the category nation and 
validates ideas related to it. Attitudes and stereotypes toward social 
objects or practices presuppose a whole body of images and ideas that 
make their manifestation possible and acceptable. For example, there 
would not be prejudice against black people if there was no theory that 
accepts the differentiation along arbitrary chosen categorisations (e. g. 
colour or ethnic origin) as a valid way to explain human nature 
(Chryssochoou 2004; Moscovici and Perez, 1997; Moscovici and 
Hewstone, 1983; Murphy and Medin, 1987). In a similar way, a 
representation of the world of nations presupposes a theory of what is a 
nation, how nation states are related and how conflict emerges. Therefore 
research should aim to access these theories that validate people's 
attitudes and stereotypes. 
Theory and research has sought to investigate the way that people 
organise their knowledge about the social wodd (Heider, 1958; Hong, Levy 
and Chiu, 2001; Kruglanski, 1990; Lickel, Hamilton and Sherman, 2001; 
Nisbeft and Ross, 1980). These theodes have received different names 
i. e. "nalfve" (Heider, 1958), "intuitivew (Lickel and Hamilton, 2001), "lay" 
(Hong, Levy and Chiu, 2001; Kruglanski, 1990). In these theodes, the 
individual is generally viewed as a naYve scientist that struggles to apply 
scientifically valid criteda in his or her everyday experience and 
understand the social wodd. However, not only do these approaches 
consider lay knowledge as false, biased and inconsistent but also 
disregard the fact that what is needed is an approach that moves from the 
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study of perceptions as being a property of the individual to the study of 
the ideas that are shared by the members of a society (Moscovici and 
Hewstone, 1983). Although early research acknowledges the context 
dependent nature of attributions as constructions that serve the attainment 
of a stable and consistent environment, these approaches undermine the 
link between the individual and the social. What is needed is an approach 
that links cognitive processes with relationships in the social world and the 
understanding of the social structure (Taylor, 1999). The study of common 
frames of reference needs to merge the personal and social levels that 
other approaches have neglected. 
Social representation theory does precisely that by emphasising the need 
to investigate the social system of regulations that generate particular 
cognitive processes (Moscovici, 196111976; Clemence, 2001; Dolse, 
1993). Social representations are theories of common sense (Clemence, 
2001) therefore the main aim of the research on social representations 
theory has been to explore how people come to understand the social 
world by constructing common sense theories and capturing local 
knowledge in modem societies (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983; Wagner, 
1997). This theory suggests that what is important in the first place is why 
a certain social object becomes relevant for a group. In other words the 
question for Social Representations Theory is which social regulations 
influence particular cognitive processes at a specific context (Clemence, 
2001; Lorenzi-Cioldi and Clemence, 2001). The attempts to approach lay 
theories that were cited above have shed light on the cognitive processes 
that operate in a specific context and make people understand the 
situation. However, what is missing from this picture is why the specific 
situation attracted the attention at the first place. 
The study of social representations was inaugurated with the seminal work 
of Moscovici (1961/1976) who studied the diffusion and integration of 
psychoanalysis in the everyday discourse. The way that scientific 
knowledge becomes common sense knowledge constitutes one of the 
three main fields of research in social representations (Wagner, 1994). 
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There is also a body of research that focuses on social objects such as 
sex-roles, women, mothers, illness, madness (e. g. Herzlich, 1973; Jodelet, 
1991) emphasising their socially constructed nature. Social objects are 
studied according to their relevance to the social subjects within a certain 
context. They signify the familiar aspects of the world within this context 
giving the social subjects a sense of belonging to a specific culture. 
Social representations approach has been also used in the study of social 
and political situations and events. The work of Doise and his colleagues 
on the organising principles of human rights (Doise, Spini and Clemence, 
1999; Spini and Doise, 1998; Staerkle, Clemence and Doise, 1998) is an 
example of this line of research. Knowledge about situations happening in 
the world is disseminated through media and makes people at least in the 
western world "experr political scientists (Wagner, 1997; Staerkle, 
Clemence and Doise, 1998). People are often asked to provide their 
accounts about political situations and they also spontaneously talk about 
political issues in their social interactions. Access to the collective 
knowledge about political conditions and the social structure provides an 
understanding of what guides collective thinking and mobilises groups. 
Therefore, social representations theory seems to be appropriate to the 
study of lay theories of international conflict. 
The construction of theories of common sense has several functions. The 
main function of social representations is to make the unfamiliar familiar, 
enabling people to achieve a common understanding of the world that is 
necessary for communication to take place. Often people and groups face 
a change in their everyday routine and reality or a new and disrupting 
phenomenon endangers established practices and becomes potentially 
threatening for the group. In other cases, new abstract terms and notions 
diffused by the media enter the everyday discourse. Social 
representations theory assumes that people in the Western societies are 
motivated to eliminate unfamiliar and threatening information and establish 
causality and are ready to attribute events to vague, abstract or even 
usupra-social" causes. Social representations will be elaborated as a 
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means to cope with the unfamiliar and threatening situation resulting in an 
array of available explanations in a context. These representations define 
what explanations can be valid and rational for a group (Moscovici and 
Hewstone, 1983; Wagner, 1997). 
In addition, social representations define the kind of actions that should be 
expected in a context while they exclude others. Actions need to be 
justified and justifications have to be drawn from what seems rational to 
the group (Wagner, 1997). In relation to this, social representations 
explain what binds people together in a group. People would not be able 
to form groups, and follow common rules without a system of beliefs and 
common representations (Moscovici, 2001). Because social 
representations act as implicit self-definitions for groups (Wagner, 1997; 
Breakwell, 1993) knowing the social representations that exist in a context 
give important information about what motivates a group and makes 
people act together. 
These ideas are summarised in the following definition of social 
representations: 
... systems of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function: first, to 
establish an order which will enable individuals to orient themselves in their 
material and social world and master it; and secondly to enable 
communication to take place among the members of a community by 
providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and 
classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their worlds and their 
individual and group history (Moscovici, 1973). 
The social nature of the social representations is certified by the fact that 
they are shared within a society or culture but they are also the result of 
processes of elaboration, communication and diffusion of social 
knowledge that takes place in public (Chryssochoou, 2003; Moscovici, 
1961/1976). The fact that social representations are shared does not 
mean that people in a society have the same social representations. 
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People share the principles that organise common sense knowledge. On 
the other hand, the theory maintains that people hold different positions as 
regards to common knowledge (Clemence, 2001). 
To understand how social thinking operates the theory suggests that along 
with the operation of the cognitive system that performs categorisations, 
associations, deductions etc there is a second system, a meta-system, at 
work that controls and verifies the operation of the cognitive system by 
means of rules. These rules are bound to a specific societal and cultural 
environment (Moscovici, 1961/1976; Clemence, 2001; Doise, 1993; 
Lorenzi-Cioldi and Clemence, 2001). The existence of the meta-system 
explains why some information attracts more significance, poses as 
threatening and asks for clarification more than others in a certain context 
(Lorenzi-Cioldi and Clemence, 2001). In other words, it explains why and 
when the general cognitive principles are activated and applied in a certain 
context. 
The operation of the meta-system is associated with two processes: 
objectification and anchoring (Doise, 1993; Clemence, 2001; Moscovici, 
1976; Wagner, Elejabarrieta and Lahnsteiner, 1995). Objectificaton Is a 
process by which new, threatening or abstract objects are transformed to 
less threatening objects and become part of everyday discourse and 
thinking. It consists of the re-framing of the new or abstract entity in 
familiar terms. The process concretises the abstract ideas and results in a 
dictionary of shared meanings that serve as common points of reference 
in a social context. Objectification isolates concepts and constructs from 
the network of social relationships it originated from and ideas become 
detached from their social sources (Doise, 1993, Wagner, ElejabarTieta 
and Lahnsteiner, 1995). Although different theories have been proposed 
(Abric, 1993,2001) the dynamic approach maintains that social 
representations form different and contrasted meanings and people's 
content of knowledge consists of the network of these variations 
(Clemence, 2001; Doise, Clemence and Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Lorenzi- 
Cioldi and Clemence, 2001). 
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Anchoring is a process by which the members of a group in their aftempt 
to make sense of a new phenomenon integrate it into pre-existing 
knowledge, beliefs and thought. Thus, the unclassified, unfamiliar and 
therefore threatening phenomena are anchored in familiar and already 
existing frameworks. New knowledge may be anchored in previous beliefs 
and values (psychological anchoring), social memberships (sociological 
anchoring) and the understanding of social relationships (socio- 
psychological anchoring). The anchoring process explains how groups 
with different belief systems arrive at different explanations for threatening 
and unfamiliar events (Doise, Clemence and Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Spini 
and Doise, 1998). 
Doise, Clemence and Lorenzi-Cioldi (1993) have proposed a theoretical 
framework for the study of social representations. This involves the study 
of the representational field or the common reference points that are 
assumed to be shared amongst the members of a society. The framework 
assumes that individuals differ in terms of their adherence and support of 
aspects of the social representations and these differences are organised. 
In addition, these organised differences derive from the anchoring of social 
representations in related systems of symbolic meaning, personal 
experiences and beliefs about social reality (Clemence, 2001; Doise, 
1986; Lorenzi-Cioldi & Doise, 1990). 
The study of the representational field or the common reference points 
that result from the objectification process involves the investigation of the 
way the representations are defined, structured and objectified by people 
in a certain context. What renders an object social is the fact that is 
relevant or it is shared by a collectivity (Wagner, 1997). The main aim of 
the study of the representational field is to show the way a social object or 
practice has become relevant for a group that shares it in a certain 
context. An important phase of the study of the social representation will 
be the search of a common organisation. 
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It is also important to know not only the shared aspects of the 
representations but also how certain aspects of it become more important 
for some groups, i. e. social positioning (Lorenzi-Cioldi and Clemence, 
2001). Social positioning is the process by which people situate 
themselves within a network of organised and shared meanings. Social 
positioning accounts for the appropriation of certain elements of the 
representation by specific groups. As noted earlier, the differences 
observed between individuals in their endorsement of various aspects of 
the representation are organised. The organising principles of inter- 
individual differences account for differences in the importance people 
attach to the various aspects of social representations. The objective of 
this level of analysis is to reveal the principles according to which meaning 
is given by the participants and where the participants are positioned in 
the overall map (Clemence, 2001; Lorenzi-Cioldi and Clemence, 2001). 
The study of organising principles helps to overcome the criticism that the 
theory of social representations is context specific as the same organising 
principles are assumed to be present in other relevant social 
representations (Spini and Doise, 1998). 
Furthermore, at the heart of the generation of social representations lies 
the concept of themata (Markova, 2000; Moscovici and Vigneaux, 2000). 
"Themata constitute oppositional taxonomies that in the course of history 
became problematised and entered the domain of public discourse 
enabling processes of social influence and communication to take place* 
(Markova, 2000, p. 446). Thernata are capable of translating threatening 
and unfamiliar images in the social worid into familiar language. Some of 
these thernata are essential in social life such as freedom/oppression, 
justice/injustice etc. 
Markova (2000) uses the taxonomy edible/inedible to illustrate this. She 
argues that eating habits demonstrate that the existence of an oppositional 
taxonomy edible/inedible is basic in everyday life. Religious beliefs and 
cultural habits might influence the content of what can be eaten or not. As 
a result some cultures may not eat pets whereas for others this is 
34 
acceptable and natural. When this taxonomy becomes problematised, i. e. 
when a crisis is introduced the boundaries of this taxonomy are likely to 
change. For example, the Omad cow diseasen, the Chernobyl disaster, 
pollution of animal food can change what comes under"edible" and 
"inediblem. Furthermore, public discussions may render this taxonomy as a 
thema capable to generate or change relevant social representations. As it 
will be illustrated in the next chapter, trust/distrust is essential for the 
maintenance of the social structure (Garfinkel, 1984; Lewis and Weigert, 
1985; Luhmann, 1979,1988,2000). Thus, it can be argued that it is an 
essential therna in social relations through which changes are precipitated 
in the representation of the relationship. 
A final step of the research is the analysis of the anchoring of the inter- 
individual differences in other systems of symbolic relationships. Social 
psychological anchoring refers to the study of the social history of 
individuals and groups and it aims at establishing links between positions 
and the personal characteristics of respondents (Clemence, 2001', 
Lorenzi-Cioldi and Clemence, 2001; Spini and Doise, 1998). There are 
three types of anchoring that can be analysed (Doise 1993; Wagner 
1995). The study of individual positioning in the form of attitudes and 
values constitutes the psychological anchoring. Socio-psychological 
anchoring focuses on the way people understand the social structure and 
the relations between social groups within this structure. Finally, 
sociological analysis refers to memberships and affiliations that individuals 
have as well as to peoples' shared social relations and experiences. The 
consideration of the social economic status, political affiliations and 
cultural differences refers to this level. 
This thesis set out to explore a study of international conflict. The chapter 
started with the presentation of the limitations of the contact hypothesis 
and self-categorisation models of the reduction of prejudice in explaining 
international conflict reduction. It has been further argued that a series of 
issues have to be taken into consideration in the study of international 
conflict. To summarise these points we could say that, first of all, one 
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needs to look at the lay theories that people have. More specifically, it was 
argued here that attitudes and stereotypes towards certain social objects 
reflect a whole theory that validates their use, i. e. make them suitable for 
explaining social phenomena and constitute valid building blocks of the 
construction of social reality. In order to understand their use and 
meaning, one needs to look at the theories that produce them. By evoking 
the category "nabon* without referring to the theory of nationhood that 
circulates in a specific context there is a danger of reifying this category. In 
addition the meaning of the category would differ depending on the 
historical processes of communication and influence in a specific context. 
This chapter emphasised the need to explore conceptual and empirical 
tools that will help us to understand international conflict. Rather than 
applying frameworks that reflect the problems and the needs of other 
settings, this research aimed to understand categories as they were 
appropriated by people in a specific context. The main objective was to 
investigate the meaning of international conflict as it was objectified and 
appropriated by the people in this context. For this reason, the research 
investigates the Greek and Turkish relationship. As it will be illustrated in 
chapter 5, Turkey constitutes a historical enemy for the Greeks. Although 
the two countries are not in a situation of conflict, there are issues in this 
relationship that make it an interesting context to study international 
conflict. 
This chapter has also suggested that research should take into 
consideration the way people understand the position of their group within 
the inter-group structure. Groups develop a theory of where they stand 
Within the inter-group structure and this has implications for the way they 
perceive the world and their relationships with others. This sense of 
positioning is suggested to shape one's understanding of the social world, 
to identify enemies and allies, to attribute intentions and establish the 
nature of inter-group relations. Therefore, the research presented here 
also looks at different national group memberships as a possible anchor of 
variations in the representations of conflict. 
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A consequence of the in-group positioning is the use of relevant 
dimensions to position the groups including the ingroup in the hierarchical 
structure. Such a dimension is power. The way people understand power 
differences shapes their understanding of the wodd. Therefore, power 
differences are also taken into consideration in this research. The 
representation of international conflict is as a specific type of relationship, 
the representation includes actors and types of interdependence between 
them. These may involve issues of attribution of respon sibi lite s, 
evaluations about the future of a relationship, win-lose mentality, third 
parties' involvement, intentions and motivations of the parties involved. 
The representation of conflict is expected to be anchored in the way 
people understand social relationships in terms of power. 
Although conflicts are associated with a specific event that signifies the 
outbreak of the conflict this event usually constitutes the culmination of a 
long term process of communication of hostility and the construction of a 
specific relationship in zero-sum terms. Conflicts are part of a historical 
process in which a pair of rivals create and sustain a relationship for some 
period of time. Conflicts of this type are very peculiar in the sense that the 
context they occur is psychologically charged in ways that are not 
necessarily present in other conflicts (Thompson, 2001). 
Research often neglects the long term nature of the range of real life 
conflicts that result in certain beliefs and mentality that filters the 
perception of the world while at the same time establishing specific 
relationships and roles i. e. enemies, victim-perpetrator. It is important to 
see how the duration of the conflict shapes the representation of the 
conflict and the parties that are implicated in the conflict, as well as the 
practices that the specific context enables. 
A society that is penetrated by intractable conflict is characterised by a 
process that makes conflict a central topic in everyday conversation. The 
more intense and durable the conflict, the more relevant it becomes to the 
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society members. People try to explain the situation, to provide accounts 
for the eruption of conflict, assign responsibility and question the intentions 
of the out-group. In addition, it is expected that in a society that is 
convulsed by long-lasting conflict, beliefs have been formed that apply to 
the situation (Bal-Tar, 2001). When a conflict lasts for many years, there is 
a considerable accumulation of animosity, hatred and prejudice. Collective 
memory is imprinted by events related to the conflict cultural products 
reflect the antagonistic sentiment, beliefs related to the conflict become 
part of the societal beliefs, and members of the society are socialised in a 
conflict reality. 
In addition, this chapter emphasised that before two parties enter a 
contact situation they should overcome the negative feelings and the 
anxiety that such a prospect poses and also recognise that they can co- 
exist peacefully. One should expect that in a context of protracted conflict 
distrust emerges as a way to deal with the uncertainty and the unfamiliarity 
of the conflict situation. When conflict becomes part of everyday reality 
distrust is taken for granted and it further serves as justification for the 
perpetuation of the relationship of conflict and the consideration of the 
other as an enemy. If distrust constitutes a central element of the conflict 
relationship it follows that it is important to explore its nature and the 
possible anchors in personal and societal beliefs, memberships and 
attachments as well as the understanding of social relationships. This will 
enable one to understand the processes that could turn distrust into trust 
and facilitate contact and conflict resolution. A great part of this research 
concerns the development of a theoretical and empirical approach of the 
study of trust in international conflict. In the next chapter, a review of the 
literature on trust across disciplines will be provided and its relevance in 
the context of inter-group conflict will be discussed. Insights emerging from 
the introduction of trust within the social psychological literature of inter- 
group conflict Vill be translated in empirical research in the following 
chapters. 
38 
Chapter 4 
T he previous chapter presented international conflict as a particular type 
of inter-group relationship and emphasised the power relations, the 
historical dimension and the theories that give meaning to these elements as 
key aspects in an attempt to understand and explore international conflict. It 
further introduced the importance of trust in the process of conflict resolution 
in a sphere that lies before and beyond a contact situation. 
This chapter aims to explore the concept of trust/distrust drawing on 
conceptual isations offered by different disciplines including political, economic 
and social sciences, philosophy, interpersonal and organisational psychology. 
It argues that trust is context specific and emphasises the need to 
conceptualise trust in relation to distrust. This chapter further theorises trust in 
the context of international relationships as they have been explored in 
chapter 3. Along with the literature on trust, it is argued that questions of trust 
and distrust are extremely relevant in a relationship because they contribute 
to the stability of the world. Furthermore, trust and distrust become very 
important, especially in situations where the world as known is challenged. As 
it is argued in chapter 3, new concepts, ideas and phenomena invite a 
common process of making sense of the unfamiliar and threatening and 
integrating it into the common sense. Trust and distrust are further discussed 
as central in this process. 
Trust has been regarded as a relevant concept in contact contexts where 
people interact and depend on each other. Trust is thought to be an essential 
component of social relationships. It applies to a range of relationships from a 
therapist-client (Seeman, 1954) to a family, spouse or a romantic relationship 
(Baldwin, Kalhorn, & Breese, 1945; Rempel, Holmes and Zanna, 1985; 
Rotter, 1971; Willig, 1997) and relations at work place (Butler, 1983,1999; 
Tyler and Degoey, 1996). Trust also emerges when different groups of people 
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need to be co-ordinated for the achievement of common goals. In this 
context, understanding trust is important to promote co-operation. 
Management at the workplace organisational mergers and co-ordination of 
different teams are areas in which trust is often discussed (Brewer, 2000; 
Kramer, 1999; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer, 1998). Trust is so 
essential in relationships that some authors have proposed that the levels of 
trust in a relationship in conjunction to the type of interdependence can 
determine the type of relationship, i. e. co-operative or competitive (Lewicki & 
McAllister, 1998; Lewicki and Wiethoff, 2000). A relationship based on trust is 
generally thought to be rewarding because of the opportunities for self- 
disclosure and the personal development it offers (Erikson, 1963; Rempel, 
Holmes and Zanna, 1985). 
Trust can also be extended to more abstract parts of the social world such as 
institutions and collective entities that people are related to in multiple ways. 
Such examples are trust in health care system (Anderson & Dedrick, 1990; 
Hillman, 1998), organisations, governments and the political system 
(Markova, 2001; Mishler and Rose, 2001) and political behaviour (Dunn, 
1988; Hetherington, 1998; Craig, Niemi, Silver, 1990), centres of decision 
making (Frewer, Howard, Hedderley, and Shepherd, 1996; Slovic, 1993), 
environmental risk (Flynn, Bums, Mertz and Slovic, 1992; Johnson, 1999), 
factories, certain brands, travel agencies etc. An important aspect of these 
entities is the extent to which their stability can be taken for granted when one 
interacts with them or when their actions are crucial to the self. Trust can also 
involve experience with the impersonal world such as reliance on machines 
and automation systems (Lee and Moray, 1992,1994; Sheridan and 
Hennessy, 1984), However, others have argued that trust is always placed on 
the responsibility and competence of people behind the impersonal entities 
(Sztompka, 1999). Certain roles also generate trust as they reinforce 
expectations of competence, responsibility and stability from those associated 
with these roles (Barber, 1983). Trust has been also considered relevant in 
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social dilemmas where often personal and social interests collide (De Cremer 
and Stouten, 2001; Kramer and Brewer, 1984; Yamagishi and Sato, 1986). 
Trust refers to an orientation towards or expectations about the future. Other 
concepts that are relevant in this context are hope and confidence 
(Sztompka, 1999). The difference between these concepts is that confidence 
and hope do not require the person to choose between available options. 
Most importantly, in the case of confidence one does not afford the possibility 
of alternative actions, e. g. for someone to go out of the house expecting that 
other people will be aggressive and attack him or her. The absence of 
alternative options make confidence and hope rather passive orientations 
towards life and therefore the attribution of blame in the case of 
disappointment will be the others and not the self (Barbalet, 1996; Luhmann, 
1988). On the other hand, trust requires active involvement, commitment and 
choice from a range of alternatives of actions. Therefore, the source of 
disappointment will be the self (Luhmann, 1988). However, not all languages 
differentiate between the two. For example, in the Greek language there are 
no different words that express confidence and trust. This could be because 
the difference between the two, while subtle, is not necessary in order to 
conduct day-to-day life. 
Trust has been extensively studied as an individual disposition that organises 
the understanding of the social environment and underlies the development 
of a healthy personality (Couch, & Jones, 1997; Erikson, 1963,1968). Trust 
as a personality variable constitutes a general belief about the good nature of 
the others (Dawes, 1980; de Cremer & van Vugt, 1999; Komorita & Parks, 
1994; Kramer, Brewer, & Hanna, 1996; Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Yamagishi 
& Sato, 1986) and appears to remain relatively stable after it is formed at an 
early stage in life (Erikson, 1963). It has been also discussed as a stable 
characteristic of certain cultures and societies, as a crucial element for their 
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development and progress (Doney, Cannon and Mullen, 1998; Fukuyama, 
1995; Hofstede, 1980; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). 
Although trust in the form of expectations about the good nature and the 
benevolent intentions of others has been recognised as an important element 
in social interaction, one is not expected to trust everybody in every situation. 
Contextual elements influence whether one could trust another or not. The 
context specificity of trust is what differentiates trust from other relevant 
concepts such as faith or gullibility. Faith reflects emotional security and it 
normally appears in very close relationships that have been tested and 
matured throughout the time (Rempel, Holmes and Zanna, 1985; Simmel, 
1950). Outside the context of a mature relationship faith would sound 
incongruent. However, the fact that faith is conceptually very close to fate 
makes it a rather passive way of facing the world (Sztompka, 1999). In 
addition, several authors have identified the belief in other's good will, which 
is not grounded on context, as a situation of gullibility and not of trust (Rotter, 
1971; Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe, 1998; Yamagishi, Kkuchi, and Kosugi, 
1999). 
To summarise, from the conceptual isations offered above it appears that it is 
important to differentiate trust as a general disposition towards life and trust 
as situation specific in the context of a relationship. Contextual information 
and. the experience of the relationship over time create a reality that is 
reflected in the way people endow trust in others. In line with this, research 
has demonstrated that the general disposition to trust is not associated with 
trust in context (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). 
It is further important to illustrate the qualities of the context that make trust 
relevant. More specifically, it has been suggested that trust becomes relevant 
in conditions of interdependence and reliance on others (LevAs and Weigert, 
1985; Luhmann, 1979; Dasgupta, 1988). The need for trust emerges when 
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one decides that one's interests and needs can be better satisfied by specific 
others or by the contribution of the efforts made by others. Furthermore, a 
situation of interdependence and reliance on others involves risk taking. 
Thus, the possibility of risk becomes an unavoidable element of trust in the 
relationship (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). The placement of trust and the 
decision to rely on others involves the potential for betrayal and harm 
(Coleman, 1990; Deutch, 1958; Gambetta, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Kee and 
Knox, 1970; Luhmann, 1978; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rotter, 
1980; Shapiro, 1987; Zucker, 1986). Because trust entails the recognition of 
risk, accepting this risk constitutes a way to deal with the complexity inherent 
in social relationships (Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 1979; Preisendorfer, 1995; 
Simmel, 1950). The link between trust and risk is so close that experiences 
that involve risk are often welcomed in a relationship because they support 
trust development (Deutsch, 1962; Rembel et al., 1985). However, trust 
becomes a possible course of action even when the possibility of 
disappointment is high. This is because when we trust there is an expectation 
or belief that the other will not take advantage of the vulnerability resulting 
from the acceptance of the risk (Deutch, 1958). Most important, there is a 
willingness to use these trusting expectations as a basis for action (Deutsch, 
1958; Mayer et al., 1998; Luhmann, 1979; Sabel, 1993). This link between 
trust and risk emphasises the action orientation of trust (Sztompka, 1999). If 
one does not have the intention to proceed any sort of action that puts one 
under risk, trust is not a relevant concept. 
If trust involves putting oneself in a situation of risk it seems that the search of 
alternatives would save one from the potential loss that entails the decision to 
take the risk Some authors have emphasised that the decision to trust could 
be a costly choice since if it is not reciprocated the consequences will be 
disastrous (Deutsch, 1958). Considering the costs of misplaced trust, distrust 
seems to be a safest alternative. However, distrust does not always enjoy in 
the literature the status of trust. Indeed, distrust often carries negative 
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connotations and it is often understood as a disorder that impinges on the 
healthy development of a person. Thus, for developing a healthy personality, 
distrust should be successfully turned into trust (Erikson, 1963). Trust and 
distrust have been conceptualised as occupying the opposite ends of a 
continuum in a way that low trust is indicative of high distrust (Rotter, 1967, 
1971,1980). Trust also constitutes the desirable option in the Prisoners 
Dilemma research tradition (Arrow, 1974; Axelrod, 1984; Coleman, 1990; 
Deutsch, 1973; Pruitt and Kmmel, 1977). These approaches overlook the 
fact that trust and distrust can be both critical in sustaining and maintaining a 
perception of a stable and consistent social world dealing with the risk 
inherent in social relationships (Gellner, 1988; Lewis and Weigert, 1985; 
Luhmann, 1988). However, while trust opens new opportunities in a 
relationship, as it enables risk-taking actions, distrust maintains ossified and 
often destructive ways of relating and diminishes the range of options that 
can be taken (Luhmann, 2000). 
To summarise the points discussed above, trust constitutes an orientation 
towards the future and it is related to the need to take actions rather to 
passively contemplate the world. Trust is also context specific in the sense 
that it requires the interdependence between parties, which in turn 
emphasises the possibility of disappointment. This introduces distrust as a 
functional equivalent of dealing with the risk inherent in human agency. 
Although trust and distrust deal in different ways with the uncertainty in social 
life it seems imperative to discuss and further integrate the two concepts. 
In light of this, some authors have proposed that it is likely for trust and 
distrust to co-exist in the same relationship. Some aspects of the relationship 
may be characterised by trust and some other by distrust. Not all the aspects 
of the relationship are relevant when one considers the interaction with 
others. Whether the relationship as a whole would be characterised as a 
trusting or distrusting one will depend on the power of the salient aspect of 
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the relationship to characterise the relationship as a whole (Govier, 1994; 
Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). The idea that different parts of the 
relationship may elicit trust or distrust further raises a question of what 
qualifies a relationship as a trusting or distrusting one. It seems that some 
dimensions of the relationship are more important or more relevant than 
others. In addition, different dimensions of the relationship may be made 
salient in a specific context. Therefore, it is important to isolate the 
dimensions of the relationship that are central at communicating trust or 
distrust in a specific context. By emphasising the aspects that may generate 
trust or distrust it could be possible to induce co-operation and contact in the 
relationship. Thus, it is important to further illustrate the possible sources of 
trust or distrust in a relationship. 
This section further presents the various sources of trust or distrust. Trusting 
or distrusting expectations, feelings or actions are based on the evaluations 
of relevant elements in the social environment. To begin with, evaluation of 
the actions of others, consistency of their actions, congruence between Usaid" 
and "did", reputation gained in other contexts have all been identified as 
important qualities that underlie the inferences about others' motivations. 
Actions that are regarded relevant to the trustworthiness of a party answer 
one of the most crucial questions in social relationships; whether the 
relationship is co-operative or competitive (Deutsch, 1969,1973; Lindskold, 
1978). Actions communicate benevolence, interest in others'welfare and 
motivations to co-operate. A group qualified with these intentions is very likely 
to be regarded as an ally (Beamish & Banks, 1987; Mayer et al., 1995). 
Actions may refer to the past in the form of a record but they may also be a- 
historical (Good, 1988). They may be related to actions that were responses 
to rules of conduct taken for granted in a specific context but they may also 
be based on rumours or experiences given by others (Sztompka, 1999). 
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Another dimension that may underlie information about others is the 
capability of a specific other to produce certain actions that would reciprocate 
trust or assure for trust investment. Beyond the good intentions that a specific 
other might have, people might be interested in whether he or she has the 
ability and competence to meet obligations (Barber, 1983; Lindskold, 1978; 
Mayer et al., 1995). Good intentions are not sufficient to gain one's trust. One 
needs to be assured that the others are able to produce a desired outcome. 
In addition, because the nature of trust implies the appropriate reciprocation 
of actions, opportunities for common understanding of the rules of proper 
conduct, of what is valuable and what constitutes an appropriate return is 
extremely important (Blau, 1967; Garfinkel, 1963; Zucker, 1986). 
Trust resides in people's expectations of a stable world where routines will be 
conducted accordingly. In order to trust one needs to take for granted a range 
of issues concerning the functioning of the social world. Therefore, the 
existence of shared general and specific rules that are able to define roles 
and rules of interaction in a given contact context is very important (Bradach 
and Eccles, 1989; Granovetter, 1985; Zucker, 1986). Belonging to the same 
group or perceptions of common identification can secure a shared 
understanding of the social world (Brewer, 2000; Kramer, Brewer and Hanna, 
1996; Messick, Wilke, Brewer, Kramer, Zemke and Lui, 1983). Common 
beliefs, similarities and value congruence can explain the existence of trust, 
but trust can be also built between individuals and groups with no previous 
experience of contact. 
In addition to the specific relationship, the position of the two parties within a 
network makes some other dimensions important that may serve as basis for 
trust or distrust. More specifically, membership in a known entity is important 
for trust as in this case, the characteristics of the known entity are likely to be 
transferred from the whole to the specific group that one might be interested 
in. The good reputation of the known others and the type of relationship with 
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the unknown other with them can provide a useful source of trust 
expectations (Strub & Priest, 1976). Reputation is important not only because 
it conveys information about the other but because it also makes people 
refrain from misconduct because they are afraid of getting a bad reputation 
(Shapiro et al., 1992). Implicit in this account is that people strive to get and 
maintain a good reputation. 
Finally, another type of cue that is used to assess the trustworthiness of 
others is by means of their membership of certain categories (Good, 1988). 
Superficial signs, easy judgements based on external appearance, may 
become a source of trust or distrust cues. Trust or distrust is justified more 
easily with some people or social groups who are seen as having specific 
characteristics. Often some groups are striped of their human qualities and 
this makes discrimination a legitimate conducL For example, distrust in 
Gypsies is justified with reference to their appearance (Sztompka, 1999). 
The above conceptualisations present trust as an active attempt to gather 
information that leads to the evaluation of key dimensions of the other. More 
specifically, people draw on a range of sources to justify trust in a 
relationship. However, the process of accumulation of certain information to 
justify trust might not be as conscious and precise as it has been assumed in 
the research so far. People are not as rational as these conceptualisations 
suggest. People are rather social in the sense that they are tied to a specific 
context within which they interact and communicate with each other drawing 
on the available resources. Whether a process or a product trust is 
embedded in this network of communication and production of meaning. 
Therefore, what is important is to investigate the set of meaningful images, 
interpretations, explanations and beliefs that are closely linked to trust in a 
specific context. In addition, research should look at the way trust is made 
salient and the possible functions that it may serve. 
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Moreover, although theory regards trust as a concept that is built up gradually 
and develops over time, conceptual isations often seem to treat trust as rather 
static. Trust appears to exist at a specific point in time and it follows the 
accumulation of available evidence (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; 
McKnight, Cummings and Chervany, 1998). However, an important question 
to be answered is how trust becomes relevant in a relationship in the first 
place. Trust is in no doubt a central concept in any form of relationships but 
the exact link between the two has not been adequately explored. 
This chapter has so far introduced a few issues concerning the importance of 
studying trust. An effort has been made to differentiate trust from relevant 
concepts such as gullibility, faith, hope and confidence and it was suggested 
that trust and distrust should be considered together. Although trust can be 
expected in non familiar relationships based on roles, predisposition or 
institutions, trust is more often discussed as an unavoidable element of a 
relationship that involves interdependence between the parties and high 
stakes. Trust also develops over time. The accumulation of information about 
others based on common membership, reputation and motivations of relevant 
others have been discussed as different sources of trust and as key 
dimensions of the trust building process. It has been argued that the sources 
of trust should be seen as bound to a specific object and in a certain context. 
Finally, this chapter suggests that trust should be discussed in relationship to 
distrust in contexts that make their emergence salient. 
Trust and the literature of contlict 
Given the importance of trust in interaction between people and groups, it is 
surprising that it rarely enters the social psychological theories that discuss 
issues of contact and co-operation as means of reduction of conflict between 
groups. Deutsch (1973), Kramer (1999), Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000) and 
Worchel (1979) are a few exceptions. Social psychological theories of the 
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reduction of prejudice have particularly emphasised the role of contact in the 
improvement of inter-group relations. Brewer (2000) has recently argued that 
every contact situation or prospect of co-operation with an out-group entails 
an element of trust. This chapter will further discuss the ideal conditions for 
contact as they proposed by the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 
1998) in relation to trust and distrust It will be argued that the conditions of 
successful contact between groups as they have been proposed by the 
contact hypothesis all render trust as a problem to be dealt with. According to 
the contact hypothesis, in order for contact to have the expected effect in the 
reduction of prejudice it should take place under conditions of equal status, 
where the two sides have the opportunity to develop close relationships over 
time, and to work together for the achievement of common goals with the 
support of institutions and authorities. 
One of the most important requirements for successful contact between 
groups is that the two groups should meet under conditions of equal status. 
However, status differences are not very likely to be eliminated during the 
contact therefore they have to be managed because they are very likely to 
generate distrust. It is important to explore the meaning people attribute to 
power inequalities and how these are in turn associated with trust. Those in 
power are expected to place others' interests before their own (Barber, 1983). 
People with the power to impose their will may be more likeable if they do not 
use their power for this purpose. Violations that come from those in power are 
very likely to produce strong reactions (Bies and Tripp, 1996). Those in power 
may be seen as having more responsibilities and be expected to make more 
compromises for overcoming problems in a relationship. In addition, status 
difference or the acknowledgement of the distinct contribution of the two 
groups during the co-operation has to be taken into consideration 
(Deschamps and Brown, 1983). Power and status differences need to be 
further explored in the generation of trust and distrusL 
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Another condition that has been proposed to influence the successful 
implementation of contact between groups is the introduction of super- 
ordinate goals that cannot be achieved unless the two groups co-operate. 
However, in situations of conflict it seems almost impossible to induce any 
form of super-ordinate goals without exacerbating the conflict. Beyond the 
recognition that they might have common goals that cannot be achieved 
without co-operation, the two groups should feel that they could coexist. 
Otherwise the induction of super-ordinate goals is more likely to increase 
competition rather reduce conflict (Brewer, 1999,2000; Deschamps and 
Brown, 1983; Kelman, 1999). Co-operation is not panacea in conflict 
resolution. In order for co-operation to support the reduction of conflict trust is 
required. Although, it has been regarded in the literature as the behavioural 
demonstration of trust or equated with trust in theoretical conceptual isations 
(Deutsch, 1949,1958) co-operation does not necessarily reflect the levels of 
trust in the relationship. People may co-operate not because they are willing 
to be vulnerable under the positive belief that the other will not exploit their 
vulnerability, (i. e. trust), but because they are accountable for their actions (de 
Cremer, Snyder & Dewitte, 2001). Furthermore, in most of the real world 
situations mutual gains co-exist with the possibility of being exploited. 
Entering a co-operative relationship with an out-group entails the risk that the 
other will take advantage of the vulnerability one is exposed to and will try to 
gain more for the self (Brewer, 2000). Stakes and possible valuable losses 
have not been given sufficient attention in the literature. A potential loss 
although it emphasises the possibility of losing valuable resources at the 
same time increases the value of the effort of conflict resolution when one 
party chooses to be in a situation of potential loss. 
A third requirement of successful contact is that it occurs over a period of 
time. This is an opportunity for trust development. Relationships develop over 
time providing an opportunity for trust development. However, very often 
contact between groups gives rise to the development of distrust. In a context 
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where there is a history of antagonism and animosity between groups, social 
memories are imprinted with stereotypic images about others that impinge on 
any interaction at the present. Actions that take place in the present are 
conditioned with what has happened in the past. When the history of 
interaction has given rise to the development of distrust, the process of 
turning distrust into trust may prove very difficult. Thus, contact is very likely 
to make distrust salient and render its longevity and success doubtful. 
Another condition that determines the success of contact in reducing bias is 
institutional support. Laws, contracts and agreements play an important role 
in shaping the favourable attitudes towards groups. Agreements and 
contracts that are sometimes introduced by parties outside the relationship 
often seal a period of conflict and they may produce co-operation as they 
ensure control by the means of sanction when a party violates them. An 
important consequence of the use of institutionalised support to promote 
more favourable treatment of minority groups is the fact that the very nature 
of these measures reinforces the image of the other as an enemy and 
potential source of disappointment (Brewer, 1997; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). The 
existence of boundaries reinforces the representation of the world as divided 
into distinct categories. Most importantly these contracts or agreements are 
required to be endorsed by the public. If there are beliefs deeply entrenched 
in the public that the other party wants to destroy their in-group, no 
agreement will suffice to convince them that the other has really abandoned 
their malevolent intentions that are often seen as driven by their character 
and nature. 
Institutional agreements and contracts may induce co-operation but this 
cannot replace trust. What may differentiate control- from trust-driven co- 
operation should be the attitude towards risk (Kee & Knox, 1970). In the case 
of control the risk one runs by entering in a co-operative relationship is low. 
The fear of deterrence in case of deception or misbehaviour is high and 
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enough to reassure somebody about the desirable outcome of the co- 
operative venture with the specific other. However, in the case of a trust- 
driven decision to co-operate, there is the recognition of the high risk but also 
a strong belief that the other party will not take advantage of the vulnerability 
one puts oneself in by entering in a co-operative relationship. This is very 
important because it promotes an image of the other as a potential partner 
and not enemy. In addition, in the absence of trust an agreement requires an 
extended list of guarantees for the parties involved. This is extremely difficult 
as the same points may be interpreted differently by the two sides. The value 
of agreements, contracts and treaties is often restricted to limited cases while 
misinterpretations are a common phenomenon (Larson, 1997). 
In order for contact to be successful it should provide opportunities for self- 
disclosure and sharing of personal information. A situation of self-disclosure 
promotes trust. However, it is quite unlikely for the interaction that occurs at 
the inter-personal level to have an impact at the inter-group level. Contact 
may operate at a symbolic level in the sense that relationships may be 
presented through media that refer to people and leaders of the other party. 
These are capable of eliciting emotions and empathy that are geared towards 
the group as a whole. Public apologies, calls for forgiveness as expressed by 
the representatives of the groups, examples of successful contact and co- 
operation of the two parties in time of need can have an impact in the inter- 
group relations and communicate trust. 
However, if there is no willingness to discuss issues that have the status of 
contagious issues by the groups and are thought as responsible for the 
perpetuation of conflict, all these efforts are more likely to fade away when a 
new conflict episode occurs. Thus, trust is needed in order for the parties to 
start envisaging the prospect of approaching each other and working towards 
the conflict resolution. Co-operation for the achievement of common goals 
assumes that the two parties have already decided to engage in contact e. g. 
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they have overcome the insecurity and the uncertainty that results from such 
a prospect. However, in reality parties that are engaged in conflict are not 
very likely to be willing to meet and discuss their issues not to mention to 
engage in co-operation for the achievement of common goals. Therefore, 
trust is needed to reassure both sides that the other has a genuine interest in 
working for the conflict resolution and that they are ready to comply with the 
implicit and the explicit rules that this assumes. Trust is also needed to justify 
that the other is competent and capable of dealing with a situation like that. 
Trust and international conflict 
As it has been argued in chapter 3, this research seeks to investigate issues 
of international conflict. It has been suggested that international conflict 
constitutes a specific type of inter-group relationship with only some similarity 
with the type of relations assumed by the contact hypothesis. Furthermore, a 
nation-state consists of different units such as people, leadership, decision- 
making etc. Therefore, a relationship between nation states includes 
interaction at different levels. Interaction at the interpersonal level is rare and 
it is restricted to certain groups and contexts that are not likely to involve the 
whole population e. g. holidays, at the workplace, at school etc. However 
people often claim knowledge about other nationalities with stereotypes and 
national character constituting popular Otruthe about foreign nations. People 
draw on material that circulates in the media, historical accounts and 
reproduction of stereotypes through cultural products that massively circulate 
in society to support their knowledge. 
Changes in the relationships between nation-states are very likely to be 
introduced through the media where politicians meet, engage in long talks 
and shake hands to seal an agreement. These events have the power to 
crystallise the relationship between countries. With reference to these, people 
will be asked to follow their countries' initiatives or decisions. It is very 
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important for research to detect the impact that these events have on people, 
as it is their endorsement that will prove these actions successful or not. 
One should expect that in the case of conflict between nation-states, a 
decision to enter in negotiations for the resolution of conflict at the level of 
leadership will provoke discussions between people about the 
appropriateness of such a venture. In situations like these, trust and distrust 
are likely to emerge as explanatory themes of future actions. They will help 
people to explain their insecurities about the outcome of such a venture. One 
should expect that explanations of distrust are more likely to prevail. 
Although in some circumstances distrust is required and is beneficial, e. g. the 
distrust in the political authorities that precedes major revolutions (Sztompka, 
1999) distrust is generally considered dysfunctional. It prevents co-operation, 
narrows the initiation of interaction with certain groups and is responsible for 
the climate of worry, fear, suspicion and anxiety that paralyses action in 
certain societies (Banfield, 1967; Deutch, 1973). An additional problem with 
distrust is that once established it is difficult to question whether it is justified 
or not in the first place. This happens because distrust can generate more 
easily a reality consistent with itself (Gambetta, 1988) and more than trust can 
do (Slovic, 1993). As it has been discussed earlier in this chapter, different 
types of information can be relevant to justify trust or distrust depending on 
the object of trust. Therefore, a first step of research should be to identify the 
bases of distrust in international conflict 
People will draw on various sources of information that help to objectify their 
feelings of uncertainty and insecurity about the future of the relationship and 
their reluctance of changing its current status. Actions that the out-group take 
and are seen as violating agreements are very likely and tangible sources for 
justifying the feelings of insecurity. Violations of agreements, lack of 
adherence to proper rules of conduct, previous history of breaches of 
contracts and agreements with other parties are all important. Certain 
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violations are more crucial than others as they entail an element of trust 
breach. Agreements and contracts offer an alternative of trust at the early 
stages of the relationship. Therefore their violation is very likely to generate 
strong emo ions. 
Another possible source of justification is provided by the evaluation of the 
internal situation of the out-group. There are certain values about the 
structure of the society such as democracy, freedom of speech, human rights 
respect that the western society adheres to. These values can be used to 
qualify a partner as equal in the relationship. These also provide some proof 
that the other is a competent partner capable of delivering its promises and 
duties. 
Finally, in highly emotional contexts there are specific beliefs about others as 
being immoral, inhuman and degenerate. These would serve as justification 
of insecurity when people are invited to evaluate the conduct of certain 
actions in this context. They will be the last resort when actions or the internal 
situation does not provide sufficient justification. 
Although trust/distrust is a central element in all relationships, some 
relationships are more likely than others to render salient the relevance of 
trust/distrust. Trust/distrust is so much entrenched in everyday life that is 
rarely problematised. For example, trust or distrust is more or less taken for 
granted in a range of relationships including relationships between parents 
and children, in-groups should be naturally trusted while out-groups distrusted 
(Brewer, 2000) and so on. People when asked about issues of trust or 
distrust in such a relationship they merely reproduce established and known 
frameworks. This is because trust and distrust serve the maintenance of 
social order. They denote the essence that cements and maintains the entire 
structure of social life and enables people to take for granted a wide range of 
elements in the social environment and deal with the inherent complexity of 
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social life (Garfinkel, 1963; Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Luhmann, 1979; Rotter, 
1971; Simmel, 1950). Therefore, trust is more likely to become part of 
everyday conversations only in the case that the routine of everyday practices 
is challenged (Gaffinkel, 1967,1963). 
One way that discourses of trust and distrust become salient is when trust is 
communicated. The starting point in this case is distrust and actions are 
consciously planned to change the relationship to a trusting one. Osgood's 
(1962) proposed Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension reduction 
is an example of such a case. Trust that has been communicated is linked to 
an expectation of reciprocation and possible disappointment. In this situation 
trust becomes relevant because it is used consciously as a means to change 
a relationship. Within this framework, trust and distrust becomes relevant 
because they have been set as key dimensions of assessment of the actions 
of the other. This is also an example of the fact that trust cannot be discussed 
without reference to risk. To be more specific, trust communication as a 
means of trust building involves the risk and the possibility of betrayal. 
On the other hand there are occasions of trust destroying processes. There 
exists an asymmetry between trust building and trust destruction. Indeed, it 
takes a long time and effort for trust to be built but on the other hand trust is 
very easily destroyed and difficult to be restored (Larson, 1997; Slovic, 1993). 
This happens because trust destroying events come to one's attention more 
easily than trust building events. Violations that occur after a period of trust 
building are expected to affect the relationship more (Teger, 1971). If the 
violation of trust comes from those that are of higher status and power the 
reaction is expected to be greater (Keniston, 1967; Worchel, 1969; Worchel 
et al., 1967). Finally attributions of responsibility that follow trust violations and 
issues of justice (Bies and Tripp, 1996) are relevant to effects that a trust 
violation would have. 
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In general terms, trust is likely to be discussed in situations that parties in a 
relationship face something unfamiliar or they are introduced with a challenge 
to see a relationship through a different scope. Introducing something new in 
the relationship may contribute to the maturity of the relationship but it may 
also cause irreversible damage (Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985; Luhmann, 
1988). As it has been argued in the previous section, contact or the prospect 
of contact as a means for reduction of prejudice and conflict is an example 
that makes trust and distrust relevant. In these cases, distrust is very likely to 
provide justification for their reluctance to make themselves vulnerable to the 
others' potential malevolent intentions. Trust on the other hand would enable 
the parties to engage in contact in order to solve their problems. Thus, the 
employment of the concept of trust has a direction towards the future while 
distrust serves the maintenance of the status quo of the relationship. 
It has been argued so far that trust/distrust is a crucial aspect of a relationship 
that regulates uncertainty and risk taking. It is problematised when a 
relationship is challenged. When something new is introduced in the 
relationship discourses of trust/distrust become salient. For example in the 
case of a peaceful relationship between two groups the introduction of conflict 
and in the case of conflict the introduction of negotiations would trigger the 
problematisation of the trust/distrust. Ajdukovic (2004) provides such an 
example of how trust/distrust became a thema that triggered discussions and 
changed the boundaries of who is trustful or not. More specifically, the out- 
break of war in former Yugoslavia in 1991 triggered questions to people about 
who they were, who their friends were and what was the future like for family 
and friends. Trust/distrust became problematised and as a result, people that 
were considered close friends or even closer than siblings were now seen 
with suspiciousness and distrust. 
Thus if we acknowledge the importance of lay theories (social 
representations) in social relationships, trust/distrust can be seen as a thema 
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that organises the relationship. According to Markova (2000) and Moscovici 
and Vigneaux: (2000) themata provide a basis for the generation of social 
representations. Themata are preconceptions in science that involve dyads 
(e. g. simplicity/complexity, analysis/synthesis) or triplets (e. g. 
constancy/evolution/catastrophic change). These oppositions are seen as 
mutually exclusive and are useful to explain the formation of schools of 
thought and progress in science (Holton, 1978). Themata are generators of 
common sense knowledge. However, not all oppositional taxonomies can 
become themata. More specifically, only those problematised in the course of 
history by entering the public discourse and becoming a source of tension 
and conflict, can produce social representations. When a thema becomes 
problematised the oppositional taxonomy will change its boundaries and it will 
be reconstructed as an effect of processes of public communication and 
social influence. The taxonomy enters the public discussions and becomes a 
thema capable of generating relevant social representations, i. e. translating 
unfamiliar objects into familiar images. In addition, the new, unfamiliar and 
threatening social object is anchored to already existing knowledge that 
includes personal beliefs, experience, understanding of relationships, social 
inequalities, memberships and attachments to groups. Anchoring is a 
stabilising process. However before it can take place, the unfamiliar event has 
to be translated in a common language, i. e. become concrete, objectified 
(Markova, 2000). The process of making familiar and concrete an unfamiliar 
and threatening phenomenon is the process of rendering salient oppositional 
taxonomies, i. e. thematise them. The new social representation is formed 
through the change of the boundaries between the oppositional categories, 
i. e. what constitutes the one and what the other. Some themata are essential 
for survival. Examples of such themata are freedom/oppression, 
justicelinjustice. Trust/distrust is suggested to be such a thema as it is 
essential in the maintenance of social order and the stability of social 
structure (Garfinkel, 1963,1967; Luhmann, 1979,1988,2000). 
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In the representation of the relationship between two groups a change, i. e. 
negotiation will affect the salience of the trust/distrust taxonomy. The 
uncertainty about the unfamiliar object that is introduced in the social 
relationship, i. e. the negotiations, could be anchored on personal beliefs and 
anxieties and the understandings of the relationships of groups. Differences 
in power and the duration of conflict will be extremely relevant dimensions in 
social relationships and may in turn influence the sources of the trust/distrust 
and also the levels of trust, e. g. how much they trust/distrust the out-group. In 
addition, different positions of the groups within the inter-group structure will 
elicit different understandings of the relationships and the acceptable levels of 
risk to be taken. These may also affect the sources of distrust and the levels 
of trust/distrust in the relationship. 
It is hypothesised that people's readiness to refer to these types of 
explanations to justify their uncertainty will depend on contextual issues such 
as the perception of social relations. Interdependence is a key concept in the 
understanding of trust/distrust therefore it is expected that it will be a central 
anchor. Expectations and beliefs about the evolution of the relationship, 
attribution of responsibility in the case of problems and disputes, power and 
the history of the conflict are also suggested to be critical. In addition, there is 
little research that focuses on the role of contextual variables such as power 
and a history of conflict and their role in influencing trust. More specifically, it 
has been found that trust concerns are more likely to be salient amongst 
people in low-status positions because of their greatest dependence and 
vulnerability (Kramer, 1996). Chapters 7 and 8 further explore the social 
psychological anchors of trust/distrust 
In addition, the different types of explanations are likely to be anchored to 
other systems of personal belief as well as group affiliations and 
memberships. Uncertainty and fear is closely linked to trust/distrust therefore 
it is expected to be a possible anchor of trust/distrust explanations. In 
59 
addition, what ties a person to a group, i. e. the identification with the group 
and the normative beliefs about the type of attachment to the group can be 
possible anchors. The endorsement of social inequalities has been found to 
influence discrimination towards out-groups and beliefs about the inevitability 
of competition between social groups (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle, 
1994). It is important to see how such beliefs are linked to trust/distrust. The 
way that people perceive themselves in relation to others or their past and 
future condition are likely to be anchors of trust/distrust. Trust/distrust may 
also be influenced by people's theories of what it means to be left or 
rightwing. Chapter 7 further investigates the relationship between the different 
types of beliefs, personal experiences and understanding of social 
relationships and the trust/distrust explanations. 
Finally, it is very likely that people coming from different social environments 
understand trust/distrust differently. Chapter 8 will deal with the sociological 
anchoring of trust/distrust by conducting research in different national groups. 
5ý0 
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Chapter 5 
his chapter aims to summarise the key points developed in the earlier 
chapters and explore the rationale for the empirical studies. It further 
outlines the design of the empirical studies and presents the main hypotheses 
of the research. 
The main aim of this research was to study international conflict from a social- 
psychological point of view. Chapter 2 has sought to delve into social 
psychological theories that aimed to provide answers on issues relating to the 
occurrence and the resolution of inter-group conflict. Theories vary in terms of 
the emphasis they put on the reasons for the occurrence of conflict. 
Explanations have been situated within the individual (Adorno et al., 1950; 
Altemeyer, 1998), in the structure of the environment in terms of material 
interests and competitive goals of the groups involved (Campbell, 1965; 
LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966; Sherif and Sherif, 1979; Sherif, 
Harvey, White, Hood and Sherif, 1961) and in the processes that underlie 
group membership (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel and Turner, 
1986; Turner, 1999; Tumer, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 1987). 
Generally, beyond their strengths and their limitations the above theoretical 
traditions refer to different levels of analysis of the phenomenon of inter-group 
conflict and offer complementary and not mutually exclusive explanations of 
eruption of conflict. 
Part of the process of looking at the reasons that produce conflict is the belief 
that finding these reasons is a first step for the successful resolution of the 
conflict. Chapter 2 also presented the key points of the theories that focused 
on inter-group conflict resolution. These include the contact hypothesis 
(Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969; Pettigrew, 1998) that focuses on the factors that 
enable contact to improve inter-group relations and the self-categorisation 
models of reduction of inter-group bias (Brewer and Miller, 1984; Hewstone 
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and Brown, 1986; Gaertner, Dovidio, Nier, Banker, Ward, Houlette and Loux, 
2000). Beyond the criticisms that these models have attracted and they have 
illustrated in chapter 2, they remain the major traditions that generate 
research in a range of issues concerning inter-group conflict. These 
theoretical models have dominated the research in inter-group relations and 
they have been also used to explain international conflict. 
The main question of chapter 3 was whether these theories are appropriate to 
explain issues of international conflict. In chapter 3 it was argued that 
international conflict is a particular type of conflict that includes characteristics 
not necessarily involved in all types of inter-group conflict. International 
conflict can be protracted, it has historical links, there are objective issues 
such as land disputes and access to resources, it may involve two (or more) 
parties but it has also impact on other parties and it can be violent and 
destructive involving armed confrontations. International conflict often 
becomes so destructive that any prospect for conflict resolution hinges on a 
reality that involves beliefs, feelings and processes that accentuate or 
perpetuate it. Conflict has also the power to disrupt life and establish certain 
types of relationships. It engages the whole society that in order to deal with it 
develops certain beliefs (Bar Tal, 2000). As a result, conflict and conflict 
resolution may only be a small part of a whole process which on the one 
hand, enables conflict to occur and, on the other, disables attempts for conflict 
resolution from having long lasting effects. For this reason, some authors 
have suggested that conflict resolution goes beyond the point of the 
agreement between two parties to resolve their conflict (Nadler, 2002; Nadler 
and Saguy, 2004). On the contrary, one needs to pay attention to what 
precedes and what follows such agreements, i. e. the issues that make a 
society susceptible to conflict and tension. 
To review the key characteristics of international conflict, often, in situations of 
intractable conflict there are unresolved issues that concern the exploitation 
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of scarce resources, land disputes, violations of treaties etc. These issues are 
very important for conflict resolution as they do not only constitute the source 
of tension but also, because they are tangible, they become easily accessible 
explanations and therefore could be used to sustain and perpetuate the 
conflict. These events or issues help to objectify conflict in common sense. 
Most importantly, in contexts occupied by long lasting, destructive conflict, 
such issues may be associated with a historical enemy (Esses, Jackson and 
Armstrong, 1998; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson and Armstrong, 2001) or be linked 
with in-group superiority and a perception of exclusive rights over certain 
resources and privileges by the in-group (Bobo, 1998; 1999; Bobo and 
Hutchings, 1996). Thus, competition over objective issues highlights the 
importance of the in-group position. This is because inter-group relations 
concern a network in which groups may belong according to status or/and 
power (Hogg, 2001; Tan and Moghaddan, 1999; Taylor and Moghaddan, 
1994). The positioning of ones' nation with respect to all other nation-states 
has important consequences for the way people understand the social world. 
Thus power is an important issue because it lies at the heart of the 
representation of the world into nation states, a world constructed by the 
hierarchical position of the different nation states that differ in status and 
power. The word power is often used to denote a nation state (e. g. the Great 
Powers, the West Powers etc). Social psychology has repeatedly stressed the 
importance of considering the effect of power differentials in the study of inter- 
group phenomena. With few exceptions (Apfelbaum, 1979; Bourhis, 1994; 
Deschamps, 1982; Coleman, 2000; Ng, 1982; Reicher, 2003; Rouhana and 
Fiske, 1995; Sachdev and Bourhis, 1984,1987) power has been neglected in 
the study of inter-group relations. This is important when one considers the 
evidence that processes of discrimination are associated with dominant 
groups that want to secure their "threatened" position (Reynolds and Turner, 
2001). The meaning of power in international relations needs to be explored 
and research should take into consideration power as a quality that organises 
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the understanding of the social world and creates positions in the international 
world. 
Another issue that may characterise international conflict is that it often lasts 
over a long period. Conflict is strongly related to a psychologically charged 
context that has cultivated hostility between the parties until the final outburst 
of the conflict (Azar, 1985; Goertz and Diehl, 1993; Rajmaira, 1997). It is clear 
that people living in such a context are subjected to the dynamics that this 
situation can produce and are socialised in a certain way of seeing the world 
(Bar-Tal, 2001; Wagner, Valencia and Elejabarrieta, 1996). A society that is 
penetrated by intractable conflict is characterised by a process that makes 
conflict a central topic in everyday conversation. The more intense and 
durable the conflict, the more relevant it becomes to the members of society. 
When a conflict lasts for many years, there is a considerable accumulation of 
animosity, hatred and prejudice. Collective memory is imprinted by events 
related to the conflict ýZultural products reflect the antagonistic sentiment. 
Beliefs related to the conflict become part of the societal beliefs, and 
members of the society are socialised in a conflict reality. It follows that a 
study of international conflict outside a temporal framework that sheds light to 
the processes that lead to the outbreak of conflict and that perpetuate and 
impinge on a successful resolution, would be partial. 
It is apparent that these characteristics are absent from the types of inter- 
group conflict usually being studied in social psychology where contact has a 
prominent position. Rather, contact in such situations is not likely to have an 
effect but also to be implemented at the first place. Indeed, often, the 
prospect of contact with an out-group is associated with anxiety (Brewer, 
1999,2000; Hewstone and Brown, 1986; Islam and Hewstone, 1993; 
Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Stephan, Ybarra and Bachman, 1999) or deeply 
entrenched and emotionally charged negative images about out-groups 
(Kelman, 1998). Certain out-groups often constitute threats to the very 
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existence of the in-group, its political and economic power and the physical 
well being of its members. It is also extremely difficult in some situations for 
some out-group to be perceived as part of a wider in-group because an out- 
group may have even been stripped of the right of existence (Bar-Tal, 1989; 
Leyens, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, Gaunt, Paladino, Vaes and 
Demoulin, 2001). Therefore, in these situations, contact is not possible 
whereas shifting the inter-group boundaries as suggested by the Self 
Categorisation models of reduction of prejudice, seems not to be an adequate 
strategy to have a positive impact in international relations. Furthermore, in 
some cases what is needed is an assurance that two groups can peacefully 
co-exist without the fear that they will be overrun by the other. 
In addition, people have lay theories about the social world that help them to 
navigate in the social environment. A social psychological study of 
international conflict needs to look at these theories since they serve as 
sources of justification of possible actions. In order to access the 
representation of international conflict, one should look at the categories that 
are used and the theories that activate and validate them. This is because, as 
it was argued in chapter 3, categories (i. e. nation) have meaning only within 
the theory that produces them. The meaning of the category unation" depends 
on the historical processes tied to a specific context therefore one should 
refer to the theory of nationhood that circulates in a specific context. This 
theory could include what constitutes a nation, how nation-states develop 
relations, what the relation involves, the reasons that international conflict 
occurs. The theories also may involve issues of conflict resolution, the role of 
agreements, negotiations, third parties etc. All these are central in lay 
peoples' theories that are asked to follow decisions and evaluate initiatives 
taken by the elites. More importantly, when politicians meet to negotiate a 
conflict resolution, people enter a process of translating this into familiar 
language and incorporate this initiative in their already existing systems of 
beliefs and meanings. As a result, the content of an agreement may be totally 
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ignored or transformed to fit existing beliefs about the meaning of such an 
agreement (Maoz, 2004). It is apparent, that negotiations and initiatives for 
conflict resolution have impact on people that already have a representation 
of the conflict, how it occurs and how it is resolved. Because the production of 
these theories is tied to a specific context and it is a result of processes of 
communication and social influence, it follows that one needs to look at the 
lay theories that people have and give meaning to the categories in use in the 
context. 
Here it is important to clarify how a social representations approach could be 
used to explore the representation of a relationship of conflict between nation- 
states. As it was explained in chapter 3, social representations theory 
suggests that along with the operation of the cognitive system that performs 
categorisations, associations, deductions etc there is also a meta-system that 
controls and verifies the operation of the cognitive system by means of rules. 
The meta-system is associated with two processes: objectification and 
anchoring. The meta-system is what makes thinking social and organises the 
social representation. 
There are two distinct approaches of the organisation of the representation. 
The dynamic approach maintains that social representations form different 
and contrasted meanings and peoples' content of knowledge consists of the 
network of these variations (Clemence, 2001; Doise et al., 1993; Lorenzi- 
Cioldi and Clemence, 2001). Doise and his colleagues employ the term 
organising principles to account for ideas or images virtual or implicit that are 
expressed through explicit ideas and images and order them giving them 
meaning they did not previously have. They are also responsible for the 
observed coherence among them in common sense. Organising principles 
reduce the ambiguity inherent in ideas or images and therefore make them 
relevant to any given context. 
66 
On the other hand, the structural approach (Abric, 1993,2001) suggests that 
a social representation consists of a number of elements that are organised 
and structured so as they constitute a particular type of cognitive system 
(Abric, 2001). This system consists of a central core and a number of 
peripheral elements. The meaning of the representation is defined by the 
element(s) that constitute its central core. The peripheral elements on the 
other hand, are responsible for the adaptation of the representation to 
different contexts. Central and peripheral elements function as entity with 
each having specific and complementary roles. 
Both approaches have been criticised because they overlook the social and 
communicative nature of social representations (Markova, 2003; Moscovici 
and Vigneaux, 2000). Social representations' theory is a constructionist 
theoryý and it puts emphasis on communication, language and the discursive 
I 
The cognitive approach offers a powerful understanding of how people think about a problem however R fails to 
explain why people consider the problem in the first place. The social representations approach deals not only with how 
information circulates and changes, but also with why this information Itself interests people. To make the difference 
clear, representative thinking is based more on the specific content of the information than on formal processes 
(Lorenzi-Cioldi and Clemence, 2001; Moscovicl and Hewstone. 1984). Transformation of Information depends primarily 
on the normative meta-system of a social context and variations between individuals in the meaning given to the 
information depend on the normative principles adopted by specific groups. Social cognition perspectives on Individuals 
mental representations help clarify the way individuals think and act in unspecified circumstances. Social 
representations further explain why and when such general cognitive principles are activated and applied In specific 
social contexts. Thus, it could be argued here that social representation adds another level at the social cognition 
approach, the level of the meta-system. 
Social representations theory is a constructioninst theory. It adobtes a critical stance towards taken for granted 
knowledge, underlies that knowledge is historically and culturally specific. places the formation of social knowledge 
within social processes of interaction and influence and finally, adheres to the idea that knowledge and social action go 
together. These are criteria proposed by Gergen (1985) and Burr (1995) to evaluate an approach as constructionist. 
Moreover, social representation theory seeks to integrate the cognitive and the discoursive aspects of social life. 
However, this is not in agreements with others, for Instance Potter and Edwards (11999) that have criticised the theory as 
being cognitive and reductionist. Discursive psychology considers what may be being done by the means of talk. Social 
representations theory is trying to read through peoples' talk to possible undedying lay theory that gives meaning to the 
expressed positions. Discursive psychology attempts to work with the talk as a piece of interaction in its own right, 
where each of its elements may be relevant to some current activity. A social representation is a device for constructing 
versions of the social world. It allows someone to make sense of something that is potentially unlamiliar as well as 
evaluating L 
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aspect of knowledge elaborated in common (Moscovici, 2001). Thus, the link 
between cognition and communication, between cognitive and linguistic 
operations, information and signification become a central issue in the theory 
(Moscovici, 2001). A basic question that social representations' theory deals 
with is what in societk is capable of giving sense and therefore sustain the 
emergence and production of discourse (Moscovici, 2001). Thus, social 
representations' theory acknowledges the importance of discourse and the 
psychological properties constructed there but it shifts the emphasis on what 
enables these discourses to take place. Knowledge is formed and organised 
in terms of processes oriented towards common themes, i. e. accepted 
knowledge or primary ideas. It is these primary ideas that instruct and 
motivate discourses in the sense that one needs to adjust to what is 
commonly known or at least confront with them (Moscovici, 2001). 
The introduction of the concept of themata in social representations' theory 
proposes an answer to the dialogical nature of social thinking. Themata, 
unlike the core-peripheral approach or the organising principles are 
prototypes of common sense knowledge that may exist implicitly in common 
sense but they may never be brought to the explicit attention of social thinking 
(Moscovici and Vigneau, 2000; Markova, 2000,2003). On the other hand, 
some themata because they are problematised enter the public discourse 
when certain social and historical events trigger them. Thus, they become the 
focus of attention and source of tension and conflict (Markova, 2000,2003). 
Most importantly, they come to play central role in the restructuring and the 
generation of new representations (Moscovici, 2001; Moscovici and Vignaux, 
2000). It could be argued here that themata lie at the heart of the formation 
and the generation of a social representation. 
Themata could be studied in their pragmatic manifestations, i. e. the contents 
and meanings of a thema in a given cultural and historical context. This may 
include the language associated with the thema and the specific objects that 
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it encompasses. The content of the thema is manifested through a continuous 
and dynamic process tied to both anchoring and objectification (Moscovici 
and Vigneaux, 2000). Anchoring, a process linked to the integration of new 
and unfamiliar phenomena into existing knowledge enriches the meaning of 
the thema. On the other hand, objectification turns the abstract notions of a 
thema into reality and gives a thema its concrete form as it can be observed 
in its pragmatic manifestations. The two processes are not independent or 
they signify different stages at the production of social representations. 
Rather every process of anchoring involves objectification (Markova, 2000). 
In her discussion of themata, Markova (2000,2003) suggests that although 
thinking is by nature antinomic, antinomies in thinking could also be dormant. 
Thinking in oppositions is implicitly transmitted from generation to generation 
as part of cultural communication and without reflection. Antinomies become 
themata if, in the course of certain social and historical events they turn into 
problems and become the focus of social attention and the source of tension 
and conflict. In the course of such events antinomies are transformed into 
themata, enter the public discourse, become problematised and further 
thematised. They then start generating social representations with respect to 
the phenomenon in question. In this study, trust/distrust was considered as a 
thema of the relationship of conflict between two nation-states. 
Themata constitute the building blocks of meaning and when they become 
problematised are capable of triggering the processes of anchoring and 
objectification and produce new knowledge. As it was suggested in chapter 4, 
trust/distrust is considered in this research as a thema in the relationship of 
two nation-states that are in conflict. If one thinks of a romantic relationship, 
infidelity would render the thema salient and become the point where tension 
and conflict would revolve producing changes in the relationship. This is 
capable of changing the relationship. The new representation of the 
relationship would be the result of the power of the thema to re-structure 
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other elements of the relationship. In a similar way, as it was suggested in 
chapter 4, the introduction of negotiations in a relationship of conflict between 
nation-states would activate the trust/distrust thema. The problematisation of 
trust/distrust would produce discourse in society and the relationship will be 
re-structured round the thema trust/distrust. As a result, the boundaries of 
what is trustful or not would change enabling e. g. former enemies to be 
treated as partners. 
Another important issue in this thesis is that variation is inherent to social 
representations. In particular, in this study, an important question to be 
answered was whether conflict is defined in the same way by everybody and 
thus why trust/distrust does not have the same meaning for everybody. In that 
respect, the concept of anchoring will be discussed. Anchoring is the process 
by which the members of a group in their attempt to make sense of an 
unfamiliar phenomenon integrate it into pre-existing knowledge, beliefs and 
thought. Because social representations are elaborated through debate, 
different points of view emerge during the transformation of abstract 
information into concrete meanings. Divergent positions are publicly 
expressed by people who belong to different groups that actively attempt to 
define abstract information from their own distinctive points of view2. 
Anchoring refers to the way that shared knowledge is anchored in different 
groups (Clemence, 2001; Lorenzi-Cioldi and Clemence, 2001; Moscovici, 
2001). Groups are different not only because they do not have access to the 
same information but also because their members share specific beliefs and 
experiences. In this sense anchoring contrary to social cognition models, 
2 Thinking by means of oppositional taxonomies resembles Billig's notion of argumentative thinking (1985,1987). His 
rhetorical approach emphasises the importance of contrary themes within what can be termed common sense. Billig 
draws the attention to arguments that occur within cultures and stresses the importance of the existence of contrary 
elements within a culture that sustain arguments and motivate social thinking. Therefore, he suggests a study of the 
social thinking in terms of oppositional terms. However, this is quite different from the notion of themata suggested by 
social representations'theory. Argumentative thinking merely resembles the process of anchoring, Le. the attempt of 
different groups within society to make sense of an unfamiliar situation drawing on their beliefs and values. 
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perceives that a belief is not merely the result of an individual cognitive 
activity, but it is anchored in the experiences and values of social groups. 
Individuals use normative rules grounded in the ideas, values and beliefs of 
their own groups, to analyse ambiguous aspects of changing lay theories. In 
other words, their thinking is anchored in the perspective of their own group. 
This for Doise and his colleagues is called sociological anchoring and it will 
be discussed in this thesis in chapter 8 through the study membership in 
different nation-states. 
Anchoring produces different types of knowledge that circulate in society and 
in the course of time are dissociated from the groups they were originated 
and continue to circulate as ideas in society (Lorenzi-Cioldi and Clemence, 
2001). These ideas are systems of values or ideological beliefs on which 
people position themselves and which can be used as anchoring points. 
Doise and his colleagues refer to these beliefs as psychological anchoring. 
The psychological anchoring of trust/distrust will be further discussed in 
chapter 7. 
Furthermore, groups are located in a network of intergroup relations that 
cause groups to vary in terms of their prestige, status and power. This social 
positioning of a group with respect to all other groups has important 
consequences for the production of social representations because it 
influences everyday thinking. For example, it has been shown that people 
elaborate different representations of a group according to the socio- 
structural position of the group they belong to (Deschamps, 1982; Eagly and 
Mladinic, 1989; Hogg, 2001). Members of subordinate groups often conceive 
of themselves and fellow ingroup members as interchangeable persons, as 
aggregates. Their personal features derive to a large extent from features that 
are ascribed to their group as a whole. In contrast, members of dominant 
groups tend to conceive of themselves as a gathering of individuals endowed 
with a fair amount of uniqueness and interpersonal distinctiveness, as a 
71 
collection (Lorenzi Cioldi, 1998; Lorenzi-Cioldi and Doise, 1990). Thus, the 
way people understand power asymmetries can be another anchoring point 
of the unfamiliar. Doise and his colleagues call this socio-psychological 
anchoring. Power will be discussed here in chapter 8 as an important anchor 
that organises the structure of the representation of conflict and its agents. Of 
course under other circumstances power could be a thema as for example in 
minority influence when minorities try to gain a different position in society. 
Thus, in this case power becomes the antinomy i. e. becomes the building 
block of the new meaning in the relationship (Chryssochou and Volpato, 
2004). However, whether power or any concept is a thema or an anchoring 
point is not inherent to the concept but to the research questions investigated. 
Here, the study focuses on power as an anchoring point of the new elements 
in the relationship. The objective was to see how power influences the 
understanding of the different aspects of a relationship of conflict rather how 
and what are the consequences of power being problematised itself. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that trust/distrust constitutes an important 
part of a lay theory of conflict resolution. If threat constitutes an obstacle of a 
successful inter-group contact, in some cases, especially in contexts 
characterised by long-lasting conflict, it can become a central part of a 
relationship. Most of all, distrust penetrates the whole society, regulates the 
representation of the parties involved and justifies certain practices, i. e. arm 
races. Because distrust in this case is likely to be functional for the group in 
the sense that satisfies the need for uncertainty reduction, it follows that a 
process that could turn distrust into trust in this context is very likely to be 
rewarding. Therefore research should focus on the conditions that could turn 
distrust to trust in a context characterised by intractable conflict. Building on 
relevant theory and research (Brewer, 2000; Deutsch, 1973; Kramer, 1999; 
Lewicki and Wiethoff, 2000; Nadler, 2002; Nadler and Saguy, 2004; Worchel, 
1979), this research considers trust as an important element of international 
conflict resolution. As said in chapter 4, trust/distrust has been theorised as 
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themata, as oppositional categories that historically, at a particular time, 
become problematised because for whatever reason they became the focus 
of attention as a source of tension and conflict (Markova 2000: 63). 
To summarise the points presented above, international conflict constitutes a 
specific type of relationship with characteristics that do not resemble the 
examples of inter-group conflict usually studied in social psychology. 
International conflict can be protracted, "objectiveý issues are important, it can 
be long lasting, power plays an important role and lay theories that involve 
the categories used are crucial in understanding the phenomenon. Therefore, 
this research aims to study the lay theories that people have about 
international conflict. Because these theories are context specific, it follows 
that research should be conducted in context. Within these theories 
trust/distrust is considered to be an important element of the relationship and 
therefore by isolating the factors that might influence it in a particular context 
one would be able to help conflict resolution. 
As it was said in chapter 3, the study of lay theories focus on both the 
common elements that serve as common reference points to people living in a 
society but also on factors that produce differences or to use social 
representations terminology, on anchors, i. e. beliefs and meanings that 
produce different positioning in relation to these common reference points. 
Doise (1992) has proposed a taxonomy of the different anchors. This 
taxonomy does not reflect a real distinction made by people but it is done on 
theoretical and methodological grounds. The three types of anchoring include 
psychological beliefs and values, sociological or group memberships and 
socio-psychological or understanding of power relations and the history of the 
relationship. 
Power is proposed here to be an important socio-psychological anchor of the 
lay theory of international conflict. As it has been argued earlier, power is 
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crucial in shaping the lay understanding of international relations and conflict. 
Power lies at the heart of the hierarchical representation of nation-states 
within the world of nations. This study investigates power as a socio- 
psychological anchor of international conflict and it explores its role in shaping 
the understanding of the context of the relationship. 
The duration of conflict is also suggested to be an important socio- 
psychological anchor of a lay theory of international conflict. Research often 
neglects the long term nature of real life conflicts that result in certain beliefs 
and mentality which filters the perception of the world and at the same time 
establishes specific relationships and roles i. e. enemies, victim-perpetrator 
(Bal-Tar, 2001). It is important to investigate how the duration of a conflict 
shapes the representation of the conflict and the parties that are implicated in 
the conflict, as well as the practices involved. 
As argued in chapter 4, the introduction of negotiations in a context of long 
lasting conflict would render salient the thema trust/distrust as an attempt to 
deal with the new unfamiliar and possibly threatening change. The activation 
of the thema is likely to change the boundaries of who could be trusted or 
what constitutes a trustworthy partner as a result of communication and social 
influence. Thus, trust/distrust becomes a theme that lies at the heart of the 
understanding of the unfamiliar situation: the prospect of a conflict resolution. 
The new social representation of the relationship will be formed through the 
redefinition of the poles of the thema trust/distrust. As a result, the boundaries 
of what is trustful or distrustful will change incorporating or excluding certain 
others, actions etc. If in a relationship there is distrust it is important to explore 
the elements on which this is anchored. it follows that it is important to 
explore the impact of the possible anchors of the relationship in personal and 
societal beliefs, memberships and attachments as well as the understanding 
of social relationships on trust/distrust. This will enable us to understand the 
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processes that could turn distrust into trust and facilitate a process of conflict 
resolution. 
The uncertainty about the unfamiliar object that is introduced in the social 
relationship, i. e. the negotiations, could be related to a range of beliefs. More 
specifically, people's readiness to refer to the types of trust/distrust 
explanations to justify their uncertainty will depend on contextual issues such 
as the understanding of the social relations. Interdependence is a situation 
that makes trust relevant because the outcomes of one person/group can be 
affected or determined by the actions of others (Brewer, 2000). The 
estimation of benefits and losses is also a main concern of inter-group 
relations (Sherif 1966, Bobo and Hutchings 1996, Esses et al. 1998, Esses et 
al 2001). Therefore, it is possible that beliefs relating to the nature of the 
interdependence between groups would be related to trust. In addition, 
because threat plays an important role in relations (Pettigrew, 2003), whether 
an out-group is perceived as an enemy or a friend is also crucial for 
trust/distrust. Attributions of responsibility are often made in conflict contexts. 
Whether the responsibility is placed on the in-group or the out-group could 
make the difference in trust/distrust. It is also important to explore the 
dynamics of the relationship between group level relative 
deprivation/gratification and trust/distrust Power is also important as a 
powerful out-group would heighten the feeling of vulnerability that a situation 
of trust bears. This is because trust is often about desired or not actions that 
an out-group could do. Finally, a conflict that lasts for a long time is likely to 
be embedded in beliefs that sustain distrust. This makes the duration of 
conflict an important sosio-psychological anchor. Chapters 7 and 8 further 
discuss and explore the social psychological anchors of trust/distrust. 
In addition, the different types of explanations are likely to be related to other 
systems of personal beliefs as well as group affiliations and memberships. 
More specifically, because trust/distrust can be seen as an equivalent of 
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uncertainty reduction (Luhmann, 1988) it could be said that there is a relation 
between trust/distrust and a general disposition to see the world as a 
dangerous place. In addition, research has suggested that people with high 
levels of beliefs supporting inequalities between social groups are more likely 
to support the existence of conflict between groups as well as military 
interventions (Levin, Henry, Pratto & Sidanius, 2003; Pratto, Stallworth & 
Conway-Lanz, 1998; Sidanius and Liu, 1992). Thus, it is important to 
investigate the relationship between this set of beliefs and levels of trust. 
Another concept that might be related to trust/distrust is the feelings of 
personal relative deprivation or gratification in relation to relevant dimensions. 
Relative deprivation because it may breed feelings of resentment and relative 
gratification because it may emphasise a fear of losing valuable resources 
might lead people to avoid situations of uncertainty and therefore, if the 
relation is a conflicting one, they might follow the representation they already 
have and distrust the others. 
People also have theories of what it means to be leftwing and rightwing and 
these beliefs might influence the way people trust different out-groups. 
Chapter 7 further investigates the relationship between the different types of 
beliefs, personal experiences and understanding of social relationships and 
the trust/distrust explanations. 
Finally, it is very likely that people coming from different social environments 
understand trust/distrust differently. Chapter 8 will deal with the sociological 
anchoring of trust/distrust by conducting research in different national groups. 
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Research objectives 
The main objective of this research is to study the lay theories of international 
conflict in context and investigate how the key anchors of the specific 
relationship influence trust/distrust. In addition, it explores trust/distrust within 
the context of a relationship between two countries that are implicated in 
conflict. The relationship between a range of anchors of the relationship and 
the levels of trust/distrust is explored. Because people within a society 
develop certain systems of beliefs and worldviews that are related to the 
characteristics and the problems that occupy their society (Bar-Tal, 2001; 
Moscovici, 1983) it is imperative to study them within a specific context. 
Therefore, the example of the Greece-Turkey relationship is used. Although 
Greece and Turkey are not in open war, the relationship between the two is 
particular and has been also considered as one of the problematic 
relationships worldwide by the political scientists (Thompson, 2001). It is 
suggested that trust/distrust will be anchored to different types of beliefs. Most 
importantly, following the theoretical and methodological distinction between 
general psychological beliefs and beliefs about the specific inter-group 
context (socio-psychological) it is argued that the beliefs about the inter-group 
context would mediate the relationship between the psychological beliefs and 
the levels and sources of trust/distrust. 
Finally, a further objective of this research was to study the relationship 
between types of socio-psychological and sociological anchoring and 
trust/distrust in a de-contextualised research setting. In this research, 
trust/distrust is studied within a context where negotiations are introduced in 
the relationship between two countries implicated in conflict. The study further 
explores the role of power and the duration of conflict in shaping the 
understanding of the conflict context and the representation of the parties 
involved. 
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The main objectives of this research are: 
1. To study the lay theories of international conflict in a specific context that 
reflects a certain understanding of the category nation and a certain 
position of one's country within the world of nations. The main aim was to 
access the explanatory resources available in the context and shared by 
the participants and study its organisation in the specific socio-cultural 
context to produce variations of a lay theory of international conflict. 
2. To study trust/distrust as a thema that is activated, (i. e. becomes 
relevant) in situations that the relationship is problematised within the 
context of the relationship between Greece and Turkey but also with no 
reference to a particular context, i. e. de-contextualised. Trust/distrust is 
thought to be reflected in a series of explanations that justify the status 
quo of the relationship. The research will study the relationship of a set of 
personal beliefs, different memberships, perception of social relationships 
and personal or societal beliefs in relationship to the levels as well as the 
different sources of explanations of trust/distrust. 
3. To study power, duration of conflict and nationality as key anchors of the 
representation of nation-states and their population, of the context of 
conflict and of trust/distrust. 
The context of the study 
The main body of the research has been conducted in Greece. Greece is 
situated geographically in the Southeast of Europe. It is a parliamentary 
democracy headed by a President since 1974 after a period of political 
instability that followed the Second World War and was sealed with a seven- 
year military dictatorship established in April 1967. 
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The relationship between Greece and Turkey is rather particular. Turkey is 
considered to be for Greece the traditional enemy (Millas, 2001). The history 
of the two counties is closely linked as Greece and Turkey share a history of 
living together as what is considered today as the modem Greek nation was 
part of the Ottoman Empire since 1453 until it became an independent nation- 
state in 1832. The Greek identity has been formed in terms of its opposition to 
Turkey (Millas, 2001; Triandafyllidou, 1998). Traditions and myths associated 
with struggles against invaders and enemies played a prominent role in the 
formation of the Greek Nation. Greece has been defined with reference to 
common ancestry, culture and language that last from ancient years until 
today. Discontinuities in the linear presentation of the Greek history were 
reinterpreted in a way that the nation appears homogeneous and 
uninterrupted (Kitromilides, 1990; Millas, 2001; Triandafyllidou, 1998). 
Since Greece became an independent state, the relationship between the two 
countries has been marked by a series of wars and treaties including the two 
world wars and the Greek-Turkish war in 1919-1922. The war followed the 
treaty of peace signed in Lausanne on 2e of July 1923. That was the last 
time the two counties had an armed confrontation. After that the two countries 
went through intermittent periods of reconciliation and hostility. These include 
the persecution of the Greeks that lived in Istanbul in 1955 and the Zurich 
London Treaty (September, 1959) for the resolution of the situation in Cyprus 
that inaugurated a new period of convergence between the two countries. In 
the last decade, territorial issues still remain at the heart of the dispute 
between the two countries (Rozakis, 1988; Tsitsopoulos and Veremis, 1988). 
More specifically, there are disputes over seabed exploration rights, territorial 
waters and air-space rights in the Aegean Sea. There is constant monitoring 
across the boundaries of the two countries, while water and air space 
violations constitute part of the daily news broadcasts at least on the Greek 
side. The relationship is exacerbated because of the occupation of the 
northern part of Cyprus by the Turkish troops since the 1974 invasion that 
79 
followed a rebellion by ultra nationalist Greek-Cypriots backed by the military 
dictatorship established in Athens. 
In recent years, the relationship between Greece and Turkey has been 
threatened with an armed confrontation when the two sides disputed a tiny 
islet in the south-eastem Mediterranean in 1996. Also, in early 1999 Greece 
was accused of having protected the leader of the Kurdish movement for 
independence in south-eastern Turkey, Abdullah Ocalan, who was captured 
in Kenya in February 1999. 
The relationship changed quite dramatically after severe earthquakes that 
inflicted both countries and the two nations offered one another humanitarian 
aid. Although none of the more serious differences have been resolved, the 
willingness to establish ties between the two people was very strong followed 
by confidence that the two societies can set aside their differences and live 
together peacefully. This has been reflected in a series of agreements about 
small-scale trade, business relationships and tackling of issues of terrorism, 
immigration and disaster response between the two sides (November 2001). 
At the same time, exchanges were encouraged at the level of the population. 
Within this climate of improvement of the relations between Greece and 
Turkey, the two countries planned a joint bid to host the 2008 European 
football championships. 
On the other hand, both Greece and Turkey spend enormous amounts of 
money for defence expenditures, where at least in the case of Greece the fear 
of Turkey constitutes one of the main justifications (Smith, Sola and Spagnolo, 
2000). In addition, while Greece supported Turkey's integration in the EU it 
strongly reacted to the EU suggestion to take into account the Turkish 
interests when planning military operations. Furthermore, political stability in 
Turkey is thought to be one of the main sources of concerns in the area. 
Cyprus constitutes one of the most contagious issues in the relationship 
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between the two countries (Koufoudakis, 1988). The Greek-Cypriot side has 
earned international recognition by the UN while the northern part was only 
recognised by Turkey. Cyprus has been recently introduced with a conflict 
resolution plan by the UN that was rejected by the Greek-Cypriots. Despite 
the rejection of the plan, a new period for the relationships between the two 
parts of Cyprus was introduced but also for the Greek-Turkish relations. 
It follows, that the Greece-Turkish relations constitute an interesting context to 
study lay theories of international conflict. Although the two countries are not 
in an open conflict, there is a history of armed conflict between the two and 
contagious issues that threaten the stability that at the moment seem to 
characterise the relationship. 
Research strategy 
In order to study the lay theories of international conflict within this context 
and explore the meaning of distrust a series of semi-structured interviews 
were conducted in Greece. The participants were all Greek nationals living in 
Greece. The rationale and the results of this analysis are presented in 
chapter 6. The lay theories and their organisation by factors such as power, 
duration of conflict and participants' nationality are also explored in chapter 8. 
Chapter 7 and a part of chapter 8 included the study of the anchoring of 
different types of beliefs on the levels and sources of trust/distrust. This is 
done by using a questionnaire and an experimental vignette study. The 
questionnaire study explored the range of beliefs, experiences and 
understanding of relationships that were likely to account for individual 
variation in relation to the levels and source of trust/distrust. The rationale and 
the specific hypothesis of this study are presented in chapter 7. The 
experimental study focused on the role of memberships to different national 
groups, as a possible anchor. It also extended the study of the lay theory of 
the international conflict by studying the role of socio-structural factors such 
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as power and duration of conflict in shaping the understanding of conflict and 
trust/distrust. Finally, it explored whether people from different nationalities 
understood differently conflict. The rationale and the specific hypotheses of 
this study are presented in chapter 8. 
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Chapter 6 
T his chapter presents the rationale, the objectives and the results of 
the first of the three empirical studies. It starts with a description of 
the method used. The presentation and discussion of the results in relation 
to the objectives addressed in earlier chapters follows. The main aim of 
the research was to explore the representational field, Le. the range of the 
explanatory resources available in the certain context and the way they 
were organised in the participants' common sense theories of international 
relationships. 
This study has been driven from a social representations' perspective and 
has attempted to explore the meanings and thoughts on international 
relationships, conflict and trust as it was organised in the context the 
research took place. Therefore a qualitative methodology has been a 
useful tool. The analysis focused on the available explanatory resources 
but also on the way they were organised. Therefore special effort was 
made to establish links between the themes that emerged. The 
participants' accounts have been treated as valid and possible in the 
specific socio-cultural context. The analysis explored and discussed the 
available representations in the way they were employed by the 
participants as building blocks of their own theories of the world. Special 
attention was given to the examples that were used by people to objectify 
international relationships whereas metaphors used by the participants 
were also emphasised. 
The objective of the research was twofold. On the one hand, it 
emphasised that what the participants said had meaning for them and 
looked for shared meaning across the participants. On the other hand, it 
was assumed that the participants adopt different positions that should be 
taken into consideration in the analysis. Participants may speak on behalf 
of or as members of humanity, their nation-state, their political affiliation, 
their local community etc. Because the speaking position of the 
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participants was important, special emphasis was given to the 
representations they draw upon to construct their positions and the 
specific type of reasoning they employed. The participant in the interview 
was regarded as a lay theodst that was trying to come to terms with the 
function of the worid, understand it, communicate with others and proceed 
or support appropdate actions. The role of the interviewer was to give the 
interviewee the opportunity to unfold his or her theory about the world. 
For this purpose a qualitative methodology was employed whereas for the 
analysis of the qualitative data the Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis framework developed by Smith was used (1995; 1996), Smith, 
Jarman and Osborn (1999) and Willig, (2001). IPA assumes that what 
people say represents what is valid and real for them but at the same time 
what is said should be seen as situated to a specific context that produces 
specific forms of knowledge and explanations. The method also 
acknowledges that the researcher inevitably uses his or her own 
experiences and concepts to approach a problem. However. theories and 
preconceptions should constitute a point of departure for the researcher 
and not limit other ideas and possible interpretations. 
For the analysis validity criteria proposed by Whittemore, Chase and 
Mandle (2001) were used. Therefore, a special effort was made to stay 
close to what the participants said, interpretations were checked 
repetitively to establish a critical and reflective approach of the data and 
themes and categories were explored thoroughly to reach saturation. 
The analysis followed the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
guidelines for the exploration of the data and the emergence of themes. 
IPA suggests two strategies for conducting the analysis, one that involves 
focusing in detail on each participant as a single case and another that 
focuses on the identification of common themes that apply to all 
participants. In the first case the focus is on certain individuals and in the 
second on a specific theme. Whether one should follow an idiographic or 
group analysis depends on the research interests and the quantity of the 
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participants vvith the idiographic approach being more appropriate With 
small samples. Because this study aimed at the exploration of shared 
meaning across the group of participants a group Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis was followed. 
13 semi-structured interviews were conducted in Greece in August 2001. 
The interview followed a pre-constructed schedule (see Appendix 1) 
however conversation flow allowed other interesting topics to emerge. The 
interview schedule covered a range of issues including participants' 
accounts of international relationships, what they thought contributes to 
peaceful relationships, what produces conflict, examples of conflict around 
the world, Greece in relation to other nations, definition of the nation-state. 
Special effort was made to explore peoples' understanding about the role 
of trust or distrust in the context of international relationships and conflict. 
The interview schedule moved from the general to the specific but this 
often changed throughout the interview. 
More specifically, the interview began With a general question. Pa'rficipants 
were asked to talk about international relationships in general. From this 
point the following two strategies were adopted: participants were either 
asked to talk more specifically how they felt about the occurrence of 
conflicts world wide or, if they had already addressed the issue of conflict, 
they were asked to further explain the reasons that they thought bring 
countries in conflict and the factors that might contribute to conflict 
resolution. Participants were asked to talk about a range of issues 
including third parties interventions, how they understood the international 
community and its role in conflicts, issues of leadership, cultural 
differences, religion etc. If participants talked in general terms they were 
asked to provide examples that illustrated their accounts. In the case that 
participants had not introduced the relationship between Greece (their in- 
group) and other countries, they were asked to do so. Questions focused 
on the relationship between Greece and its neighbours but also between 
Greece and the rest of the world. These questions referred to how the 
participants positioned their in-group within the world, how they felt that 
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other counties perceived their country, how they envisaged the 
relationships between their in-group and other groups in the future. 
Furthermore, if the concept did not emerge in the conversation, the 
participants were asked to talk about trust in the context of international 
relationship and in the context of familiar relationships of their in-group and 
other groups. They were asked to discuss the relevance of trust in this 
context and to justify their assertions. Finally, participants were asked to 
provide their accounts about what constitutes a nation-state. 
The participants were recruited through a snowballing procedure and they 
were informed that the research was about peoples' understanding of 
international relationships. The interview took place at a place of their 
choice and the average duration of the interviews was from 30 minutes to 
1 hour. All the interviews were tape recorded and later transcribed 
verbatim. In addition, field notes where kept during and after the interviews 
were being conducted. These notes were taken into consideration while 
conducting the analysis. Table 6.1 below presents some personal 
information about the participants in this study. For confidentiality 
purposes the names that appear on the table are not the real ones. 
Table 6.11: Demographic characteristics of the participants 
Name Age Sex Profession Political orientation 
Labros 45 Man Chef-cook Conservative party 
Vasilis 64 Man Elechic engineer Communist party 
Penelopi 35 Woman Officer for the protection of the Conservative party 
forest 
Elena 29 Woman Teacher Socialist party 
Persephoni 48 Woman Teacher Conservative party 
Nora 38 Woman Teacher Communist party 
Fanis 33 Man Civil servant in the employment Disaffected/not interested in 
office from politics 
Dafni 46 Woman Civil servant in the public sector Communist party 
Pantelis 55 Man Teacher Socialist party 
Effichia 31 Woman Teacher Socialist party 
Magda 56 Woman Teacher Socialist party 
Mitros 64 Man Postman Socialist party 
Vasiliki 58 Woman Teacher Socialist party 
It should be noted here that the time that the interviews were conducted 
was a relatively peaceful period for Greece and Turkey, a relationship 
often overshadowed by violations that constitute a big issue in the daily 
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news in Greece and further in the public discussion. On the other hand, 
the world has not been yet convulsed by the I 1th of September events that 
precipitated a range of actions that are happening around the world at the 
moment and rendered specific discourses salient. August is also an 
extremely peaceful, hot and sluggish month for the Greeks, cities are 
normally empty and people enjoy their holidays in tourist resorts. 
Procedure 
The aim of the analysis was to identify the themes that organised the 
participants' representations of international conflict and trust. 
The interviews were read and re-read a few times in order to become 
acquainted with the participants' accounts and be able to understand and 
interpret it. While reading the manuscripts the researcher was making 
notes, comments, associations, early interpretations, summaries about the 
themes that seemed to be interesting and significant. At an early stage 
the analysis stayed dose to the data looking for meaningful units within the 
participants' account. An effort was made to keep dose to the data and 
not rush into hasty interpretations or impose theoretical concepts on the 
data. This process enabled the production of several themes across the 
participants' accounts. 
The aim of the second stage was to identify themes that reflected a shared 
understanding by the participants. A list of the emerged themes was 
produced and links between the themes were attempted. This stage 
revealed the dynamics of some themes to attract and explain other themes 
and categories. This process required an evaluation of the themes and 
allowed the creation of categories that merged common themes. At this 
stage started the interpretative attempts of the researchers that tried to 
produce an order of the themes and concepts produced from the 
participants' accounts. 
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As the analysis proceeded new themes were added to the ones identified 
when the first scripts were read. The emergence of new themes was 
tested against earlier transcripts to see whether they could stand as 
distinct themes or they could fit with the previous ones. An effort was 
made to match the themes with several quotations from the interviews. 
This process enabled the content and the meaning of the emerged themes 
to be decided and to produce a working definition for each theme. This 
process was repeated and modified several times until the analysis 
reached a satisfactory stage for the researchers. The analysis continued 
during the writing up. 
The presentation of results uses themes to produce a coherent account of 
explanations and interpretations that appeared to be valid for the 
participants in the specific context. It also presents the complexity of 
particular themes that emerged (e. g. power) or that the research aimed to 
explore (e. g. trust/distrust). 
An important element of the interview analysis is how the researchers' 
background, concerns and interests affect both the conduct of the 
interview and the analysis. Both researchers, Spyridoula Ntani and Xenia 
Chryssochoou are Greek nationals. Therefore they share the language, 
culture and history with the participants. This was equally likely to help as 
to impinge on the analysis as on the one hand the familiarity of the context 
gave the researchers a good understanding of the explanatory resources 
in the specific setting but on the other hand it may have restricted their 
interpretative resources. 
In addition, rather than considering the data as objective and true in 
general, the perspective was to provide one reading of the data driven 
from the researchers' preconceptions, research interests, training in social 
psychology and within the social representations theoretical framework. 
The data Vill be discussed in conjunction to theoretical terms borrowed 
from the current research in social psychology and psychology in general. 
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Political issues and information about the context will be also brought into 
the analysis where appropriate. 
Although the analysis revealed a range of themes that either emerged 
spontaneously as the interview proceeded or have been introduced by the 
research, this presentation will be selective and it will focus on themes that 
dominated the discourse of the participants or were of particular interests 
for the researchers. More specifically, the analysis will look at the pair of 
the state and people. This distinction emerged when participants talked 
about the nation-state. Moreover it will illustrate the pervasive use of the 
notion of power and they way it was understood and used by the 
participants in different contexts. Along with the definition of nation-state 
that was provided by the participants the role of boundaries as the place 
where the conflict is objectified and enacted will be discussed together 
with issues of similarity and homogeneity as factors that contribute to 
harmonious relationships or engender conflict. Finally the analysis will 
shed light on the concept of distrust as it was understood and elaborated 
by the participants. 
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International conflict., people and state as the two units that constitute the 
nation-state 
As the participants developed their accounts about international 
relationships the abstract term nation-state is split into two distinct units. 
On the one hand, there is the state that includes the leadership, the 
politicians as the formal structure of the nation state and on the other hand 
there are the people that constitute the population, the ordinary people or 
the citizens. When participants talk they want to make sure of which part of 
the nation state they are referring to. For example Pantelis was eager to 
clarify: 
When I am talking about relationships between nation-states I mean the 
relationship about the states not the people (Pantelis, 55 years old, teacher, 
socialist party). 
Vasilis wants to make clear that conflicts happen at the level of the states 
and there is nothing that could divide people even if they belong to 
different ethnic groups or different nationalities. 
People, ordinary people ... there is nothing to divide an Albanian, a Skopjan, a Slav, 
a Serb, a Bulgarian, a Turk. I will give you an example. When in 1974 Turkey 
invaded Cyprus, a Turkish couple needed my help ... I knew that we were at 
war ... however, 
I felt I had no personal differences with these people. I helped them 
(Vasilis, 64 years old, electric engineer, communist party). 
Vasilis refers to his personal experience to justify his account by saying 
that in time of war he helped a couple of Turks who according to the 
situation of war between Cyprus and Turkey, he should have considered 
as enemies. Vasilis speaks from the position of an ordinary person whose 
personal experience demonstrated to him that conflicts and differences 
occur between states not people. In addition, the examples of nationalities 
that Vasilis refers to, come from the area that is close to Greece and has 
been recently convulsed by ethnic conflict and invited international 
interventions (the Balkans). 
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A consequence of differentiating between the two and treating them as 
different is that it may disqualify people from being accused as prejudiced 
or holding stereotypic views towards an out-group when these stereotypes 
are expressed towards the formal and abstract state and its practices 
rather than the people. By expressing warm feelings and identifying with 
the people of the out-group, the participant can still talk in negative terms 
about the relationship with the out-group without risking accusations of 
being prejudiced. Vasilis may also reproduce the discourse of the 
communist party with which he identifies with and places the responsibility 
for conflicts to vested interests rather than to people. 
Drawing on the collective meaning of Greeks and Turks living together 
peacefully in the past, Persefoni reaches the same conclusion when she 
talks about the relationship between Greece and Turkey. Sayings that may 
circulate in the local community constitute for Persefoni a proof that the 
problem between Greece and Turkey is not a problem of the people as 
they have proved that they can live together peacefully. 
its not a problem of the Turkish people. We used to live here with the Turks as the 
older say. and we lived well' (Persefoni, 48 years old, teacher, conservative party). 
For Magda, the problems between Greece and Turkey are also due to the 
states not the people. 
I think the problem (with Turkey) is situated at the level of the state not the people. 
If you go to Turkey people are so simple. You feel sorry for them [] They are 
oppressed people. They welcomed us like brothers in Albania and Turkey [] and if 
you ask the people nobody would want the war. We have families, children. 
Nobody wants the misfortune of his or her own children (Magda, 56 years old, 
teacher, socialist party). 
I Thesprotia, the area that the participants come from has been part of the Ottoman Empire until the beginning of the 
2dh century whereas the population was mixed including Turks and Albanians that were forced to leave the area after 
the end of the Second World War because of their relationship with the occupation forces (references). 
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There are different reasons that support her claim. On the one hand, 
people in Turkey are described by Magda as simple and oppressed that 
one should feel sorry for them. Magda possibly implies that people like that 
are not likely to create any problems. On the other hand, these people are 
presented as welcoming her and her friends as "siblings" when they visited 
Turkey. This means that Magda sees them as well intentioned. At a more 
general level Magda possibly identifies with the Turkish people or people 
in general. According to Magda, people have families and bonds that they 
are not willing to lose and this is a proof that they do not want the war. It's 
interesting to see here that Magda describes the people in Turkey as 
oppressed and people that you should feel sorry for. She doesn't see them 
as equal to her. This constitutes a well researched hypothesis in the area 
of international relationships. This hypothesis consists of a pervasive 
representation of people in authoritarian countries according to which 
people in authoritarian countries tend to be represented as nalive and 
preys of their oppressive governments. In addition, the relationship 
between the state and the people is perceived of as one of conflict. The 
state is seen as unwanted by the people who do not have the means to 
get rid of it (Bum and Oskamp, 1989). Military interventions are often 
planned in the name of liberating the people that suffer under an appalling 
regime. This allows people to act without creating doubts about their 
motives or risking a positive self-evaluation (AJexander, Brewer and 
Herrmann, 1999). From another point of view, this reflects a paternalistic 
form of prejudice as suggested by Glick and Fiske's (2000) dual nature of 
prejudice that involves a warm and competent dimension. According to 
this, by describing groups as warm and non competent one makes it easy 
to justify the exploitation of other groups without the risk of being 
characterised as prejudiced. 
Although, according to the participants, the state is responsible for the 
occurrence and perpetuation of conflict in general, when participants move 
from the abstract to more concreteand familiar Situations, people may also 
become responsible or share some responsibility. Nora for example when 
she was asked to talk about the relationship with Albanians she wanted to 
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make sure from the beginning that she would talk about the people as she 
did not perceive any problems at the level of the state. She presented 
Albanians as barbarians and tough. She tries to justify her claims by 
referring to the political situation these people grew up in, the history and 
the education. 
(about the fiJbanians) I will talk about the people now because I can't see there is a 
problem at the level of leadership. There is a problem with these people [I Maybe 
it's due to the history, the education, the political situation they grew up in, maybe 
it's their nature. They are tough people. Barbarians (Nora, 38 years old, teacher, 
socialist party) 
It is also important to notice here that Nora is trying to attribute to the 
Albanians an inferior and inhuman nature. Delegitimisation and 
dehumanisation is a phenomenon that has been explored in the study of 
phenomena related to intractable conflict where the members of the 
groups in conflict strip the opponents of their human nature (Bar Tal, 
1989). Penelopi below also identifies the lack of education at the level of 
people as a main cause of conflict. It is the uneducated people and not the 
intellectuals that are driven to the battlefield. It is ordinary people, groups 
and gangs that due to their lack of education cannot understand what 
appears for Penelopi to be obvious, that they can all co-exist peacefully. 
Penelopi represents people as irrational crowds, which has been a popular 
way of representing group behaviour in public after the influential work of 
Le Bon (1895). The individu2I is f2voured to the group, the crowd where 
the individual loses him/herself, becomes an unthinking entity and is made 
as part of the herd to act unconsciously. The reasoning of the solitary 
individual is superior to that of a crowd, which has no individuality. 
Because this war starts from the people. They fight each other, groups and gangs. 
People should understand, an efficient policy should help them realise that they 
can co-exist peacefully [] and the appropriate education will help (to realise that 
they can co-exist). Because if s not the intellectuals or educated people that fight 
this war (Penelopi, 35 years old, officer for the forest protection, conservative party) 
93 
Magda adds: 
Do the European countries have ever had conflicts? You go there and you are amazed by 
the cultural achievements (Magda, 56 years old; teacher, socialist party). 
She refers to education as a protection shield from war and seems to be 
oblivious of the two World Wars that started and involved most of the 
Europe. 
For Dafni civilisation is a shield against religious fundamentalism. Although 
these interviews have been conducted before the events of September the 
11 th, they seem to echo the claims that opposed civilisation to 
fundamentalism. 
I believe that when people are civilised and cultured, religion cannot influence them. I mean, 
it cannot separate people ... Where there is no culture. there fanaticism prevails (Dafni, 46 
years old; civil servant in the public sector. communist party). 
These last extracts reveal that there are cases where the people can be 
blamed for the conflict when it comes to a specific group that the in-group 
is familiar with and when the people are seen as uneducated. In the first 
case the out-group is the Albanians. Albania is an immigrant provider 
country for Greece and people have experienced immediate contact with 
them. Albanians constitute a group that may pose an "objective" threat for 
the in-groups' resources, security and homogeneity. 
Education seems to be an important notion when participants talk about 
people. Magda believes that educated and intelligent people could not be 
oppressed or misled by anyone. But what we can also see in the following 
extract is that the relationship between the state and the people is one of 
conflict. The leaders are presented as being motivated to keep people 
uneducated. It appears to be common sense knowledge for Magda that 
education helps people to be independent and not ddven by others. Most 
importantly the leaders use this knowledge in order to keep their people 
ignorant and therefore oppressed and easily manipulated. States want to 
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control people and the only way to do this is to keep them uneducated. It 
should be noted here that Magda is a teacher and this possibly explains 
the central role of education in her accounts. 
Its not the people's fault Its the leaders that mislead the people that are 
uneducated. And often they intentionally keep them ignorant in order to guide them 
wherever they want to. Because educated and clever people could never be 
oppressed by anyone (Magda, 56 years old, teacher, socialist party). 
Nora presents politicians as being driven by their own interests that are to 
secure their positions and continue to govern. As a result they don't take 
decisions that may result in a better outcome but they are not too radical 
because they don't want to risk their future. 
The political leaders could play an important role but unfortunately this does not 
happen all the time. Maybe because their interests are threatened. Maybe they 
don't want to risk losing the next elections. Therefore they don't do something 
radical in order to maintain their position in the future (Nora, 38 years old, teacher, 
socialist party). 
Although, it is normally the states that are attributed with ambitions, these 
can be also assigned to people. Pantelis expresses his fears about the 
territorial ambitions of the Albanians and he discerns a strong nationalism 
to both the people and the state. There are a few issues here concerning 
the example of Albania. Apart from the fact that Albanians are a familiar 
out-group associated with the increase of immigration flux in Greece, there 
is also the memory of the recent conflicts in the Balkans that were 
associated with the Albanian Movement of Uberation of Kosovo. Albanians 
are connected With the proximity of a recent and disastrous confilict that 
still convulsed the area at the time the interviews took place. 
(about Albania) Albania wants to extend its territory. It wants to become big too []I 
am afraid there is strong nationalism there at both the levels of the state and the 
people (Pantelis, 55 years old, teacher, socialist party). 
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The disbelief about the motives and the efficiency of the politicians is 
reflected in other participants' accounts. Fanis believes that politicians are 
corrupted. He believes that anyone that manages to reach this level and 
become Prime Minister has no values and morality and is corrupted. 
in Greece and other countries, in any country the leadership is corrupted. Because, 
in order for somebody to become a Prime Minister he must be a corrupted 
character. With no morality and values. A monster (Fanis, 33 years old, civil 
servant in the employment office, politically disaffected). 
It could be said here that Fanis's account is anchored in his disbelief about 
the effectiveness of politics that he reported when he was asked to 
disclose his political beliefs. He also dehumanises the politicians by 
presenting them as monsters. It is interesting that Fanis, one of the 
youngest participants is so disappointed by the politicians. 
In addition, we see that according to Dafni the relationship between the 
state and the people is asymmetrical in terms of access to information and 
knowledge. States have access to information that may never be 
presented to people or even if it is presented it may not reflect the reality. 
However, Dafni believes that people, no matter what their level of 
education is, understand a lot more today than in the past. Here the idea is 
that no matter how much the governments try to hide information and 
mislead people, people are becoming enlightened and are taking up 
control over their lives. 
The governments know a lot of things but not everything, in every detail, is 
announced to the people. They present something but you are not sure if this is the 
reality or not. Some things are confidential. But the people have awaken today [] 
the most illiterate understands a lot of things (Dafni, 46 years old, civil servant in 
the public sector, communist party). 
For Vasilis and Nora the relationship between the people and the state is 
also unequal and they suggest that appropriate action in the sense of 
revolting against this situation should be taken: 
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There is nothing to divide us as people. Everything happens as a result of inter- 
state interests. And all these have an impact on us. Therefore, we should revolt. 
With our vote, our demonstrations, our strikes (Vasilis, 64 years old, electric 
engineer, communist party). 
It could be added here that Vasilis reproduces the discourse of the 
communist party that he votes for. On the other hand, Nora as a teacher 
emphasised the importance of the education as a means of confronting 
the establishment. 
What is needed is enlightenment People should revolt. It may sound utopian but I 
believe that people would start developing and becoming cultured and in the end, 
why not, they would be able to confront the establishment (Nora, 38 years old, 
teacher, socialist party). 
However, other participants express their disbelief about the impact of 
initiatives coming from the level of people. For Fanis and Penelopi 
initiatives at the level of people and the civic society are good but if s 
difficult to be trusted and have a broader effect: 
What is needed are private initiatives. For example, nobody cared about the 
extinction of the duck before the ecological organisation took the initiative and with 
their own money did something I] But we have been given the impression that only 
the state has power therefore we don't trust initiatives that come from individuals 
(Fanis, 33 years old, civil servant in the employment office, disappointed from 
politics). 
I believe this. The fact that some volunteers (from Turkey when earthquakes 
inflicted Athens in September 1999) came here to Athens after the earthquakes 
doesn't prove anything. It was a good thing but it doesn't mean that we have 
solved our problems (with Turkey). Maybe all these little things may help the 
improvement of the relationship (with Turkey) in the future (Penelopi, 35, officer for 
the forest protection, conservative party). 
Finally, governments and leaders may appear to be more powerful but 
they appear as controlled by other parties and therefore their decisions 
may not always reflect thorough consideration of the situation but simply 
an influence of "othere not further defined by Vasilis. 
97 
In the relationship between Greece and Turkey I am not sure how far the Turks or 
our leaders... I don't know how much the decisions that have been reached after 
thought are theirs or its simply commands of others (Vasilis. 64 years old, electric 
engineer, communist party). 
This last extract emphasises that relationships between nation-states 
cannot be discussed outside the general context they are situated in and 
this includes other nation states. The worid is divided by the participants 
into rich and poor countries into powerful and non-powerful countries. 
One's own nation-state is positioned within this structure and relationships 
between nation-states are positioned and are discussed in relation to the 
consequences of being part of this structure. This last extract brings us to 
the discussion of the next theme that emerged in the accounts of the 
participants, power. 
Intemational contlicts as a result of po wer 
International relationships are put within a general context where different 
nation-states form organisations and unions. Whether a nation state would 
be part of these alliances depends on their resources and power. 
According to Elena, countries with resources and money form alliances 
that exclude the participation of other countries without these resources. 
America and Germany are the examples of powerful countries for Elena: 
Some countries that have some resources, some money like America, 
Germany ... they have a good relationship with each other and they keep outside 
other countries that they don't have this commercial relationship with them. Their 
objective is to unify with each other and keep out other countries that don't have 
power (Elena, 29 years old, teacher, socialist party). 
Eftichia and Labros also use economy to qualify a country as powerful. 
f; 
ot war like in the past years; it's the economy thatjustilles the power of a Its not 
country (Labros, 45 years old, Chef-cook, conservative party). 
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What makes a country powerful is its economy; its currency. The more powerful the 
economy of a country the more powerful the country is itself. Unfortunately, it's not 
the culture that makes a country powerful (Eftichiaý 31 years old, teacher, socialist 
party). 
Economy is presented by the participants as governing the world and 
seems to eliminate or have replaced other sources of power. It is 
interesting to note here that economy is contrasted to military power and 
cultural achievements. It seems that it overtook the "power of the guns" 
that historically countries used to achieve and demonstrate power. Eftichia 
regrets that culture does not give power to a nation. We could hypothesise 
that this regret refers to the participants national in-group, Greece, which 
is considered to have an important cultural tradition. Previous research 
has shown the tendency of Greek nationals to use culture as a resource 
that justifies their position in the European Union, even though they feel 
that they cannot contribute to its economic development (Chryssochoou, 
2000). This also reflects findings that low status groups tend to favour their 
groups in peripheral dimensions and not the one's that they "objectively" 
contribute to a high status and which they obviously lack (Mummendey 
and Schreiber, 1983). This argument continues in the words of Elena. 
Here countries with distinct culture are opposed to the world of the big 
powers. A possible interpretation is that the participant makes an implicit 
reference to Greece and she regrets that culture does not convey power. 
On the other hand we have countries with distinct culture, long traditions and 
historical heritage. These elements give them power. However, they don't give 
them the power to compete with the other (powerful) countries (Elena, 29 years 
old, teacher, socialist party). 
Participants position their own nation among the poor countries. Eftichia 
justifies the in-groups' lack of power by pointing to its inability to exploit its 
own resources. 
In Greece we don't have the power to create a strong political unit so as not to 
depend on others. Greece is a poor country. It cannot exploit its own resources 
(Eftichia, 31 years old, teacher, socialist party). 
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Greece cannot be politically strong and make its own decisions. Therefore 
it has to depend on others. Economy does not only play a crucial role in 
conflicts but also the absence of a strong economy hinders the political 
eyistence and autonomy of the nation. Being a poor nation in a world 
dominated by economically powerful nations threatens also the cultural 
traditions in the sense that cultural changes are "imposed" as Elena, who 
regretted previously the fact that culture does not convey power, suggests 
here: 
I believe that our culture changes because of the more powerful countries. I also 
think that the way we live is being changed as a result of pressure yielded from the 
nations that have the power. (Pressure) for issues such as freedom. values such 
as family, how to raise our children. There is a tendency in the poor nations to 
change their national character in order to reach the wealthy nations (Elena, 29 
years old, teacher, socialist party). 
It seems important here to point out that Elena alludes to the fact that 
dominant groups constitute the model, the reference to which every 
country needs to compare itself in order to evaluate its position 
(Deschamps, 1982). 
The powerful countries are seen by the participants as dominating the 
world. What motivates the great powers are the economic interests that 
they have. The term Oeconomic intereste emerges in the participants' 
accounts to explain a range of conflicts around the world where the big 
powers are seen as implicated. The participants define economic interests 
in different ways. 
For Eftichia the economic interests mean the enlargement and extension 
of one's own profits and benefits. Waging war is a way the big powers use 
to fulfil their objectives for expansion and dominance. On their way to 
realise their objective they do not hesitate to destroy other people. The US 
is identified as such a power. 
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Everything happens as a result of the economic interests. In otherwords: To we 
want to e)dend our business in this area? Haw can we accomplish this? Let's get 
rid of these people. Lets make war*. This is haw it works. Everything is based on 
the economic interests of the big powers. Mainly the economic interests of the US 
(Eftichia, 31 years old, teacher, socialist party). 
It is important to remind here that the interviews were conducted before 
the I 1th of September that would explain such a representation of the 
politics of USA. Other participants echo these views in relation to more 
familiar situations. Vasilis and Pantelis in the following extracts allude that 
the economic interests of third countries oppose the economic 
development of Greece and Turkey. Powerful countries are using the 
conflict between Greece and Turkey to promote their interest3 in other 
words: arms trade. Pantelis specifically names the uAmericans" as being 
behind the conflict between Greece and Turkey. Their interests are 
defined as territorial claims in the Aegean Sea. They achieve this by 
means of arms trade: 
If I refer to the conflict vAth Turkey, it is simply because of economic interests. 
Simply they want to sell arms to us and to Turkey, in order not to let us develop 
economically. The conflict is created by people with economic interests, countries 
with economic interests (Vasilis. 64 years old. electronic engineer. communist 
party). 
I believe that the relationship between Turkey and Greece would be fine if others 
didn't claim important parts of the Aegean. In fact the Americans have the claims 
and are using Turkey I] The Americans have vested interests in creating conflicts. 
That is why they give us arms. They give arms to them and they give to us 
(Pantelis, 55 years old, teacher, socialist party). 
And later Pantelis continues specifying that the arms trade is behind the 
creation of conflicts and fanaticism 
In fact there are economic interests behind this. There are some people that do not 
want to see countries being friendly. They are interested in seeing war because 
their arms must be sold somehow. They find it easy to create fanaticism (Pantelis, 
55 years old, teacher, socialist party). 
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Not only do economic interests create conflicts but also, according to 
Labros, International interventions to resolve conflicts are dictated by the 
interests of the more powerful nations. The participant draws on examples 
of the selective military interventions in recent years. Big powers intervene 
where they see there is a chance to satisfy their own interests. 
The international community and the international organisations serve the interests 
of the big powers. This was clear after the interventions of the United Nations- 
which in essence were interventions of the US-... after the war in Iraq and Serbia. 
Why didn't they intervene in Cyprus for example? Interventions only happen, where 
the interest of the big powers can be satisfied (Labros, 45 years old, Chef-cook 
conservative party). 
Power emerged as a central explanatory theme in relation to the 
occurrence and perpetuation of conflicts world-wide. What mostly 
contributes to the power of a country is its economy. Powerful nations 
create conflicts to protect their interests and constitute the cultural models 
for all nations. The position of the in-group seems an important issue. 
How people understand the world depends greatly from which position 
they see it. Our participants explain the existence of conflict by the 
existence of status asymmetries between nations founded in their 
economy. However, the power of the in-group does not have the same 
content in all contexts. 
Different contexts serve as a basis for the evaluation of national status and 
therefore as proposed by Social Identity Theorists (Tajfel and Turner, 
1979; Turner et al., 1987), a different context will change the outcome of 
the social comparison. As remarked in the following extract, if Greece 
does not do very well in the context of the European Union, it has a 
dominant position in the Balkans where it constitutes an immigrant 
destination country. Effichia suggests that people tend to discriminate 
against others when feeling superior. This seems to correspond to 
experimental findings that showed that high status groups seem to 
discriminate more (Bourhis, 1994). 
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Greece in the context of European Union, is dependent on the other countries. In 
the context of the EU the Greeks feel dependent upon others and they try to reach 
their standards. With the Balkan countries and especially with those countries that 
chose Greece as an immigration destination ... they feel they are superior and as a 
result they behave as racist (Eftichia, 31 years old, teacher, socialist party). 
It is interesting to note that although participants referred to economic 
power when they talked in abstract terms about nations, when it came to 
specific comparisons with their rival Turkey the factors that conveyed 
power shifted to include other dimensions. 
I think Turkey has more power than Greece. It has better military forces. I think 
they (the Turks) have a huge army, bigger in comparison to the one we have. On 
the other hand the Greeks have a huge cultural and historical heritage and, most 
importantly, strong will as a nation. And this is important. This is what made us 
strong in the war against the Turks (Nora, 38 years old; teacher, socialist party). 
The power of Turkey is numerical and military as Nora indicates. To 
counteract these advantages Greece has to rely on its culture and strong 
will. We can see here again the importance that culture has for Greeks as 
a source of power. Furthermore the nation is portrayed here with 
anthropomorphic characteristics such as having "strong will". According to 
Nora along with the historical heritage, strong will helped the Greek nation 
in its war against the Turks. It is important to notice here that Nora draws 
on history to elaborate her account Schoolbooks were replete with such 
descriptions and often they encouraged the image of certain enemies as 
possessing a ubarbarie character. Changes in schoolbooks have been 
introduced in the early 90's (Millas, 2001), however it seems that they are 
still available in teachers discourses. 
A final aspect of power that was explored by the participants is the support 
that big powers offer to other smaller countries and help them to realise 
their objectives. Support from big powers enables other countries to 
misbehave or realise their objectives. 
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The Turks have their reasons to do all these (being provocative). They know they 
can get away with it [ ]Turkey has its support: the Americans. That's why is so 
stubborn (Penelopi, 35 years old, officer for the protection of the forest, 
conservative party). 
Everything is decided at the tables of the'big" ones (she means the Great 
Powers). This is where the decisions are made. Albania want to create the big 
Albania but the issue is who is going to support it to do so (Nora. 38 years old, 
teacher, socialist party). 
Participants! explanations of conflict brought issues of power to the 
forefront. Power is mainly economic but other types also e)dst such as 
culture, numerical power or military. it is clear that the discourse of the 
participants is characterised by the position from which they speak. 
Evoking the world of Nations renders salient their own national 
membership. This becomes even clearer in the presentation of the next 
theme: territorial ambitions. 
Conflicts as a result of competitions over boundafies and tenItodal claims 
Although the big powers, third parties or whoever the "others* are may 
trigger conflicts between parties, the conflicts are seen as being enacted 
along the boundaries of nation-states or they are translated in territorial 
terms. Vasiliki defines these interests in terms of terTitory: 
They (nation-states) clash because of interests. Territorial interests. They might be 
pushed by others, political pressures [] The territorial claims divide people. They 
make refugees... you see young children. old people dragged in the streets. It's the 
territorial claims that generate this... (Vasilild, 58 years old, teacher, socialist party) 
For the participants, the issue of the territory is at the heart of the definition 
of the nation-state as it constitutes the most tangible way to objectify the 
nation. Along with issues of history, common language and religion, 
boundaries are seen as important to define the nation for the follomfing 
participants: 
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Nation ... what constitutes a nation 
is the common history. This is the natiort How 
are the boundaries marked. This is how a nation is defined (Effichia; teacher, 31 
years old, socialist party). 
When I say nation, I mean basically that there is a marked land. This is what I 
mean and also a nation has its own language. religion (Pantells, 55 years old, 
teacher, socialist party). 
Nation-State... A piece of land, a bunch of people with the same traditions and 
customs that were born in this land and defend it (Mitros, 64 years old, postman, 
socialist party) 
The boundaries constitute a concrete way of representing the nation. They 
mark the national territory and create the possibility of identification and 
common fate for those born inside these boundaries. They create the 
entity that has a common history, language and traditions. In that respect 
they should not be challenged and they should be respected. For instance, 
talking about the Balkans Pantelis concludes: 
I mean that every agreement should be based on the already established 
boundaries. I strongly believe that the boundaries between the Balkan countries 
should be maintained by all means (Pantelis, 55 years old, teacher, socialist party). 
Lack of territorial ambitions and claims characterise for Magda the in- 
group as a peaceful nation: 
We do not have claims. All we want is to keep our Greece as it is. They have 
deprived us from land. Despite that we are well-behaved. (Magda, 56 years old, 
teacher, socialist party). 
On the other hand, the peaceful, a claim based on the lack of tenitodal 
ambitions national in-group, is contrasted with the expansionism of the 
out-group as Labros in the following extract suggests: 
We do not want to take Constantinople (the Christian name of Istanbul), as the 
Turks accuse us of, or the coast of Asia Minor. But the Turks want to take our 
islands, they want Cyprus, they want a larger part of Cyprus. They are continuously 
demanding. (Labros, 45 years old, chef-cook conservative party) 
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In many interviews the participants expressed feelings of threat that the 
territory and the Greek boundaries might be disputed. This fact is seen as 
impinging on the relationships with the neighbouring countries, for 
example Turkey and creates distrust. 
Its the territorial claims of Turkey. Its all these incidents in the Aegean Sea with 
the disputes of Greek sovereignty ... our islands. Under these circumstances, we 
can't have a good relationship with Turkey (Penelopi, 35 years old; Officer for 
Forest Protection, conservative party). 
Turkey has expansionist aspirations. For us here in Greece it is the only country 
that desires the Aegean Sea and our islands (Mitros, 64 years old; postman, 
socialist party) 
However, boundaries may be transgressed not only by the territorial 
ambitions of neighbours but also from the uncontrollable flux of 
immigrants. Vasiliki regrets the situation with the AJbanians that are 
entering the country illegally and are chased by the Greek authorities that 
send them back to Albania. 
The situation with Albania was a mistake. When they opened the borders... they 
shouldn't have done it as they did: 'enter and do as you please.... They should 
have done it in a more organised way. We should not be in the position that they 
come here hiding and that we have to send them back like that [] It's not right for 
everybody to cross the borders without permission or illegally. The borders are 
open to be crossed by anyone, providing they bring their identification documents 
and their passport. All these things must be controlled. The borders must be 
controlled ... in order 
for us to feel safe (Vasilild, 58 years old, teacher, socialist 
party). 
The borders are open under the monitoring of the authority of the state 
that controls them and protects the nationals providing them with a sense 
of security. The definition of the state through its boundaries outlines the 
limits of the national in-group, the recipient of rights. Boundaries and 
borders are places where the meaning of memberships is negotiated 
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(Wilson and Donnan, 1998a and 1998b). The participant in the next 
extracts claims, OR is not right that everybody hoards here". 
The relationship with Albania is under development II people with criminal records 
enter our country and create all these problems we experience in the area (crime, 
xenophobia etc). [j The relationship Wth Albania must be taken seriously because, 
at the end of the day, its not right that everybody hoards here (Penelopi, 35 years 
old; officer for the forest protection, conservative party). 
Immigrants from Albania are accused of having cAminal records and of 
being responsible for increased rates of crime in the area. Boundaries are 
important for the objectification of a relationship. The way countries 
consider their boundaries is indicative of their relationships. Open 
boundaries are indicative of a friendly relationship between two countries 
while control and monitoring is indicative of hostility and mistrust (Trovoll, 
1999). For the participants, the open boundaries with Albania may signify 
a relationship that they do not forsake. 
Contlict due to the threats to in-groupshomogeneity 
The fact that people transgress these boundaries constitutes a threat to 
the national in-group by challenging its homogeneity. It seems that a 
homogeneous group in terms of language, traditions and history is less 
likely to experience conflicts and nations that are similar can co-exist 
peacefully as expressed below: 
If they (the nations) can find ground of common identification, if they have common 
roots; common culture. Uke the countries ... like Austria and Germany that are very 
close with each other. They can co-exist without any problem (Pantelis, 55 years 
old; teacher, socialist party). 
Countries that can co-e)dst peacefully are the ones that share common culture, 
language, same national celebrations, common religion (Elena, 29 years old; 
teacher, socialist party). 
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Similarity with the out-group members is important when one thinks about 
the future of a relationship. Elena for example is trying to understand in the 
following extract why the relationship with Turkey is not working as it 
should be. She sees the two countries as very similar that she considers 
as a criterion for peaceful relationships. In order to come to terms with this 
inconsistency she is seeking reasons for the conflict outside the 
relationship. She finds these reasons by referring to the nature of the area 
the two countries are situated in suggesting that it is a crossroad, an 
important passage for others. It is interesting to see here that Elena 
alludes that the very nature of an area that the two countries are situated 
in breeds conflict. Most importantly, Elena emphasises, as previous 
participants did that aotherss are responsible for the conflict between 
Greece and Turkey: 
While we are so close ... we are talking about two similar countries. Similar in the 
sense that they have the same climate, we produce the same things, our roots are 
the same. Because we are so similar we should be closer. Therefore its our 
position in the map. The rest of the countries see us as a crossroad and want to 
exploit us (Elena, 29 years old, teacher, socialist party). 
Participants express doubts that culturally dissimilar entities can peacefully 
co-exist and co-operate vvith each other. At best the different groups are 
segregated and live in parallel according to Effichia: 
Its very difficult if not impossible for different ethnic groups to live together. That's 
why there are ghettos. This is clear in countries-destinations of economic 
immigrants. In Germany for example, there is the Greek community, the Turkish 
society, and other societies. They have created their own group and they don't 
transgress the boundaries of their own community (Eftichia, 31 years old; teacher, 
socialist party). 
Perceived similarity with the out-group makes Labros positive about the 
future of relationships between Greece and Albania. Similarity is defined 
here by evoking a past where the in-group members were in a similar 
situation as the one that the out-group members are in at present. It could 
be said here that Labros empathises with the out-group members. 
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Albanians are progressive people. irs only in the last few years that they stayed 
behind. If we look at Greece 50 years ago we will see that we were what the 
Ad banians are today [] When we were immigrating to Europe they treated us as 
second-class citizens. This is what the Affianians are today (Labros, 45 years old, 
chef-cook, conservative party). 
Even within the European Union it is expected that conflicts will rise. Dafni 
believes that the future of the European Union is unstable because of the 
human factor, which she describes as different religions, traditions, 
language and culture: 
It is very difficult for different elements to co-exist within the same country. Even 
the European Union and the countries that are members, I believe that soon lots of 
problems will arise as a result of the human nature, the religion, the different 
traditions, the culture, the language (Dafni, 46 years old; civil servant in the public 
sector, communist party). 
However, Fanis explains the absence of conflicts within the Union because 
of the regulations and the eAstence of laws. 
At present, the countries that belong to the European Union are obliged to maintain 
harmonious relationships because of the lam (Fanis, 33 years old; civil servant in 
the Employment Agency, disappointed from politics). 
For others, the unique history of Greece can help the country to survive 
such pressures of enforced homogeneity, which is how Pantelis 
understands globalisation. He pictures globalisation as a melting pot that 
threatens to dissolve the particularities and the uniqueness of the different 
nations. 
Because people have a history, an identity etc. Unfortunately, globalisation wants 
to see people as a crowd, a horde of animals that are driven by their leaders, the 
establishment. the bank establishment the economic interests [] they want to put 
all people into a melting pot [] Greece has a unique history and it can survive this. 
As long as this danger is emphasised to the new generation (Pantelis, 55 years 
old, teacher, socialist party) 
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Pantelis as a teacher emphasises the importance of making known to the 
new generations the danger of losing ones! uniqueness. People's worries, 
concerns and threats are bound to their own experiences. Possibilities of 
actions may be constructed in regard to experiences and the context that 
people see themselves acting in and their attempts to be realised. 
To summarise the emerging "theory', we could say that conflicts occur 
because of economic interests of powerful nations that control the fate of 
others or because of challenges to the e)dsbng boundaries of nation- 
states. The transgression of the boundaries can also threaten the cultural 
homogeneity of the nation and put it at risk of internal conflicts between 
nationals and non-nationals. Laws and regulations can maintain peace. 
However, the chwilis2tion of the n2tion and the education of its people 
might protect from conflicts. As we will see in the analysis that follows 
concerning trust those who do not have a high civilisation cannot be 
trusted. 
Trust(distrust 
Participants were asked to describe the role of trust In the context of 
relationships between nation-states. In general their answers refer to their 
familiar situation of the relationship between their own country and its 
neighbours. They express doubts that trust can exist, in particular between 
Greece and Turkey and they justify their assertions. Their answers can be 
classified into three dimensions. The out-group cannot be trusted either a) 
because of its actions (i. e. it violates agreements etc); b) and/or because 
of its Ocharacter" c) and/or because of elements in the social environment 
that might prevent it from keeping its promises and behave in an expected 
and agreed way (its political situation, incapable leadership, it does not 
have a record of keeping international agreements such as human rights 
etc). 
110 
However, Dafni, when prompted to talk about the issue of trust between 
nation-states, replied in general terms pointing out that governments might 
not always say what happened and people lose their trust. Dafni 
emphasises that there is a decline in values and people are only motivated 
by money. Therefore trust cannot be built It is interesting that the loss of 
one's identity constitute a barrier to communication and the development 
of trust. 
After years we discover things (concerning the negotiations)... You never know... 
Unfortunately there is no trust People do not trust. This is the problem I see. There 
is a cdsis of values, there is no Vision... I believe that humankind has lost its 
identity, it has changed. Thats where everything started. When you have lost your 
identity it is difficult to communicate with others, to trust them. Money, Money... 
People have been dedicated to money they became its slaves (Dafni, 46 years old, 
civil servant in the public sector, communist party). 
But when it comes to specific relations the out-group cannot be trusted 
because it proceeds to certain actions. The following extracts illustrate this 
argument. In the first one Elena points to the violations of the boundaries 
that are a concrete transgression of the agreements and concludes that in 
these cases trust cannot be expected. Consistency with ones'words and 
keeping of agreements especially in a period of peace between the two 
countries were used by Elena as explanations that justify her belief about 
the lack of trust between the two countries: 
I don't think we can talk about trust between nation-states. [] Lets use Greece and 
Turkey as an example. Afthough at the moment the two countries are going 
through a peaceful period there are constant violations of the territorial sovereignty 
from both sides. Therefore, the trust one should expect doesn't exist [] when they 
sign an agreement they should respect ft. Sometimes there are steps back. They 
say they will do something and they don't (Elena, woman, 29 years old, teacher, 
socialist party). 
For Penelopi the way the out-group is predisposed towards the in-group is 
an important prerequisite before one talks about trust: 
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To trust another country it depends on the political position that this country has in 
relation to us (Penelopi, 35 years old; officer for the forest protection, conservative 
party) 
Persefoni also emphasises that trust would be assigned to an out-group 
depending on actions that the out-group should take and not the words 
and promises that it might make. Concrete actions, over time, are 
important as evidence that trust can be expected In a relationship. It is 
important to notice here that trust is associated with the demand of 
concrete actions and not promises. 
Relations are not only words, we need actions, not only promises... (Persefoni, 48 
years old; teacher, conservative party) 
Nora also emphasises the importance of consistency when one evaluates 
the trustworthiness of an out-group, in this case Turkey. For Nora 
consistency Is incongruent with the challenge of boundaries, an action that 
is associated with the out-group. 
We need consistency from the political leadership of the countries, on what they 
say. For example the Greek and Turkish leaderships are making efforts to get 
closer but in fact nothing is respected. Don't they challenge the boundaries in the 
Aegean constantly? Is this political consistency? (Nora, 38 years old; teacher, 
socialist party) 
Trust enters the discourse when people or groups were not given the 
appropriate response to actions that the in-group has taken and are 
generally seen as charitable and generous (Garfinkel, 1963). For Mitros, 
the opening of the boundaries that gave permission to the out-group 
members, here the Albanians, to enter Greece was not followed by the 
appropriate behaviour. 
We opened the boundaries, they came to our country. The political situation was a 
dictatorship for 40-50 years ... their standards of living were so 
bad that most of 
them died before they reached 45 [1 (Their lives were) work and hard life and only 
little food. And then we opened the boundaries and they spread to Italy and 
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Greece. We welcomed them with the best intentions. But they didn't live up to our 
good hospitality (Mitros, 64 years old; postman. socialist party) 
The in-groups'well-intended actions were not reciprocated. The 
description of the out-group as suffering and living in very low standards 
emphasises the magnitude of the in-groups! well-intended actions. The 
out-group is accused for not changing and not responding positively to the 
positive actions of the in-group. Referring to the Albanians the participant 
regrets that they did not live up to the hospitality offered. The building of 
trust is based on a give and take process (Rempel and Holmes, 1985) 
where not all actions constitute an appropriate return to a favour or good 
deed (Blau, 1967) and violations are frequent (Bies and Tripp, 1996). Later 
Mitros expresses the same disappointment vis-, I-vis the Turks. Here again 
the in-group is presented as well intended but trust is lost because the out- 
group does not seem to reciprocate: 
Although we, after the earthquakes, had the best intentions to develop friendly 
relationships, I am expressing my deep disappointment, but they have remained 
the same (Mitros. 64 years old; postman. socialist party). 
The second set of explanations of distrust is associated vvith the nature or 
the ucharacter" of a specific out-group. In this particular extract Penelopi 
portrays the Turks as unpredictable and as people that can "go crazy". 
But the situation is quite risky. Something may happen ... because 
Imia came up 
suddenly and we nearly came to the verge of open confrontation and war. You can 
never know if something like that will happen in the future again. I] Although I 
believe that it's relatively impossible to happen... but the Turks are unpredictable. 
Its not impossible that they go crazy one day and occupy several of our islands 
(Penelopi, 35 years old; officer for the forest protection, conservative party). 
Although Penelopi thinks that it is relatively unlikely that something will 
trouble the relationship between Greece and Turkey in the future she still 
feels that the situation is risky. She justifies her uncertainty by referring to 
the unpredictable nature of the Turks. The character of the out-group can 
113 
also Oprevent7 them from keeping their promises in contrast with the 
a natural* trustworthiness of the in-group as Mitros remarks: 
We the Greeks, how can I put it... when we say something we keep our word 
whereas they can't be friends. An agreement is respected from Greece whereas it 
is not from Turkey. I don't think they would keep it (the agreement) (Mitros, 64 
years old; postman, socialist party). 
It is also the lack of civilisation that makes the out-group not worthy of the 
in-group's trust as the following extract indicates. 
The Turks have shown all these years that they do not build something. They don't 
have a civilisation. They do not have roots. They continuously destroy. Not only the 
Greeks but also the Bulgarians and the Armenians and the Kurds now. They do not 
have anything to show in terms of civilisation (Labros, 45 years old; chef-cook, 
conservative party). 
The out-group again is disqualified from being a nation worthy of the in- 
group's trust. The fact that the out-group does not have cultural 
achievements to demonstrate becomes more Important when Labros 
refers to the area that the Turkish State is situated as an area that in the 
past has given rise to great civilisations. He continues saying: 
Although they lived in an area that has given rise to great civilisations, like the 
Assyrians, Iraq etc Turks haven't managed to show anything. Why should we trust 
them now (Labros, 45 years old; chef-cook conservative party)? 
Vasiliki, when asked whether there is trust between nations replied 
pointing either to the character of the out-groups or to their similarity with 
the in-group, drawing on history to justify and validate the truthfulness of 
the stereotypes she expressed. 
I believe that AJbania and Turkey are a little bit weird despite the fact that we help 
them. Now with Serbia we always had good relationships, we have the same 
religion. Now with Bulgaria, I dont know. they are cunning people, from what I read 
in History (Vasilild, 58 years old; teacher, socialist party). 
114 
It is interesting to see how Vasiliki draws on different explanations to 
explain distrust or trust in relation to different out-groups. To begin with, 
Turkey and Albania are distrusted because they do not seem to respond 
or reciprocate to the help that the in-group offers. In relation to the 
character of these out-groups, they are both characterised as "weird". The 
good relationship with Serbia seems to be justified because of the 
common Christian Orthodox religion. However, this does not seem to be 
enough for Bulgaria. Vasiliki seems to dismiss the fact that Bulgarians are 
Christian Orthodox too and she draws on history to explain their cunning 
character. 
By reflecting on the character of the out-group history becomes a sources 
that explain it Beliefs and stereotypes are embedded in historical 
accounts. Mitros in order to show that the Turks have not changed over 
the years after referring to the current human rights violations he goes 
back in history and draws images of the Ottoman Empire. 
They had us as slaves for 400 years [I Now, they have the same prisons as they 
had then, in ancient times, when they had us chained in the water.... (Mitros, 64 
years old; postman, socialist party) 
A final source for explanations of distrust is the consideration of elements 
in the environment that make the participants believe that the out-group 
cannot be trusted. According to the following participants the political 
situation of the out-group is such that the in-group should be cautious. 
Pantelis expresses his cautiousness about the relationship between 
Greece and Turkey because he thinks that the country is governed by the 
military establishment and not by the politicians. Pantelis implies here that 
Turkey is not a democratic country and its politicians cannot be trusted 
because they have no control over the decision-making: 
I am quite cautious (about the recent developments of the relationships between 
Greece and Turkey), mainly because its not the polibcians that have control of the 
country but mainly the Army, the military establishment [I that intervenes in the 
political decision making (Pantelis, 55 years old; teacher, socialist party). 
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For Effichia, Turkey is a country with many problems something that 
makes her believe that Turkey cannot be trusted. 
No. There can't be trust in Turkey. We must always be careful as we are ... Because 
it's a country with many problems and nobody knows what can crop up (Eftichia, 31 
years old; teacher. socialist party)... 
As a result of not trusting the out-group, one should be cautious and 
careful. Magda links the lack of trust in Turkey vvith a concern for arm 
expenditures: 
There cannot be trust in Turkey. We should be always cautious as we are. We 
should not be inferior in arms expenditure and weapons so we could feel stronger 
(Magda: 56 years old. teacher. socialist party). 
In the following extract Penelopi in order to explain her distrust points out 
the fact that Turkey does not respect Human Rights nor has equality 
between sexes. Therefore it is disqualified somehow from being a partner 
in a trusting relationship. 
In Turkey there is no human rights respect! They arrested Ochalan and many other 
people, and there are documentaries about the conditions they are kept in ... and 
there is much more. There is no equality between men and women. Turkey has to 
prove that it can reach these standards first (Penelopi, 35; officer for the protection 
of forest, conservative party). 
Penelopi emphasises that Turkey ushould reach these standards firsir 
before one can talk about trust. Human rights have been suggested to 
constitute organising principles that help people to assess and evaluate 
international relationships within a context of the global world (Spini and 
Doise, 1998). Common understandings, common values and 
representations of the world, constitutes a first source for assuming or 
building trust (Brewer, 2000). 
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Discussion 
The main aim of this study was to explore the way people explain and give 
meaning to the world of international relationships, conflict and trust. One 
of the main assumptions of this research was that meaning has to be 
regarded as relevant to a specific context and as a product of processes of 
communication and influence that take place in public. In addition, this 
process as it was illustrated by Social Representations Theory (Moscovid, 
1971/1979,1984,2000) is historical and occurs in a certain context and 
produces shared representations. Therefore in order to study these 
theories one should access the channels in which they circulate. 
The current study sought to explore the lay theories of international conflict 
and trust as they were employed by participants from Greece. The 
analysis looked for shared aspects in the participants' accounts. Most 
importantly, their representations were discussed in relation to the 
positions that were adopted by the participants. It was argued that the way 
the participants understand the position of their own nation within the world 
of nations and the cultural and historical environment they find themselves 
in, shapes their understanding of the wodd. 
The analysis focused on the reasons that produce or perpetuate 
international conflict and restrain parties to reach conflict resolution. 
Participants differentiated between the state and the people that were 
described as two distinct elements of the abstract notion of nation-state. 
The participants presented the relationship between the two as 
asymmetrical and often conflicting and they identified with the people. 
People were generally seen as suffering the consequences of the 
decisions made by the states who were the ones that start conflicts and 
even manipulate people in order to promote their interests. Although 
people were generally presented as the victims of the decisions taken by 
the states and states appeared to be responsible for the conflicts, people 
could be equally responsible when it comes to familiar relationships. More 
specifically while in the general context of intemational relationships 
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people were presented as helpless, powerless and victims of international 
politics when it came to the relationships between the in-group (Greece) 
and specific out-groups such as Turkey, AJbania etc, people were 
considered also responsible for the conflict. In addition, it has been shown 
that in some cases, only people were considered as responsible while the 
governments were absent from the participants' accounts. 
In relation to this, previous research has emphasised that different 
processes apply to abstract and specific situations (Jackman, 1978). For 
example, while people may oppose the death penalty in general they may 
consider it as relevant to specific situations. Spini and Doise(1998) have 
suggested that the distinction between abstract versus applied organising 
principles is common when people want to provide a socially desirable 
answer. However, people often abandon their socially desirable positions 
especially in situations where they are personally and emotionally 
involved. Apart from the motive of social desirability there is an issue of 
identification in the case of international conflict. Participants identify with 
the people that they present as the victims that suffer the consequences of 
conflicts. As individuals they feel that there is nothing that could make 
people fight against each other. In the case of more specific examples, the 
participants employed issues of similarity, cultural backwardness and 
brutality in order to justify their attribution of responsibility to the people. In 
other words, they employed an essence of the out-group described as 
inferior and dangerous to the in-group. This process has been referred to 
the social psychological literature as essentialism (Haslam, Rothschild and 
Ernst, 2000). Essentialist beliefs and de-personalisation of the enemy is a 
common strategy that is used by the people in a context of long term 
conflict (Bar-Tal, 1989,2000). The enemy is stripped from its human 
essence and therefore it is easier to deny them rights and privileges. 
A second position that the participants took while they were talking about 
international conflict was with reference to the world of nations and the 
way they understood relationships in this context. The participants 
employed the concept of power in order to organise their theories of 
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occurrence and persistence of conflict world-wide. Power was used to 
differentiate nation-states. In broad terms, power becomes synonymous to 
a strong economy. As a result the worid is divided between powerful and 
powerless nation-states. Within this framework, participants situated their 
own group as a less powerful country. 
Cleady, participants provided a representation of the world in terms of a 
hierarchy. Nation-states were situated higher or lower in this structure 
depending on their economical power. This result is in line with the 
assumptions of various theories that stress the importance of socio- 
structural factors in shaping the representation of the social world. These 
include the Social Dominance Approach (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and 
Malle, 1994), Elite theory and the Five-stage model (Tan and Moghaddan, 
1999; Taylor and Moghaddan, 1994). An important implication of such a 
representation of the worid is that it constitutes a reason that explains the 
occurrence and the perpetuation of conflicts. Inequalities in terms of 
power, misuse of power by some were considered to be at the heart of 
intemational conflict. Powerful nation-states were seen as dominating the 
wodd, intervening in other countries! affairs and were considered as the 
main forces responsible for conflicts. Conflict was considered to be the 
result mainly of the economic interests of "Big Powers". Economic 
interests were defined in territorial terms, access to resources and 
extension of business. This is dose to the belief that power corrupts 
(Depret and Fiske, 1993). 
Another consequence of this representation is that it produces a sense of 
the position of ones' own group within this structure. The participants 
positioned their country along with the less powerful groups compensating 
for this by yielding other dimensions of power such as culture and 
historical heritage. Research has suggested that such a representation of 
the wodd is more likely to be found among dominated groups that feel 
deprived from privileges and standards imposed by dominant groups 
(Deschamps, 1982). Moreover, this sense of group position is not based 
on the evaluation of the in-group at a specific point in time without 
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considering the history of the affiliations of the group with other groups. On 
the contrary, group position has been suggested to be the result of a long 
term social and historical process of exchange and dissemination of 
shared ideas about where one group should stand in the social order 
relative to other groups (Blumer, 1958). Research should take into 
consideration the sense of group position and study its consequences in 
shaping people's understanding of the social word. Research has shown 
that participants coming form certain countries had difficulties considering 
other positions for their own nation apart from being dominant (Herrmann, 
Voss, Schooler and Ciarrochi, 1997; Moscovici, 1972). Theories have 
neglected the fact that people's understanding of the world may differ 
depending on the different positions that they place their own nation. 
Military power has also emerged as a dimension of comparison between 
nation-states. In the context of the relationship between Greece and 
Turkey, military power was considered to be important by the participants. 
This may reflect the fact that the specific out-group is considered to be and 
is commonly known, as the traditional enemy (Millas, 2001). Finally, 
different contexts triggered the use of different dimensions of power. 
Whereas in the international context the in-group was considered to be 
powerless, in other contexts it was seen as powerful using the same 
dimensions. An implication of this is that one should be always aware of 
the context that the representation of power takes shape. 
In more specific situations, boundaries and territorial claims between 
nation states were considered the cause of conflict. Territorial claims and 
violation of boundaries were thought to sustain and perpetuate conflicts. 
The fact that boundaries and conflict over land were very important for the 
participants needs to be considered in relation to the definition that the 
participants provide about the nation, and the importance of boundaries in 
sustaining the nation-state. This reflects the collective memory of the 
process of the construction of the modem Greek Nation-State. Boundaries 
are associated Wth the emergence of the nationalist movements in the 
Balkans and a series of wars and movements in the Ottoman empire that 
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also include the Balkan wars (1912-1913), the world wars and the recent 
reconstruction of boundaries in former Yugoslavia. Greek nationalism 
constitutes an example of an ethnic group that aims to create its own state 
(Millas, 2001). This is a rather different process than that of perhaps, the 
nationalist movements in France or Britain, for example, where the ethnic 
group and the state developed in parallel or as in the case of Turkey 
where the state pre-existed but there was no sense of ethnic identity. The 
emergence of nationalism has created the world as it is known today 
(Smith, 1986): a world of nations that constitutes an almost natural 
representation of the world (Billig, 1995). However, research should take 
into consideration how these processes are imprinted in the collective 
memory and shape the understanding of the world in certain contexts. 
Relevant to this is the issue of homogeneity as an important factor that 
could sustain or hinder relationships between nations. Participants used 
the criterion of similarity and congruence of beliefs in order to explain why 
some relationships are more peaceful. Similarity was seen as important to 
sustain relationships while conflicts were explained in terms of lack of 
similarity and dashing interests between nation-states or their populations. 
Even international organisations such as the European Union were seen 
as threatened with downfall due to cultural differences. It should be noted 
here that Greece is a country with a population predominantly white, 
Greek speaking and orthodox Only in recent years has Greece become a 
recipient of immigrants that mostly come from the former Soviet Union, 
Albania and other Balkan countries (Lazaridis and Wickens, 1999). Lack of 
experience of living together with people from different ethnic, linguistic, 
racial groups may explain the adherence of the participants in the similarity 
principle and its importance in peaceful relationships between groups. 
Finally, this study focused on the exploration of trust in the context of 
international conflict. More specifically, participants were asked to provide 
their accounts on the role of trust in the context of international 
relationships, how relevant they thought it was and issues that contributed 
to a trusting relationship. This study is very important if one considers the 
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lack of research on the way people understand trust in a context of 
international conflict. One of the contexts in which the participants 
discussed trust was in relationship to general theories about humanity and 
values. The decline of values, the lack of vision for the future and the loss 
of personal identity were linked to the lack of trust. However, trust was 
mostly discussed in the context of international relationships with respect 
to big powers and in the familiar relationship of the in-group with an out- 
group. 
It is important to notice here that the participants mainly talked about 
distrust or lack of trust in the relationships. A first interpretation of this is 
that trust may be a quality restricted within the boundaries of the In-group 
as proposed by Brewer (2000). Therefore, it is expected that distrust is a 
sort of default option when it comes to the evaluation of the relationship 
with an out-group. Although participants often described relationships in 
favourable terms, they were hesitant to consider the relationship as a 
trusting one. If one considers this interpretation then one should accept 
that trust is an irrelevant concept in inter-group relations unless there are 
grounds of common identification. If there is no such possibility then inter- 
group relations are not very likely to be peaceful. 
Another issue that may explain the fact that the participants talked mainly 
about distrust is the fact that they discuss it in the context of a relationship 
with an out-group that their in-group shares a history of animosity and 
disputes with (e. g. Turkey). Trust deals with the unfamiliar in social life in 
the sense that it reduces uncertainty (Luhmann, 1978; Weigert and Lewis, 
1985). It is a concept that becomes relevant when one encounters 
unfamiliar aspects in the relationship. This could be the case when 
changes are introduced in the relationship i. e. when two groups discuss 
the prospect of reaching an agreement after a period of conflict. In these 
situations, representations of trust/distrust would be made available in 
everyday discourse as means of coping with the transformation of the 
image of an out-group from an enemy to a new image of this group as a 
partner. People may either start with trusting the out-group until they are 
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proved wrong or start with distrusting the out-group until they think that 
trust can be justified. The tendency to trust or distrust has been proposed 
to be a cultural characteristic (Fukuyama, 1995). However, in the case of 
conflict between groups that share a history of animosity people are more 
likely to start with distrusting the intentions of the other. Finally, distrust 
may be the discourse of the powerless. Participants may have talked 
about distrust as members of a less powerful nation with a history of 
conflicts. 
Justifications of distrust are important, as there is a range of actions that 
are built on the basis of lack of trust in another party. International 
relationships are replete of such examples that include the arms race 
between the USA and the Soviet Union during the cold war (Osgood, 
1962) and missed opportunities to reach agreements and peaceful 
settlements (Larson, 1997). In order to legitimise their actions, leaders 
often employ a discourse based on the creation of insecurity of potential 
enemies in order to establish their power. Zimmerman (1995) provides an 
example of the way that leaders such as Slobodan Milosevio and Franjo 
Tudjman forged hatred and distrust of an ethnic enemy to gain power. 
The participants' accounts of distrust were grouped into three types of 
explanations. The first one is action based, the second character based 
and the third one situational based. Although all types of explanations may 
be available and shared by group members, people may differ in their 
adherence to aspects of them. Factors that may help to explain individual 
differences in this context may be peoples' memberships and valued 
identities, representations of the nation and the meaning they attach to it 
and perceptions of social relationships with issues of power differences 
and issues of relative deprivation being critical. In addition, personal 
experiences and beliefs should be looked at, such as feelings of personal 
injustice, beliefs about the nature of social relationships and the place of 
competition and conflict as inevitable consequences of the existence of 
different groups. In addition, beliefs about safety and security in the wodd 
should be looked at The following chapters further explore the relationship 
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of distrust justifications vvith these systems of beliefs and perceptions of 
social regulabons. 
From this analysis one can see that when the participants were prompted 
to talk about trust between nations, they mainly talk about distrust or lack 
of trust. The participants justified their assertions by using three main 
categories of explanations. The first category draws on concrete actions of 
the out-group that disqualify it from being trustworthy, the second category 
refers to internal characteristics of the nature of the out-group and the last 
one to situational, external characteristics. If trust/distrust has become 
concrete in the actions, situational factors and internal characteristics of 
relevant out-groups then it is important to further explore other beliefs and 
bulks of meaning that it is anchored to. The following empirical chapters 
will further show how the representation people have of the world and the 
particular relationship and their understanding of power asymmetries along 
with their beliefs, values and uncertainties, their identifi cat ons, positions 
and attachment to the in-group might be anchors of trust/distrust. 
To summarise, this research sought to explore the theories people hold 
about international relationships, conflict and trust within a specific context. 
Issues of power and in-group positioning, experience of familiar 
relationships and history were used to understand the emergence of 
themes. Finally, an exploration of the concept of trust in the context of 
international conflict was provided. 
PQ 
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Chapter 7 
T he bipolar concept of trust/distrust has been introduced earlier as a 
"thema" whose poles are activated differently in specific relational 
contexts. Therefore it is important to study what makes people move along 
this dimension and display different levels of trust/distrust In other words, 
and along with the theoretical lines discussed in chapter 3, it is important to 
study the possible anchors of trust/distrust. 
Following Doise's (1992) theoretical framework presented in earlier 
chapters, it is suggested here that trust/distrust can be anchored on 
personal beliefs and values (psychological anchoring), on sociological 
memberships (sociological anchoring) or on different understandings of the 
relationship between groups and the power structure (social-psychological 
anchoring). In this chapter, an attempt is made to test this idea empirically. 
In particular, it is hypothesised that trust/distrust might be anchored on 
personal beliefs and attachments that are formed in different stages in life 
and could be seen as relatively stable and unchallenged. Such beliefs 
could be the way people are attached to their national in-group, the levels 
of their identification with it, different belief orientations and fears (social 
dominance, political orientation and belief in a dangerous world) and 
feelings of personal relative deprivation. On the other hand, the social 
psychological anchoring concerns the way that the specific inter-group 
relationship is understood. For example possible anchors are: the type of 
perceived interdependence between the two groups, the expectations 
about the relationship in the future, group relative deprivation, attribution of 
responsibility for the problematic situation between two groups and 
perceptions of power of the two groups. 
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Possible psychological anchors of trust(distrust 
Levels of identification with the national in-group and the type of 
attachment to the nation can be possible anchors. If trust/distrust becomes 
a salient issue when we are in presence of a strong in-group/out-group 
differentiation, like the situations of conflict, it is possible that identification 
with the in-group and types of attachment to it play a role in the 
development of trust/distrust. Recognising that one's national identity is 
important for the individual constitutes a kind of declaration that he/she 
shares the group beliefs of this particular group (Bar-Tal, 1989). In the 
case of protracted conflict such beliefs might include the derogation of the 
out-group and feelings of distrust in them. Researchers (Hopkins and 
Murdoch, 1999; Triandafyllidou, 1998) have drawn attention to the key role 
of certain "otherso in the process of constructing a national identity. In the 
case of a problematic relationship, the feelings towards the uenemy" can 
be related to the levels of identification to the national group. Therefore 
levels of identification with the in-group might play a significant role in the 
anchoring of trust/distrust 
The relation to the national in-group is not characterised only by the 
importance the group has for peoples' self-presentation. It has been 
argued that there are two different types of attachment to the nation: a 
blind and a constructive attachment (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989; Schatz, 
Staub and Lavine, 1999; Schatz and Staub, 1997; Staub, 1997). More 
specifically, blind patriotism is associated with the unquestionable 
allegiance to the nation and the intolerance of criticism directed to it, 
whereas constructive patriotism is associated with criticism of decisions 
and practices of one's nation and an orientation to a positive change. 
These two types of attachment with the nation have been found to relate 
differently to a variety of policies, attitudes to out-groups, perceived 
importance of certain group symbols and practises and information 
processing (Schatz, Staub and Lavine, 1999). It has been argued that 
these two types of attachment relate to the distinction between nationalistic 
(blind) and patriotic (constructive) feelings (Mummendey et al., 2001). Here, 
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along with others (Condor 2001; Hopkins 2001) these constructs are not 
considered "good" or nbad" individual properties. It is suggested that these 
constitute sets of beliefs that express normative ways of relating towards 
the nation: the one accepts that the national in-group can be wrong 
whereas the other considers that the in-group is always right. In that sense, 
and following Brewers (2000) argument that trust is a property of the in- 
group, it can be expected that those who have a blind orientation towards 
the nation, when in conflict, might feel that trust should be endowed only to 
the in-group and distrust is the appropriate feelings towards the out-group. 
On the other hand, the more constructive orientation could allow the 
thought that the out-group is trustworthy. Thus, it seems important to 
investigate how these two types of attachment relate to trust. 
The perception that the world is a dangerous place can be also associated 
with distrust. In chapter 4, trust/distrust has been theorised as functional 
equivalents of uncertainty reduction since they become salient when the 
world as known is challenged (Luhmann, 1988). Questioning aspects of 
the social environment that otherwise would be taken for granted 
constitutes a source of increased uncertainty. In addition, in contexts of 
protracted conflict fear often becomes a crystallised and rigid belief that is 
very difficult to change (Bar-Tal, 1989). Thus, a relation between 
trust/distrust and a general disposition to see the world as a dangerous 
place might be possible. 
Recently it has been argued that another factor that influences levels of 
discrimination towards different out-groups is a set of beliefs concerning 
the existence of social hierarchies that prevail in western societies and are 
known as social dominance orientation. According to Social Dominance 
Theory (Pratto, Sidanius, Staltworth and Malle, 1994; Sidanius, Levin, 
Federico and Pratto, 2001) beliefs concerning the inequalities between 
social groups appear to be inherent in the contemporary Western world, 
are supported by people irrespective their social position and seem to 
predict levels of prejudice. Research has suggested that people with high 
levels of social dominance are more likely to support the existence of 
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conflict between groups as well as military interventions (Pratto et al., 
1994). Thus, it is important to investigate the relationship between this set 
of beliefs and levels of trust. 
Another concept that might be related to trust/distrust is the feelings of 
personal relative deprivation or gratification in relation to relevant 
dimensions. Research has studied the link between relative deprivation 
and prejudice with some authors suggesting that relative deprivation would 
produce resentment that in turn would trigger collective strategies for 
change (Mummendey et al., 1999) and others suggesting that the 
anticipation of even a positive change in one's condition may be adequate 
to produce discrimination (Guimond and Dambrun, 2002). Relative 
deprivation and the feeling of injustice in life are likely to produce feelings 
of uncertainty about one's future. In turn, uncertainty is related with high 
feelings of distrust (Luhmann, 1988). On the other hand, personal 
gratification since it denotes feelings of empowerment might be connected 
with the fear of losing the obtained resources. Thus, feelings of resentment 
and injustice or the threat to lose one's position might lead people to avoid 
situations of uncertainty and therefore, if the relation is a conflicting one, 
they might follow the representation they already have and distrust the 
others. Justice concerns are central in intergroup conflict (Austin, 1979) 
whereas trust is closely related to these (Brockner and Siegel, 1996). 
Finally, following the social identity perspective, a negative self-image due 
to the negative comparison with others may produce feelings of threat 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979) that very likely would undermine trust. Thus, the 
way people perceive themselves in relabon to others or in relation to their 
position in the past and their future expectations (either in terms of relative 
deprivation or relative gratification) is likely to be anchors of levels and 
sources of trust. 
Another possible anchor of trust might be people's positioning on a left- 
right dimension since this dimension is one of the most meaningful 
representations of the political world (Papastamou and Prodromitis, 2003). 
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People have theories of what it means to be leftwing and rightwing. These 
beliefs might influence the way people trust different out-groups. 
Possible social-psychological anchors of trustldistrust 
Another, possible anchor is the perception of the relationship between the 
two groups in terms of interdependence. Interdependence is broadly 
defined as a situation where the outcome of one person or group is 
dependent on the actions and outcomes of another person or group 
(Chryssochoou, 2004) or a situation where the outcomes of one 
person/group can be affected or determined by that another individual in the 
interdependent unit chooses to do (Brewer, 2000). 
As it has been noted in chapter 2, the concept of interdependence has been 
explored in the conflict resolution literature and research (Sherif 1966, Bobo 
and Hutchings 1996, Esses et al. 1998, Esses et al 2001; Brewer 2000). 
Interdependence might be of different types. Negative interdependence 
between groups means that the benefits of the out-group are translated into 
losses for the in-group. In the case of positive interdependence both groups 
benefit or lose. Finally, there may be a situation that two people or groups 
are independent in the sense that the outcomes of the one group have 
nothing to do with the outcomes of the other. The resources at stake might 
be material, symbolic, such as power, or more psychological resources 
such as the achievement of a sense of positive group distinctiveness. 
In chapter 4, it has been argued that trust becomes relevant in cases of 
interdependence. A reduced level of the need to control one's life is due to 
the fact that part of this control has been given to those considered 
trustworthy. In addition one places trust on others or decides to trust 
because he or she believes that the other would satisfy one's needs and 
interests well and, most importantly, that the other will not take advantage 
of the vulnerability in which one consciously puts oneself by trusting 
(Barber, 1983; Lewis and Weigert, 1985). In situations of vulnerability 
people are afraid of being exploited or that the out-group could gain more 
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than the in-group (Brewer, 2000). Thus, it is possible that beliefs relating to 
the nature of the relationship between groups (positivelnegative 
interdependence; independence) facilitate or hinder the development of 
trust. 
Another important anchor of trustidistrust might be the expectations and 
the beliefs people have about the evolution of the relationship between the 
two groups in the future. Symbolic or objective, threat heightens distrust, 
suspicion and prejudice (Pettigrew, 2003). In addition, fears about the 
future are one of the most common causes of ethnic conflicts and violence 
(Lake and Rothchild, 1998). It seems likely that a belief that the 
relationship will be confrontational or that a threat for an armed conflict will 
always be hanging will heighten distrust. On the other hand, a view that the 
relationship would be constantly improving in the future is more likely to be 
associated with increased levels of trust. 
Often, in contexts characterised by protracted conflict there are beliefs that 
the other party is the one responsible for the problems in the relationship 
whereas little responsibility is placed to the in-group (Bar-Tal, 1989). Trust 
entails a belief that the other will act by taking into consideration one's 
welfare without a selfish orientation (Barber, 1983). Thus, the attribution of 
responsibility for the conflict to the out-group is almost synonymous with 
the justification of why this group should be distrusted. If one's 
responsibility is accepted then higher levels of trust to the out-group should 
be expected. 
Runciman (1966) has suggested that there are two types of relative 
deprivation: the egoistical and the fraternal. Feelings of fraternal 
deprivation occur due to an unfavourable comparison of one's group with 
an out-group. Extending the argument developed previously about relative 
deprivation/gratification, it is important to explore the dynamics of the 
relationship between group level relative deprivation/gratification and 
trust/distrust. This time, group level relative deprivation is considered a 
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social psychological anchoring as it denotes beliefs about the asymmetries 
between different groups. 
Power is an important notion in the context of international relations and, it 
has been suggested that it determines the relationship between social 
groups (Alexander et al. 1999; Bouhris, 1994; Deschamps, 1982; Deutch, 
2001; Glick and Fiske, 2001; Sachdev and Bourhis, 1984,1987; Sidanius 
et al., 2000). It has also consequences in inter-group relations. As said 
before, trust is a belief that the other would not take advantage of one's 
vulnerability. Taking advantage is, indeed, what the more powerful party is 
more capable of doing. Thus, beliefs about power dynamics become 
central in the understanding of trust. In addition, the belief that the other 
party is able to produce a course of action and confirm that can be trusted 
is important. Power often carries a negative connotation and people and 
groups in power are often seen negatively (Asch, 1946). It could be, 
therefore, th2t powerful out-groups 2re 21SO considered untrustworthy. 
Thus, power is suggested to be an important socio-psychological anchor in 
this research. 
Following the above lines of reasoning, the first hypothesis is that all these 
beliefs and attachments would be related to the levels and the sources of 
trust. However, the beliefs discussed under the label *psychological 
anchoring" give the impression of dimensions characterising individuals 
and that they constitute criteria of individual differences. Although, this is 
not the approach taken here, it is important to note that the implication 
would be that conflict resolution follows changes in ustable", across- 
situation personality characteristics of the different actors. 
Although this research acknowledges the importance of such beliefs in the 
understanding of the social world, it suggests that it is rather the 
understanding of and the beliefs associated with the specific context that 
plays a more important role. Such an approach follows Moscovici's 
suggestion that the social psychological approach to understanding the 
relationship between the individual and an object (here between "individual 
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factors" and levels of trust/distrust to the out-group) needs to acknowledge 
the constant mediation of the other (here perceptions of the context 
characterising the relationship between the two groups). A similar point Is 
made by Tajfel (1974) when he suggests that the choice of strategies for 
improving one's condition relates to beliefs about social change and how 
these beliefs are mediated by the perception of socio-structural 
characteristics of the situation between the two groups (stability and 
legitimacy of the relationship and permeability of the boundaries). Thus, 
the second hypothesis made here is that the effect of the factors relating to 
the psychological anchoring on trust/distrust will be mediated by the 
perception of the specific relationship between the two groups, i. e. the 
social-psychological anchoring. Figure 7.1 below presents the hypothesis 
of mediation that will be tested here: 
Figure 7.1: the hypothesis of mediation 
Psychological Socio-psychological 
anchoring anchoring Trust/distrust 
Types cf irterdependerce 
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BDVV II kidependence) 
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nation 0 AttrWion d 10 stuatioNchearacter 
resj)orsbhty (to the related) d 
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orientation the Wout-group/Great 
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Pla-rsonal relative 
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Pbw er d the Wout-group 
To summarise, the objective of this research was twofold: on the one hand 
it sought to explore whether a series of psychological and socio- 
psychological beliefs and attachments were anchors of the levels and 
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sources of distrust. On the other hand, it tests whether the socio- 
psychological beliefs mediated the relationship between the psychological 
anchors and the levels and sources of distrust Because the study was 
exploratory, no specific hypotheses were made relating to which of the 
socio-psychological beliefs would mediate the effect of which psychological 
beliefs and types of attachment on the levels and sources of distrust. 
Therefore the analysis proceeded in an exploratory fashion. As the 
qualitative study demonstrated, participants differentiated between the 
people and the state as two distinct units of the nation-state. Thus, this 
study follows this differentiation and makes a distinction between 
trust/distrust in the Turkish people and the Turkish state. 
Method 
Design and participants: the participants were 165 Greek nationals: 106 
psychology students (8 men and 98 women) and 59 non-students (23 men 
and 35 women). The age of the student participants varied from 18 to 38 
years old (Mean=1 9.44). The student participants' political orientation 
ranged from 0 (political left) to 8 (political right) with a mean score of 3.19 
(SD=1.68). The measure was constituted by a straight 8 cm line on which 
the participants were asked to position their political orientation. The age 
range of the non-student participants varied from 16 to 69 years old 
(Mean=34.83). The non-student participants' political orientation ranged 
from 0 (political left) to 8 (political right) with a mean score of 3.72 
(SD=2.38). The difference between the non-student and the student 
participants in terms of their political orientation was not significant 
(F(1,141)=2.418, n. s. ). 
Procedure: A questionnaire was distributed to the student participants 
during class time whereas the rest of the participants were working in a 
research organisation in Greece. The objective was to recruit equal 
numbers of students and non-students participants. However, this was not 
possible. Participants responded to all questions using 5-point Likert-type 
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scales ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The 
questionnaire comprised the follovving parts: 
Measures 
Belief in a dangerous wortd scale: The first part of the questionnaire was 
composed by thel 0 item belief in a dangerous world scale that was 
developed by Duckitt (2001) based on Alterneyer (1988). The items were 
translated into Greek and a special effort was given to keep the meaning of 
the items of the original scale and, at the same time, to ensure that the 
translated items were meaningful in the Greek language and context. The 
scale was satisfactorily back translated in English by a third researcher. 
For the exact items that constituted the belief in a dangerous world scale 
see the first part of the questionnaire in Appendix 2. 
Social dominance ofientation: the second part of the questionnaire 
consisted of the 16 items of the "social dominance orientation, scale taken 
from Pratto et al., (1994). The items were translated into the Greek 
language. Because the term "group" was thought to be very abstract used 
in a variety of contexts a specification of the term was given to include a 
range of groups that Greeks are familiar with. These included social, 
cultural, ethnic and religious groups. The scale was satisfactorily back 
translated in English by a third researcher. For the exact items that 
constituted the social dominance orientation scale see Appendix 2. 
Feelings of personal deprivatiorVgratification: in this section of the 
questionnaire the participants were asked to assess their relative personal 
deprivation/gratification after taking into consideration relevant dimensions 
used in other research (Schmitt and Maes, 2002). These dimensions 
included employment, prosperity, quality of relationships, conditions of life 
and a general assessment. The participants were provided with different 
comparison settings to asses their personal situation. They were asked to 
assess whether they consider themselves to be better or worse in 
comparison to the past (Cronbach's a=0.65), to the future (Cronbach's 
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a=0.83) and also in comparison to the rest of the Greeks (Cronbach's 
a=0.76)1. 
Feelings of being treated unjustly in life: The participants were asked to 
declare how far they thought they were treated unjustly in life using a5 
point scale ranging from not at all (1) to very much (5). 
Types of attachment to the nation: A measure of constructive and blind 
patriotism taken from (Schatz, Staub and Lavine, 1999) has been used. 
The scale consisted of 17 items 9 expressing blind and 8 expressing 
constructive patriotism. The items were translated and modified 
accordingly to express the needs of the specific context. The scale was 
satisfactorily back translated in English by a third researcher. 
Identification: The measure of identification with the nation included the 
following questions: ffilt's very important for me that I am Greele', "If you 
asked who I am, one of the most important characteristics that I would use 
it would be that I am Greele, "I am proud to be Greek", *1 identify with the 
rest of the Greeks". 
Group relative deprivatibrVgratirication. in this section of the questionnaire 
the participants were asked to assess their in-group relative 
deprivationIg ratification using relevant dimensions. These included 
employment, prosperity, quality of relationships, conditions of life, 
environment and general aSSGSSMGnt. The participants were asked to 
evaluate the position of their in-group in comparison to the past (a=0.65), 
how they thought it would be in the future (a=0.83) and also in comparison 
to Europe (a=0.76) and the Balkans (a=0.80). 
Perceived injustice at the group levet The participants were asked to state 
how far they thought that Greece has been treated unjustly in comparison 
to TuOkey using the same 5 points Likert scale. 
The reliabilities provided refer to this specific sample 
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Type of interdependence: in this section participants were asked to assess 
the type of goal interdependence between the two countries. This part was 
constituted by the following items: 'the more Turkey wins the more Greece 
loses (negative interdependence)", Othe more Turkey wins the more 
Greece wins (positive interdependence)", 'the gains and losses of Greece 
and Turkey are independent (independence)% 
Power of the in-group and the out-group: in the next section the 
participants were asked to assess the overall power of each one of the 
groups on a5 point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (no power at all) to 5 
(very powerful). In addition, the participants were asked to evaluate the 
extent to which relevant dimensions contributed to the power of the in- 
group and the out-group. These dimensions were culture, population size, 
support from big powers, economy, voice in international organisations, 
political organisation, strategic geographic position, army and people with 
will power. 
Expectations of the relationship in the future: this section was constituted 
by three questions that aimed to assess the way that the participants 
perceived the relationship between the two countries in the future. The 
items that constituted this section were the following: "Although the two 
countries are not in open armed confrontation, the threat of war will always 
shadow the relationship between Greece and Turkey (no change, constant 
threat)", "It is very likely that the two countries will be implicated in an 
armed confrontation in the future (deterioration)", "The relationship 
between the two countries will be constantly improving in the future 
(improvement)". 
Attribution of responsibility for the problems in the relationship: in this 
section participants were asked to assess how far each of the following 
explanations were responsible for the problems in the relationship between 
the two countries: "the character of the Greeke, "the character of the 
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Turks", "the politics of the Greeks", mthe politics of the Turke and "the 
interventions of Great Powers". 
Levels of trust1distrust participants were asked to assess the extent to 
which they trust the out-group and the out-group members ("How much do 
you trust the Turksfrurkey? "). 
Sources of distrust explanations: After answering the questions about 
general trust participants were provided with a series of statements that 
were presented as reasons that make other members of their group to feel 
insecure about the future of the relationship between the two countries. 
They were asked to rate the importance of these reasons for making them 
personally sceptical about the future of this relationship. The scale 
consisted of 18 items that were constructed in order to measure the three 
types of explanations of distrust. The construction of the items was based 
on the explanations of distrust that the participants provided in the 
qualitative study, presented in the previous chapter. Three types of 
sources of distrust explanations were proposed: distrust based on the 
actions of the out-group, seen as violating agreements and rules of proper 
conduct, the internal situation of the out-group that disqualify it from being 
a democratic, competent and reliable partner and the intrinsic character of 
the out-group members that hinders the possibility of any kind of 
relationship with the group. All sources of distrust explanations emphasise 
the different ways of assessing the trustworthiness, the reliability and the 
benevolence of the out-group. The items that constituted this scale are 
presented in table 7.1 below, 
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Table 7.1 The list of the sources of explanations of the Insecurity about the future of the 
relationship between Greece and Turkey 
Sources of distrust explanations items 
Action related explanations The Turks ignore agreements and are constantly 
provocative and dispute the Greek islands 
The Turks do not seem willing to revise their positions and 
withdraw some of their demands 
The Turks do not keep agreements they have signed with 
other countries so we do not have reasons to believe that 
they will keep the ones they signed with Greece 
The Turks have more support from the Great Powers 
The Turks do not seem co-operative in other areas and this 
is evidence of what we can expect Cyprus and the seabed 
The Turks do not hesitate to break rules of international law 
in order to achieve their goals 
Internal situation related The Turks violate basic human rights so we cannot expect 
explanations anything better from them in international affairs 
The Turks have many internal problems that can change the 
political situation in the country so we cannot rely on them 
The Turks do not have experience and the knowledge to 
resolve a crisis or to handle international problems 
The Turks are not afraid of any sanctions if they do not keep 
the agreements 
The Turks use the crisis in order to solve internal problems 
The political leaders in Turkey are incapable of following a 
consistent policy so we cannot be sure that they will live up 
to their obligations 
Intrinsic character related The Turks are uncivilised so one cannot be sure what to 
explanations expect from them 
The Turks will always take actions in order to harm us 
The Turks are unpredictable 
The Turks are the kind of people that will cheat you if they 
had the chance 
The Turks would lie very easily to satisfy their own interests 
The Turks are useless 
Demographics. Finally, in the last section of the questionnaire, participants 
were asked to provide some demographic information including gender, 
age, political orientation and profession (in the non-student sample). 
Data screening 
Because the sample was not homogeneous as the majodty of the 
participants were students (64.2%) and women (80.6%), it was imperative 
to screen the sample for any consistent sex or age differences along the 
scales and the items that constituted the questionnaire. Any items that 
produced differences were removed from further analysis. Table 7.2 below 
presents the list of the variables that have been excluded from the analysis 
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because there were found differences between the non-students and 
student or the male and female participants. 
Belief in a dangerous worfd scale: As it can be seen in table 7.2, three of 
the items that constituted the belief in a dangerous world scale were 
excluded from further analysis because of significant sample and sex 
differences. The internal consistency of the rest of the items was improved 
(from a=0.64 to u=O. 76) after the item 1: 7he mend" is not near People 
who think that earthquakes, wars, and famines mean that God might be 
about to destroy the worid are being foofish"was excluded from the 
analysis, and therefore it was also not included on the computed factor. 
The scores of the rest of the items were averaged together after reverse 
scored items were appropriately re-coded. The scores ranged from 1.33 to 
4.67 (M=3.16, SD=0.65). 
Social Dominance Ofientation: After the item In getting what you want it is 
sometimes necessary to use force against other sociallculturaYethnic or 
religious groups"was excluded from the analysis due to sex differences, 
the rest of the items were entered in an exploratory factor analysis with 
principal components extraction method and varimax rotation (See 
Appendix 4). The two-factor solution explained 49.79% of the variance. 
The suggested one factor solution by Pratto et al. (1994) explained only 
36.84% of the variance (a=0.86). The scores of the items that constituted 
the two factors were averaged together and further computed into two 
factors. The scores on the first factor that measured support in equality 
between groups were ranged from 2.54 to 5.00. The items that were highly 
skewed were transformed adequately to achieve "normalisation" as this is 
a requirement for factor analysis. The mean was 4.07 (SD=0.57). The 
second factor measured support in social inequalities. The scores of this 
factor ranged from 1.00 to 4.00 (M=2.20 and SD=0.68). The two new 
scales displayed adequate internal consistency (a=0.85 and a=0.68). The 
two scales were negatively correlated (r---0.508, p<0.01). 
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Types of national attachment The items of the scale were entered in an 
exploratory factor analysis. Because the items "People should not 
constantly try to change the way things are in Greece" and "we should 
have complete freedom of speech even for those that criticise the country" 
shared little variance with the rest of the items of the scale they were 
excluded from the analysis. An exploratory factor analysis was conducted 
with the rest of the items and vAth principal components extraction method 
and varimax rotation (see Appendix 4). The two-factor solution explained 
46.70% of the variance. The scores of the items that constituted the two 
factors were averaged together and the two emerged factors were 
computed into two new ones. The scores on the first factor (constructive 
patriotism) ranged from 1.67 to 5.00 (M=3.96 and SD=0.55). The scores of 
the second factor ranged from 1.00 to 4.50 (M=2.45 and SD=0.65). The 
two new scales displayed adequate internal consistency (a=0.77 and 
a=0.83). The two scales were positively correlated (r--0.350, p<0.01) 
suggesting that the two types of attachment with the nation are not 
necessarily conflicting. This is consistent with other research that found a 
positive correlation between the two types of attachment to the nation 
(Depuiset and Butera, 2003). 
Identification: Given the observed differences between the non-student 
and the student participants, the scale was not included in further analysis. 
However, it is interesting that the non-student participants positioned 
themselves higher on the identification scale than did the student 
participants. Research should study differences in identification between 
younger and older participants and suggest possible interpretations. 
Especially student populations are exposed to multiple influences and 
possible identities to choose from. Possibly, the identification with the 
nation is too exclusive or even implies more conservative orientations that 
younger participants are not very willing to accept. 
Responsibility forthe problems in the relationship: Paired comparisons 
revealed that the participants attributed significantly more responsibility to 
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the character of the out-group than to the character of the in-group 
(Mout=2.85, SD=1.29 and Min=2.01, SD=0.94; t(161)=8.751, p<0.001). 
They also attributed more responsibility to the politics of the out-group than 
to the politics of the in-group (Mout=3.76, SD=0.89 and Min=2.31, SD=0.92; 
t(161)=14.255, p<0.001). 
Sources of distrust explanations: The items were entered in an exploratory 
factor analysis with principal components estimation and varimax rotation. 
As it can be seen in Appendix 4 the three-factor solution revealed a 
structure very close to the hypothesised one. The hypothesised scale 
displayed high reliability (action: a=0.80, internal situation: a=0.79 and 
character a=0.88). As it can be seen in table 7.3 below, the three factors 
were highly correlated. They were also negatively correlated with trust in 
the Turkish state and people. Therefore three factors were computed 
following the hypothesised structure. 
Table 7.3: correlations between the three sources of distrust explanations 
Trust in Trust in Internal 
Turkish state Turkish Action situation Character 
people 
Trust in Turkish state I 
Trust in Turkish people . 574- 1 Action -. 357- -. 336- 1 
Internal situation -. 3M- -. 320- . 708- 1 Character -. 446- -. 494** . 6N.. . 641 
The process described above resulted in the exclusion of the statistically 
problematic items from the construction of the independent measures. 
These included the measure of identification with the nation, the feelings 
that the in-group has been treated unjustly in comparison to the out-group 
and the belief that a threat of war will constantly shadow the relationship 
between Greece and Turkey that were central to the main hypothesis 
described in the introduction of this chapter. 
Follov-ving the first hypothesis, the rest of the psychological and socio- 
psychological anchors were initially tested as predictors of the levels and 
the sources of trust/distrust. This analysis was also part of the mediation 
analysis that tested which socio-psychological predictors of trust/distrust 
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mediated the relationship between the psychological anchors and 
trust/distrust. Although correlation analysis would also answer the first 
hypothesis as they convey the same information with regression analyses 
the latter were preferred because they also constitute the first step of the 
mediation analysis that follows. Mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny, 
1986, Kenny, Kashy and Bolger, 1998) consists of a series of linear and 
multiple regressions. The main assumptions of the mediation analysis are 
that the independent variable predicts the dependent variable and the 
mediator, the mediator predicts the dependent variable, and the effect of 
the independent variable drops significantly or disappears when both the 
independent variable and the mediator enter the regression equation. 
Therefore, hypothesis 1 is part of hypothesis 2. 
Results 
Following the first hypothesis of this study that the psychological and 
socio-psychological anchors described in the introduction would be related 
to the levels and the sources of trust/distrust, a series of regression 
analyses were conducted to detect whether the proposed anchors 
predicted the levels of trust/distrust. The tables 7.4 and 7.5 below present 
these results'. 
Table 7.4: the psychological anchors that predicted trust in Turkish state and Turkish people 
Trust in the Turkish State Trust in the Turkish People 
F df Sig- R2 F df Sig. R' 
BDN -0.24 10.507 1,160 p<0.001 0.05 -0.28 13669 1,161 P<O 001 0.07 SDD -0.16 4.175 1,160 p<0.05 0.02 -0.23 9.617 1.161 P<0.01 0.05 
Constructive 
attachment -0.21 7.371 1.16D P<0.001 0,044 -0.21 7.634 1,161 P<0.01 0.04 
Blind 
attadiment -0.35 22.793 1,160 p<0.001 0.12 -0.45 42355 1,161 P<0.001 0.20 
Political 
orientation -0.24 8.544 1,139 P<0.01 0.05 
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Table 7.5: the socio-psychological anchors that predicted trust in the Turkish state and 
people 
Trust in N- Tirldsh State Trust in the Turldsh Pbopie 
F df Sig- F df Sig. 
R2 
Negative 
interdependence -0.34 20.795 1,159 P-Q. 001 0.11 -0.39 28501 1,160 P<0.001 0.14 
Positive 
kiterdet--ndence ai8 a3315- 1,158 p-: 0.05 0ý02 0.21 7 25-0 1,159 Pý. Ol 0.03 
Independence 0.16 4.551 1,160 P<0.05 0.02 
Armed 
confrontation -0.25 11.317 1,159 P-CO. 001 0.06 -039 2RO82 1,161 p<0.001 0.14 
Re lat ions h jp 
constart ly 
in proved 0.31 17.581 1,160 P<0ý001 0.09 0.25 11.050 1,161 P<0.001 0.06 
Responsiblityto 
the Poltics of 
Turkey -0.31 17.878 1,160 P<0.001 0.09 -0.26 12.232 1,161 p<0.001 006 
lResponsibilityto 
the Character of 
the Turks -0.18 5.677 1,158 P<0.05 0.02 -038 28.255 1,159 p<0.001 0.14 Responsibility to 
the polt" of 
Greece 0.23 9.144 1,158 P<OV 0.05 0.22 8636 1,159 P<0,01 Oý04 
Responsibility to 
the character ct 
the Greeks 0.18 5,697 1,158 p<0.05 0.03 
Deprivation/ 
gratif i,. afiDn in the 
Bal-ans -0.16 4.366 1,158 p<0.05 . 02 
From the psychological beliefs- the belief in a dangerous world, the social 
dominance orientation, the blind and constructive attachment to the nation 
negatively predicted trust in the Turkish state and people. Interestingly, 
political orientation predicted only trust in the Turkish people. Indeed, the 
more respondents positioned themselves on the left the more they trusted 
the Turkish people. No such relation was found for trust to the Turkish 
state. Feelings of personal injustice in life, relative deprivation/gratification 
in relationship to the past, the future and the rest of the in-group members 
as well as the belief that social groups should be equal, did not predict 
trust. 
Negative interdependence, expectation of war, attribution of responsibility 
to the character of the Turks and the politics of Turkey, negatively 
predicted trust in both the Turkish state and people. Positive 
interdependence, independence, expectation of a constantly improving 
relationship and attribution of responsibility to the politics of Greece, 
positively predicted trust in both the Turkish state and people. In addition, 
attribution of responsibility to the character of the Greeks positively 
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predicted trust in the Turkish state whereas relative deprivation/gratification 
of the in-group in relation to the Balkans negatively predicted trust in the 
Turkish people. Power of Turkey, relative deprivation/gratification of the in- 
group in relation to the past, future and Europe did not predict trust in the 
Turkish state and people. 
It seems that all three types of interdependence between the two countries 
predicted trust in the Turkish people. However, only negative and positive 
interdependence predicted trust in the Turkish state. It is interesting to note 
here that independence did not predict trust in the Turkish state but it 
predicted trust in the Turkish people. It seems that the belief that the two 
countries were independent in terms of outcomes had a positive impact on 
trust in the Turkish people but not on the state. In line Wth the results 
presented in the previous chapter, this possibly happens because 
concerns about benefits and losses are situated Wthin the sphere of the 
state and not the general population. 
Interestingly, the power of the out-group did not predict trust. It needs to be 
noted here that the item that measured the power of the in-group was 
excluded from the analysis as a result of the data screening process. As a 
result the exploration of power as an important socio-psychological anchor 
of trusttdistrust was impossible. 
The items that measured the relative deprivation/gratification of the in- 
group in relation to the past, the future and Europe did not predict trust. 
The only exception was the fact that the more the participants believed that 
their group was in a better position in comparison to other Balkan countries 
the less they trusted the Turkish people. Although, here, relative 
deprivation/g ratification did not predict trust/distrust, because the study 
concerns a specific population it might be premature to conclude that such 
beliefs do not have an impact on trust/distrust generally. 
Furthermore, the more the participants believed that the character of the 
Turks and the politics of Turkey were responsible for the problems in the 
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relations between the two countries, the less they trusted both the Turkish 
state and people. In addition, the more the participants believed that the 
politics of the in-group was the source of problems in the relations between 
the two countries the more they trusted both the Turkish state and people. 
Also, the belief that the character of the in-group was the source of 
problems in the relations between the two countries positively predicted 
trust in the Turkish state. It seems that trust in the people is not related to 
the degree of responsibility that the participants attribute to the character of 
the in-group. 
Following the second hypothesis that the socio-psychological anchorings 
would mediate the relationship between the psychological anchors and the 
levels of trust/distrust a series of mediation analyses were conducted. 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 include the results of the first step of the mediation 
analysis and present the psychological and socio-psychological anchors 
that predicted the levels of trust/distrust. The next step of the analysis 
included the isolation of the socio-psychological anchors that could play 
the role of a mediator. Therefore, a series of regression analyses were 
conducted to detect which of the psychological anchors predicted the 
socio-psychological anchors. Finally, the third step of the mediation 
analysis included the conduct of a series of regressions where the 
potential mediator and each psychological anchor entered the same 
equation to detect whether the effect of the psychological anchors on 
trust/distrust was significantly reduced whereas at the same time the effect 
of the socio-psychological anchor remained strong. The results referring to 
the final step of the mediation analysis are presented in tables that show 
the size of the effect and the assessment of its significance using 
Goodman' (1960) statistical test of mediation. Table 7.6 below presents 
these results: 
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From table 7.6 above it appears that negative interdependence, the belief 
that there vvill be an armed confrontation in the future, the belief that the 
politics and the character of the out-group were responsible for the 
problems in the relations between Greece and Turkey, positive 
interdependence and independence met the mediation criteria. This 
section further discusses each potential mediator. 
Negative interdependence 
Negative interdependence was tested as a potential mediator between the 
psychological beliefs and trust in the Turkish state and people. Tables 7.7 
and 7.8 below present the results of a series of multiple regressions 
conducted With each of the psychological anchors that predicted trust in 
the Turkish state and people respectively and negative interdependence. 
Table 7.7. negative Interdependence as mediator of the effect of the belief In a dangerous 
world, social dominance orientation, blind and constructive attachment to the nation on trust 
In the Turkish state: 
F df Sig- t Sig. P R' z test 
Negatrve interdependence 11.775 Z159 0.001 -3.615 0.001 ý29 0.11 2.95- 
BOW -1.597 ns. -. 12 
Negative interdependence 11.272 Z159 0.001 -4.211 0.001 -. 32 0.11 2.23* 
SDO -1.289 n& -. 09 Negative interdependence 11.530 Z159 0.001 -3.951 0.001 -. 30 0.11 2.77- 
Constructive attactynert to the 
nation -1.455 n. & -. 11 
Negative interdependence 15.688 Z 159 0.001 -2.792 0.01 -. 22 0.15 2.55- 
EMind attactment to the nation -3077 001 -25 
Table 7.8: negative Interdependence as mediator of the effect of the belief In a dangerous 
world, social dominance orientation, blind and constructive attachment to the nation and 
political orientation on trust In the Turkish people: 
F df Sig. It Sig. P R2 z-test 
Negative iriterdependence 16530 Z160 0.001 -4206 0001 -. 33 0.16 3-24- 
BDW -2.004 0.05 -. 15 
Negative iriterdependence 17. M Z160 0.001 -4.839 0.001 -. 32 0.16 2.38- SDO -2.250 0.05 -. 16 
Negative irterdependence 15.432 Z160 0.001 -4.699 0.001 -. 35 0.15 3.00- 
Constnictive attactmerit to Vie 
nation -1.468 n& -. 11 Negative irterdependence 26.699 Z160 0.001 -2.992 0.01 -. 23 0.24 2.70- 
Egind attaclynert to the nation -4.611 0.01 -. 35 
Negative irterdependence 14.526 Z138 0.001 -4.413 0.001 -. 35 0.16 2.70- Political odentabon -2187 005 -17 
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As it can be seen in these tables (7.7 and 7.8) and figure 7.2 below, in 
terms of trust in the Turkish state the effect of the belief in a dangerous 
world, social dominance orientation and the constructive attachment to the 
nation were reduced to non-significance whereas the effect of negative 
interdependence remained strong, indicating that negative 
interdependence totally mediated the relationship between these beliefs 
and trust in the Turkish state. On the other hand, the effect of the blind 
attachment to the nation was only partially reduced. 
In terms of trust in the Turkish people the effect of the belief in a 
dangerous world, social dominance orientation, the blind attachment to the 
nation and political orientation was partially reduced whereas the effect of 
negative interdependence remained strong indicating that negative 
interdependence mediated at least partially the relationship between the 
belief in a dangerous world, social dominance orientation, the constructive 
attachment to the nation and political orientation and trust in the Turkish 
people. In the case of the constructive attachment to the nation the 
mediation was even stronger as the effect of the constructive attachment 
was reduced to non-significance. 
It is interesting here that negative interdependence totally mediated the 
effect of the psychological anchors on trust in the Turkish state whereas 
this mediation was only partial for trust in the Turkish people. In addition, it 
seems that the effect of the constructive attachment to the nation on trust 
in both the Turkish state and people was reduced to non-significance when 
negative interdependence was taken into account whereas the effect of the 
blind attachment to the nation on trust was only partially reduced. 
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FIgure 7.2: negative Interdependence as mediator of the relationship between the 
psychological anchors and trust in the Turkish state and people: 
Belief in a dangemus 
wodd 
Social dominance 
onentation 
Constuche affachmert 
to the nation 
(Blind attachmerd to Vie 
nation) 
(Belief in a dangerous 
worico 
(Social dwinance 
orientation) 
Constructive attachment 
to the nation 
(Blind attachment to tie 
nation) 
Trust In the 
Turldsh State 
Negative 
interdependence 
Trust In the 
Turkish people 
These results support the second hypothesis that the effects of different 
beliefs (psychological anchors) are mediated by the specific belief that the 
relationship between the two countries is negatively interdependent. This 
was stronger for the effects of SIDO and BDW on trust in the Turkish state. 
One could speculate here that the effect was stronger on trust In the state 
as negative interdependence concerned a relation between the two 
countries. It seems also important to note that blind attachment to the 
nation, which was the belief that best predicted levels of trust (see table 
7.6) was only partially reduced. Finally, the effect of the constructive 
attachment to the nation on trust (both in the state and people) was totally 
mediated by negative interdependence. It seems that the belief about 
negative interdependence totally explains why those participants that 
accepted the possibility of being critical to the nation distrusted both the 
people and the state. However, we need to keep in mind that both blind 
and constructive attachments were positively correlated. 
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Belief that there will be an armed confrontation between Greece and 
Turkey 
The belief that "it is very likely that the two countries will be implicated in an 
armed confrontation in the future" was also tested as a potential mediator 
between the psychological anchors and trust In the Turkish state and 
people. Tables 7.9 and 7.10 below present the results of a series of 
multiple regressions conducted with each of the psychological anchors that 
predicted trust in the Turkish state and people respectively and the belief 
that "It is very likely that the two countrieswill be implicated in an armed 
confrontation in the future'. 
Table 7.9: the belief that there will be a future armed confrontation between the two countries 
as mediator of the effect of the belief In a dangerous world, social dominance orientation and 
the blind attachment to the nation on trust In the Turkish state: 
F (N sig. 
-- 
t Sig. p R2 Z-test 
Affned cortrortabon 7.946 Z159 0.001 -2.082 0.05 -. 19 0.08 2.09* 
BDW -Z315 0.05 ý17 
Armed confrortabGn 6.523 Z159 0.01 -3.008 0.01 -. 23 0.06 1.99* 
SDO -1.296 A& '10 
Armed confrortabon 15-586 Z159 0.001 -4.312 0.001 . 
20 0.15 1.89 
EMind affactnert to the nabon -2.780 0001 . 
31 ns 
Table 7.10: the belief that there will be an armed confrontation between the two countries as 
mediator of the effect of the belief In a dangerous world, social dominance orientation and 
the constructive and blind attachment to the nation on trust In the Turkish people: 
F df Sig. t Sig. P R2 z-test 
Armed confrortabon 16.603 Z160 0.001 4.270 0.001 -. 33 0.16 3.24- 
BOW -1.908 ns. -. 15 
Armed oorifrortabon 17.251 Z160 0.001 4.869 0.001 -. 35 0.16 2.38- 
SDO -2-176 0.05 -. 16 
Armed corfrortation 35.824 Z160 0.001 4.865 0.001 -. 32 0.30 2.36- 
Blind attachmert to the nation -6.012 M001 -. 40 
Armed confrortation 21.610 Z138 0.001 -5.718 0.001 ý43 0.23 2.22* 
Political orientabon -2239 005 -. 17 
As it can be seen in the above tables (7.9 and 7.10) and in figure 7.3 below, 
in terms of trust in the Turkish state the effect of the belief in a dangerous 
world was partially reduced whereas the effect of social dominance 
orientation on trust in the Turkish state was reduced to non-significance. 
On the other hand the effect of the belief that there will be an armed 
confrontation between the two countries remained strong, indicating that 
this belief mediated the relationship between the belief in a dangerous 
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world, social dominance orientation and trust in the Turkish state. Finally, 
the effect of the blind attachment to the nation on trust in the Turkish state 
was not affected when the belief that an armed confrontation between 
Greece and Turkey is likely in the future was taken into account. 
In terms of trust in the Turkish people the effect of the belief in a 
dangerous world, social dominance orientation, the blind attachment to the 
nation and political orientation was partially reduced whereas the effect of 
the belief that there will be an armed confrontation between Greece and 
Turkey remained strong indicating that the latter mediated, at least partially, 
the relationship between the belief in a dangerous world, social dominance 
orientation, the blind attachment to the nation, political orientation and 
trust in the Turkish people. 
Figure 7.3: the belief that there will bean armed confrontation between Greece and Turkey as 
mediator of the relationship between the psychological anchors and trust In the Turkish 
state and people 
(Belief in a dangerous world) 
Social dorrinance 
orientation 
Trust in the 
Turldsh State 
Armed confrordation 
in the future 
(Belief in a dangerous voorld) 
(Social dominance 
orientation) 
(Blind attachment) 
(Political orientation) 
Trust in the 
Turkish People 
These results support again the second hypothesis that the effects of the 
psychological anchors will be mediated by the belief that there will be an 
armed confrontation between the two countries towards an armed 
confrontation. As far as trust in people was concerned, the effects of all 
psychological anchors (SDO, BDW, blind attachment and political 
orientation) that satisfied the mediation criteria were partially mediated by 
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this expectation. However, as far as trust in the state was concerned the 
effect of SDO was totally mediated and the effect of BDW only partially. 
The [after result seems understandable as dreading an armed 
confrontation could be only one of the fears of those who believe that the 
world Is a dangerous place. Finally, It seems Important to note that blind 
attachment to the nation was not mediated at all by the belief that the 
relationship between the two countries will deteriorate. The distrust of 
those who are blindly attached to the national in-group is not explained by 
their belief that an armed confrontation is likely in the future. This finding 
could merit future exploration in relation to the fact that constructive 
attachment was not related (and thus did not satisfy the mediation criteria) 
to the expectation about armed confrontation in the future. 
The belief that "the politics of Turkey were the soutre of the problems in 
the relations between the two countries" 
The belief that "the politics of Turkey were the source of the problems in 
the relations between the two countries' was also tested as a potential 
mediator between the psychological anchors and trust in the Turkish state 
and people. Tables 7.11 and 7.12 below present the results of a series of 
multiple regressions conducted with the psychological anchors that 
predicted trust in the Turkish state and people respectively and the belief 
that "the politics of Turkey were the source of the problems in the relations 
between Greece and Turkey". 
Table 7.11: the belief that "the politics of Turkey were responsible for the problems In the 
relations between the two countries" as mediator of the effect of social dominance 
orientation and the constructive and blind attachment to the nation on trust in the Turkish 
state: 
F df Sig. t Sig. P R2 Z-test 
Responsibility to the politics 10-153 160 0.001 -3.968 0.001 -. 30 0.10 2.70- 
SDO -1.511 n. s. -. 11 
Responsibility to ttm politics 10.161 Z160 0.001 . 3.524 0.001 -. 27 0.10 2.70- 
Constructive attactwneft to the 
nation -1.516 ns. -. 12 
Responsibility to the politics 18.884 Z160 0.001 -4.240 0.001 -. 30 0.18 1.99* 
Bind attactment to the nation -3636 0001 -26 
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Table 7.12: the belief that "On politics of Turkey were responsible for the problems In the 
relations between the two countries" as mediator of the effect of social dominance 
orientation, the constructive and blind attachment to the nation on trust In the Turkish 
people: 
F df Sig. Ill Sig. P RI Z-test 
Responsibility to the politics 9.921 Z 161 OL 0011 -1115 11011 23 0.10 1.60 
SDO -2-672 0.01 -. 20 n. s. 
Responsibility to the politics 7.789 2,161 0.001 -2.762 0.001 ý22 0.07 2.31 
Constiuctive attachment to We -1.783 n. s. -. 14 
nation 
Responsibility to the politics 25.859 Z161 0.001 -2-759 0.01 %19 0.23 1.89 
Bind attachment to the nation -6062 0001 -. 42 ns 
As tables 7.11 and 7.12 show and figure 7.4 below summarises, in terms 
of trust in the Turkish state the effect of social dominance orientation and 
the constructive attachment to the nation was reduced to non-significance 
whereas the effect of the belief that "the politics of Turkey were responsible 
for the problems in the relations between the two countries" remained 
strong, indicating that this belief mediated the relationship between social 
dominance orientation and the relationship between constructive 
attachment to the nation and trust in the Turkish state. On the other hand, 
the effect of the blind attachment to the nation on trust in the Turkish state 
was only partially reduced. 
In terms of trust in the Turkish people the effect of the constructive 
attachment to the nation on trust in the Turkish people was reduced to 
non-significance whereas the belief that "the politics of Turkey were 
responsible for the problems in the relations between the two countries" 
remained strong indicating that this belief mediated the relationship 
between the constructive attachment to the nation and trust in the Turkish 
people. On the other hand, the effects of social dominance orientation and 
blind attachment to the nation on trust in the Turkish people were not 
affected when the belief that athe politics of Turkey were responsible for 
the problems in the relations between Greece and Turkey" was taken into 
account. 
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Figure 7.4: the belief that "the politics of Turkey were responsible for the problems In the 
relationship between Greece and Turkey" as mediator of the relationship between the 
psychological anchors and trust In the Turkish state and people 
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These results again support the second hypothesis about the mediation 
effects of the anchors concerning the relationship between the two 
countdes. 
As far as trust in the state was concerned all beliefs were either partially 
(blind attachment) or totally mediated by the attribution of responsibility for 
the problems in the relations between Greece and Turkey to the politics of 
the out-group. On the other hand it is worth noting that in terms of trust in 
Turkish people, only the effects of constructive attachment were mediated 
by the attribution of responsibility to the out-group's politics. Both the 
effects of SDO and blind attachment remained unaffected by this 
attribution and therefore this belief did not explain their relationship with 
levels of trust to the Turldsh people. 
The belief that "the character of the Turks was the source of the problems 
in the relation between the two countries" 
The belief that "the character of the Turks was the source of the problems 
in the relations between the two countries' was also tested as a potential 
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mediator between the psychological beliefs and trust in the Turkish state 
and people. Tables 7.13 and 7.14 below present the results of a series Of 
multiple regressions conducted with the psychological beliefs that 
predicted trust in the Turkish state and people respectively and the belief 
that "the character of the Turks was responsible for the problems In the 
relations between Greece and Turkey'. 
Table 7.13: the belief that "the character of the Turks was responsible for the problems In the 
relations between Greece and Turkey as mediator of the effect of SDO and the constructive 
and blind attachment to the nation on trust In the Turkish state: 
F df Sig. It Sig. P R2 z-test 
Responsibikty to the character 3.776 Z158 0.05 -1.840 ns. ý115 0.04 1.62 
SDO -1.511 n& -. 111 n& 
Respormbibty to the character 3.322 Z158 0.05 -ZI33 0.05 -. 17 0.02 2.64- 
Constructive attachment to the 
nation -0.079 n. s. -. 07 
Responsibilty to the character 10.342 Z158 0.001 -1.379 n. s. -. 10 0.10 1.26 
Bind attachrnent to the nabon -3810 Cal -29 ns 
Table 7.14: the belief that "the character of the Turks was responsible for the problems In the 
relations between the two countries" as mediator of the effect of SDO and the constructive 
and blind attachment to the nation on trust In the Turkish people: 
IF d Sig t sta p R2 z4est 
Responsibility to the character 15.878 Z159 0.001 4.556 0.001 -. 34 0.15 3.01- 
SDO -1.767 n. s. -. 13 
Responsibility to the character 14617 Z159 0.001 4.994 0.001 -. 41 0.14 2.44- 
Constructive attactment to the 
nation -0.991 n& -. 07 
Responsibility to the character 29.466 Z159 0.001 4.135 0,001 -. 29 0.26 2.15* 
Rind attachrnent to the nation -5.116 0.001 -. 36 
As it can be seen in tables 7.13 and 7.14 and in figure 7.5 below, the 
results for trust in the Turkish state and people were similar. Only the effect 
of the constructive attachment to the nation was reduced to non 
significance whereas the effect of social dominance orientation and the 
blind attachment to the nation on trust in the Turkish state was not affected 
when the belief that uthe character of the Turks was responsible for the 
problems in the relations between the two countries" was taken into 
account. However, it needs to be noted that in the case of social 
dominance orientation and the constructive attachment to the nation the R- 
squared were small. 
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As far as trust in the Turkish people was concerned, the effect of social 
dominance orientation and the constructive attachment to the nation on 
trust in the Turkish people was reduced to non significance whereas the 
belief that "the character of the out-group was responsible for the problems 
in the relations between the two countries" remained strong. Finally, this 
belief mediated only partially the effect of the blind attachment to the nation 
on trust in the Turkish people. 
Figure 7.5: the belief that "the character of the Turks was responsible for the problems In the 
relations between Greece and Turkey" as mediator of the relationship between the 
psychological anchors and trust In the Turkish state and people: 
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These results also confirm the second hypothesis about the mediation 
effects of anchors concerning the relationship between the two countries. 
As far as trust in the people was concerned all beliefs were either partially 
(blind attachment) or totally mediated by the attribution of responsibility for 
the conflict to the character of the out-group. On the other hand it is worth 
noting that only the effect of constructive attachment on trust to the state 
was mediated by the attribution of responsibility to the out-group's 
character. Both the effects of SDO and blind attachment remained 
unaffected by this attribution and therefore this belief did not explain their 
relationship with levels of trust to the Turkish state. 
157 
Bringing together the results of the attribution of responsibility to the 
politics and the responsibility to the character of the out-group it is worth 
noting a kind of symmetry. In general, the attribution of responsibility to the 
politics of the in-group mediated the effects of SDO, constructive and blind 
(partially) attachment to the nation on trust in the Turkish state. The same 
effects were mediated by the attribution of responsibility to the character of 
the out-group on trust in the Turkish people. Moreover, as far as trust in 
Turkish people was concerned the effects of constructive attachment were 
mediated by the attribution of responsibility to the politics. As far as trust in 
the state was concerned constructive attachment was mediated by the 
attribution of responsibility to the character of the out-group. The attribution 
of responsibility to the politics of the out-group left unaffected the effects of 
blind attachment and SDO in relation to trust in people as did the 
attribution of responsibility to the character of the out-group in relation to 
trust in the state. It could be said here that when the beliefs concern state 
level attributions (to the politics) they mediate psychological beliefs (such 
as SDO and attachment to the nation) in relation to trust in the state. 
Similarly they mediate the effects of these anchors in relation to trust in 
people when they concern character level attributions. Interestingly, only 
the constructive attachment was affected by the presence of state level 
attributions in relation to trust in people and by the presence of character 
level attribution in relation to trust in the state. 
Positive interdependence 
When tested as possible mediators of the relationship between the 
psychological anchors and levels of trust as assumed by hypothesis 2, 
both positive interdependence and independence of outcomes did not 
mediate the effect of the psychological anchors on trust in the Turkish 
people and state. On the contrary, the results showed that these two 
factors were reduced whereas the psychological anchors remained 
unaffected. As a result, the relevant psychological anchors (see table 7.6) 
were tested as potential mediators of the relationship between positive 
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interdependence and independence and trust in the Turkish state and 
people. 
Tables 7.15 and 7.16 below present the results of a series of multiple 
regressions conducted with positive interdependence and the 
psychological anchors that predicted trust in the Turkish state and people 
respectively. 
Table 7.15: the belief In a dangerous world, social dominance orientation and the blind 
attachment to the nation as mediators of the effect of positive Interdependence on trust In 
the Turkish state: 
F df Sig. t Sig. P R2 Z-test 
BM 6.671 Z158 0.01 -2.789 0.01 -. 21 0.06 2.95- 
Posftlve irterdependence 1.705 n& . 13 SDO 3.952 Z158 0.05 -1.586 n& 12 0.03 1.59 
Posftive irterdependence 1.909 A& . 15 AS. Blind attactnerit to V* nabon 12-470 Z158 0.001 4.358 0.001 -. 33 0.12 2,23* 
Pmdive irterc"3enderre 1432 ns . 10 
Table 7.16: the belief In a dangerous world and the blind attachment to the nation as 
mediators of the effect of positive Interdependence on trust In the Turkish people 
F df Sig. t Sig. P R1 z-test 
BDW 8.969 Z159 0.001 -3.302 0.01 -. 24 0.09 2.06* 
Posftive kterdependence 2.039 0.05 . 15 SDO 7.220 Z159 0.001 -2.628 0.001 -. 20 0.07 1.83 
Posftive irterdependerm 2.124 0.05 . 16 ns. Egind attactmert to the nabon 22-474 Z159 0.001 -6.006 0.001 -. 43 0.21 2.71- 
Poskive Irterdependence 1574 ns . 11 
As tables 7.15 and 7.16 and figure 7.6 below indicate, in terms of trust in 
the Turkish state the effect of positive interdependence was reduced to 
non-significance whereas the belief in a dangerous world and the blind 
attachment to the nation remained strong, indicating that these beliefs 
mediated the relationship between positive interdependence and trust in 
the Turkish state. On the other hand, the effect of both positive 
interdependence and social dominance orientation were reduced to non- 
significance when they were entered together in the regression equation 
indicating that the mediation criteria were not met for this pair of beliefs. In 
addition, the R-squared in this case was very small to indicate any 
significant effects. 
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In terms of trust in the Turkish people the effect of positive interdependence 
was reduced to non-significance whereas blind attachment to the nation 
remained strong indicating that it mediated the relationship between 
positive interdependence and trust in the Turkish people. On the other 
hand, the effect of positive interdependence on trust in the Turkish people 
was only partially reduced when the belief in a dangerous world was taken 
into account Finally, the relationship between positive interdependence 
and trust in the Turkish people was not affected by social dominance 
orientation. 
Figure 7.6: The belief In a dangerous world and the blind attachment to the nation as 
mediators of the relationship between positive Interdependence and trust In the Turkish state 
and people 
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Thus, it seems that the positive effects on trust of the belief that when the 
out-group gains the in-group benefits as well, are reduced to non- 
significance because people believe that they live in a dangerous world or 
because they are blindly attached to the nation. Interestingly, SDO does 
not mediate the effects of positive interdependence. 
Independence 
The belief in a dangerous world and the blind attachment to the nation 
were further tested as potential mediators of the relationship between 
independence of benefits and trust in the Turkish people. As table 7.17 
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below indicates, the belief in a dangerous world and the blind attachment 
to the nation mediated the effect of independence of benefits on trust in 
Turl(ish people 2. 
Table 7.17: the belief in a dangerous world and the blind attachment to the nation as 
mediators of the effect of independence on trust in Turkish people: 
IF 
- 
df 
- 
Sig. t sigý p R' Z-test 
BDDW 8 0315 2,160 0001 -3350 0001 26 008 1 96* 
Positive interdependence 1 438 ns 11 
Blind attactyneryl to the nation 21 666 2.160 0001 -6142 0001 - 44 020 2 35' 
Positive interdependence 1001 ns 07 
As table 7.17 and figure 7.7 below indicate, the effect of independence on 
trust in the Turkish people was reduced to non-significance whereas the 
effect of the belief in a dangerous world and the blind attachment to the 
nation remained strong, indicating that these beliefs mediated the 
relationship between independence and trust in the Turkish people. As the 
R-squared indicates, the equation that included the blind attachment to the 
nation and positive interdependence was more significant. 
Figure 7.7: the belief in a dangerous world and the blind attachment to the nation as 
mediators of the relationship between independence and trust in the Turkish people 
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Like with positive interdependence, the positive effects on trust in people, 
of the belief that the outcomes of Greece and Turkey were independent, 
were reduced to non-significance because of beliefs in a dangerous world 
and because of a blind attachment to the nation. 
The hypothesis of mediation was also tested in the case of the sources of 
distrust explanations. However, the presentation of these results would 
2 The belief that what benefits, the one country is independent of what benefits the other was not correlated writh trust 
in the Turkish state 
I() I 
only increase the size of this chapter which would probably disorient the 
reader from the main hypothesis which was the hypothesis of the 
mediation. 
Discussion 
This chapter explored the relationship between a series of personal beliefs 
and attachment to the nation discussed under the label "psychological 
anchoring" and beliefs related to the understanding of the specific 
relationship between Greece and Turkey considered as "socio- 
psychological anchoring" and the levels of trust/distrust (hypothesis 1). 
Although this research acknowledges the importance of the psychological 
beliefs in the understanding of the social world, it suggests that it is rather 
the understanding of, and the beliefs associated with the specific context of 
the relationship between countries that plays a more important role. More 
specifically, following Moscovici's (1984) social psychological approach, 
this research explored how the understanding of the context of the 
relations between Greece and Turkey mediates the way that relatively 
"stable" beliefs about the social world and the type of attachment to the in- 
group are related to the levels of trust/distrust (hypothesis 2). 
The psychological anchors included the type of attachment 
(blind/constructive) to the nation and the levels of identification with it, 
social dominance orientation, fears (BDW) and feelings of relative 
de privation/g ratification. The participants' self-disclosed political orientation 
was also included. As social psychological anchors were considered the 
type of interdependence between the two countries (negative, positive, 
independence), the expectations about the nature of the relationship in the 
future (no change, deterioration, improvement), the attribution of 
responsibilities for the problems in the relation (character and politics of the 
in-/out-group), the power of the two countries and the relative group level 
de privation/g ratification. 
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To a large extent both hypotheses were supported by a series of 
regressions and mediation analyses. Because of the specificities of the 
sample some of the proposed anchors were not tested (power of the in- 
group, identification with the nation, perceived injustice at the group level). 
In addition, from the suggested anchors some did not predict trust: feelings 
of personal injustice in life, relative deprivation/gratification of the individual 
in relationship to the past, the future and the rest of the in-group members, 
or relative deprivation/gratification of the in-group in relation to the past, the 
future and Europe, the belief that social groups should be equal and the 
power of Turkey. Because of the specificities of the sample and the 
relational context one should be cautious, however, to conclude that 
feelings of injustice and the power of the out-group do not have an impact 
on trust. From the other anchors the more important seem to be: blind 
attachment to the nation and beliefs about the negative interdependent 
nature of the relationship between the two countries. It is also worth noting 
that political orientation affects the level of trust in people and not in the 
state, with self-categorised leftwing people being more trusting. Other 
important anchors are the attribution of the responsibility for the conflict to 
the character of the out-group members and the belief that the relationship 
will deteriorate in the future towards an armed confrontation. 
Regarding the second hypothesis of medlatlon, the analyses showed 
different patterns of results. Because of the exploratory nature of this 
research it would be inappropriate to speculate why some social 
psychological anchors mediated the effects of the different beliefs (totally 
or partially) and others did not. What is important to highlight is the fact that 
the hypothesis was largely confirmed and that the social psychological 
anchors indeed mediated the relation between psychological beliefs and 
the levels of trust. More important anchors seemed to be the belief about 
the negatively interdependent nature of the relationship between the two 
countries. From both a theoretical and an applied point of view these 
findings are important since they show that some ideological differences 
between people can become more or less important under the influence of 
beliefs concerning the specific relationship between the two groups. The 
163 
case of constructive attachment to the nation is another example. The 
impact of this factor on trust was very often totally mediated. 
Thus, theoretically, isolating abelief syndromes' and orientations may not 
be enough to explain why some people behave the way they did. 
Incorporating these beliefs within the specific context of inter-group 
relations might offer a more complete understanding of the phenomenon. 
From a policy point of view, the importance of beliefs about the specific 
context would mean that targeting them might be a better way to change 
levels of trust than simply targeting the general ideological positions of the 
individuals. This would have been a positive outcome if it wasn't for the 
results regarding positive interdependence and independence. These two 
beliefs not only did not mediate any of the more "stable" sets of beliefs but 
were also totally mediated by them. Thus, the positive effects on trust of 
the belief that the two countries are positively interdependent disappear if 
some other anchors are entered in the equation. From a policy point of 
view these results are not encouraging because if one tried to change the 
nature of the beliefs from negative interdependence to positive 
interdependence this would not be enough to create higher levels of trust 
since other sets of beliefs might interfere. 
The complexity of these results, from a theoretical point of view, shows 
that social psychological research should take into account different levels 
of analysis (Doise 1996; Lorenzi-Cioldi and Doise, 1990). It was 
evidenced here that personal beliefs may have a direct relation with trust 
but also with other relevant ways of constructing this relationship (socio- 
psychological anchoring). These sets of beliefs combine forces together to 
enable or hinder different constructions of the world that impact on the 
levels and sources of trust1distrust. In the content of these beliefs different 
ideologies are expressed. Finally it should be noted that in this research, 
the beliefs were classified into "psychological" (individual level) and into 
social psychological (contextual level) for taxonomic reasons as is the 
practice in social representational research. These categories of anchoring 
correspond to different levels of analysis and not to different levels of 
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psychological or social reality (Doise, 1986; Papastamou & Chryssochoou 
2004). 
There are some limitations in the study that mainly concern the sample. In 
the second study, most of the participants were women or students. A 
main concern in the data collection process was to achieve an as 
homogeneous as possible sample in order to test the main hypothesis that 
was the interplay of the different types trust/distrust anchors. This made 
the analysis rather complex as there was a need to remove any factors 
that produced differences due to gender or occupation. This made difficult 
to test some of the hypothesised relationships between some anchors and 
trust/distrust that in another sample might play an important role. In 
addition, the research does not make claims of generalisafion of the results 
which would need a more representative sample. However, these 
limitations do not undermine the main results of this study. 
Chapter 8 further tests different types of anchors of trust/distrust 
explanations using a different methodology. More specifically, by 
employing an experimental methodology it will explore types of socio- 
psychological (power and duration of conflict) and sociological anchoring 
(nationality) of trust/distrust In addition, it seeks to study key aspects of 
the lay understanding of conflict settings and discusses the consequences 
of elaborating a general lay theory of intemational conflict. 
1ý0 
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Chapter 8 
T he two previous empirical chapters have explored issues of trust and 
representations of conflict between nations within the context of the 
relationship between Greece and Turkey using interviews and a survey. 
The research issue was contextualised within this conflict and the results 
were tied to the specific context. This was done because, as it was argued, 
inter-group conflicts should be contextualised. However, social psychology 
has often studied these issues using experiments. Experimentation is also 
welcome within the social representation theory tradition as it offers the 
opportunity to isolate some factors and study the pattern of their effect. 
The use of the experimental method here offers the opportunity to 
reproduce the main context of this study which was the Greek-Turkish 
relations and by employing a wider sample, to focus on several factors that 
were considered to be important The purpose of this study was not to 
make context independent generalisations but rather to focus on some 
factors and investigate how they shape the representation of the context. 
The question that can be asked here in relation to conflicts between 
nations is twofold: on the one hand is a conflict understood in the same 
way by people belonging to different nation-states, on the other hand, are 
trust and the perception of the conflict influenced in the same way across 
nations by factors such as the power of the groups involved and the 
duration of their conflict? These are the issues that could be usefully 
investigated through experimentation and that the study below tries to 
address. 
More specifically, the study employs a paper and pencil experimental 
methodology which, by means of a vignette, introduces the participants to 
a conflict that occurs between two fictional countries. The participants are 
asked to identify with one of the two countries and answer the questions, 
not as bystanders, but rather as members of the general population of the 
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fictional country. In addition, the conflict presented had specific 
charactedstics. 
First of all, it concerns a conflict over boundaries. As seen eadier, 
boundaries were found to be important to the participants. In addition, this 
type of conflict is closer to the Greece-Turkey conflict. This example 
characterises many conflict settings world wide and it is thought to satisfy 
more the definition criteria of a conflict between nation-states (modem 
rivalries). 
Furthermore, whereas the previous study explored possible anchors of 
trust/distrust in a situation that is crystallised in a real world context, this 
study puts the two fictional countries in a process of conflict resolution. As 
it has been discussed in chapter 4, a conflict resolution is a situation where 
trust/distrust is likely to emerge as a "themata' in the public sphere i. e. to 
become problematised in order to trigger changes in the relationship. This 
is because trust/distrust as a "thematas becomes relevant when the social 
world as known is being challenged. In this situation, trust/distrust will 
emerge as an explanatory theme to justify actions and choices and to 
support or hinder change. A peace process that takes place at the level of 
the political leadership, the elites or the intemational organisations, is a 
situation that induces change and therefore it could render salient the 
"themata" of trust/distrust. Peace agreements are often introduced by 
international organisations or neutral parties that seek to find an "objective" 
solution that will optimally satisfy both parties. Thus, this study uses the 
example of two countries that decided to enter in negotiations to resolve 
their problems. 
Trust is only one of the issues of importance in a negotiation. As it has 
been said in chapter 3, people have lay theories and the study of these 
theories provides an understanding of collective thinking and of what is 
likely to mobilise people. However, this part is often neglected not only by 
the research but most importantly, by policy makers that so meticulously 
plan "road maps" a term used recently to refer to the Israeli-Palestinian 
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conflict resolution process. People's understandings of the situation and 
how these might be influenced by factors such as power and the duration 
of the conflict is another important point investigated here. These 
understandings might involve a series of issues such as: who wants this 
resolution, who is responsible for the conflict, who should compromise 
more and who will benefit more if a solution is found, who desires the 
solution and whose control and safety is at risk. All these are issues that 
could influence a negotiation process and determine its outcome. 
Furthermore, participants from different nationalities were used. As 
discussed in chapter 3, differences in the position of groups within the 
societal structure shape different understandings of the social world. Most 
importantly, there is a sense of group positioning (Blumer, 1958) which is a 
historical product generated by the conditions of interaction and contact 
between nation-states. In this process, dominant groups define and 
redefine the subordinate groups and the relations between them (Blumer, 
1958; Deschamps, 1982). People experience a different aspect of the 
world depending on the social environment they grow up in. Beyond the 
different position that different countries may have within the international 
structure, each society develops its own beliefs where the new element is 
likely to be anchored. It is expected that this different world view Will be 
reflected in the understanding of international conflict and it will be also 
relevant to trust/distrust (Fukuyama, 1995; Hofstede, 1995; Yamagishi & 
Yamagishi, 1995). Thus, it is also important to study different nationalities 
as an important sociological anchor of trust/distrust. More specifically, this 
study uses Greek, Greek-Cypriots, Turkish and British participants. As the 
context of the study were the relations between Greece and Turkey as 
experienced by the Greeks, the use of Greek participants seem necessary. 
Turkish participants were used as the significant other in this relationship 
whereas the Greek-Cypriot participants were chosen because they 
experience a situation very close to the specific type of conflict explored in 
this research. The British participants were included in the sample as a 
traditional "control* group since Britain occupies a rather different position 
in the international world in comparison to the other three countries. 
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Indeed, Britain is included within the powerful nations and it plays an active 
role in decision making and world politics. The focus is still the specific 
Greek-Turkish dispute and the main rationale of choosing the specific 
countries as target groups was, apart from the British participants, their 
proximity to the context of the study. 
In addition, factors such as the power of the groups involved may alter the 
representations of the parties in the conflict whether these are the states or 
their populations. Research has emphasised the importance of social 
reality in shaping the content of stereotypes (Alexander, Brewer and 
Herrmann, 1999; Eagly and Kite, 1987; Glick and Fiske, 1999,2001; 
Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994) and some authors have proposed that 
"realistico differences between nation states would be reflected in the 
content of the nationality stereotypes (Linssen and Hagendoom, 1994; 
Poppe and Linssen, 1999). The representation of nations and nationalities 
is likely to be based on urealistic7 issues such as economic status, power, 
geographical position and culture. In addition, the nature of the relations 
between states determines the representation of other nations, i. e. 
perceived conflict would be associated Wth a perception of a state as 
aggressive or immoral (Bronfrenbrenner, 1961; Eagly and Kite, 1987; Glick 
and Fiske, 2001). If "social reality" determines the representation of nations 
and nationalities then it follows that it also has an influence on the general 
tendency to favour the in-group along valuable dimensions to achieve 
positive distinctiveness. Research has shown that groups tend to be 
characterised along two dimensions: a warm, communal or moral 
dimension and a competent or agentic dimension depending on their 
power/status. The first dimension refers to the morality of the group and 
the second on its ability and way to achieve its goals. The latter is the one 
that is likely to be influenced by social reality. Generally, the in-group is 
likely to enjoy high ratings on both dimensions whether out-groups, 
depending on the nature of the relationship with the in-group, are likely to 
exceed only in one dimension (Alexander et al., 1999; Glick and Fiske, 
2001). The question that this study addresses is whether power shapes 
the representation of the groups in a similar way when these groups are in 
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conflict. In addition, it offers the opportunity to test these ideas cross- 
culturally. 
Another factor that may play a role in perceptions of conflict and issues of 
trust is the duration of the conflict As it has been suggested in chapter 3, 
one of the factors that differentiates international conflict from the cases of 
inter-group conflict studied in social psychology is that the parties are often 
implicated in long lasting conflict. This type of conflict penetrates the whole 
society and produces certain roles or identities. It is crystallised in certain 
beliefs (e. g. siege mentality), creates certain expectations from the parties 
involved and shapes the understanding of the social environment. Distrust 
has been previously discussed in the literature of inter-group conflict as the 
result of long lasting, intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 1993,2000; Larson, 
1997; Osgood, 1962). In these cases, distrust could be a crystallised 
general belief rather than a process that is being elaborated to deal with 
the introduction of something new. It is therefore important to differentiate 
conflict in terms of its duration. 
Thus, this study aims to investgate people's representations of a particular 
type of conflict cross-nationally when there is a decision to resolve the 
conflict. This conflict is also described as a conflict over boundaries. 
In particular the power of the groups involved and the duration of the 
conflict are thought to influence the perceptions of the conflict and the 
levels and sources of distrust. Further, the power of the parties involved 
might influence how the population and the states are represented in 
common sense. Finally the real worid positioning of the groups might 
influence the understanding of power. Because the study was exploratory, 
no specific hypotheses about the direction of the effects were made. These 
are the key issues that will occupy the sections that follow. 
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Method 
Design and parficipants: The design was a between subjects 4 (Greece, 
Republic of Cyprus, Turkey and Britain) x3 (in-group more-, less- and 
equally powerful with the out-group) x2 (recent versus long-lasting conflict) 
factorial with random allocation of the participants to the six experimental 
conditions. 
The sample was constituted by 159 Greek, 107 Greek-Cypriot, 91 Turks, 
and 124 British participants. The Greek participants were undergraduate 
students at Greek Universities (71 male, 80 female and 8 did not declare 
their gender). The age of the participants varied from 17 to 31 years 
(Mean=19.85, SD=1.68). The majority of the participants declared that 
their political ideas were represented by one or other of the two major 
political parties in Greece. the governing at the time of the study socialist 
party PA. SO. K (26.7%) and the conservative party, New Democracy 
(22.1 %), which constituted the main opposition party in Greece. 
Furthermore, 17.4% of the participants declared left-wing parties while 
19.5% of the parficipants declared that none of the political parties 
expressed their political ideas. Also, 17.6% of the participants did not 
disclose any infonnation about their political beliefs. 
The Greek-Cypdot participants (18 male, 86 female and 3 did not declare 
their gender) were undergraduate students at a college based at the Greek 
part of Cyprus. The age of the participants vaded from 18 to 42 
(Mean=19.88, SD=3.04). No information about the political beliefs of the 
participants was collected. 
The Turkish participants (49 male, 41 female and 1 did not declare his/her 
gender) were undergraduate students at various Turkish Universities. The 
age of the participants varied from 18 to 55 years (Mean=21.82, SD=4.57). 
It was not possible to collect information about the political beliefs of the 
Turkish participants as the vast majority did not wish to declare their 
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political views. This is an interesting finding itself. However, any 
interpretations are beyond the objectives of this study. 
The British participants (23 male, 98 female and 3 did not declare their 
gender) were undergraduate students. The age of the participants varied 
from 18 to 46 years (Mean=M58, SD=3.72). 20.2% of the participants 
cited the labour party, 13.7% the conservative and 37.9% the liberal 
democratic party as representative of their political orientation. 1.6 % of the 
participants declared the green party while 10.5% of the participants 
mentioned that none of the political parties expressed their political ideas. 
Finally, 16.1 % of the participants did not disclose any information about 
their political beliefs. 
Procedure: Three versions of the questionnaire were produced in the 
Greek, English and Turkish language (see Appendb(3). The Greek version 
was translated in English by another researcher. The questionnaire was 
then accurately back translated to the Greek language. The English 
version was translated to the Turkish language by a Turkish national and it 
was accurately back translated in English. The research employed a 
vignette design that was distributed in questionnaire form to the 
participants during lectures. The British participants received course 
credits for the completion of the questionnaire whereas the participants 
from the other countries participated in the study without incentives. 
In the questionnaire it was briefly explained that the purpose of the study 
was to collect people's views about international relationships. Participants 
were reassured about the anonymity and the confidentiality of their 
answers. The questionnaires were distributed by the researcher in the 
case of the British participants. The questionnaire was translated from the 
English into the Turkish by a Turkish native speaker and it was back 
translated in English by another. Academics in Greek Greek-Cypriot and 
Turkish universities were contacted and accepted to distribute and collect 
the questionnaires. To avoid the influence of the information about the 
country from where the study originated and the researchers' country of 
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origin, the relevant information were ornifted in the case of Turkish, Greek 
and the Greek-Cypdot participants. 
Questionnaire: The participants were presented with a short story that 
described the relationship between two fictional countries: Thargelia and 
Nardelia. The two countries were presented as disputing an area along 
their common border. The dispute was described as weakening the two 
countries that, as a result spent a lot of money on arm expenditure leaving 
undeveloped other more vital aspects. The scenario read as follows: 
Imagine a distant planet that is inhabited by many countries. Thargelia and 
Nardelia are two of those. The two countries are neighbours. Thargelia is more-, 
less- powerful than Nardelia/ equally powerful with Nardelia. The two countries 
have been recently implicated in conflict/the two countries are Involved In a long 
lasting conflict. The two countries dispute an area along their boundaries. Both 
countries claim/have claimed the possession and exploitation of this area (for many 
years). Although the two countries are not openly at war, the conflict destabilises 
the area and undermines the development of both countries that invest the biggest 
part of their annual expenses for arm expenditures leaving other important sections 
underdeveloped. The two countries decide to enter in negotiation rounds. 
All the participants were asked to consider themselves as an inhabitant of 
and take the perspective of Thargelia. Pronouns such as "your country" 
were used throughout the questionnaire in order to enhance identification 
with the assigned perspective. The scenario was tailored with the 
manipulation of the two independent variables, the power of the in-group 
(more-, less- and equally powerful with the out-group) and the duration of 
the conflict (recent versus long-lasting). Apart from the manipulations there 
were no other differences between the six scenarios. Six different versions 
of the scenario were designed as they are presented in table 8.1 below 
(see also Appendix 3d): 
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Table 8.1: the allocation of the participants In the experimental conditions 
Power of the group 
erfu in-group P erful out-gr p Equal power 
GRE GREf 
CYP 
TUR BRI GRE GREI 
CYP 
TUR BRI GRE I GREI 
CYP 
TUR BRI 
recent 
26 29 13 19 26 16 14 18 23 14 17 22 
long 
lasting 28 1 15 , 16 , 18 , 25 14 1 14 22 31 19 14 
1 
25 
For example, in the in-group more powerful and recent conflict condition, 
the in-group was presented as more powerful than the out-group and the 
dispute was described as recent. 
Measures: After reading one of the six scenarios, participants were asked 
to complete the rest of the questionnaire that consisted of a series of 
measures aiming to test the hypotheses. 5-point Liked response scales 
were employed ranging from 1 (not at all/ strongly disagree) to 5 (very 
much/strongly agree). 
Desctiption of conflict: The first set of questions that followed the text 
assessed the way participants perceived the conflict The items included 
measures of responsibility for the conflict (e. g. Who do you think is 
responsible for the conflict? "), the possibility for a solution to be reached 
(e. g. "How possible do you think it is for a solution to be reached? "), the 
desirability of a solution (e. g. "what do you think is the percentage of the 
population that wants the dispute to be solved? "), the compromises the two 
parties should make (e. g. "The in-group/out-group should make more 
compromises"), the outcome of the negotiations (e. g. "No matter what the 
outcome of the negotiations will be, the in-group vvill benefit more in the 
future"), who initiated the negotiations (e. g. "The in-group/out-group/third 
parties*) and how far the participants believe that they control the situation. 
In addition, a series of items measured how safe was for the in-group to 
proceed in a series of actions (e. g. withdrawing the anny, reduce 
investments in new arm expenditures, ignoring minor actions taken by the 
other party that transgress agreements etc). 
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Country ratings. In the next section of the questionnaire participants were 
asked to use a series of adjectives in order to describe the in-group and 
the out-group. On a scale ranging from I to 5, participants rated each of 
the two groups on the degree to which they possessed the following 
characteristics: progressive, democratic, civilised, conservative, capitalist, 
bureaucratic, organised, powerful, good in health, education, social 
services, respectful of human rights, successful, close to being a perfect 
place to live, open to the reception of immigrants. Most of these attributes 
were taken from Stapf, Stroebe and Jonas's (1986) study on the 
description of nationalities. 
People ratings. In this section participants used a series of adjectives to 
describe the in-group and the out-group. The adjectives for this study have 
been previousiy used in studies as appropriate for the description of 
various nationalities (Stapf, Stroebe and Jonas, 1986). The adjectives 
were selected on the basis of frequent mention by partcipants when they 
describe various nationalities. They were further enriched by more 
adjectives to ensure adequate representation of agentic and communal 
dimensions (Eagly and Steffen, 1984). The importance of asserting 
communion and agency follows from research showing that these 
dimensions reflect major differences in aspects of society such as 
distribution of roles, natural resources, economic development etc. The list 
of the adjectives completed a series of attributes that were thought to be 
relevant to the description of populations (with a sense of honour, 
traditional). The list of the adjectives that were used here is: educated, 
religious, understanding, individualistic, polite, independent materialistic, 
aggressive, self-confident, traditional, cold, competitive, co-operative, 
organised, unfriendly, sociable, tolerant, ambitious, family oriented, 
hospitable, democratic, hard-working, successful, trustworthy, with a sense 
of honour. 
Dimensions of power In addition, participants were presented with a sedes 
of items in order to evaluate the different sources of power of the two 
groups (e. g. military, geopolitical position, organisation, power in the 
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international arena, economy, culture, population density, support from big 
powers, psychological poweO, solidarity among the citizens). 
Trust(distrust. using a 5-point Ukert-scale that varied from I (not at all) to 5 
(very much), the participants were asked to declare how much they think 
they trusted the out-group. 
Sources of distrust explanations: After describing the two groups and their 
members, participants were provided with a series of statements that 
where presented as "reasons that make other members of their group to 
feel insecure about the outcome of the negotiationsm. Participants were 
asked to rate the importance of these reasons for making them personally 
insecure. The scale consisted of the samel 8 items that were used in the 
previous study to measure the three sources of distrust explanations. The 
references to the specific situation of the relationship between Greece and 
Turkey have been removed from the items whereas the name of the 
fictional out-group (Nardelia) replaced Turkey. See Appendix 3 for he items 
that constituted this scale. 
Manipulation check. In order to assess the effectiveness of the first 
manipulation, i. e. the power of the group, the participants were asked to 
state in a 5-5-point Likert-scale that varied from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very 
much), how powerful the two countries were. This followed the completion 
of the third section of the questionnaire. In order to assess whether the 
second manipulation, the duration of the conflict was well perceived, 
participants were asked to specify in a 5-point Likert scale that varied from 
I year (recent conflict) to more than 50 years (long-lasting conflict). 
In addition, an item was included that measured the strength of 
identification with the in-group Chow far did you answer the above 
questions as a Thargelian? ). 
I Psychological power is an expression that refers to the Greek equivalent of will power 
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Country quotations. Finally, participants were asked to provide names of 
countries and examples of international conflicts that resembled the 
description of the fictional countries. The objective was to specify whether 
participants consciously objectified the abstract and minimal description of 
the conflict relationship depicted in the vignette into a specific 
representation of a real world relationship. Participants were not 
encouraged to think of an example of conflict from the beginning. Rather 
they were asked to provide names of the countries and conflict contexts in 
the end. As it has been explained in chapter 5, people are expected to 
bring in the experimental conditions their own understanding of the social 
world that guides the interpretation of new situations. However, this 
research did not ask participants to consciously think of possible conflicts 
and countries. Rather, they were encouraged to imagine that one of the 
fictional countries was their country implicated in conflict with the other 
country. This put the participants in a situation that they had to identify with 
a country that may not resemble their own. In addition, by asking 
participants from the beginning to objectify the abstract experimental 
scenario we may have forced them to accept that their country is similar to 
a real world country that is not seen very favourably. People evaluate in 
different ways their own country and other countries. Participants in this 
study were encouraged to think or feel that the fictional country was their 
own county and not judge as *bystandere. 
Demographics. Finally, in the last section of the questionnaire, participants 
were asked to provide some demographic information including gender, 
age, political orientation and the type of their studies. 
Results., manipulation check 
Power of the group: In order to test whether the participants perceived well 
the instructed information about the power of the fictional countries four 
repeated measures ANOVA were conducted in each national group using 
a3x2 design. The first factor was a between subjects with three levels 
(in-group more-, less- or equally powerful when compared with the out- 
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group) whereas the second a within subjects factor with 2 levels (power of 
the in-group and power of the out-group). Table 8.2 below presents these 
results: 
Table 8.2: the perception of power by the participants from the four countries 
Powerful in-group Powerful out-group Equal power 
F df p< In-group out-group irv-group out-group in-group out-group 
Mean(SD) Mean(SD) Mean(SD) Mean(SD) Mean(SD) Mean(SD) 
Greek 58.248 2.145 0.001 3.72(0.75) 2.60(0.63) 2.63(0.72) 3.79(0.73) 3.20(0.57) 3.14(0.67) 
Greek Cypriot 17.704 2,98 0.001 3.53(l. 03) 2.81(0.87) 2.59(0.84) 3.59(11.00) 3.22(0.88) 3.32(0.74) 
Turkish 21.510 2.86 0.001 3.51(l. 15) 2.24(l. 13) 2.86(l. 15) 3.65(1.13) 3.45(11.15) 2.74(1.13) 
British 50.470 2,118 0.001 3.97(0.78) 2.71(0.75) 2.57(0.74) 3.90(0.74) 3.39(0.77) 3.13(0.74) 
As shown in table 8.2 above all the participants evaluated differently the 
power of the two groups depending on the experimental condition. 
Greek participants: Clearly, when the in-group was presented as more 
powerful, the Greek participants described the in-group as more powerful 
than the out-group (t(49)=6.969, p<0.001). In addition, in the less powerful 
in-group condition the out-group was described as more powerful than the 
in-group (t(48)=-6.969, p<0.001). Finally, in the equal power condition, the 
two groups were not rated as significantly different in terms of power 
(t(48)=0.583, n. s. ). Thus, it can be said that the Greek participants 
perceived the power of the gmups according to the experimental 
manipulation. 
Greek-Cypriot participants., When the in-group was presented as more 
powerful, the Greek-Cypriot participants described the in-group as more 
powerful than the out-group (t(42)=3.698, p<0.001). In addition, when the 
in-group was less powerful, the out-group was described as more powerful 
than the in-group (t(26)=-3.747, p<0.001)- Finally, in the equal power 
conditions the two groups did not elicit significantly different ratings in 
terms of power (t(30)=-0.682, n. s. ). 
Turkish participants: When the in-group was presented as more powerful, 
the Turkish participants described the in-group as more powerful than the 
178 
out-group (t(28)=5.259, p<0.001). In addition, when the out-group was 
presented as more powerful, it was described as more powerful than the 
in-group (t(28)=-3.000, p<0.01). Finally, the participants in the equal power 
condition described the in-group as more powerful (t(30)=4.062, p<0.001). 
British participants: When the in-group was presented as more powerful, 
the British participants described the in-group as more powerful than the 
out-group (t(34)=6.091, p<0.001). When the out-group was presented as 
more powerful, it was described as more powerful than the in-group 
(t(39)=-7.071, p<0.001). Finally, in the equal power condition, participants 
did not describe the two groups significantly differently in terms of power 
(t(45)=1.772, n. s. ). 
Taken together, these results indicate that the participants well perceived 
the experimental manipulation of power. The Turkish participants were the 
only exception as they described the in-group as more powerful in the 
equal power condition. 
Duration of conflict In order to test whether the participants perceived well 
the instructed information about the duration of the conflict between the 
two fictional countries four one way ANOVAs were performed in the four 
samples. Table 8.3 below presents these results: 
Table 8.3: the perception of the duration of conflict by the participants from the four 
countries 
F df p< Long lasting conflict Recent conflict 
MQ2n(SD) Mean(SD) 
Greek 12.889 1,142 0.001 3.75(l. 16) 2.95(l. 46) 
Greek Cypriot 0.705 1.95 n. & 3.14(l. 07) 2.94(l. 20) 
Turkish 0.123 1.88 n. & 3.53(l. 30) 3.43(l. 42) 
British 4.237 1,120 0.05 3.19(l. 17) 2.77(l. 02) 
As it can be seen in table 8.3, only the Greek and the British participants 
described the conflict as significantly shorter in the recent in comparison to 
the long lasting condition. On the contrary, the Greek Cypriot and the 
Turkish participants did not significantly differentiate between recent and 
long lasting conflict. 
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Identification with the in-group: 65.5% of the Greek participants declared 
that they answered the questions as members of the in-group more than 
enough on a5 point Liked scale ranging from not at all to very much 
(Mean=3.23, SD=1.02 and Median=3.00). The percentage was 71.3% for 
the Greek-Cypriot (Mean=3.06, SD=0.92 and Median=3.00), 85.6% for the 
Turkish participants (Mean=3.52, SD=0.94 and Median=4.00) and 81 % for 
the British (Mean=3.24, SD=0.93 and Median=3.00). 
Summaty 
The manipulation of power was generally well perceived by the participants 
in the four national groups. The only exception was the Turkish participants 
that described the in-group as more powerful than the out-group in the 
equal power condition. However, the manipulation of the duration of 
conflict was well perceived only by the Greek and the British participants 
whereas the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish participants did not 
differentiate between the two types of conflict. We should bear these points 
in mind when looking further to the results. 
f5c) 
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Chapter 8.1 
T his section focuses on the first of the objectives of this study which 
, 
',, 'as 
to explore whether the participants understood the context of 
the relationship between the two fictional countries in a different way 
depending on their nationality and the information they received about 
the power of the two countries. Because the manipulation of the duration 
of conflict was not satisfactory, this dimension was not included in the 
analysis. It was expected that the participants would understand 
differently the context of the relationship depending on the power of the 
in-group and their nationality. Because of the exploratory nature of the 
study, no specific hypotheses about the direction of the effects were 
made. 
As it was said in the method section, the participants were asked: to 
attdbute responsibility for the conflict (to the politics/character of the in- 
/out-group and the Great Powers), to assess the compromises that the 
two parties should make (the in-/out-group), to name the party that they 
believed played the most important role in the initiation of the 
negotiations (the in-/out-group, a third party), to consider the extent that 
the population in the two countries desired a solution (the in4but-group), 
to evaluate how safe it would be for the in-group to undertake a sedes of 
actions to reduce the tension (withdrawal of troops from the disputed 
area, stop further arm expenditure, ignore provocative actions, 
encourage co-operation in other areas), to assess the perceived control 
over the situation by the in-group, to consider how possible it was for a 
solution to be reached, how likely it was for the outcome to be negative 
for the in-group and whether they believed that there will be more 
benefits in the future even if the solution does not benefit the in-group at 
the present. It needs to be remembered here that the participants were 
asked to answer the questions by considedng one of the two countdes 
(Thargelia) as their own country. In the presentation and discussion of 
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results, Thargelia will be referred to as the in-group whereas Nardelia as 
the out-group. 
A series of multivariate and univariate ANOVAs were conducted in order 
to detect the effect of power and participants' nationality on each of the 
above aspects of the context of the relationship. For the multivariate 
ANOVAs the interval of confidence was appropriately modified 
depending on the number of the tests conducted. This section further 
presents the results concerning each of the aspects of the context of the 
relationship described above. Main effects of power and nationality as 
well as interactions between power and nationality are looked. Further 
one-way ANOVA! s and paired comparisons illustrate the meaning of the 
main effects or interactions observed. Due to the number of the tests 
conducted the interval of confidence was appropriately adjusted and it is 
given each time. 
Responsibility for the conflict 
There was no main effect of power (F(l 0,846)=1.600, n. s.; n2=0.01) or 
interaction between power and participants' nationality 
(F(15,1275)=1.477, n. s.; r12=0.02) indicating that information about the 
power did not affect the attribution of responsibility for the conflict. Table 
8.1.1 presents these results. 
A main effect of the participants' nationality (F(I 5,1275)=7.343, p<0.001; 
r11=0.08) revealed that the participants from the four countries attributed 
differently responsibility for the conflict This effect was due to the fact 
that the Greek participants attributed less responsibility to the character 
of the out-group than the rest of the participants did (F(3,439)= 15.497, 
p<0.001). The Greek participants also attributed more responsibility to 
the politics of the in-group than the British participants did 
(F(3,439)=9.499, p<0.001) and the British participants attributed less 
responsibility to the Great Powers than the rest of the participants did 
(F(3,439)=23.052, p<0.001). As far as the attribution of responsibility to 
the character of the in-group (F(3,439)=2.931, p=0.033) and the politics 
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of the out-group (F(3,439)=2.570, p=0.054) participants' responses did 
not differ significantly (adjusted p<0.01). Figure 8.1.1 below presents 
these resuits: 
Figure 8.1.1: attribution of responsibility and the participants' nationality 
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Interestingly, attribution of responsibility for the conflict was not 
influenced by the power of the countries indicating that powerful as well 
as powerless countries were seen as equally responsible for the conflict. 
However, participants' nationality produced differences in their 
responses. For example, the British participants attributed less 
responsibility to the Great Powers than the rest of the participants. This 
last finding seems to make sense if one considers that Britain is itself a 
Great Power that has played an active role in conflict resolution ventures 
worldwide. However, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey are countries with a 
national history replete with examples of "Great Power' interventions 
(Millas, 2001) and therefore it could be said that the different 
experiences as they are transmitted through history books or mass 
media have an impact on where people put the role of the Great Powers 
within their theory of conflict. The fact that the Greek participants 
attributed less responsibility to the character of the out-group than the 
rest of the participants and more responsibility to the politics of the in- 
qroup than the British participants shows that in terms of the attribution 
of responsibility for the conflict the Greek participants had a distinct 
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pattern of response that differentiates them for the rest of the 
participants. 
Table 8.1.1.: attribution of responsibility for the conflict 
In-group Out-group In-group Out-group Great 
character character politics politics Powers 
GRE 2.62(1.09) 2.47(0.95) 3.79(1.04) 3.39(1.09) 3.15(1.37) 
0 th GRFJCYP 2.82(11.07) 3.0-4(1.09) 3.28(1.14) 3.28(1.11) 2.66(1.42) 
TUR 2.25(1.14) 2.64(1.19) 3.21(1.10) 3.37(1.17) 3.06(l. 43) 
BRI 2.29(1.15) 3.40(1.16) 2.62(l. 26) 3.56(1.06) 2.32(1.27) 
Total 2.53(1.12) 2.86(1.13) 3.29(1.20) 3.40(1.10) 2.86(1.40) 
CL GRE 1.90(0.98) 2.45(1.26) 3.17(1.27) 3.92(0.91) 3.29(0.91) 
P 
,P GRE/CYP 2.13(0.91) 2.72(1.03) 2.77(l. 12) 3.03(1.23) 2.48(1.27) 
0 
TUR 2.07(0.93) 3.37(1.21) 3.07(1.41) 3.82(1.24) 3.26(l. 21) 
BRI 2.35(1.01) 3.25(1.11) 2.79(l. 10) 3.69(0.92) 2.17(1.02) 
Total 2.10(0.97) 2.89(l. 22) 2.97(1.23) 3.66(1.09) 2.80(1.33) 
GRE 2.18(0.98) 2.64(1.20) 3.33(1.01) 3.58(0.98) 3.26(1.39) 
GRE/CYP 2.83(1.15) 2.93(1.01) 3.30(1.11) 3.51(0.99) 3.26(1.43) 
0 2L 
10 TUR 2.40(1.19) 2.90(1.32) 3.24(1.24) 3.68(1.16) 2.71(1.48) 
w 
BRI 2.36(0.99) 3.30((193) 2.91(1.05) 3.59(0.77) 2.24(1.02) 
Total 2.40(1.07) 2.94(1.14) 3.18(1.09) 3.59(0.95) 2.86(1.38) 
GRE 2.25(11.05) 2.51(1.12) 3.44(1.12) 3.60(1.01) 3.22(1.39) 
2: 1 GRE/CYP 2.65(1.08) 2.89(1.05) 3.18(1.13) 3.29(1.15) 2.84(1.41) 
.2 TUR 2.24(1.13) 3.02(1.28) 3.17(1.25) 3.62(1.19) 2.97(1.39) 
z 
BRI 2.33(1.03) 3.33(1.05) 2.78(1.10) 3.61(0.89) 2.22(1.09) 
lotal 2.35(1.07) 2.90(l. 12) 3.16(11.16) 3.54(1.05) 2.83(1.37) 
-- 
Which countty should make more compromises? 
There was a main effect of power (F(4,928)=3.539, p<01; rl 2=0 . 
015). 
Participants expected the out-group to make more compromises when 
the in-group was less powerful than when it was more powerful 
(F(2,477)=6.032, p<0.001). On the contrary, the participants' 
expectations about the compromises that the in-group should make did 
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not vary as an effect of power (F(2,477)=0,818, n. s. ). Table 8.1.2 
presents these results. 
Furthermore, paired comparisons (adjusted p<0.01) revealed that the 
out-group was expected to make more compromises when it was more 
(t(I 48)=-6.042, p<0.00 i) or equally (t(I 63)=3.203, p<O. 002) powerful 
compared to the in-group. However, participants did not expect their in- 
group to make more compromises when it was more powerful (t(163)=- 
0.429, n. s. ). It seems that the participants did not have the same 
expectations about compromises from the powerful or even equally 
powerful out-group and the powerful in-group. Indeed, the in-group was 
never expected to make more compromises than the out-group no 
matter what was the power condition. However, the powerful of equally 
powerful out-group was expected to make more compromises than the 
in-group. Figure 8.1.2 below presents these results: 
Figure 8.1.2: compromises that the two countries should make in the three power 
conditions 
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There was also a main effect of nationality (F(6,928)=10.986, p<001 
q2=0 . 066) indicating that nationality also played a role in the 
compromises that the two countries were expected to make. The British 
more than all the other participants considered that the in-group should 
make more compromises (F(3,477)=7.495, p<0.001) and the British and 
the Turkish participants more than the Greek and Greek Cypriot 
participants considered that the out-group should make more 
compromises (F(3,477)=18.616, p<0.001). Figure 8.1.3 below presents 
these results'. 
Figure 8.1.3: compromises that the two countries should make and participants' 
nationality 
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Furthermore, paired comparisons (adjusted p<0.025) revealed that the 
in-group was expected to make more compromises by the Turkish 
(t(90)=3.664, p<0.001) and the British (t(123)=2.279, p<0.01) 
participants. The Greek (t(155)=0.474, n. s. ) and the Greek-Cypriot 
(t(105)=1.225, n. s. ) participants equally divided the compromises 
between the two countries. 
These results were further qualified by a significant interaction between 
power and nationality (F(l 2,928)=3.333, p<001 -, q2=0.041). This 
interaction was due to the fact that the degree of compromises that the 
out-group was expected to make changed as an effect of power 
differently across the four national groups (F(6,477)=3.91 1, p<0.001). 
The degree of the compromises that the in-group should make did not 
change (F(6,477)=2.265, n. s. ). A series of one way ANOVAs revealed 
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that the Greek participants considered that the out-group should make 
more compromises both when the in-group was less and equally 
powerful with the out-group (F(2,155)=10.074, p<0.001). In addition, the 
Greek-Cypriot (F(2,106)=3.841, p<0.025) and the British 
(F(2,123)=3.633, p<0.029) participants also considered that the out- 
group should make more compromises when it was more powerful. 
Finally, the Turldsh participants did not expect the out-group to make 
more or less compromises depending on the power condition 
(F(2,90)=2.587, n. &). 
In addition, further paired comparisons (adjusted p<0.004) revealed that 
when the in-group was more powerful, the Greek participants 
(t(52)=3.198, p<0.002) considered that the in-group should make more 
compromises, the Turkish participants considered that the out-group 
should make more compromises (t(30)=-2.930, p<0.006) whereas for 
the Greek-Cypriots (t(42)=0.644, n. s. ) and the British participants(t(42)=- 
0.321, n. s. ) no differences were detected. The Greek (t(49)=-3.430, 
p<0.001), the Greek-Cypriot (t(29)=-2.812, p<0.009) and the British 
(t(39)=-4.51 1, p<0.001) participants considered that the out-group 
should make more compromises when the in-group was less powerful 
whereas this was not the case for the Turkish participants (t(28)=1.543, 
n. s. ). Finally, in the equal power condition only the Greek participants 
considered that the out-group should make more compromises (t(52)=- 
2.976, p<0.004). The Greek Cypriot (t(32)=0.000, n. s), the Turkish 
(t(30)=-0.688, n. s) and the British (t(46)=-0.242, n. s) participants did not. 
Power seemed to have an effect on the compromises that the out-group 
was expected to make. If conflict concerns the dispute about resources 
that are claimed by both parties, it is clear that their division does not 
follow an equality principle. On the contrary, if the out-group is more 
powerful it is expected to make more compromises. However, this is not 
the case for the powerful in-group. Indeed, when the out-group is less 
powerful than the in-group, the compromises that the two parties should 
make are equally divided. This effect was qualified by the interaction 
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between nationality and power but only for the Greek, the Greek-Cypriot 
and the British participants. 
Who has initiated the negotiations: the in-group, the out-group or the 
international community? 
There was no main effect of power (F(6,896)=0.961, n. s. -, n2= 0.006). 
There was a main effect of nationality (F(9,1090)=2.070, p<0.05-, 
nl=0.014). This effect was due to the fact that participants from the four 
countries assessed the contribution of the international community in the 
initiation of negotiations differently (F(3,462)=4.239, p<0.006). The 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level was 0.016. Table 8.1.3 and figure 8.1.4 
below present these results*. 
Figure 8.1.4: the contribution to the initiation of the negotiations of the in-group, the out- 
group and the international community and participants' nationality 
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The Greek participants gave a greater percentage of contribution to the 
initiation of negotiations to the international community than the British 
participants did (F(3,462)=4.239, p<0.01). Participants in the four 
countries did not differ in the extent that they believed that the in-group 
(F(3,462)=3.127, ri. s. ) or the out-group (F(3,462)=2.01 1, n. s. ) initiated 
the negotiations. 
There was also an interaction between power and nationality 
(F(18,1168)=1.763, P<0.05-, q2= 0.025). Participants from the four 
countries differed in the extent that they believed that the out-group 
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contributed in the initiation of negotiation depending on power 
(F(6,462)=3.915, p=0.003). The Bonferroni adjusted alpha level was 
0.0%. Further one way ANOVAs revealed that this difference was due 
to the fact that the Greek participants gave a lower percentage to the 
out-group for the contribution to the initiation of negotiations in the less 
powerful in-group condition (F(2,155)=10.219, p<0.001). The other 
differences were not significant. Figure 8.1.5 below presents these 
results: 
Figure 8.1.5: Participants' nationality and the contribution of the out-group to the initiation 
of the negotiations 
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Interestingly, the Greek more than the British participants considered 
that the international community had initiated the negotiations. This may 
reflect the type of conflict that the Greek participants were more familiar 
with where the two parties in a conflict are difficult to take the initiative 
without the contribution of an external party. In addition, only the Greek 
participants considered that the out-group contributed less to the 
initiation of the negotiations when it was more powerful. The Greek 
participants believed that a powerful out-group is not interested in 
resolving the conflict. Again, there is a pattern of results here that 
differentiates the Greek from the rest of or the British participants. 
How much the two countries desire a solution? 
There was a main effect of power (F(4,918)=16.694, p<0.001 -1 02=0.068). 
More specifically, the in-group members were perceived as wanting less 
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a solution when the in-group was more powerful than when it was less or 
equally powerful with the out-group (F(2,460)=10.988, p<0.001). The 
out-group members were also seen as wanting a solution less when the 
out-group was more powerful in comparison to both the less and equal 
power conditions (F(2,460)=9.606, p<0.001). Table 8.1.4 and figure 
8.1.6 below present these results* 
Figure 8.1.6: desirability of the solution in the three power conditions 
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Paired comparisons (adjusted p<0.016) revealed that when the in-group 
was more powerful the in-group members were seen as wanting a 
solution less than the out-group members (t(160)=-3.613, p<0.003). The 
out-group members were also seen as wanting a solution less than the 
in-group members when the out-group was more powerful 
(t(l 47)=7.106, p<0.001). In the equal power condition, the in-group 
members were thought to be wanting a solution more than the out-group 
members (t(162)=3.825, p<0.001). 
There was also a main effect of nationality (F(6,918)=4.063, p<0.001 
nl=0.026). The Greek-Cypriot less than the Turkish and the British 
participants, considered that the in-group members wanted a solution 
more (F(3,460)=6.973, p<0.001). No differences between the 
participants from the four countries were found on whether the out-group 
members wanted a solution more (F(3,460)=2.776, n. s, ). Figure 8.1.7 
below present these results- 
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Figure 8.1.7: desirability of the solution and participants' nationality 
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Furthermore, pairwise comparisons (adjusted p<0.004) revealed that 
only the Bdtish participants considered that the in-group members 
wanted a solution more than the out-group members (t(l 23)=3.908, 
p<0.001). The Greek (t(151)=0.671, n. s. ), the Greek-Cypriot 
(t(l 04)=2.003, n. s. ) and the Turkish (t(90)=2.115, n. s. ) participants did 
not. 
There was no interaction between power and nationality (F(l 2, 
918)=0.959; ql=0.012). 
Overall, the participants considered that the members of a powerful 
group, whether this was the in-group or the out-group, wanted a solution 
less than those in the less and equal power conditions. This is important 
if one considers that the willingness to enter negotiations and find a 
solution is central in a conflict resolution venture. Moreover, one needs 
to be convinced that the other party has enough motivation to work for 
the conflict resolution. There may be many reasons that possibly make 
people believe that the other party does not want a solution, power here 
seems to play an important role. The fact that the participants in the 
equal power condition believe that the in-group members still want a 
Solution more than the out-group members reveals that there may be 
other factors apart from power that are important. In addition, there were 
some differences between the participants from the four countries. The 
Greek-Cypriot less than the British and the Turkish participants 
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considered that the in-group members wanted a solution whereas the 
British participants considered that the in-group members wanted a 
solution more than the out-group members. It is interesting here that the 
Greek-Cypriot participants that experience a conflict close to the one 
described in the vignette appear to want less a solution than the out- 
group members. This is important, if one considers that participants 
bring in the experiment their own theories of international conflict and 
draw in familiar contexts to respond to more abstract situations. One 
would expect that people that experience long lasting conflict would 
desire to find a way to resolve it. 
Actions that are considered as safe to be taken by the in-group in order 
to reduce the tension 
There was a main effect of power (F(8,918)=3.473, p<0.001 *1 0-'=0.029). 
When the in-group was less powerful the withdrawal of troops from the 
disputed area was considered to be a less safe option than when it was 
more- or equally powerful with the out-group (F(2,473)=14.053, 
p=0.002). Actions such as stopping further arms expenditure 
(F(2,473)=4.369, n. s. ), ignoring provocative actions (F(2,473)=0.549, 
n. s. ) and encouraging co-operation in other areas (F(2,473)=2.946, n. s. ) 
were not affected by the manipulation of power. The Bonferroni adjusted 
alpha level was 0.012. Table 8.2.5 and figure 8.1.8 below present these 
results. 
Figure 8.1.8: safety of certain actions in the three power conditions 
0 p+ 13 p- M p= 
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There was a main effect of nationality (F(12,1212)=3.178, p<0.001. 
q2=0 . 
027). This effect was due to the fact that the Turkish participants 
considered the withdrawal of the troops from the disputed area as a less 
safe option than all the other participants (F(3,473)=6.934, p=0.001). To 
stop further arm expenditure (F(3,473)=2.233, n. s. ), ignore provocative 
actions (F(3,473)=3.519, n. s. ) and encourage co-operation in other 
areas (F(3,473)=2.516, n. s. ) were considered by the participants as 
equally safe. The Bonferroni adjusted alpha level was 0.012. Figure 
8.1.9 below presents these results: 
Figure 8.1.9: safety of certain actions and participants' nationality 
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No interaction between power and nationality (F(24,1557)=1.264, n. s. -, 
n2=0 .0 
17) was detected. 
Interestingly, only the withdrawal of troops was affected by power with 
the participants in the less powerful country considering such an action 
riskier than those in the more- and equal power conditions. If the army 
and the occupation of an area constitutes a valuable aspect of power for 
a country then it is not surprising that those in the less powerful in-group 
condition, find it riskier to withdraw from something that offers them a 
means to put pressure or have some control over the situation. The 
withdrawal of troops from the disputed area was also considered as a 
riskier action to be undertaken by the Turkish in comparison to all the 
other participants. There may be differences in the meaning that the 
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army has in different societies as well as the position and importance of 
the army in the society and its role in settling or managing disputes. 
Table 8.1.5: actions considered safe to be undertaken by the In-group In order to reduce 
the tension 
Withdrawal 
of troops 
Stop arm 
expenditure 
Ignore 
provocative 
actions 
Encourage 
co-operation 
GRE 2.51(1.11) 3.00(11.18) Z46(1.03) 3.53(1.24) 
Cx 
2 
tx GRE/CYP 2.54(1.06) 2.61(0.86) 2.40(0.84) 2.93(1.14) 
TUR 2.23(1.13) 2.83(1.01) 1.90(1.01) 3.30(1.02) 
0 CL BRI 2.67(1.02) 2.81(l. 07) 2.81(1.07) 3.32(0.85) 
Total 2.50(l. 08) 2.81(1.05) 2.42(1.02) 3.28(1.11) 
GRE 2.23(l. 03) 2.39(0.91) 2.45(1.00) 3.47(1.08) 
CL 
0 
GREICYP 2.13(0.89) 2.83(1.11) 2.48(l. 15) 3.10(1.12) 
0 TUR 2. OD(O. 88) 2.42(1.45) 2.42(1.45) 3.41(1.15) 
SRI 2.52(0.08) 2.588(0.90) 2.61(1.22) 3.12(1.15) 
Total 2.16(1.00) 2.45(0.98) 2.49(1.17) 3.29(1.12) 
GRE 2.50(1.04) 2.52(0.95) 2.57(1.14) 3.58(1.04) 
GRE/CYP 2.6D(I. M 2.75(0.90) 2.39(0.96) 3.42(1.27) 
0 
TUR 2.12(1.14) 2.32(1.22) 2.35(1.33) 3.64(1.17) 
Or 
w 
BRI 2.63(0.96) 2.78(1.04) 2.70(1.08) 3.53(1.01) 
Total 2.49(1.07) 2.6D(I. 03) 2.53(1.12) 3.54(1.10) 
GRE 2.42(l. 06) 2.64(1.05) 2.49(1.05) 3.53(1.12) 
Z. GRE/CYP 2.44(1.06) 2.71(0.94) 2.42(0.96) 3.13(1.10) 
a TUR 1.97(1.08) 2.38(1.09) 2.22(1.27) 3.45(1.11) 
z 
BRI 2.61(0.98) 2.72(1.01) 2.70(1.12) 3.34(0.98) 
Total 2.39(1.06) 2.63(l. 03) 2.48(1.10) 3.37(1.11) 
Does the in-group control the situation? 
There was a main effect of power (F(2,475)=63.169, p<001; rl 2=0.220). 
The participants in the more (p<0.001) and equal (p<0.001) power 
conditions considered that the in-group controlled the situation more 
than the participants in the less power condition did. In addition, the 
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participants in the more powerful in-group condition considered that the 
in-group controlled the situation more than the participants in the equal 
power condition did. Table 8.1.6 and figure 8. i. 10 below present these 
results: 
Figure 8.1.10: perceived control in the three power conditions 
There was also a main effect of nationality (F(3,475)= 10.583, p<001 -, 
0'=0.064). More specifically, the Greek less than the British (p<0.01) and 
the Turkish (p<0.001) participants considered that the in-group controls 
the situation. The figure 8.1.11 below presents these results- 
Figure 8.1.11: perceived control and participants' nationality 
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No interaction between power and nationality (F(6,475)=0.598, n. s. ) was 
observed. 
If control over the situation is a dimension of the power of the group then 
it is not surprising that the participants in the more powerful in-group 
condition considered that they controlled the situation more than those in 
the less and equal power conditions. The balance of power between the 
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two countries was thought to give to the in-group enough assurance of 
control at least more than when the in-group was less powerful. Lack of 
power means limited control. Control over the situation was also 
considered low for the Greek in relation to the British and Turkish 
participants. Possibly control reflects a dimension that it is influenced by 
familiar conflicts and disputes, and the experienced levels of control they 
had in their resolution. 
Table 8.1.6: control over the situation, possibility for a solution to be reached, belief that 
the outcome will be negative for the In-group and belief that there will be more benefits for 
the In-group In the future 
Control over Possible Outcome More future 
the situati(m sokition n! Rative benefits 
GRE 3.17(0.73) 2.44(0.69) 2.01(0.74) 3.47(0.82) 
CL 
2 GREICYP 3.15(0.77) 2.72(0.73) 2.45(0.90) 3.38(0.75) 
TUR 3.45(0.92) 2.45(0.80) 2.54(1.05) 3.16(1.15) 
0 9L BRI 3.48(0.73) 3.02(0.76) 2.37(0.86) 3.69(0.64) 
Total 3.29(0.79) 2.65(0.77) 2.31(0.89) 3.41(0.84) 
GRE 1.96(0.52) 2.49(0.80) 3.45(0.80) 2.62(0.87) CL 
0 
Yl GRE/CYP 2.16(0.64) 2.8D(O. 71) 2.83(0.87) 2.96(0.71) 
IS 
0 
73 TUR 1.58(0.73) 2.68(0.80) 2.93(0.92) 3.55(1. M 
0 0- BRI 2.51(0.88) 2.95(0.90) 3.32(0.99) 3.42(0.87) 
Total 2.28(0.81) 2.71(0.83) 3.19(0.92) 2.89(0.94) 
GRE 2.55(077) 2.56(0.90) 2.40(0.69) 3.03(1.01) 
GRE/CYP 2.63(0.54) 2.84(0.56) 2.66(0.59) 3.30(0.84) 
0 CL 
TUR 2.96(0.87) 3.06(0.94) 2.90(0.97) 3.16(1.24) 
W 
BRI 2.87(0.67) 2.95(0.75) 2.74(0.56) 3.65(0.70) 
Total 2.74(0.74) 2.82(0.82) 2.65(0.72) 3.28(0.97) 
GRE 2.56(0.84) 2.50(0.80) 2.61(0.96) 3.05(0.96) 
>. GRE/CYP 2.71(0.78) 3.42(0.95) 2.62(0.81) 3.24(0.78) 
TUR 3.04(0.99) 2.73(0.88) 2.79(0.99) 2.06(1.17) 
z 
BRI 2.94(0.85) 3.95(0.77) 2.. 82(0.89) 3.56(0.74) 
Total 2.78(0.88) 2.73(0.81) 2.70(0.92) 3.20(0.94) 
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Possibility for a solution to be reached: 
No main effect of power (F(2,476)=2.519, n. s., n2=0.01 1) or interaction 
between power and nationality (F(6,476)= 1.161, n. s. -, q2=0.015) was 
observed. 
There was a main effect of nationality (F(3,476)=8.624, p<001 -1 
q2=0 . 053) with the 
Greek-Cypriots (p<0.05) and the British (p<0.001) 
participants considering the possibifity for a soiution higher than the 
Greek participants. Table 8.1.6 and figure 8.1.12 below presents these 
results., 
Figure 8.1.12: possibility for a solution to be reached and participants' nationality 
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Interestingly, in the participants' theories of conflict resolution power 
does not give to a country assurance for a possible solution. This seems 
to make sense if one considers that powerful countries implicated in 
protracted conflicts with less powerful countries are not successful in 
resolving their conflicts. The fact that the Greek-Cypriot and the British 
more than the Greek participants considered that such a solution was 
possible, may reflect the different speaking positions of these countries. 
The Greek-Cypriots were implicated in a conflict resolution venture, the 
British play an active role in settling conflicts world wide and the Greeks 
are implicated in a long term but not open dispute with Turkey that it 
minht ho fnn %in might be -- vague to decide what would constitute a resolution. 
The outcome will be negative for the in-group 
No main effect of nationality (F(1,478)=1.701, n. s.; q2=0.01 1) was 
observed. 
There was a main effect of power (F(2,478)=33.663, p<00 1; n2=0.126) 
with the participants in the more power condition considering that the 
outcome will be less negative for the in-group than the participants in the 
less (p<0.001) and equal (p<0.001) power conditions. In addition, the 
participants in the less power condition considered that the outcome will 
be more negative for the in-group than the participants in both more 
(p<0.001) and equal (p<0.001) power conditions did. Table 8.1.6 and 
figure 8.1.13 below present these results: 
Figure 8.1.13: the belief that the outcome will be negative in the three power conditions 
I ()() 
There was also an interaction between power and nationality 
(F(6,478)=4.693, p<001; q2=0.057) that partly qualified the main effect of 
power for the Greek and the British participants. The Greek participants 
in the less powerful in-group condition considered more than the 
participants in the more (p<0.001) and equal (p<0.001) power conditions 
did that the outcome will be negative for the in-group. In addition, the 
Greek participants in the equal power more than the participants in the 
more powerful in-group condition (p<0.05) perceived that the out-come 
will be negative for the in-group (F(2,155)=50.446, p<0.001). In a similar 
way, the British participants in the less power condition considered that 
the outcome will be negative for the in-group more than the participants 
in the more (p<0.001) and equal (p<0.01) power conditions did 
(F(2,123)=13.304, p<0.001). Figure 8.1.14 below presents these results: 
Figure 8.1.14: the belief that the outcome will be negative, power and participants' 
nationality 
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It seems that for those that belonged to the less powerful countries it 
was more likely for the outcome of the negotiations to be negative. Thus, 
being the less powerful country in a conflict resolution venture means 
that it is likely to envisage a less favourable solution for the in-group. On 
the other hand, a powerful in-group seems to be able to achieve a more 
satisfactory solution. However, these results were qualified only by the 
Greek and the British participants indicating that for the rest of the 
participants that the favourability of the outcome of the negotiations was 
irrespective of the power of their country. These results indicate that 
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nationality plays an important role here in understanding the meaning of 
power in the favourability of the outcome of the negotiations. 
More benefits in the future 
There was amain effect of power (F(2,477)=13.260, p<001*, q2=0.054). 
This effect was due to the fact that the participants in the more (p<0.001) 
and equal (p<0.001) power conditions considered that the in-group will 
benefit more in the future than the participants in the less power 
condition did. Table 8.1.6 and figure 8.1.15 below presents these results: 
Figure 8.1.15: the belief that there will be more benefits in the future in the three power 
conditions 
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There was also a main effect of nationality (F(3,477)= 10.263, p<001 I 
rl 2=0 . 062-, ). 
More specifically, the British more than the Greek (p<0.001) 
and the Turkish (p<0.001) participants considered that the in-group will 
benefit more in the future. Figure 8.1.16 below presents these result& 
Figure 8.1.16: the belief that there will be more benefits in the future and the participants' 
nationality 
No interaction between power and nationality (F(6,477)=1.406, n. s. -, 
n2=0 
.0 
18) was observed. 
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Again, the powerful in-group seems to be able to achieve benefits for the 
in-group in the long term. Such a belief is very important, if a conflict 
resolution involves the ability to see beyond the settlement at the 
moment of an agreement and be sustained in the future. The British 
more than the Greek and the Turkish participants believed that there will 
be more benefits for the in-group in the future. It may be difficult for 
those that are implicated in conflicts to surpass the fears that everything 
is decided at the moment of the negotiations whereas nothing could 
compensate for any losses in the future. 
Discussion 
This section sought to explore the role of power and the participants' 
nationality in shaping the way that the participants understand the 
context of the relationship between two countries that are implicated in 
conflict and enter in negotiation rounds. The aim of this section was 
twofold. On the one hand, it attempted to highlight the role of power in 
organising such a context and on the other hand, to explore whether 
there is a common understanding of the context by people that are likely 
to occupy different positions, in this case by people from different 
nations. The results confirmed the key role of power in shaping the 
understanding of the context but also showed that there is a different 
understanding of the context by people with different national positions. 
Interestingly, the effect of power on certain dimensions of the context 
was not qualified by the participants from all the countries. In addition, 
there were differences in the way that the participants from the four 
countries responded independently of the manipulation of power. Some 
differences seemed to make sense and reflect differences in the context 
that the participants have been socialised and also a different position 
within the international world. 
In terms of the effect of power, as it was said in the introduction of this 
chapter, no specific hypotheses could be made for the direction of the 
effect. Different information about the power of the two countries 
produced an interesting pattern of the context of the relationship 
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between the two countries which is worth to summarise and further 
discuss. 
To be the less powerful party in a conflict put the participants in a 
situation of little control whereas actions that could contribute to the 
reduction of the conflict such as the withdrawal of the troops from the 
disputed area were considered to be risky. Although participants in the 
less power in-group condition expected the out-group to make more 
compromises they believed that the outcome would be negative for the 
in-group and they would not have greater benefits in the future. They 
also wanted a solution urgently. 
Things are not more encouraging regarding the conflict resolution for the 
more powerful in-group. Although the participants believed that it was 
safe to withdraw the troops from the disputed area that the outcome 
would be positive for the in-group and they will have more benefits in the 
future, participants in this power condition did not expect their In-group to 
make more compromises (something that it was expected from the 
powerful out-group) and they did not want a solution urgently. 
Interestingly, the participants in the equal power condition responded in 
a similar way with those in the more powerful in-group condition. 
Power did not influence the participants' assessment about which party 
has initiated the negotiations and the possibility for a solution to be 
reached. In addition, actions such as stopping further arms expenditure, 
ignoring provocative actions and encouraging co-operation were 
considered as equally risky in all power conditions. Interestingly, the 
powerful in-group was not attributed more responsibility for the conflict or 
was not believed to having taken more initiatives for the negotiations. 
The results relative to the effect of nationality on the participants' 
responses were also interesting. Participants from the four countries 
produced different responses in the understanding of the context of the 
relationship. However, only speculations could be made about the 
reasons that may have produced such differences. Some of the results 
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seem to make more sense than others. For example, the fact that the 
British participants attributed less responsibility for the conflict to the 
Great Powers than the Greek and the Greek-Cypriot participants Is likely 
to reflect the real world positions of the three countries. Interestingly, the 
British participants from a country that has been implicated in conflict 
resolution plans and the Greek Cypriot participants from a country that 
entered at the time of the data collection a phase of resolution of the 
problem of the partition of the island after the Turkish invasion in 1974, 
appear to be more positive about the possibility for a solution to be 
found. The Turkish participants appear to be the more "stubborn" as they 
expected the out-group to make more compromises and the more 
"vigilant" as they considered less safe to withdraw the troops from the 
disputed area. This may have to do with the special position that has the 
army in Turkey. Beyond the differences observed, participants seem to 
have a common understanding of the aspects of the relationship 
between the two countries. 
These results are very important for two reasons. First of all, they 
demonstrate the key role of power in understanding a conflict context 
especially when a conflict resolution process has been introduced. In 
addition, certain dimensions of the context produced differences 
between the two countries. Indeed, power did not produce symmetrical 
results for the two groups when they were more powerful. For example, 
whereas the powerful out-group was expected to make more 
compromises this was not the case for the powerful in-group. The results 
in the equal power condition resemble those in the more powerful 
condition in most of the cases. This indicates that apart from the 
manipulation of power, the distinction between in-group and out-group 
could be used to explain some of the results. 
Most importantly, the participants responded differently for reasons 
others than the expedmental manipulations. For the explanations of 
such differences only speculations could be made that refer to the 
positioning of the countdes Within the international wodd, the history of 
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the societies that the participants were socialised in and the expedences 
of conflict that the four countries may be familiar with. The expedmental 
method should take into consideration such influences especially when it 
is used to study conflict as a worid phenomenon subjected to common 
processes across the cultures. Research should further study these 
issues in a systematic way and try to explore common elements and 
sources of individual vadation in respect to these theodes. 
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Chapter 8.2 
T his section seeks to explore whether power and participants' 
nationality influenced participants' levels and sources of 
trust/distrust. It was expected that participants would endow trust/distrust 
differently depending on their nationality and the power relation between 
the two countries. The presentation of the results starts with the effect of 
power and nationality on the levels of trust/distrust. 
Levels of trust1distnist 
A univariate ANOVA was performed with trust as dependent variable 
and power and the participants' nationality as independent variables. 
Consistently with the hypothesis that trust would be influenced by the 
power of the in-group, there was a main effect of power 
(F(2,476)=3.218, p<0.05, r12=0.0 14; Mmore=1.85, SD=0.68, Mless=1.72, 
SD=0.75 and Mequal=1.94, SD=0.71). A one way ANOVA revealed that 
this effect was due to the fact that the participants in the equal power 
condition trusted the out-group more than the participants in the less 
power condition did (F(2,474)=3.864, p<0.05). Figure 8.2.1 below 
depicts these results, 
Figure 8.2.11: levels of trust in the three power conditions 
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The hypothesis that trust would differ across nations was also confirmed 
as a main effect of country was found (F(3,476)=4.197, p<0.001 -, 
rl 2=0.026, Mgre=1.78, SD=0.69, Mcyp=1.96, SD=0.70, Mtur=1.65, 
SD=0.71 and Mbri=1.95, SD=0.74). More specifically, a one-way ANOVA 
(F(3,475)=4.345, p<0.01) revealed that the Turkish trusted less the out- 
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group than the British (p<0.05) and the Greek-Cypriot (p<0.05) 
participants did. Figure 8.2.2 below presents these results. - 
Figure 8.2.2: levels of trust and participants' nationality 
No interaction between power and nationality (F(6,476)=0.340, n. s. -, 
nl=0.004) was observed. 
The results generally confirm that the levels of trust would depend on the 
power equation between the two groups and participants' nationality. 
The participants in the equal power condition trusted more the out-group 
than the participants in the less powerful in-group condition did. It is 
interesting to note here that trust in the out-group was higher in the 
situation of equal power between the two countries. It seems that the 
levels of trust/distrust remain low in situations of unequal power whereas 
are higher in conditions of equal power. As far as the effect of 
participants' nationality on the levels of trust/distrust was concerned it 
was found that the Turkish participants trusted less the out-group than 
the British and the Greek-Cypriot participants did. It could be argued 
here that participants from different nationalities may differ in terms of 
general trust/distrust. This result would add on previous research that 
has shown that cultures and societies may differ depending on how 
much they trust (Fukuyama, 1995'. Hofstede, 1980-, Markova et al., 
2000). It could also be argued that these differences may just reflect 
participants' tendency to use more or less the whole range of the scale 
given. 
207 
Sources of distrust explanations 
This chapter continues with the results concerning the sources of 
distrust explanations. Because of the different experimental conditions 
that may have influenced the way the participants valued the different 
types of distrust explanations, differences in sample size (although still 
acceptable for the conduct of analysis) the different experiences of 
conflict that participants might have in their mind when they were 
answering the questions, it was decided to follow the theoretical 
structure of the three types of distrust explanations as they have used in 
chapter 7 (see Appendix 3). The same three factor's were computed for 
the four groups based on the theoretical assumptions as described in 
chapters 7 and 8 earfier. The reliabilities of the three factors were high 
(action =0.83, internal situation=0.79 and character =0.86). 
It was expected that the participants would value differently the sources 
of distrust explanations depending on their nationality and the power 
condition they were assigned to. The analysis also sought to explore 
whether there were differences in the importance that the participants 
assigned on the three sources of distrust explanations. A 4(participants' 
country of origin) x 3(power of the in-group) x 3(source of distrust 
explanation) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. The first factor 
was a between subjects factor with four levels (Greece, Greek part of 
Cyprus, Turkey and Britain), the second factor was also a between 
subjects factor with three levels (in-group more, -less and equally 
powerful) whereas the third factor was a within subjects factor with three 
levels (action-, situation- and character-related source of distrust 
explanations). Only the effects and interactions relevant to the research 
objectives are further illustrated and discussed. 
Results 
There was a main effect of the source of distrust explanations 
(F(2,882)=65.085, p<0.001; F12=0.216) indicating that the participants 
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evaluated differently the three sources of distrust explanations. Indeed, 
the participants rated as more important the action related sources of 
distrust explanations than both the situation (p<0.001) and the character 
related sources (p<0.001). See table 8.2.1. The difference between the 
internal situation and the character related sources of distrust 
explanations was not significant. It seems that the participants overall 
valued more the action related sources of distrust explanations than the 
other two sources. This result seems to make sense if one considers 
that actions are more tangible and therefore could easily serve as 
justifications of attitudes. 
Relative to the assumption that power would influence the endorsement 
of the sources of distrust explanations, a main effect of power was 
observed (F(2,441)=5.047, p<0.01; rlz=0.022) Indicating that the overall 
rating of distrust explanations differed depending on the power condition. 
This effect was due to the fact that the participants in the less powerful 
condition valued the sources of distrust explanations significantly more 
than the participants in both the more- (p<0.05) and the equal (p<0.01) 
power conditions. It seems that overall, those that are in a less 
advantage position in terms of power are more prone to use distrust 
explanations to justify their uncertainty. Table 8.2.1 below illustrates 
these results. 
Furthermore, there was an interaction between the sources of distrust 
explanation and power (F(4,882)=4.481, p<0.001; n2=0 . 02). Table 8.2.1 
below presents these results: 
Table 8.2.11: the Interaction between the sources of distrust explanations and power 
pow er of the in-group 
P+ p- Pý- tota I 
action 3.07(0.79) 3.45(0.83) 3.18(0.84) 3.23(0.83) 
internal situation 2.98(0.71) 3.08(0.77) 2.85(0.81) 2.97(0.77) 
character 2.87(0.82) 3.01(0.89) Z70(0.91) 2.85(0.88) 
total 2.97(0.77) 3.18(0.83) 2.91(0.82) 
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Further one-way ANOVAs revealed that this interaction was due to the 
fact that the action related sources of distrust explanations were 
significantly less important when the in-group was more than when it 
was less powerful (F(2,453)=8.065, p<0.001). The internal situation 
(F(2,453)=3.434, n. s. ) and the character (F(2,453)=4.81 8, n. s. ) related 
sources of distrust explanations did not differ significantly in the different 
power conditions. 
Further paired compadsons revealed that when the in-group was more 
powerful the internal situation related sources of distrust explanations 
were as important as the action related ones (t(157)=1.807, n. s. ). 
However, this was not the case in the less (t(140)=6.071, p<0.001) and 
in the equal (t(154)=7.564, p<0.001) powerful conditions. Whereas 
generally action related sources of distrust explanations were 
considered as more important than both the internal situation and 
character related sources this seems not to be the case when the in- 
group has more power. 
In addition, in the equal power condition the internal situation 
significantly differed from the character related distrust explanations 
(t(154)=3.074, p<0.005). However, the two sources of distrust 
explanations were equally important in the more (t(l 57)=2.489, n. s. ) and 
less (t(139)=1.044, n. s. ) powerful in-group conditions. 
Finally, the action related distrust explanations were valued as 
significantly more important than the character related ones in all power 
conditions (Pmore: t(157)=3.810, p<0.001, Pless: t(139)=7.089, p<0.001 
and Pequal: t(154)=8.584, p<0.001). Figure 8.2.3 below presents the 
interaction between the type of explanation and power 
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Figure 8.2.3: the interaction between power and source of distrust explanations 
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It seems that the results discussed under the main effect of the sources 
of distrust resemble more the condition that the in-group is less powerful. 
In the more powerful in-group and the equal power conditions the results 
seem to be a bit different. More specifically, in the more powerful in- 
group condition action and internal situation related sources were 
considered as equally important whereas in the equal power condition, 
the internal situation were considered as more important that the 
character related sources. 
There was an interaction between the sources of distrust explanations 
and participants' nationality (F(6,882)=6.943, p<0.001 -, q2=0 . 
041). Table 
8.2.2 below presents these results* 
Table 8.2.2: The interaction between the sources of distrust explanations and 
participants' nationality 
sources of distrust explanations 
action int character Total 
situation 
Greek 3.24(0.90) 2.94(0.77) 2.66(0.85) Z94(0.84) 
Greek-Cypriot 2.97(0.75) Z92(0.75) 2.92(0.80) Z93(0.76) 
Turkish 3.22(0.83) 2.85(0.83) 2.86(1 03) 2.97(0.89) 
British 3.43(0.76) 3.10(0.72) 3.01(0.84) 3.18(0.77) 
Further one-way ANOVAs revealed that this interaction was due to the 
fact that only the action and the character related sources of distrust 
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explanations elicited differences across the participants from the four 
national groups. More specifically, the British considered more important 
the action related sources of distrust explanations than the Greek- 
Cypriot participants did (F(3,453)=5.742, p<0.001) and the character 
related sources of distrust explanations more important than the Greek 
participants did (F(3,452)=3.700, p<0.01). 
In addition, paired comparisons revealed that the Greek-Cypriot 
participants considered the three sources of distrust explanations as 
equally important. The Greek participants considered the internal 
situation as more important than the character related sources of distrust 
explanations (t(145)=4.627, p<0.001) whereas the British (t(122)=1.895, 
n. s. ) and the Turkish participants (t(87)=-0.142, n. s. ) considered these 
two sources of distrust explanations as equally important. Finally, the 
action related sources of distrust explanations were rated as significantly 
more important than both the situation and the character based 
explanations by the Greek (tac-sit(145)=5.532, p<0.001 and tac- 
cha(145)=9.353, p<0.001), the Turkish (tac-sit(87)=4.939, p<0.001 and 
tac-cha(87)=4.374, p<0.001) and the British (tac-sit(122)=5.686, p<0.001 
and tac-cha(122)=6.779, p<0.001) but not by the Greek-Cypriot 
participants (tac-sit(96)=0.613, n. s. and tac-cha(95)=0.771, n. s. ). Figure 
8.2.4 below presents the results of the interaction between the source of 
distrust explanation and the country: 
Figure 8.2A the interaction between the sources of distrust explanations and 
participants' nationality 
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There was no interaction between power, participants country of origin 
and the sources of distrust explanations (F(12,882)=0.856, 
Discussion 
The action related sources of distrust were the most important sourres 
of distrust explanations overall. This may happen because actions are 
more tangible to be used to explain a certain attitude towards an out- 
group than the character or the internal situation of the out-group. 
Actions express certainty whereas internal situation and character may 
reflect the potential of taking certain actions. In addifion, actions entail an 
element of violation, which is important in the case of trust (Bies and 
Tripp, 1996). More specifically, actions that include transgression of 
agreements and violation of common rules of proper conduct seem to 
objectify more the feelings of uncertainty about the success of the 
conflict resolution venture. On the contrary, the assessment of the 
character and the internal situation seems to be less tangible sources for 
the parficipants. It could be also said that especially the character 
related sources were the less likely to be considered as important in 
comparison to the other two sources for social desirability reasons. 
Power had an effect on the endorsement of the sources of distrust 
explanations with those in the less power in-group condition considering 
the action related sources more important. Possibly, violations of 
agreements and rules of proper conduct objectify the misuse of power 
from those that have it The other two sources were equally likely to be 
used to jusfify uncertainty in the relationship in all power conditions. It 
seems that those sources could offer justifications of insecurity 
irrespective the power equation between the two groups. Because the 
character related sources are more essentialised, it is likely that they are 
more tied to the historical context that produces them therefore it was 
not possible to evoke a differentiation in the use of those sources of 
distrust in the experimental context. Power, thus, is a possible socio- 
psychological anchor of the levels and sources of trust/distrust. 
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However, other possible anchors more tied to a specific context should 
be explored. 
Internal situation related sources of distrust did not vary as an effect of 
power. One would expect that a powerful group with an unpredictable 
leadership not able to deal with its internal affairs would be represented 
as more distrustful than a less powerful country that also has incapable 
or unstable leadership. Power and an unpredictable opponent should be 
a combination capable of increasing the insecurity of this opponent. 
However, this was not the case in this study. The internal situation of the 
out-group was considered as a less important source of distrust than the 
actions of the out-group. This was not the case when the in-group was 
more powerful where both sources of distrust were equally important for 
the participants. It could be argued here that there is a different 
representation of a powerful out-group with incapable leadership and of 
a less powerful out-group with incapable leadership. 
Nationality had an effect on the endorsement of the distrust 
explanations. The British participants appeared to value more the action 
related sources of distrust than the rest of the participants. A first source 
of explanation could be perhaps relating to the different types of conflict 
that the countries have been implicated. Britain, as a Great Power, has 
supported in the recent years a series of war campaigns that were 
defined as invasion of one country into another (Iraq 1991,2004), rigidity 
and inflexibility of governments to co-operate with or violations of 
international law (Yugoslavia 1999) etc. Without necessarily being the 
reason for the intervention, it seems that the construction of the war as a 
protection of a powerless country or subculture from the irrational use of 
power of another country was enough to make Britain support the war. 
This was the case for the Turkish participants. More specifically, for the 
Turkish participants actions were also the most important sources of 
distrust explanations whereas the internal situation and the character of 
the out-group was considered as a less important source of distrust. This 
might reflect a general trend to evaluate actions as a more important 
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source of distrust. However, as far as the Greek-Cypriots was concerned 
this was not the case. For the Greek-Cypriot participants the three 
sources of distrust were considered as equally important. It could be 
said here that the Greek-Cypriots being in a situation of long lasting 
conflict where there are constant everyday reminders of the tension and 
the separation, are more likely to use all types of explanations to justify 
their distrust in the out-group. Finally, the Greek participants were the 
only ones that differentiated between the three types of distrust 
explanations. Indeed, whereas the internal situation and the character 
related sources of distrust were considered as equally important by the 
participants from the other countries, the Greek participants did 
differentiate between the two. This finding may reflect the fact that the 
sources of distrust were drawn from the qualitative study presented in 
chapter 6 where Greek nationals explored their reasons for distrusting 
various out-groups. 
In conclusion, it could be said that power influenced only the actions that 
the out-group takes as possible source of distrust. It could be said that 
trust/distrust is tied to the socio-historical context of a culture. Further 
research should take this into consideration and explore the meaning of 
trust in a context and the possible anchors in the systems of beliefs that 
are relevant to the specific culture. 
fý'O 
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Chapter 8.3.1 
T his section aims to show how power influences the perception of 
the two groups. It also seeks to answer the question whether there 
is a common representation of countries and their populations across 
nations. As it was said in the method section, the participants were 
provided with a series of adjectives and descriptive features to represent 
the two countries and their population. 
A first objective of this study was to unravel the dimensions that 
underlain the representation of the two fictional countries. Furthermore, 
having as a starting point the assumption that soclo-structural factors 
shape the content of stereotypes about nations and nationalities (Eagly 
and Me, 1987; Glick and Fiske, 2000; Poppe and Linssen, 1999; 
Staerkle, Clemence Doise, 1998), the main focus of the analysis was on 
detecting how power organises the representation of the two groups 
(states) in the context of international conflict. Because the in-group was 
expected to be favoured on relevant dimensions this study also sought 
to explore the way that in-group favouritism may be affected by 
information about the social reality, i. e. power. Finally, participants' 
nationality was also expected to influence the representation of the two 
countries. 
In order to unravel the underlying structure of the participants' responses 
exploratory factor analyses were conducted. In order to be able to make 
comparisons between the four countries, two exploratory factor analyses 
were conducted, one for the in-group and the other for the out-group 
representation, using the responses from the participants from all four 
samples (N=481). Separate factor analysis of the participants in each 
country, revealed a similar structure (see Appendix 5). Tables 8.3.1.1 
and 8.3.1.2 present these results. In bold and italics are the loadings of 
the items that were common for the description of the in-group and the 
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out-group and were computed into new variables to be used for further 
analysis. 
Table 8.3.1.11: Factor analysis of the adjectives and descriptive features used for the 
description of the in-group' 
Descriptives Factors 
Items Mean SID Com. organised deffVtic capitalist 
Powerful 3.39 1.12 0.772 
. 846 
Organised 3.18 1.03 0.666 
. 
790 
Successful 3.12 1.04 0727 . 768 
Good in health, education, social services 3.06 1.19 0.675 . 752 
Progressive 2.91 0.94 0,462 . 
585 
Respectful of human rights 3.11 1.19 0.745 . 
798 
Democratic 3.14 1.05 0.636 
. 738 
Civilised 3.21 1 
ý00 
0.642 . 
706 
Open to the reception of immigrants 2.68 1.20 0,485 . 695 
Close to being a perfect place to live 2.74 1.20 0.612 537 . 
568 
Bureaucratic 3.00 1.05 0.729 . 
832 
Capitalist 2.87 1A2 0.651 . 795 
Conservative 2.72 0.97 0.193 327 
descriptives 3.14(. 84) 3.04(. 86) 2 87(. 73) 
Cronbach's 43 0.84 0.80 0.44 
A total of 6150% of the variance was explained by the three factor solution. Extraction method: Principal 
Components Analysis, Rotated methodý Varimax with Kaiser Normalisat ion, Rotation converged in 5 iteration s, 
.. p<0V 
Table 8.3.1.2: Factor analysis of the adjectives and descriptive features that were used for 
the description of the out-group 
Descriptives Factors 
Items Mean SD Com. organised derrittic capitalist 
Powerful 118 1.11 0.730 . 839 
Successful 2.89 1.01 0.667 . 775 
Organised 3.02 0.99 0.0m . rw 436 
Good in health, education, social services 2.85 1.05 &655 . 678 
Progressive 2.71 0.98 0.552 . 658 
Respectful of. human rights 2.54 1.138 0.682 . 810 
Democratic 2.64 0.91 0.622 . 736 
Close to being a perfect place to live 2.24 1.00 0.567 706 
Open to the reception of inwnigrents 2.40 11AI 0.472 . 687 
Civilised 2.76 Oý93 0.615 . 667 
Bureaucratic 2-99 1.02 0.638 . 786 
Capitalist 3ý07 1 14 0655 . 721 
Conservative 289 1.02 0.520 711 
Descnptives 2.93(. 82) 2.62(. 79) 2ý98(80) 
Cronbach's a 0.83 0.80 0.61 
A total of 61.64% of the variance was explained by the three-factor solution. Extraction metho& Principal 
Components Analysis, Rotated method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, Rotation converged in 5 iterations 
I In Wd the gems that constituted the computed factors 
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As it can be seen in tables 8.3.1.1 and 8.3.3.2, the factor analysis of the 
description of the two groups revealed a similar three-factor structure. 
The three dimensions were named *democratie, worganised" and 
"capitalist7. 
The "democratie and the worganised" dimensions could be regarded as 
the state equivalent of the "warm or "moral" and "competenr 
dimensions described by other researchers (Glick and Fiske, 2001; 
Phalet and Poppe, 1997). More specifically, it could be argued here that 
the dimension "democrati(f connotes the relationship of the state with its 
citizens and the dimension morganised* reflects the internal structure of 
the state critical for its efficiency and competence. It can also be argued 
that these two dimensions constitute the group equivalent of the agentic 
and relational dimensions that were used in the literature in studies of 
representations of people and groups (Eagly and Kitte, 1987). These two 
dimensions connote the two b2sic dimensions of the description of 
people as group members. According to Glick and Fiske (2001) what 
makes these dimensions so important is the fact that they answer key 
questions about the intentions of an out-group (whether is a friend or an 
enemy) and therefore shape the expectations that one may have in 
interpersonal and inter-group relations. 
In order to be able to make comparisons and conduct further analyses, 
the same three factors were computed for the in-group and the out- 
group. More specifically, the items *powerful". "organised", "successful", 
"good in health, education and social sciences" and uprogressive" 
constituted the organised dimension. The reliability of this factor was 
satisfactory for both the description of the in-group (a=0.84) and the 
description of the out-group (a=0.82). The items "democratic", ucivilised", 
urespectful of human righte and "open to the reception of immigrants" 
constituted the democratic dimension. Again, the reliability of this factor 
was satisfactory for both the description of the in-group (a=0.86) and the 
description of the out-group (a=0.76). The item "close to being a perfect 
place" was not included in this factor because it loaded highly on both 
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the organised and the democratic dimensions in the case of the in- 
group. Finally, the items ftbureaucratid' and mcapitalisf were computed 
into a new factor. The item aconservative" was not included in this factor 
because in the case of the in-group did not share enough communalities 
with the rest of the adjectives and descriptive features. The two items 
were highly correlated for both the description of the in-group (r--0.379, 
p<0.01) and the description of the out-group (r--0.498, p<0.01). 
To test whether the use of the emerged dimensions differed depending 
on whether they referred to the in- or the out-group, power and the 
participants' nationality a series of comparisons were conducted 
between the in-group and out-group descriptions using repeated 
measures. A series of repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted 
using a3 (power) x2 (in/out-group) x4 (participants' nationality) x2 
(description of the groups) design. The first factor was a between 
subjects factor with three levels (in-group more-, less- or equally 
powerful with the out-group), the second a within subjects factor with 
three levels ("democraticw, Norganised* and "capitalisr), the third factor 
was also a within subjects factor with two levels (in-group and out-group) 
and the fourth factor a within subjects factor with four levels (Greek, 
Greek-Cypriots, Turkish and British participants). Only the effects and 
interactions relevant to the four hypotheses will be reported and further 
discussed. More specifically, the analysis focused on the interaction 
between the description of the state and the target group. Further, paired 
comparisons were used to detect the nature of the differences in the use 
of the dimensions depending on whether they referred to the description 
of the in-group and the out-group. It also focused on the interaction 
between the description of the state, the target group and power. One- 
way ANOVNs were conducted to detect how the dimensions were used 
to describe the in-group and the out-group in the three power conditions. 
In addition, paired comparisons were used to detect whether the 
dimensions produced differences between the in-group and the out- 
group in each power condition. Finally, following Glick and Fiske (2001) 
paired comparisons were used to detect whether the use of the 
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dimensions organised and democratic were used differently for the in- 
group and the out-group in each power condition. The analysis also 
looked for an interaction between the description of the state, the target 
group and nationality and an interaction between the description of the 
state, the target group, nationality and power. Due to the number of the 
test adjusted levels of confidence were calculated where appropriate. 
Table 8.3.1.3 present results: 
Table 8.3.1.3: democratic, organised and capitalist dimensions, In-grouplout-group 
ratings, power and participants' nationality 
Power (in- in-group out-group 
group) dern/tic organised capitalist demthc organised capitalist 
more 2.77(. 98) 3.38(. 73) 3.55(. 79) 2.84(. 81) 2.53(. 63) 2.78(. 94) 
W less 3.15(. 90) 2.71(. 66) 2.88(l. 05) 2.41(. 72) 3.31(. 60) 3.60(. 72) of (9 equal 3.23(. 78) 3.05(. 79) 3.11(. 97) 2.46(. 80) 2.84(. 75) 3.10(. 99) 
total 3.05(. 91) 3.04(. 77) 3.18(. 98) 2.52(. 73) 2.89(. 73) 3.16(. 95) 
more 2.88(. 79) 3.23(. 73) 2.55(. 83) 2.92(. 75) 2.72(. 61) 2.64(. 91) 
IL 6 less 3.10(. 84) 2.55(. 87) 2.52(1.16) 2.28(. 72) 3.11(. 81) 2.83(1.07) 
th equal 3.01(. 72) 3.13(. 78) 2.63(. 88) 2.72(. 93) 3.09(. 90) 2.81(. 91) 
0 total 2.98(. 78) 3.03(. 82) 2.57(. 93) 2.70(. 84) 2.93(. 78) 2.74(. 94) 
more 2.64(. 86) 3.08(. 97) 2.79(. 79) 2.89(. 91) 2.12(. 75) 2.60(l. 01) 
less 2-62(. 91) 2.79(. 92) 2.80(. 73) 2.21(. 64) 3.49(. 91) 3.48(. 88) 
D equal 3.15(. 91) 3.42(l. 00) 3.11(. 91) 2.58(. 88) 2.83(. 81) 3.01(. 97) 
total 2.82(. 95) 3.12(. 99) 2.91(. 82) 2-54(. 85) 2.78(. 98) 3.01(1.01) 
more 3.14(. 80) 3.83(. 72) 3.16(. 66) 3.00(. 70) 2.68(. 73) 2.84(. 80) 
less 3.56(. 68) 3.07(. 71) 2.60(. 79) 2.62(. 66) 3.70(. 77) 3.39(. 91) 
Ca equal 3.05(. 79) 3.32(. 70) 3.02(. 74) 2.50(. 66) 2.96(. 61) 3.13(. 75) 
total 3.24(. 79) 3.39(. 77) 2.93(. 76) 2.69(. 70) 3.11(. 81) 3.13(. 84) 
P+ 2.87(. 87) 3.38(. 81) 3.05(. 80) 2.77(. 78) 2.54(. 70) 2.71(. 90) 
p- 3.14(. 88) 2.78(. 79) 2.72(. 95) 2.51(. 76) 3.40(. 78) 3.36(. 90) 
2 P= 3.13(. 81) 3.22(. 82) 3.00(. 88) 2.54(. 80) 2.92(. 75) 3.04(. 90) 
total 3.04(. 86) 3.14(. 84) 2.93(. 91) 2.62(. 79) 2.94(. 82) 3.03(. 94) 
An interaction between the group and the description of the state 
(F(2,876)=31.628, p<0.001; rf=0.098) revealed that the three 
dimensions (Le. democratic, organised and capitalist) differed depending 
on whether they referred to the in-group or the out-group. These results 
are presented in figure 8.3.1.1 below. 
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Figure 8.3.1.1: the interaction between the description of the state and the group 
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Paired comparisons revealed (adjusted p<0.01) that the in-group was 
described as more "democratic" (t(456)=8.307, p<0.001) and more 
"organised" than the out-group (t(458)=3.885, p<0.001). However, the 
description of the two groups as "capitalist" did not vary significantly 
(t(449)=1.929, n. s. ). 
These results indicate that the in-group was favoured over the out-group 
in the "democratic" and "organised" dimensions. The fact that there were 
no differences in the description of the two groups as "capitalist" is 
probably due to the fact that such a dimension may not be as much 
valued by the participants as the "democratic" and "organised" 
dimensions or they just do not perceive differences on this dimension. 
Paired comparisons revealed that the dimensions "democratic" and 
11 organised" did not differ significantly when they were used to describe 
the in-group (t(463)=2.555, n. s. ) whereas they differed when they were 
used to describe the out-group. The out-group was described as 
significantly more "organised" than "democratic" (t(461)=8.044, 
P<0.001). 
If the "democratic" dimension constitutes the state equivalent of the 
dimension "warmth" or "morality" proposed by other authors as one of 
the key dimensions used to describe group members, then this result 
seems to be reasonable. As Glick and Fiske (2001) suggest, out-groups 
tend to be either as "warm" or "competent" but rarely both. Whether an 
out-group is seen as more "warm" or "competent" that would depend on 
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the nature of the relations between the two groups. In this researr-h, the 
fact that the out-group was described as more Norganised" than 
ademocratie may reflect the fact that the relationship between the two 
states was a competitive one. In the same way that a competitive out- 
group is described as more competent than warm, a competitive state is 
likely to be described as more organised than democratic. 
The analysis revealed a three way interaction between the description of 
the state, the target group and the power of the group (F(4,876)=35.739, 
p<0.001; rf=0.16) which is further illustrated as it is relevant to the 
hypothesis that power would have an effect on the use of the three 
dimensions to describe the two countries. 
As far as the "democratid* dimension was concerned one-way ANOVAs 
revealed that both the description of the in-group (F(2,463)=4.868, 
p=0.008) and the description of the out-group (F(2,461)=5.220, p=0.006) 
varied as an effect of power. Bonferroni corrected post hoc tests 
revealed that the dimension *democratic! had a higher value when the 
in-group was less or equally powerful with the out-group in comparison 
to when it was more powerful (p<0.05). This was the case when the out- 
group was less powerful in comparison to the more and equal powerful 
out-group conditions (p<0.05). It seems that in the case of the in-group, 
the dimension udemocratidw in the equal power condition resembles the 
less powerful in-group condition where the in-group appears to exceed 
in democratic characteristics. On the contrary, the description of the out- 
group in the equal power condition resembles the more powerful out- 
group condition where the out-group appears to be weak in democratic 
characteristics. These results are presented in figure 8.3.1.2 below: 
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Figure 8.3.1.2: the dimension democratic for the two groups 
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Furthermore, paired comparisons revealed that when the in-group was 
more powerful, the dimension "democratic" did not produce significant 
differences between the two countries (t(159)=0.962, n. s. ). However, 
when the in-group was less (t(139)=6.605, p<0.001) or equally powerful 
with the out-group (t(l 56)=8.703, p<0.001) the dimension "democratic" 
had a higher rating for the in-group than the out-group. 
Interestingly the out-group is never described as more "democratic" than 
the out-group whereas in the less and equal power conditions it was 
described as significantly less "democratic". Even in the condition that 11U U 
the in-group is more powerful and therefore has an obvious advantage 
over the out-group, the out-group was described as "democratic" as the 
out-group but not more. Overall, participants could not imagine an out- 
group more democratic than their in-group no matter what was the 
power equation. 
As far as the "organised" dimension was concerned, the one way 
ANOVA revealed that both the description of the in-group 
(F(2,464)=21.582, p<0.001) and the out-group (F(2,462)=49.959, 
p<0.001) varied as an effect of power. Bonferroni post hoc tests 
revealed that both groups were described as more "organised" when 
they were more (p<0.001) and equally (p<0.001) powerful in comparison 
to the condition that they were less powerful. In addition, the out-group 
was described as more "organised" when it was more powerful 
( V-0. UOUO -11 NJ il, 1 Fp la Irli s0ln 
to the eq uall power co ndition whereas thl is 
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comparison was not significant for the in-group. These results are 
presented in figure 8.3.1.3 below- 
Figure 8.3.1.3: The organised dimension for the two groups 
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Paired comparisons revealed that when the in-group was more powerful, 
it was described as significantly more "organised" than the out-group 
(t(160)=10.324, p<0.001). Equally, the out-group was described as more 
"organised" than the in-group when it was more powerful (t(140)=-7.031, 
p<0.001). Finally, the in-group was also described as more "organised" 
than the out-group in the equal power condition (t(l 56)=4.528, p<0.001). 
Generally, the group that was more powerful was also described as 
more "organised". Therefore, it can be said that the dimension 
"organised" is a power relevant dimension. There is some research that 
sought to explore the dimensions that are relevant to the status and 
power of a group and how in-group favouritism is restricted on these 
dimensions when the group has lower status or/and power from another 
group (Glick and Fiske, 2000, Mummendey and Schreiber, 1983,1984). 
Such a dimension is competence. It could be said that organisation 
constitutes a dimension that reflects power at the level of nation-states. 
in the equal power condition the in-group was also described as more 
"organised" than the out-group. This can be interpreted as in-group 
favouritism. If the dimension "organised" is related to the power of the 
group then in-group favouritism may be hindered because the in-group 
"objectively" was deprived on this dimension when it was less powerful- 
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Furthermore, paired comparisons revealed that the in-group was 
described as significantly more "organised" than "democratic" when it 
was more powerful (t(159)=7.563, p<0.001). It was described as more 
"democratic" than "organised" when it was less powerful (t(143)=5.530, 
p<0.001). However, the two dimensions did not differ significantly when 
the in-group was presented as equally powerful with the out-group 
(t(159)=1.697, n. s. ). The use of the two dimensions for the description of 
the in-group is presented in figure 8.3.1.4 below- 
Figure 8.3.1.4: Democratic and organised dimensions for the in-group 
Paired comparisons revealed that the out-group was described as 
significantly more "organised" than "democratic" when it was more 
(t(142)=12.498, p<0.001) or equally powerful with the in-group 
(t(156)=7.974, p<0.001). The out-group was described as more 
"democratic" than "organised" when it was less powerful (t(161)=4.156, 
p<0.001). The use of the two dimensions for the description of the out- 
group is presented in figure 8.3.1.5. 
Figure 8.3.1.5: The democratic and organised dimensions for the out-group 
'the power of the out-group 
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As in the case of the in-group, the out-group was described as 
significantly more "organised" than "democratic" when it was more 
powerful and as more "democratic" than "organised" when it was less 
powerful. Unlike the in-group, the out-group was described as 
significantly more "organised" than "democratic" in the equal power 
condition. This description of the out-group may reflect the conflict 
relations between the two groups. 
As far as the "capitalist" dimension was concerned, both the descriptions 
of the in-group (F(2,458)=5.775, p<0.01) and the out-group 
(F(2,458)=19.444, p<0.001) varied as an effect of power. Bonferroni 
corrected post hoc tests revealed that both countries were described as 
more "Gapitalist" in the more- and equal power conditions in comparison 
to the less power condition. In addition, the out-group was described as 
more "capitalist" in the more power in comparison to the equal power 
condition. All differences were significant at adjusted p<0.003. Figure 
8.3.1.6 below presents these results: 
Figure 8.3.1.6: The capitalist dimension for the two groups 
Furthermore, paired comparisons revealed that when the in-group was 
more powerful, the in-group was described as significantly more 
"capitalist" than the out-group (t(155)=3.518, p<0.001). Equally, the out- 
group was described as more "capitalist' than the in-group when it was 
more powerful (t(136)=-6.499, p<0.001). Finally, the description of the 
two groups as "capitalist" did not vary in the equal power condition 
(t(156)=0.494, n. s. ). 
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It can be said here that the dimension "capitalisf follows the power 
manipulation. Thus, the more powerful group was described as more 
scapitalist*. In the equal power condition the two groups were equally 
likely to be described as capitalist. 
There was no interaction between the clescription of the state, the target 
group and the participants' nationality (F(6,876)=1.617, n. s.; 112=0.0 13). 
This indicated that nationality did not have an effect on the use of the 
three dimensions to describe the two states. 
Finally, the analysis revealed a four way interaction between the 
description of the state, the target group, power and participants' 
nationality (F(12,876)=2.610, p<0.01; r12=0 . 033) that indicated that 
participants from the four countries described the two groups differently 
depending on the power condition. These differences possibly reflect a 
different use of dimensions to describe the two countries by the 
participants from the four countries depending on power. It might be that 
participants from the four countries had a different understanding in how 
power influences the use of a dimension to describe the two countries. It 
might also reflect differences in the favourability of the dimensions that 
described the two countries. Generally, this interaction further qualifies 
the interactions observed and discussed earlier. 
f5O 
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Chapter 8.3.2 
T his section discusses the results concerning the description of the 
members of the two countries. As in the case of the description of 
the states, this section aims to unravel the dimensions that underlain the 
representation of the population of the two fictional countries. 
Furthermore, the analysis focuses on detecting how power organises the 
representation of the two populations in the context of international 
conflict. Because the in-group members were expected to be favoured 
on relevant dimensions, this study also sought to explore the way that in- 
group favouritism may be affected by information about the social reality, 
i. e. power. Finally, participants' nationality was also expected to 
influence the representation of the two populations. 
As in the case of the description of the states, exploratory factor 
analyses were conducted in order to unravel the dimensions that 
underlain the representation of the in-group and the out-group by the 
participants in all four samples (N=481). The tables 8.3.2.1 and 8.3.2.2 
present these results: 
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Table 8.3.2.1: Factor analysis-the members of the in-group 
Items Mean 
Descriptives 
SD Com. warm 
fact ors 
competent aggressive traditional 
Polito 3.30 -04 . 706 . 796 
_ 
Hospitable 3-34 1 
ý02 . 
711 
. 
750 
Understanding 2.71 . 
98 
. 
595 
. 733 Democratic 3.43 1.05 
. 
618 
. 726 Sociable 3.10 
. 
85 
. 
610 
. 
724 
Educated 2.26 1.05 
. 
592 
. 
703 
Trustworthy 2.36 
. 
96 
. 
631 
. 697 
Unfriendly 3.26 1.07 
. 
570 -. 669 
Tolerant 3.07 . 
88 
. 
460 
. 
669 
With a sense of honour 3.08 . 
85 
. 
573 
. 665 
Co-operative 2.97 . 
93 
. 
488 
. 
652 
Cold 2.92 
. 
93 
. 
513 -ý563 
Self confident 3.20 . 
83 
. 
610 
. 751 Successful 3.09 . 
93 
. 
635 
. 661 Organised 3.48 
. 
87 
. 
620 
. 
460 . 632 Ambitious 3.72 
. 
96 
. 
439 
. 
572 
Hard-working 3-6 . 
84 
. 
548 
. 
420 . 565 
Independent 3.20 . 
94 
. 
451 
. 
542 
Competitive 3.28 1.09 
. 
571 
. 
495 
. 
474 
Individualistic 3.18 . 
96 
. 
669 
. 782 Materialistic 3.44 
. 
92 
. 
570 
. 
698 
Aggressive 3.48 
. 
90 
. 
630 -. 425 . 
630 
Traditional 2.76 1.03 
. 
659 
. 
790 
Religious 3.23 
. 
97 
. 
584 
. 
732 
Family oriented 3.16 . 
97 
. 
572 485 538 
Descriptives 3.17(. 73) 3.34(. 64) 3.31(. 84) 3.06(. 84) 
Cronbach's a 0.92 033 0.62 0.75 
A total of 58.49% of the variance was explained by the four-factor solution. Extraction metho& Principal 
Components Analysis, Rotated method: Varimax with Kaiser Normahsation , 
Rotation converged in 7 
iterations 
Table 8.3.2.2: Factor analysis-the members of the out-group 
Items Mean 
Descriptives 
SD Com, Warm 
factors 
competent Aggressive traditional 
Co-operative 2.64 1 
ý02 . 
575 
. 
757 
Understanding 2.58 
. 
91 
. 
609 
. 
750 
Hospitable 2.70 1.04 
. 
661 
. 
746 
Polite 2.65 1.00 
. 
613 
. 
744 
Tolerant 2-44 1.06 
. 
557 
. 
726 
Trustworthy 2.41 1.04 
. 
650 
. 
724 
Democratic 2.77 1.06 
. 
580 
. 
664 
Sociable 2.78 
. 
98 
ý513 . 642 Family oriented 3.03 1.01 ý584 ý 
554 
With a sense of honour 2.83 1.17 . 
512 
. 519 
431 
Successful 2.98 1.04 
. 
640 
. 
727 
Hard working 3.25 . 
97 
. 
613 
. 668 Organised 3.06 1.02 
. 
548 
. 
667 
Ambitious 3.52 1.06 
. 
505 
. 626 Self confident 3.46 1.04 ý 
534 
. 
603 
Educated 2.75 1.01 
. 
579 
. 
484 
. 
572 
Competitive 3.40 1.06 
ý 
596 
. 569 475 Independent 2.99 1.09 
. 
535 . 526 Individualistic 2.95 1.11 5ý615 
. 
722 
Materialistic 3.24 1.11 
. 
562 
. 700 Aggressive 3.24 1.09 
. 
539 
. 607 Cold 2.96 1.14 
. 
509 
. 
594 
Unfriendly 3.07 1.18 
ý577 
550 
Traditional 3.29 1.05 
. 
702 . 
821 
Religious 3.06 1.05 638 . 
772 
Descriptives 2.66(. 70) 3.16(. 72) 3.37(. 95) 3.09(86) 
Cronbach's a 0.91 0.77 0.79 0.570** 
A total of 57.99% of the variance was explained by the four factor solution. Extraction method Principal 
Components Analysis. Rotated method: Varimax with Kaiser Normahsation. Rotation co nverged in 6 
iterations 
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A similar four-factor structure emerged for the two groups. On the first 
dimension loaded most of the communal adjectives and the second 
dimension collected most of the agentic adjectives. Research has been 
consistent in identifying these two dimensions as key in the structure of 
the representations of groups (Eagly, 1987; Glick and Fiske, 2001; 
Phalet and Poppe, 1997). The two dimensions were named "warm", 
"competent" whereas the other two dimensions that emerged were 
named uaggressive" and "traditionaln. 
In order to be able to make comparisons and conduct further analyses, 
the same four factors were computed for the in-group and the out-group. 
More specifically, the items "polite', "hospitable', "understanding", "With a 
sense of honour" and "democratid", "sociable", utrustworthy", "tolerant7 
and "co-operative" constituted the dimension "warm". The factor 
displayed satisfactory internal consistency for both the in-group (a=0.90) 
and the out-group (a=0.90). The items Oself-confidenr, usuccessful", 
"organised", "hard-working", "independent7 and "ambitious" constituted 
the dimension "competent". The factor displayed satisfactory internal 
consistency for both the in-group (a=0.78) and the out-group 
(a=0.80). The items "individualistic', umaterialistic" and "aggressive" 
constituted the dimension "aggressive". The factor displayed satisfactory 
internal consistency for both the in-group (a=0.62) and the out-group 
(a=0.64). Finally, the items "religiouso and "traditional* were computed 
into a new factor that was named "traditional". The two items were highly 
correlated for both the in-group (r--0.422, p<0.01) and the out-group 
(r--0.570, P<0.01). 
To test whether the use of the emerged dimensions differed depending 
on whether it referred to the in- or the out-group members, power and 
participants' nationality a series of comparisons were conducted 
between the in-group and out-group descriptions. A series of repeated 
measures ANOVA! s was conducted using a3 (power) x4 (description of 
the group members) x2 (in/out-group) x4 (participants' nationality) 
design. The first factor was a between subjects factor with three levels 
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(in-group more-, less- or equally powerful with the out-group), the 
second a within subjects factor with four levels (warm, competent, 
aggressive and traditional), the third factor was also a within subjects 
factor with two levels (in-group and out-group) and the fourth factor a 
between subjects factor with four levels (Greek, Greek-Cyprlots, Turkish 
and British participants). Only the effects relevant to the hypothesis are 
presented and discussed. More specifically, the analysis focused on the 
interaction between the description of the population and the target 
group. Further, paired comparisons were used to detect the nature of the 
differences in the use of the dimensions depending on whether they 
referred to the description of the in-group and the out-group members. It 
also focused on the interaction between the description of the 
population, the target group and power. One-way ANOVA! s were 
conducted to detect how the dimensions were used to describe the in- 
group and the out-group members in the three power conditions. In 
addition, paired comparisons were used to detect whether the 
dimensions produced differences between the in-group and the out- 
group in each power condition. Finally, following Glick and Fiske (2001) 
paired comparisons were used to detect whether the use of the 
dimensions "warmth" and "competence' were used differently for the in- 
group and the out-group members in each power condition. The analysis 
also looked for an interaction between the description of the population, 
the target group and nationality. Paired comparisons further illustrate the 
nature this interaction. Finally, the analysis looked on the interaction 
between the description of the population, the target group, nationality 
and power. Due to the number of comparison the interval of confidence 
was appropriately adjusted. Table 8.3.2.3 presents these results: 
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Table 8.3.2.3: warm, competent, traditional and competitive dimensions, in-group/out- 
group, power and participants' nationality 
Power In-group Out-group 
(in- 
group) warm competent traditional aggressive warm competent traditional aggressive 
more 3.01(. 76) 3.63(. 61) 3.31(. 79) 3.30(. 84) 292(70) 3.10(. 65) 3.50(. 77) 2.70(. 79) 
W less 3.14(. 84) 3.17(. 54) 3.42(. 78) 2.97(. 82) 2.43(. 67) 3.41(. 76) 3.12(. 93) 3.57(. 80) x 
equal 3.19(. 65) 3-32(. 63) 3.26(. 91) 2.90(. 83) 2.59(. 67) 3.17(. 67) 3-47(l. 11) 3,00(. 77) 
total 3.11(. 75) 3.37(. 62) 3.33(. 83) 3.06(. &5) 2.65(. 71) 3.22(. 70) 3.37(. 96) 3.08(. 86) 
more 2.84(. 73) 3.35(. 62) 3.00(. 74) 3.18(. 88) 3.01(. 77) 3.20(. 73) 3.19(. 94) 2.84(. 89) 
CL >- Y le55 3.07(. 81) 3.07(. 73) 3.19(. 70) 2-35(157) 2.23(. 80) 3.27(. 03) 2.80(. 95) 3.40(l. 04) 
uj equal 3.21(. 86) 3.45(. 71) 3.411(. 96) 100(M) 2ý84(. 93) 3.31)(15) 144(1.03) 3.07(1.00) 
total 3.01(. 80) 3.31(. 95) 3.17(. 84) 2.93(. 95) 2.77(. 88) 3.25(. 71) 317(. 99) 3.05(. 98) 
more 2.1,5(. 91) 3.33(. 95) 3.15(. 88) 2-93(l. 06) 2.16(. 70) 2.47(. 77) 2.96(. 96) 2.75(. 90) 
of less 3.06(. 83) 
3.11(. 94) 3.07(-92) 2.61(. 79) 2.54(-66) 3.58(. 81) 2.96(. 96) 3.74(. 76) 
D 
equal 3.24(. 92) 3.47(. 97) 2.93(. 73) 2.33(. 92) 2.35(. 78) 2.91(. 70) 3.01(. 84) 124(. 95) 
total 3.02(. 91) 3.31(. 95) 3-05(. 84) 2.62(. %) 2.35(. 72) 2.97(. 87) 2.98(. 91) 3.23(. 96) 
more 3.33(-84) 3.93(. 49) 3.18(. 79) 3.40(. 61) 3.03(. 70) 3.06(. 65) 3.26(. 83) 3,05(. 59) 
less 3.58(. 69) 3.35(-58) 3.46(. 76) 2.54(. 76) 2.50(. 61) 3.74(. 64) 3.00(. 79) 352(. 68) 
Ca equal 3.14(. 78) 3.45(. 56) 3.08(. 75) 3.05(. 64) 2.55(. 69) 3.19(. 55) 3.05(. 83) 3.27(. 58) 
total 3.33(. 79) 3.56(. 59) 3.23(. 77) 2.99(. 75) 2.68(. 70) 3.33(. 67) 109(. 82) 3.29(. 64) 
p+ 2.98(. 82) 3.55(. 70) 3.16(. 80) 3.21(. 86) 2.83(. 78) 3+00(. 74) 3.25(. 88) 2+82(. 86) 
p- 3+24(. 81) 3.20(-67) 3.32(+83) 2.67(. 83) 2.42(. 68) 3+50(. 73) 3.01(. 90) 3.55(. 80) 
P= 3.20(. 78) 3.42(. 70) 3.16(. 85) 2.87(. 80) 2.59(. 77) 3.15(. 67) 3,25(. 98) 3.14(81) 
Total 3.14(. 81) 3.40(. 71) 3+21(. 82) 2.93(. 88) 2ý62(76) 3.21(. 74) 118(. 93) 3.18(. 93) 
There was an interaction between the target group and the description of 
the group members (F(3,1320)=50.463, p<0.001 ; 02=0.198) indicating 
that the four dimensions (i. e. warm, competent, aggressive and 
traditional) differed depending on whether they referred to the in-group 
or the out-group members. This interaction is presented in figure 8.3.2.1 
below. * 
Figure 8.3.2.1: the interaction between the description of the state and the group 
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Paired comparisons revealed that the in-group members were described 
as more "warm" (t(457)=10.515, p<0.001), more "competent" 
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(t(453)=4.319, p<0.001) and less "aggressive* than the out-group 
members (t(452)=-4.058, p<0.001). No differences were detected in the 
description of the members of the two groups as Otraditional* 
(t(453)=0.036, 
In addition, paired comparisons revealed that both the in-group (t(462)=- 
7.771, p<0.001) and the out-group members (t(456)=-15.613, p<0.001) 
were described as significantly more Ocompetent7 than "warm". 
The in-group members were favoured over the out-group members on 
"warmth" and "competence' whereas the out-group members were 
described as more *aggressive". Finally, no differences were detected in 
the use of the dimension "traditional". Both, the in-group and the out- 
group members were described as more "competent" than "warm" 
indicating that "competent7 is a more valuable dimension for the 
participants. 
The analysis also revealed a three way interaction between the 
description of the group members, the target group and the power of the 
group (F(6,1320)=32.042, p<0.001; rf=O. 148) indicating that power had 
an effect on the use of the dimensions to describe the two populations. 
The nature of this interaction is further illustrated. 
More specifically, as far as the dimension "warmo was concemed one- 
way ANOVAs revealed that both the description of the in-group 
(F(2,463)=4.577, p=0.01) and the out-group members (F(2,461)=l 1.559, 
p=0.001) as "warm" varied as an effect of power. More specifically, both 
group members were described as more "warm" when the two groups 
were less powerful in comparison to the more powerful condition. In 
addition, the out-group members were described as more *warm"when 
the out-group was less powerful in comparison to the equal power 
condition (p<0.05). 
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Furthermore, paired comparisons revealed that in the more powerful in- 
group condition, the description of the members of the two groups as 
"warm" did not differ significantly (t(160)=1.685, n. s. ). However, when 
the in-group was less powerful the participants described the in-group as 
more "warm" than the out-group members (t(139)=9.108, p<0.001). This 
was also the case in the equal power condition where the in-group 
members were described as more "warm" than the out-group members 
(t(l 56)=1 0.074, p<0.001). Figure 8.3.2.2 below presents these results'. 
Figure 8.3.2.2: The dimension warm for the two groups 
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It is interesting here that the out-group members never exceeded in 
"warmth" even when they were less powerful. The in-group members 
were described as more "warm" than the out-group members in both the 
less and the equal power conditions. It could be argued that "warmth" is 
a dimension that is used to describe only the in-group members. In the 
only case that the in-group members are described equally warm with 
the out-group members was when the in-group was more powerful. It 
may be that the in-group members lose some of their "warmth" when 
their group has other important qualities such as "competence", a 
dimension that reflects power. It could be also argued that the out-group 
members did not appear to exceed in warmth because the relationship 
between the two countries as it was defined in the vignettes was 
presented as competitive. The fact that the out-group was one with 
which the in-group was in dispute may explain the fact that the out-group 
members did not appear to exceed in warmth. 
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As far as the dimension "competent" was concerned, one way ANOVAs 
revealed that both the description of the in-group (F(2,464)=21.582, 
p<0.001 and the out-group members (F(2,462)=49.959, p<0.001) varied 
as an effect of power. Bonferroni corrected post hoc tests revealed that 
both group members were described as more "competent" in the more 
powerful than in the less power condition (p<0.001). In addition, the in- 
group members were described as more "competent" in the equal in 
comparison to the less power condition (p<0.05). However, the out- 
group members were described as more "competent" in the more in 
comparison to the equal power condition (p<0.001). It seems that the 
equal power condition resembles the more power condition in the case 
of the in-group whereas it is similar to the less power condition in the 
case of the out-group. 
In addition, paired comparisons revealed that when the in-group was 
more powerful, the in-group members were described as significantly 
more "competent" than the out-group members (t(160)=7.155, p<0.001). 
Equally, the out-group members were described as more "competent" 
than the in-group members when the out-group was more powerful 
(t(l 36)=-3.998, p<0.001). Finally, the in-group members were also 
described as more "competent" in the equal power condition 
(t(155)=4.785, p<0.001). Figure 8.3.2.3 below presents these resultsý 
Figure 8.3.2.3: The competent dimension for the two groups 
ongraip DoAgroup 
The dimension "competent" seems to follow the power manipulation with 
the more powerful in-group being allocated the more competent group 
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members. However, in the equal power condition the in-group members 
were also described as more "competent" than the out-group members 
indicating that this dimension was subjected to in-group favouritism. 
Paired comparisons revealed that the in-group members were described 
as significantly more "competent" than "warm" when the in-group was 
more powerful (t(160)=-9.515, p<0.001). They were also described as 
more "competent" than "warm" in the equal power condition (t(l 57)=- 
4.851, p<0.001). However, the two dimensions did not differ significantly 
when the in-group was presented as less powerful (t(143)=0.753, n. s. ). 
The use of the two dimensions for the description of the in-group 
members is presented in figure 8.3.2.4 belowý 
Figure 8.3.2.4: Warm and competent dimensions for the in-group 
38 
3,3 
2,8 
2,3 
0 Yam [3 cornWent 
*the power of the in-group 
Finally, paired comparisons revealed that the out-group members were 
described as significantly more "competent" than "warm" in all power 
, when the out-group was more (t(l 38)=-l 4.312, p<0.001), conditions, 
less (t(161)=-3.135, p=0.002) and equally powerful with the in-group 
(t(l 55)=-l 3.861, p<0.001). The use of the two dimensions for the 
description of the out-group members is presented in figure 8.3.2.5 
below. 
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Figure 8.3.2.5: The warm and competent dimensions for the out-group 
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The use of the two dimensions, "warmth" and "competence" to describe 
the members of the two groups followed a similar fashion in the more 
and the equal power conditions where both group members were 
described as more "competent" than "warm". However, in the less power 
condition the out-group members were again described as more 
"competent" than "warm" whereas the two dimensions did not produce 
significant differences in the case of the in-group. Interestingly, the less 
powerful out-group members are still more "competent" than "warm". 
This is an interesting finding that points to the relevant literature. In 
particular, Glick and Fiske (2001) have identified patterns of out-groups 
depending on their power and the type of relationship with the in-group. 
Out-groups could be either "warm" or "competent" but not both. Groups 
that are not threatening might be perceived as more "warm" than 
11 competent". On the contrary, groups that are threatening are more likely 
to be characterised as more "competent" than "warm". This has also 
implications in legitimating certain positions that mainly minority groups 
occupy in society (Jost et al., 2001). This refers to the dual nature of 
stereotypes that are not necessarily negative towards a minority. For 
example, a categorisation of people in some Third World country as 
na*fve and helpless, justifies their exploitation by the "wise" and "helpful" 
Westerners. 
As far as the "aggressive" dimension was concerned, both the 
descriptions of the in-group (F(2,462)=15.971, p<0.001) and the out- 
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group members (F(2,457)=30.004, p<0.001) varied as an effect of 
power. Bonferroni corrected post hoc tests revealed that both group 
members were described as more "aggressive" when the groups were 
more powerful in comparison to both the equal and less powerful group 
conditions (p<0.001). In addition, the out-group members were 
described as more "aggressive" in the equal power in comparison to the 
less power condition (p<0.001). 
Paired comparisons revealed that when the in-group was more powerful, 
the in-group members were described as significantly more "aggressive" 
than the out-group members (t(160)=4.456, p<0.001). Equally, the out- 
group members were described as more "aggressive" than the in-group 
members when the out-group was more powerful (t(l 35)=-8.588, 
p<0.001). Finally, the out-group members were also described as more 
"aggressive" than the in-group members in the equal power condition 
(t(l 55)=-3.894, p<0.001). Figure 8.3.2.6 below presents these results- 
Figure 8.3.2.6: The aggressive dimension for the two groups 
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Interestingly, the "aggressive" dimension also follows the power 
manipulation with the more powerful group being assigned with the more 
aggressive group members. The fact that the out-group members were 
also described as more "aggressive" in the equal power condition may 
reflect the fact that the relationship between the two groups was 
competitive. 
As far as the "traditional" dimension is concerned, neither the description 
of the in-group (F(2,462)=1.978, n. s. ) nor the out-group members 
(F(2,458)=3.455, n. s. ) varied as an effect of power. 
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Paired comparisons revealed that when the in-group was more powerful 
the dimension "traditional" did not produce any differences between the 
two groups (t(l 59)=-1.154, n. s. ). The same pattern was observed in the 
equal power condition (t(l 56)=-1.127, n. s. ). Finally, the in-group 
members were described as more "traditional" than the out-group 
members in less powerful in-group condition (t(l 36)=3.227, p<0.01). 
r Figure 8.3.2.7 below presents these results: i 
Figure 8.3.2.7: The traditional dimension for the two groups 
There was an interaction between the target group, the description of the 
group members and the participants nationality (F(9,1320)=3.118, 
p<0.0 1 n2=0. 016) indicating that there were differences in the use of the 
four dimensions depending on the participants' nationality. 
More specifically, the Greek (t(147)=5.386, p<0.001), the Turkish 
(t(89)=6.539, p<0.001) and the British (t(121)=7.168, p<0.001) 
participants described the in-group members as more "warm" than the 
out-group members. However, this dimension did not elicit differences in 
the description of the in-group and the out-group members in the case of 
the Greek Cypriot participants (t(97)=2.249, n. s. ). 
In addition, only the British participants (t(121)=2.756, p<0.007) 
described the in-group members as more "competent" than the out- 
group members whereas the Greek (t(l 45)=2.050, n. s. ), the Greek- 
Cypriot (t(98)=1.021, n. s. ) and the Turkish (t(88)=2.531, n. s. ) 
participants did not. 
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Finally, all participants described the in-group members as more 
ecompetent" than "warm" (Greek (t(I 48)=-3.974, p<0.00 1), Greek- 
Cypriot (t(101)=-4.403, P<0.001), Turkish (t(89)=-4.104, p<0.001) and 
British participants (t(121)=-3.346, p<0.001). 
They also all described the out-group members as more ucompetenr 
than "warm" (Greek (t(l 45)=-8.61 1, P<0.001), Greek-Cypriot (t(96)=- 
5.614, p<0.001), Turkish (t(89)=-8.142, p<0.001) and British participants 
(t(123)=-8.894, p<0.001). 
Furthermore, the Turkish (t(88)=-4.230, p<0.001) and the Bdtish 
(t(121)=-3.416, p<0.001) participants described the out-group members 
as more "aggressive" than the in-group members whereas the Greek 
(t(145)=-0.202, n. s. ) and the Greek-Cypriot (t(95)=-0.934, n. s. ) 
participants did not. 
None of the participants used differently the dimension "traditional" in 
order to describe the members of the two groups (Greek (t(l 45)=-0.426, 
n. s. ), Greek-Cypriot (t(97)=-0.223, n. s. ), Turkish (t(87)=0.559, n. s. ) and 
British participants (t(121)=1.467, n. s. ). 
This interaction was due to the fact that unlike the other participants, the 
Greek Cypriot participants did not describe the in-group members a 
more "warm" than the out-group members. In addition, only the British 
participants described the in-group members as more "competent7 than 
the out-group members. Finally, the Turkish and the British participants 
described the out-group members as more "aggressive" than the in- 
group members. 
Discussion 
This section sought to examine the pattern of the representation of the 
two fictional countries and their population. Research has focused the 
attention to the role of social structural factors such as power and 
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competition, in shaping the way that out-groups are represented. 
Drawing on this research this study explored the role of power in 
shaping the representation of a fictional in-group and a fictional out- 
group. In addition, by using participants from four different countries, this 
research sought to explore whether there were cross-national 
differences in the representation of the two groups. Only speculations 
can be made about what may have produced differences between the 
participants from the four different national groups. The most plausible 
explanation may be that the different positions within the international 
structure but also different experiences of conflict settings produce 
different images of enemies. In addition, this research acknowledges 
that nation states are complex entities that can be referred to as the 
government and the population, the state and the people according to 
Staerkle et al. (1998). Therefore, it differentiated between the two and 
asked the participants to provide descriptions of both the State and the 
population. 
It was proposed that participants would generally favour their in-group 
on the relevant dimensions. However, it was expected that in-group 
favouritism would be restricted by the Information about the power 
differentials between the two countries. The fact that the two countries 
were in dispute was expected to influence the results. Finally, 
participants from the four different countries were expected to use 
differently the relevant dimension to describe the two groups generally 
and depending on differences in power. 
The description of the states revealed a three factor structure. The 
dimensions were named Ndemocratie, Oorganised" and "capitalist7 with 
the first two being proposed as the equivalent of *warmth" or "morality" 
and "competence" that were found in the description of group members 
by other authors (Eagly and Kitte, 1987; Glick and Fiske, 2001; Phalet 
and Poppe, 1997). The description of the people revealed a four factor 
structure. The four factors were named "warmo, "competent", 
U aggressive" and "traditional". Most of the adjectives and descriptive 
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features loaded onto the factors "warrW and "competent". As it can be 
seen in the Appendix 5 the representation of the states produced a more 
common structure between the participants from the different countries 
whereas the description of the people produced more differences 
between the participants from the four countries. It can be argued here 
that participants' description of the state reflect a common understanding 
of the state within the western world. However, under this common 
structure there is place for different in-group and out-group members. 
The results generally confirmed the hypotheses that the representation 
of the two countries would be related to the power relation between the 
two countries. The dimension Oorganised* for the description of the state 
and ucompetenf for the description of the population were strongly 
related to the manipulation of power. The more powerful country was 
also described as more "organised* and its population as more 
"competeriV. Equally, the less powerful country was described as less 
"organisedn whereas its population as less Ocompetent". In the equal 
power condition the in-group was also described as more "organised" 
and the in-group members as more Ncompetent7 indicating an in-group 
favouritism tendency. It seems that in-group favouritism in the less 
powerful in-group condition decreased as a function of apparent 
differences in power. 
The "democratie dimension for the state and the *warm" for the 
population followed a quite different pattern. The out-group was never 
described as more "democratic" or *wann* than the in-group even in the 
more powerful in-group condition where one would expect that the 
powerful in-group would cede some of its qualities to a less 
advantageous out-group and still enhance Its distinctiveness (Glick and 
Fiske, 2001; Mummendey and Schreiber, 1983,1984). This may reflect 
the nature of the relations between the two countries which is 
characterised by a dispute over land issues or it may be just that out- 
group members could not exceed the in-group members in warmth. It 
could be that some emotions are rarely attributed to the out-group not to 
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mention an out-group that one is in conflict vvith (Leyens, Paladino, 
Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez & Gaunt, 2000; 
Leyens et al., 2001). 
These findings generally confirrn previous research that Indicated that 
the representation of nationalities is related to features of social reality, 
such as power. In addition, although it was not possible to control the 
nature of the relationship of the groups involved, the fact that the two 
fictional countries were in dispute is thought to have influenced the 
participants' responses. This was more obvious in the equal power 
condition where any observed differences had to be explained by factors 
others than the power manipulation. The results generally showed that 
in-group favouritism on a power related dimension decreases as a 
function of the power of the out-group, whereas in-group favouritism on 
an alternative dimension increases as a function of the power of the out- 
group. These results emphasise the role of perceived differences in 
power between countries that are more psychologically valid than real in 
providing people with a certain representation of the nationalities 
involved in an inter-group context. 
Finally, despite the discussed differences it could be argued that the 
results from the participants from the four countries were close. The 
participants from the four countries have probably reproduced a western 
representation of states and populations. Although the four countries 
occupy different positions in the world of nations and have different 
experiences of conflict they still belong to the same part of the world, i. e. 
the western world. 
ic) 
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Chapter 8.4 
T his section explores the concept of power as it was understood by 
the participants. In particular, it seeks to answer whether there was 
a common understanding of power by the participants from the four 
countries. Furthermore, it explores whether there were differences in the 
use of the dimensions of power depending on the group they referred to 
(i. e. in-group or out-group). Finally, this section investigates whether all 
the dimensions of power contributed equally to the power of a country 
when it is powerful. Differences between the powerful in-group and out- 
group were expected. The participants were asked to evaluate on a 
scale that ranged from I (not at all) to 5 (very much) how much a list of 
dimensions contributed to the power of the in-group and the out-group. 
These dimensions included military power, strategic geographical 
position, politic2l org2nisation, voice in intenl2tional organisations, 
support from the Great Powers, economy, culture, solidarity and 
population density. See appendix 3. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using a4 (participants 
nationality) x3 (power of the in-group) x2 (inlout-group) x9 (dimensions 
of power) design. The first factor was a between subjects factor with four 
levels (Greek, Greek-Cypriots, Turkish and British participants), the 
second was also a between subjects factor with three levels (in-group 
more-, less- or equally powerful with the out-group). The third factor was 
a within subjects factor with nine levels (military power, strategic 
geographical position, political organisation, voice in international 
organisations, economy, culture, population density, support from big 
powers and solidarity among the population) and the fourth factor also a 
within subjects factor with two levels (in-group and out-group). Only the 
effects and interactions relevant to the hypotheses will be reported and 
further discussed. More specifically, the analysis looked for an 
interaction between the target group and the dimension of power. 
Further paired comparisons were used to detect whether the dimensions 
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were used differently for the in-group and the out-grx)up. It also looked 
for an interaction between the target group, the dimension of power and 
power. Further paired comparisons were conducted In order to detect 
whether the dimensions of power were used differently for the in-group 
and the out-group in each power condition. The analysis further looked 
on an interaction between the target group, the dimension of power and 
the participants' nationality. Paired comparisons were used to detect 
whether the participants from each country used differently the 
dimensions of power when the described the in-group and the out-group. 
Finally, an interaction between the target group, the dimension of power, 
power and participants' nationality was looked. Due to the number of 
tests conducted the interval of confidence was appropriately adjusted. 
There was an interaction between the target group and the dimension of 
power (F(8,3168)=20.285, p<0.001) indicating differences in the use of 
the dimensions of power by the participants depending on whether they 
referred to the in-group or the out-group. Table 8.4.1 below presents this 
interaction: 
Table 8A. 1: the Interaction between the dimension of power and the target group 
in-group out-group It CK Sig. 
Army 3.21(1.02) 3.31(1.10) -1.013 447 n. & 
Strategic 
geographical position 3.25(1.06) 3.07(11.02) 3.063 452 0.005 
Political organisation 3.27(l. 01) 3.02(1.03) 3.637 429 0.001 
Voice In International 
organisations 3.22(l. 15) 3.24(1.13) -0.058 446 n. & 
Economy 3.29(1.11) 3.11(l. 08) 2.384 443 n. & 
Culture 3.24(11.08) 2.69(11.09) &264 445 0.001 
Population density 2.8,9(1.04) 2.99(1.10) -1.609 436 ILS. 
Support from the 
Great Powers 3.27(1.21) 3.47(1.21) -2.448 446 O. S. 
Solidarity 3.58(l. 13) 3.10(l. 16) 7.153 449 0.001 
As it can be seen in table 8.4.1 the strategic geographical position, the 
political organisation, culture and solidarity contributed more to the 
power of the in-group than the out-group. It seems that the participants 
considered some dimensions more appropriate for the description of the 
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power of the in-group. A possible explanation would be that these 
differences possibly reflect the real world examples of in-groups and 
conflicts that the participants may bring in the experimental setting. 
These examples may include a fixed power relation between the two 
countries that goes beyond the one induced experimentally. It can also 
be that this effect was due to in-group favouritism that is likely to reflect 
these dimensions. 
The analysis also showed a significant interaction between the 
dimension of power, the target group and the power of the group 
fli 6,3168)=1 7.602, p<0.001) which indicated that there were 
differences in the use of the dimensions of power to describe the power 
of the two groups as an effect of the manipulation of power. This 
interaction is further illustrated as it is relevant to one of the objectives of 
this study. In particular, not all dimensions of power where relevant for 
the description of the in-group when it was powerful. Paired comparisons 
revealed (adjusted p<0.001) that when the in-group was more powerful, 
it was described as more powerful in terms of army, strategic 
geographical position, political organisation, voice in international 
organisations, economy and support from the Great Powers. 
Interestingly, culture and solidarity did not seem to contribute to the 
power of the in-group when it was more powerful. Moreover, culture and 
solidarity constitute two of the dimensions that the in-group was 
favoured irrespective the power condition. Table 8.4.2 below presents 
these results: 
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Table 8A. 2: the use of the dimensions of power to describe the two countries when the In- 
group was more powerful 
in-group out-group t Cif Sig. 
Army 3.55(0.96) 2.84(l. 08) 6.250 154 0.001 
Strategic 
geographical position 3.40(1.07) 2. "1.01) 5.905 155 0.001 
Political organisation 3.60(0.95) 2.78(o. 96) 7.869 149 0.001 
Voice in international 
organisations 3.51(l. 09) 2.84(l. 09) 5.438 154 0.001 
Economy 3.72(1.04) 2.78(l. 07) 8.358 151 0.001 
Culture 3.11(1.08) 2.79(1.08) 2.500 154 n. s. 
Population density 3.06(l. 06) 2.86(i. oB) 1.806 149 n. s. 
Support from the 
Great Powers 3.72(1.06) 3.06(l. 15) 5.567 153 0.001 
Solidarity 3.47(l. 15) 3.31(l. 15) 1.450 153 A& 
The dimensions that contributed to the power of the out-group when it 
was more powerful were similar to the ones used by the participants to 
denote the power of the in-group. These included: army, political 
organisation, economy and support from the Great Powers. Interestingly, 
the in-group was described as more powerful than the out-group in 
terms of culture and solidarity. Population density and strategic 
geographical position were not used differently to describe the power of 
the two countries. Table 8.4.3 below presents these results: 
Table 8.4.3: the use of the dimensions of power to describe the power of the two countries 
when the out-group was more powerful 
in-group out-group t dt Sig. 
Army 2.68(l. 03) 3.74(l. 04) -7.549 138 0.001 
Strategic 
geographical position 3.05(l. 05) 3.30(l. 01) -1.549 138 n. & 
Political organisation 2.813(0.99) 3.27(1.03) 3.177 134 0.001 
Voice in international 
organisations 2.79(1.15) 3.54(1.14) -5.186 138 0.001 
Economy 2.77(l. 04) 3.50(0.98) -6.896 137 0.001 
Culture 3.24(1.03) 2.55(0.99) 5.401 138 0.001 
Population density 2. WO. 97) 3.19(l. 10) -2.309 135 n. & 
Support from the 
Great Powers 2.78(1.21) 3.85(1.13) -7.293 139 0.001 
Solidarity 3.65(1.14) 2.93(1.19) 5.314 139 0.001 
There is agreement among the participants about the dimensions that 
contributed to the power of a country no matter if this country is the in- 
group or an out-group. However, some dimensions such as culture and 
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solidarity constitute the power of the powerless but only in the case of 
the in-group. In the case of the out-grx)up, some dimensions contributed 
to its power when it is more powerful whereas it does not exceed in any 
of the dimensions of power when it was less powerful. In a similar way, 
in the case of the in-group, the same dimensions contributed to its power 
when the in-group is more powerful. However, unlike the out-group the 
in-group also appears to exceed in some dimensions even when it does 
not have "objective" (i. e. experimentally induced) power. These 
dimensions included "culture* and "solidarity, ". It could be argued here 
that culture and solidarity are inversely influenced by power. In other 
words, they are attributed to the powerless group but only if the less 
powerful groups happens to be the in-group. 
This becomes even clearer when it comes to the equal power condition 
where the in-group was described as more powerful in terms of culture 
and solidarity whereas the out-group did not excel in any dimensions as 
no differences were detected in the use of the other dimensions in this 
power condition. Table 8.4.4 below presents these results: 
Table 8AA: the use of the dimensions of power to describe the power of the two countries 
In the equal power condition 
in-group out-group t CK Sig. 
Army 3.58(0.91) 3.42(0.99) -0.800 153 A& 
Strategic 
geographical position 3.28(l. 03) 3.15(0. " 0.826 155 n. & 
Political organi5ation 3.28(0.98) 3.05(l. 04) 2.596 144 n. & 
Voice in international 
organisations 3.31(l. 10) 3.38(l. 06) -0.066 152 A& 
Economy 3.31(l. 04) 3.10(1.08) 2.204 153 n. & 
Culture 3.37(1.11) 2.70(1.18) 6.9w 151 0.001 
Population density 2.74(11.06) 2.94(l. 11) 2.676 1150 M& 
Support from the 
Great Powers 3-26(11.22) 3.54(I. M 2.425 152 n. & 
Solidarity 3.64(1.09) 3.04(1.11) 6.177 154 0.001 
It seems that culture and solidarity amongst the population constitute 
two sources of power that are not relevant to the "objective" power of a 
country. This was the case for both the powerful in-group and the 
powerful out-group. However, the in-group was favoured on these 
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dimensions when it was less powerful. It is interesting that the out-group 
never appears to excel in culture and solidarity. Out-groups with which 
one is conflict with are often presented in lacking In culture (Alexander et 
al. 1999; Bar-Tal, 2000a). Dehumanisation is also a phenomenon that is 
often observed in areas inflicted with protracted conflict (Bar-Tal, 1989). 
There was an interaction between dimension of power, target group and 
nationality (F(24,3168)=3.494, p<0.001) indicating that the use of the 
dimensions of power to describe the power of the two countries differed 
depending on power. 
In particular, the Greek participants described the in-group as more 
powerful in terms of political organisation, solidarity and culture and the 
out-group as more powerful in terms of army and population density. 
Table 8.4.5 below presents these results: 
Table 8A. 5: the use of the dimensions of power to describe the two countries by the 
Greek participants 
in-group out-group t CK Sig. 
Army 3.15(0.96) 3.58(l. 01) -3.276 145 0.001 
Strategic 
geographical position 3.36(0.97) 3.35(0.96) 0.131 146 AS. 
Political organisation 3.43(0.94) 2.07(0.97) 3.781 140 0.001 
Voice in international 
organisations 3.26(l. 20) 3.36(l. 09) -0.570 143 n. & 
Economy 3.37(11.09) 3.13(l. 04) 2.229 145 n. & 
Cuture 3.27(11.06) 2.59(l. 04) 6.083 145 0.001 
Population density 2.72(0. M 3.10(1.10) -3.438 145 0.001 
Support from the 
Great Powers 3.56(l. 18) 3.71(1.09) -1.308 144 n. s. 
Solidarity 3.59(l. 15) 3.15(1.23) 4.135 145 0.001 
There were no significant differences in the use of the dimensions of 
power to describe the in-group and the out-group by the Greek-Cypriot 
participants. Table 8.4.6 below presents these results: 
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Table 8A. 6: the use of the dimensions of power to describe the two countries by the 
Greek-Cypriot participants 
in-group out-group t C1 Sig. 
Army 3.19(1.09) 3.16(1.21) 0.305 95 n. & 
Strategic 
geographical position 3.37(l. 06) 3.20(1.16) 1.489 95 n. & 
Political organisation 3.24(l. 06) 3.24(1.03) 0.083 911 a. 
Voice in international 
organisations 3.15(1.07) 3.38(1.10) -1.081 93 n. & 
Economy 3.16(1.04) 3.18(1.06) -0.162 90 n. & 
Culture 3.20(l. 02) 2.95(l. 01) 2.044 92 n. & 
Population density 2.66(1.06) 2.89(1.13) -1.675 87 n. & 
Support from the 
Great Powers 3.40(1.15) 3.40(l. 18) 0.196 93 n. & 
Solidarity 3.43(1.07) 3.24(l. 01) 1.245 93 n. & 
The Turkish participants favoured the in-group in terms of strategic 
geographical position, culture and solidarity. In addition, they described 
the out-group as more powerful in terms of support from the Great 
Powers. Table 8.4.7 below presents these results: 
Table SAA: the use of the dimensions of power to describe the two countries by the 
Turkish participants 
in-group out-group It df Sig. 
Army 3.49(l. 07) 3.06(l. 11) 2.898 83 A& 
Strategic 
geographical position 3.25(l. 22) 2.70(l. 03) 3.662 87 0.001 
Polftical organisatlon 3.22(1.10) 2. M1.09) I. M 78 n. s. 
Voice in international 
organisations 3.05(l. 32) 2.86(l. 30) 0.939 86 n. s. 
Economy 3.30(1.28) 2.97(l. 27) 1.482 W A& 
Culture 3.16(1.26) 2.34(1.09) 4.390 85 0.001 
Population density 3.14(l. 08) 2.81(l. 09) 2.237 84 n. & 
Support from the 
Great Powers 2.61(1.30) 3.38(l. 45) -3.496 W 0.001 
Solidarity 3.80(1.25) 2.88(l. 27) 4.990 87 0.001 
Finally, the British participants favoured the in-group in terms of culture 
and solidadty. Table 8.4.8 below presents these results: 
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Table 2A. S: the use of the dimensions of power to describe the two countries by the 
British participants 
"roup otkvoup t cl Sig. 
Army 3.11(0.98) 3.27(1.07) -1.026 121 
Strategic 
geographical position 3.03(l. 02) 2.89(0.87) 1.122 121 
Political organisation 3.23(l. 02) 3.00(1.04) 1.635 117 n. & 
Voice in international 
organisations 3.33(l. 01) 3.24(l. 05) 0.409 121 n. s. 
Economy 3.26(1.05) 3.14(l. 02) 0.890 119 n. s. 
Culture 3.29(l. 01) 2.84(l. 14) 3.618 120 0.001 
Population density 3.111)(11.011) 3.07(11.08) 0.071 119 A& 
Support from the 
Great Powers 3.26(l. 11) 3.28(11.17) -0.167 119 n. & 
Solidarity 3.54(11.06) 3.09(1.08) 3.044 121 0.001 
The results shed light to how the subgroups (i. e. the participants from 
the four national groups) contributed to what has been observed earlier. 
More specifically, the Greek participants described the in-group as more 
powerful in terms of political organisation, solidarity and culture, the 
Greek-Cypriots did not favour the in-group in any dimensions, the 
Turkish participants described the in-group as more powerful in terms 
strategic geographical position, culture and solidarity and the British in 
terms of culture and solidarity. Interestingly, in this analysis there were 
some dimensions that at least for the Greek and the Turkish participants 
contributed to the power of the out-group. More specifically, the Greek 
participants described the out-group as more powerful in terms of army 
and population density whereas the Turkish participants described the 
out-group as more powerful in terms of support from the Great Powers. 
The British and the Greek-Cypriot participants did not favour the out- 
group in any dimensions. Only speculations could be made about these 
results that possibly refer to the real world countries that the participants 
had in their mind when responding to the questionnaire. See appendix 6 
for the list of real world in-groups, out-groups and conflict contexts that 
the participants considered that were close to the situation described in 
the vignette. 
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There was also an interaction between dimension of power, target 
group, power and country (F(24,3168)=3.761, p<0.001) indicating that 
the participants used the dimensions of power to describe the two 
groups differently depending on the power condition and their nationality. 
Because the numbers of the tests would be extremely high to give any 
validity to these results no further analyses were conducted to shed light 
on the nature of this interaction. 
Discussion 
This section sough to explore the meaning of power in the context of a 
relationship between two countries that are in conflict Several 
dimensions were included that involved2riny, strategic geographical 
position, economy, population density, solidarity amongst the population, 
culture, voice in international organisations, support from the Great 
Powers and political organisation. The analysis revealed differences in 
the use of these dimensions to describe the power of the in-group and 
the out-group. The analysis also revealed differences in the use of these 
dimensions to describe the powerful country. In particular, it was shown 
that whereas both groups appear to exceed in more or less the same 
dimensions when they were more powerful, culture and solidarity 
constituted the dimensions that the in-group exceeds when it was less or 
equal powerful with the out-group. Finally, there were differences in the 
use of the dimensions to describe the power of the in-group and the out- 
group depending on the participants' nationality. 
It seems that there are at least three dimensions that organise 
differences in the use of the sources of power. First of all, the in- 
grouptout-group distinction produces differences in the use of the 
dimensions of power with the in-group being favoured on some 
dimensions. Secondly, there were differences in the use of the 
dimensions to describe the power of the in-group and the out-group 
depending on the participants' nationality. This indicates that the 
participants' nationality played an important role that meaning that the 
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participants attributed on the dimensions of power and the assessment 
of their relevance to describe the power of the two countries. For the 
possible sources of this cross-cultural variation only speculations could 
be made that refer to the familiar context that the participants were likely 
to draw on to understand the unfamiliar situation introduced in the 
experiment. Finally, power had an impact on the use of the dimensions 
to describe the power of the two countries. More specifically, although 
there was a common representation of the power of a powerful in-group 
and out-group (the dimensions used were the same), there were 
diversions when it came to the description of the in-group. Interestingly, 
the in-group was presented as having always some kind of power, if not 
what was generally agreed as the power of the powerful, i. e. army, 
political organisation, voice in international organisations, economy, 
support from the Great Powers and strategic geographical position. 
Interestingly, in the case of the in-group culture and solidarity seemed to 
contribute to the power of a powerless in-group. The same dimensions 
also added to the power of the in-group in the equal power condition. 
It could be argued that there are some dimensions that are subjected to 
the restrictions of the social reality. If a country does not have power this 
automatically means that it is not powerful in terms of certain 
dimensions. Apart from the social reality there is also a strong in-group 
favouritism on certain dimensions and most importantly, peoples' 
experiences and socialisation environment that shape the meaning of 
what contributes to the power of a country. It is plausible that differences 
in perceived real group position and different experiences of relevant 
out-groups and conflict contexts might have produced these differences 
between the participants from the four national groups. 
f5O 
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Appendix 1: Interview schedule 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. As you know, I would like you to 
tell me a few things about international relations. I want you to know that all the 
information you give me today will be in strict confidence. This means that what 
you say to me today will be analysed and written up in a way that your personal 
information will not be able to be identified. Also, I want to remind you that you 
do not have to answer any questions you do not want to respond and you can 
withdraw from the research at any stage. I would like to ask for your permission 
to record our discussion. Do you have any questions before we start? 
I would like to start with some questions about yourself. 
How old are you? 
What do you do at the moment? 
Now we can move to the issue of our main discussion. 
1. Can you tell me what issues are important for you when you think about 
the relations between countries? 
Participants are left to say what this general question brings to their mind. 
Questions are asked to explore some points developed by the participants 
that give a better understanding of what is mentioned. If the participants do 
not mention conflict between countries the following questions are asked: 
Apart from the aspects of the relations between countries that you have 
already mentioned, there are also conflicts between countries. Can you 
please tell me: 
2. What do you think are the reasons that bring two countries into conflict? 
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3. Can you give any examples of conflicts that interested you at the moment 
or/and you discuss with your family/friends? 
4. Can you think of countries that have no conflicts? Why do you think these 
countries have no conflicts? 
5. Can you tell me a few thinks about conflicts that are long and protracted? 
Why do you think this happens? 
6. What would involve a successful conflict resolution? 
7. Do you know of anyone that deals with issues of international conflict? Do 
you think they are successful? 
8. Do you have any examples of successful conflict resolution? If yes, what 
factors do you think contributed to the successful resolution? 
If the participants do not mention any conflicts relevant to Greece then the 
following questions are asked. Thank you. You have already given me many 
useful information. I would like know to ask a few questions about Greece. 
9. How do you think are the relations between Greece and its neighbour 
countries? Are there any relations that trouble you? 
If the participants mention a peaceful relationship then they are asked: 
10. What makes the relationship between Greece and this country 
peaceful/co-operative? 
If they mention a problematic relationship then the following questions are 
asked: 
11. What do you think makes the relationship between Greece and this 
country problematic? 
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3. Can you give any examples of conflicts that interested you at the moment 
or/and you discuss with your familytfriends? 
4. Can you think of countries that have no conflicts? Why do you think these 
countries have no conflicts? 
5. Can you tell me a few thinks about conflicts that are long and protracted? 
Why do you think this happens? 
6. What would involve a successful conflict resolution? 
7. Do you know of anyone that deals with issues of international conflict? Do 
you think they are successful? 
8. Do you have any examples of successful conflict resolution? If yes, what 
factors do you think contributed to the successful resolution? 
If the participants do not mention any conflicts relevant to Greece then the 
following questions are asked. Thank you. You have already given me many 
useful information. I would like know to ask a few questions about Greece. 
9. How do you think are the relations between Greece and its neighbour 
countries? Are there any relations that trouble you? 
If the participants mention a peaceful relationship then they are asked: 
10. What makes the relationship between Greece and this country 
peaceful/co-operative? 
If they mention a problematic relationship then the following questions are 
asked: 
11. What do you think makes the relationship between Greece and this 
country problematic? 
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12. Do you think there is somebody that deals with this situation? In this 
country? Internationally? Are they successful? Are you satisfied with the 
way that the relationship has been treated? 
13. How do you imagine the future of the relationships between the two 
countries? 
If they give more than one example of relations they are asked to compare 
the relations. 
14. You have given some examples of problematic and some examples of 
peaceful relations. Do you want to tell me what, according to you, are the 
main differences between a good and a not good relationship between 
Greece and another country? 
I would like you know to tell me a few things about what you think of trust in 
international relations. 
15. Do you think that trust is important? In what way? 
16. Can you discuss trust using the relationships that you have already 
described? 
17. Can trust be built in a relationship? What contributes to it? 
1 B. Finally, I would like you to tell me a few things about what do you think is 
the nation. 
Thank you very much. 
321 
Appendix 2a: study 2 questionnaire 
My name is Spyridoula Ntani and this questionnaire is part ofmy doctorate research 
in the area of Social Psychology. Please ans" er carefully the folloNN ing questions. 
Notice that there are no right or wrong answers. Thank you very much lor your time 
and effort to participate in this research. 
Here follow a series of statements. Please use the ratings of the scale to show how tntich you 
agree or disagree: 
I tolallY neither tigrec totC1111 
disagree I disagree neither disagree agi-ce agree 
I. Although it may appear that things are constantly 
getting more dangerous and chaotic, it really isn't 
so. Every era has its problems, and a persons 
chances of living safe, untroubled life are better 12345 
today than ever Nforc 
2. Any daNr no", chaos and anarchy could erupt around 
us. All the signs are pointing to it 12345 
3. There are many dangerous people in our society who 
will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no) 
reason at all 12345 
4. Despite what one hears about "crime in the street". 
there probably isn't any more now than there ever 
has been 12345 
5. If a person takes a few sensible precautions, no)thing 
bad is likely to happen to him or her-, we do not live 
in a dangerous world 12345 
6.1 'verv day as society become more ],, t%k less and 
bestial, a pLrson's chances ofbeing robbed, 
assaulted, and even murdered go upand tip 12345 
7. My knowledge and experience tells me that the 
, social world we live in is basically a safe, stable and 
secure place in which most people are 
fundamenWly good 12345 
8. It seems tat even, vear there are l6ver and fewer 
truly respectable people, and moreand more persons 
with no morals at all who threaten evervonc else 12345 
9. My knowledge and my experience tells me that the 
social world we live in is basicaliv a dangerous and 
unpredictable place, in which good, decent and 
moral people's values and wav offife are thrcittencd 
and disrupted by bad people. 12345 
10.4-he -end" is not near. People N% ! to think that 
earthquakes, wars, and famines mean God might be 
about to destrov the world are being Foolish 12345 
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Please tisc the ratings or the scale to show how much you agree or disagree %% A the rollowing 
statements: 
" lotall 
-" neither agree 
I tot'1111- 
disagrec I disagree neither disagrcc agree agre, 
11. Some social/cultural/ethnic or religious groups arc 
simply inferior to other groups 2 3 4 5 
12. In getting what you want, it is sometimes nccessar\ 
to use force against other social/cultural/ethnic or 2 3 4 5 
religious groups 
13. It is OK if some sociaUcultural/ethnic or religious 
groups have more of a chance in lite than others 1 2 3 4 5 
14. To get ahead in lite, it is sometimes nLccssarN to 
step on other social/cultural/ethnic or religious 1 2 3 4 5 
groups social/cultural/cthnic or religious groups 
15. 1 feertain sociaUcultural/ethnic or religious groups 
staved in their place, we would have fewer problems 1 2 3 4 5 
16. It is probably a good thing that cLrtam 
social/cultural/ethnic or religioms groups are at the 1 2 3 4 5 
top and other groups arc at the bottom 
17. Inferior social/cultural/ethnic or religious groups 
should stay in their place 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Sometimes other social/cultural/ethnic or religious 
groups must be kept in their place 1 2 3 4 5 
19. It would be good if sociaUcultural/ethnic or religious 
groups could be equal 2 3 4 5 
20. Equality between social/cultural/ethnic or religious 
groups should be our idea] 2 3 4 5 
21. All social/cultural/ethnic or religious groups should 
be given an equal chance in life 1 2 3 4 5 
22. We should do . khat we cm to equalisc conditions lor 
different social/cultural/ethnic or religious groups 2 3 4 5 
23. We would have fewer problems if we treated people 
more equally 1 2 3 4 5 
24. We should aim at increased social equalitN 2 3 4 
25. We should strive to make incomes as equal as 
possible 2 3 4 5 
26 No one sociallculturaVethnic or religious group 
should dominate in societv 2 3 4 5 
)23 
Please use the ratings of the scale to show how each of the following sectors was for ýou ul 
the past: 
Much much 
WOrS(I worve thesarnt, befter helter 
27. Employement 12 3 4 5 
28. Prosperity 12 3 4 5 
29. Quality of personal relationships 12 3 4 5 
30. Waý of life 12 3 4 5 
31. Generally 12 3 4 5 
Please use the ratings of the scale to show how each of the followin g sectors will be f or you in 
the future: 
much much 
worse Wont, /hv Same hetter heller 
32. Employment 12 3 4 5 
33. Prosperity 12 3 4 5 
34. Quality of personal relationships 12 3 4 5 
35. WaN of life 12 3 4 5 
36. Generally 12 3 4 5 
Please use the ratings of the scale to sho %N how each of the following sectors is for yo u in 
comparison to the rest of the Greeks: 
rmch Inuch 
WOrS(I worst, themmit, heller hetter 
37. Employment 12 3 4 5 
38. Prospcritý 12 3 4 5 
39. Quality of personal relationships 12 3 4 5 
40. Way of life 12 3 4 5 
41. Generally 12 3 4 5 
42.1 believe that I have been treated unjustly in lific: 
neither ayret, 
I lotalb, dimigree I iAvagree neilher disagrve I agree I folaill, agn't. 
i12345 
Here follow a series of statements that describe the way you possibly see Greece. Use the 
ratings of the scale to show how much you agree or disagree with the follo%Ning statements: 
43. It's un-Grcek to criticize this countrv 
44.1 oppose some Greek policies because I care 
about niN country and want to impi-me it 
45.1 express my love for Greece by supporting 
cfforts at positive change 
46. People vý ho do not N-, holcheartcdly support 
CiTeccc should live somc", hcrc else 
I I'm"JA. 11"4"111 
disaYrve I disagret, neither chsagret, agret, agrc, 
12345 
I234 
12345 
I2345 
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Use the rat I nigs of the scale to show how much you agree or disagree with the follo%N I lig 
Statements: 
neither ,., Krvc I tot"1111, 
disagree I disagree netthct dr, q: rcc aýý,, wc , I, i 
47. Greccc is virtually ah%ays right 1234 
49.1 would SUDDort mv countrv rivht or mong 1234 
49. Mý love oý 
6recce' demands that I speak out 
against popular but potentially destructive 
policies 1 2 3 4 5 
50. Because I identify with Greece, some of its 
actions make me feel sad 1 2 3 4 S 
I. If another country disagreed ii ith an important 
Greece policy that I knc%N little about, I would 
not necessarily support my country's position 1 2 3 4 
52. People should not constantly try to change the 
way things are in Greece 1 2 3 4 
53. 1 support Greece policies for t lie % erN reason 
that theý arc the policies of my countrN 1 2 3 4 5 
54. There is too much criticism of the Greece in the 
world. and w-c its citizens should not criticize it 1 2 3 4 5 
55. If I criticize Greece. I do so out of love for niý 
counti-N 1 2 3 4 5 
56. We should have complete freedom of speech 
even for those vho criticize the country 1 3 4 5 
57. 1 believe that Greece policies are almost alxNaNs 
the morally correct ones 1 2 3 4 
58. People should work hard to move this countrN 
in a positive change 1 2 3 4 5 
59. If you love Greece, you should notice its 
problems and work to correct them 1 2 3 4 
60. It's very important for me that I arn Greek 1 2 3 4 5 
61. If you asked me who I am. one of the most 
important characteristics that I would use it 
would be that I am Greek 1 2 3 4 
62. 1 am proud to be Greek 1 2 3 4 
63. 1 identifN, %% ith the rest of the Greeks 1 2 3 4 5 
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Use the ratings of the suilc to sho%% ho%% you see Greece along each one of the folio%% Ing 
sectors in comparison to how it -A as in the past: 
65. Prospcritý or the population 
66. Personal relationships 
67. Waý orlife 
68. Natural environement 
69. Gcnerallý 
much 
V4'OrVt' I/W Stillit' beffer better 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 .3 
Use the ratings of the scale to show how you see Greece along each ofthe IN lolk i ng sectors 
in the future: 
70. Unemployment/job opportunities 
71. Prospcritý ofthe populatimi 
72. Personal relationships 
73. WaN of life 
74. Natural environment 
7i. Generally 
imch nuich 
W()r. vtl worve Illesivile better beller 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
Use the ratings of the scale to show ho%% ýou see Greece in each one oftlic llolloN%ing sectors 
in relation to the rest of the Europe.. 
much imich 
WI)rlvt, worve thestune befter belter 
76. Unemployemcnt/job opportunities 12 3 4 5 
77. Prospcritý of the population 12 3 4 
78 Personal relationships 12 3 4 5 . 
79. Waý oflifle 12 3 4 
80. Natural environment 12 3 4 5 
81. Gcncralk 12 3 4 5 
Use the ratings of the scale to sho", how you see Greece in each one ofthe folloNNing sectors 
in relation to the rest of the Balkans: 
rrfm . /I m u( -11 
14'(PrSt' "'OrSt, I/It'siont, beller beller 
, 82 Uncmploymcnt/job opportunities 2 3 4 5 . '16 
83. Prospcritý of'thc population 12 3 4 5 
84. Personal relationships 2 3 4 5 
95. Waý oi'lii'c 12 3 4 5, 
86. Natural environment 2 3 4 
87. Cicncrallý 2 3 4 
98. Greece has been treated unjustly in relation to Turkey: 
neither agret, 
I tola/ýv dimigret, disagree neither disdigret, (kgret, lolaW agm, 
12345 
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Here follows a scfies of statements that concern the relations between Greece and Turkey 
Use the ratings of the scale to sho%N how much you agree or disagree %N ith the fial lo%% ing 
statements, 
I 1(wally neither qý: rc, t"I'1111 
disagree ldi, wrcc ncttherdi. ý, igrc, , ýivcv 
99. The more Turkey wins the more Greece losses 1 234 5 
90. The more the benefits fior Tiirkcý the more the 
benefits Cor Greece 1 234 5 
91. Benefits or losses orGreecc are independent or 
the benefits or losses of TurkeN 1 234 5 
92. How powerful is Greece'? 
not at all a 11ttfe enough much very much 
12345 
93. Ho%% poNNerful is Turkey? 
not at all a 11ttle enough much very much 
12345 
Which of the following contribute to the power of Greece'? 
94. Its culture 
95. The I-act it is highlý populated 
96. The fact that it is supported by other Powers 
97. The fact that the Greeks arc people with great 
psýcliologlcal po%%er 
98. Its economy 
99. The fact that Greece has a po%%crl'ul voice 
mthin dic In(cmational organisa(ions 
100. Its political organization 
101. Its strategic geographical position 
102. Its army 
not at all '4 little crun4gh tim, /I vcf v Inu, 1) 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
Which of the following contribute to the poAer ol"Furkey? 
noiatall a little enough rmich very rmich 
103 . Its culture 1 2 3 4 5 104 . Thc flact that It is highly populated 1 2 3 4 5 
105 
. 
The fact that it is supported by other 
PONNers 1 2 3 4 5 
106 
. 
The fact that tile Turks are people %N ith 
great 1)s. N chological poNN er 1 2 3 4 5 
107 
. 
Its economy t 2 3 4 5 
108 
. 
The flact that Turkcý has a po%kerl'ul voice 
mthin the international organizations 1 2 3 4 5 
109 
. 
Its political organizAtion 1 2 3 4 S 
110 
. 
Its strategic geographical position 1 2 3 4 5 
111 
, 
Its armv 1 2 3 4 5 
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Use the ratings or the scale to show how much the rolloNving statements describe the relat lons 
between Greece and Turkcv: 
I neither agrei, 1"t"d1v 
L/I %, igree Idisagree neithcrilisagrev ýiKicc 'I'vr( 
112. Although they are not in an open war, the 
threat of war will always shadow the 
relationship between Greece and Turkey 12345 
113.1 tis crN 11 Wý For Greece and Turkcý to 
crigage in an arined confrontation 12345 
114. 'Me relations between Greece and Turkey 
will be constantly improving in the future 12345 
115. How, iar cach of (hc following factors inipcdes on the rclations bctwccn Grcccc and 
Turkcy'? 
wit at all a little vn, mgh nni( Ii ver vmr4ch 
116. The character of the Greeks 1 2 3 45 
, 
117. The character oftlic Turks 1 2 3 .1 
118. The politics of Cyrcccc 1 2 3 .4 
119. Tlic politics offurkc. ý 1 2 3 -1 5 
120. Great power interventions 1 2 3 45 
121. HoA much do you trust the Turks'? 
not at all a 1AWe enough much very much 
123 4 5 
122. How much do you trust Turkcy? 
not at all a kttle enough much very much 
12345 
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Here follow some reasons that make some Greeks fccl insecure about the relations vVith 
Turkev How much make you feel insecure about this relation each one or the follow ing 
reasons" 
not at all I /Ittle enough muc h v"n. nm, /I 
I 23. Thc Turks do not scern willing to revise their 
positions and withdraw some of their demands 1 2 3 4 5 
I 24. The Turks ignore agreements and are constantiv 
provocative and dispute the Greek islands 1 2 3 4 5 
125. ThcTurks are uncivilized so one cannot be sure 
what to expect from them 1 2 3 4 5 
126. 'I'hc'I'urks do not keep the agreements thev have 
signed with other couniries so we do not have 
reasons to believe that they, will keep the one's theN 
signed with Grecce 1 2 3 4 5 
127. TheTurks violate basic human rights so we cannot 
expect any-thing better tiom them in the international 
affairs 1 2 3 4 
128. "I'he political leaders ofTurkcN' are incapable of 
following a consistent policy so we cannot he sure 
that thev will live up to their obligations 2 3 4 
129. TheTurks have many internal problems that can 
change the political situation in the countrv so we 
cannot rely on them 1 2 3 4 5 
130. ThcTurks use the crisis in order to solve internal 
problems 1 3 4 
13 I. The Turks are riot atraid ofany sanctions iftheý do 
not keep the agreements 1 2 3 4 5 
132. TheTurksarcuscIcss 1 2 3 4 
.5 
1 33. The Ti irks w ould lie very, easily to satisfy their own 
interests 1 2 3 4 5 
134. 'I'he'l'urks do no( havc the cxpcrIcncc and the 
knowledge to resolve a crisis or to handle 
international problems 1 2 3 4 5 
l35. ThcTurks have more support from the (treat Powers 1 2 3 4 5 
1 36. The Turks do not hesitate to break rules of 
international law, in order to achieve their goals 2 3 4 
137. The Turks are the kind ofpcople that will cheat y ou 
ifthey had the chance 2 3 4 
139. The Turks do not SLCM Co--OpCTatiVC in other areas 
and this is evidence ofw-hat %ýc can expect in issues 
such as CyPriks and the seabed 1 2 3 4 
139. The Turks are unpredictable 1 2 3 4 5 
140.1'he'l'urks will alwavs take action-., in order to harin 
us 1 2 3 4 5 
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PefSO17al informadon 
'11iis section of' the questionnaire concerrus the disclosure of' pcrsorial 11111017niation. It is important for 
you to answer all the question of this section- We ensure you that all information tl-kit you give in this 
section and all other sections are confidential and thLv will no( be used ['or ariv other reason apart I, roin 
this research. You will not be required to give your name. Please, choose the appropriate answer for 
each ofthe following questions. 
1. You are: 6. Please write here atý), comments about the 
ksues that you were asked to answer in thi. % 
Man Li questionnaire: 
Woman U 
2. Hon, oldareyou; 
3. K%at is your profession? 
4. "ich party iv clover to your political 
orientation? 
LI PASOK 
L3 NevN Democrao, 
LI Communist pariý 
LI Lell Coahtion 
El DIKKI 
U Offia (pletw nanic) 
5. Use the lane topo. vitionyourseifpofidcally. 
L eft Right 
330 
Appendix 2b: study 2 questionnaire Greek version 
Aýyopca lm)pt6of)ý. a NTdx-q icon q jictl)of)oct ýJ)Flwa CLITOTEý,, -i Pýpoý -Eqý 
ýtOl) F-fYyCt(Yi(Ig GTOt 7E; Wi(YI0L '101) 616OLKIOPIKof) [101) (MIN, KOIN'(I)Nlffl kvirxOý. 0yiCt. 
IIXPOWU, ýAb MCWTýGTC gF- 7Eý)OGOXý GUý xotpaKduo F-pwrý(Yctý. Am, wt6il-iXom, GWGTýý 
fl ýAoog CtjEoft, TýCFE1q. Y-Otý ElrXCtpl(YT6) 7EOkf) YICL TO Xj)6V0 K(It Tq 6160F-oý cyotq VOt 
(mýtpadoXar- ac amýv Tq%, tpFi)vct. 
Flctpctic&Tco 6ivorrat ptta mtpd ct7c6 npOT&GFtý. XPIJ(RgO710týGTE: Ttý 6tOtKl)oVGF-K TIK 
RUPCEIC&T(I) Oi[t(XKa,; yta Va &iýCTE; lc6(yo mqupowciTc ý 6ta(4)(, )vciTc p' onyrýq: 
, ýl (upow", 
evroý 1, ra ýl (upow, "m: oop, p", % 
Aev Eivat a; ýýOcta woý 0 K&Ypoý Pclý Yivt', T(lt 6AA) Kat 
7ito txtKiv6inoz xctt Xcxouic6ý. KdOr cxoxý txrt Ta 
npOfikýýL(Mi rqý. 10(l iCY(I Ot M()(M)TqTfl-ý Va (ý(31'-t 
Kavflý IV-, acy(P44,1a Icat Xwpiý Xj-X)P)LIjP(rCa F. IV(lt 
. 2345 nox, 6 ýnto auýllw-, Vrq cmý llaý 
2. An6 (yTtylti'l m-. aTrypi'l ýLicopc. i va ý; nwp(rnjomv X(X0- 
KQI (A'(XpXi(X. T(X 7TdVTQ [ICt; 6FiXVOI)%' Wj), ý (II)TO 
7EOkfj 7[10(IN'o V(I M)Jljiýll 2345 
3. 0 00110ý vivaryrpkoý rxlldwrwvouý av(ý-Xjmol)ý 
ROD fiv(XI ftotItOt Va 001) 1', IEITI', OOI'YV XO)ptý 
CnYyKi'XjX[týVO "0. M(WO X(It ýa)Vo ME6 K(10Wý 
Kcocict. 2345 
4. AV K(Xt Ot QVOKPOJ)ý, (TT11V i-, YKklj[LUTtKoTljT(I CU00- 
6p6w)D; t', iV(ll 16t(XiTEf)(X 61', V 7Ej, )6KlAT(xl'YW 
ývu (PUI%'(')W, -Vo 7rou ýxa al)ýIJWi 1: 61mi mifu: l-)tl M: 
CTXý, Mj P, ". ý KXOXiýý. 2345 
5. AV jcdnotoý 7iaipvFt )uMict; xpoqu)L6#ý dvat 
CTXV, TtIC6[ (17riOCRIO Va TOO M)ýIý. i KdLTI e"50COM AC, 
ýOi)W, Or, LV(XV f. 7CUdV6bVO Kýý110.1 2345 
6. Wf)(l JUý T11 jlý, [)Q OIEO)ý 0 K601107 OW K01 71W 
C. MkiV(%Voý-, Kal (! Vopoý, 11 xI(klVorljr(l VU lUX'Wl 
minot(K of)[La )ajmciaý, a6uciaý ý mc(ýjq mn (hýpi 
(POV01) (IDEQVýJ(ft ()kO K(It 7Ef. Pt0CT(')TEj')O, 2345 
7. 11 CýLnClpia K(Il Tj YV6)(Tq ý&Ol) W, KdVVI V(l 7EIMM')(0 
7E(,. ), - rwfpf: (it., pla fwy(P(Aý Kat tna(k-, Pý Kolvowia 
kal 01 7Ef-, PI(TCT(STC. f)Ol (M)IN)MOt I: iV(lt KaT& IMMI 
ICCE)LOi. 2345 
S. K(i0c, xp6vo 6), o Kat JWWAT. T(ll 0 TOW 
(! V0(X07E(0V IEOV (14iýOIW 7EjI(l'yýl(ITUC('l TO CYC. 1ý1(5ýL6 
ýLcu-. ANTiOFT(I (n)ý(IVC. T(ll 0 UP10116, ý T(0V (TVý01M0V 
(rVOf)(I')n(f)', 'nOl) TOW, IY96). OMODC. 2345 
9. fI qoccipia icat il yv6)ml ýum W, o-voolOxf)m wj)ý o 
k6cypoý paý rival "Kd fmlciv6uvoý Kal 
U71116(W. ICTOC. Ot (14iG; Wt 0 Tf)67CO(; TOW 
CtýtMiN. N6W K(Il IlOtK(i)V (r%'(hKi)MI)V 
fiPiaKOVT(Il CW, KiV61)VO IMI U(P(IVLGýL6 (IX6 TODý 1 2345 
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129.00'of)picot ýXoi)v nokkd coomptK6 npo[P, ý[tavx 
Rol) ýUEOIIO*V V(l (rVC(T&. YOIL)V TTIV 7EOktTtk*fl 
MIT60TO(OT11 otv6 7Ed(Ta mvyýifj dpa ew. [mot)of)W,, va 
PCLCY46ýLCKTTF, c5' ainoi)ý 1 2345 
130.0tToi)p)cot Xjmjmýuyxotoin, ril 6t(i[t(! pj W, T7rV 
F)JA6(l 7E(X)KfA["'Ol) VU MlklýYOIN T(I CMOTCPtK(ý 
rol)ý. 7EP019.1, I[LaTa 1 234S 
131.0t'l'of)f)Kot 6F "upt(tCOI)v ((poliof)vTat, 
IYJEO),, (YyiýoVV) Ttý K147xj)(YIAý ROD (nwv, 7EdYl,, T(It li [ill 2345 
TýPlj" CFI)P(P(I)vt6)V. 
132.0tToopkot r. ivat uvikavot. 34i 
133. Ot Toiýpkot woXi) v. iwoka Oa 6f. 7av ytpara (", am) 
výIM11pr. -to-6c1c. TO mweptw Taoý. 1 2345 
134.0tTof)pKot &x ý401)\'14LRI'Vi(l K(It Yv(ý'()'Il "I 
(1VTt[WT(0Irl(301JV Kf)lalAZ III VU XCVIOIOý)v 611MVII 
7Ej)0[9Jj[tQT(L 34 
135. Ot Toiýpjcot kXouv ýwyaliýv4n) imocsTilptibi a2E6 ri; 
ýWydxzý 61)vdw-tý- 1 234 
136.0t Tof)pKoi &ý (it(IT(f(OAA' VU K(ITQOTjNITIryljMn)V 
KUN'6N'E,, ý- 
61)C(li0l) 7EJ)OMAýýX'Olyv "ll 
7[j)(X-yýtQT07E0tlj(T01)V Tol< (TTOXOU; TOD, 34 
137. Ot Tobf)Kot rivat drv0pomot nou Oa c7ou Til (pý. povv 
W, qv 7EP6)-nl cimutpia. 234 
I 
_18. (h 
Voulwot (ii: (Paivovrat Mwqlpirytpot (TI-I 
TOýWiý ICI (n)T6 civat i-. v6f,. tKTuc6 Tot) Ti [t7Eojx)bW,. va 
7U-, jXpi-A'0VjU-, Ot7EO (n)TOiK 71(l TO Mpa rqý Ki)7Efx)i) 234 
- )C(lt T1117 
139. Ot 1,0*wot f; iv(xt axp6oLexTot. 1 2345 
140. ()tToi)pKot 7E(! -,, T(x Oa 7[poliaivom, (v. cxý. pr. tný nok, 
ýXODV (TT()XO V(X [MC jW'IYOI)V 1 2345 
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AuT6 To Toýta Tou qxorilýLaTo"im) a(pol-)d XPOGO)Xtktý; FiVal MIPORTI)CO Vd 
(x7rCt%'Tij(Tr-TF- crr 64ý Ttý FN)Tf)CFI', tg myrof) Tot) Tpfjpmoký- Na riaTr Iiiliat(va 7E(J)g Ot 7EXIjj, )O(POj, )u-, ý 7rol) 
(iivt,, TF- crr ain6. (5wax- icat cyr 6ka Ta x(xn"o4LLva TýdjpaTa TOD f-, fWj)Tqjl(lTOýA)'YiOl) FAVQL UX6), lYra 
Fqm0, Tn), rllc&: Icat 6E Oa XM(Yt[lo7EO'71()Olbv 7EV6 Yta Tqv KcEPOi)Oct ý, ff-IML ! ý', K%U4 x"4'i7ET0)Cnj (73C, 0(1 
(7FCE,: ý11T-90ri VCt YpdyFTE TO 6VOýLd CYCEý- 1-ta Kd[W Pla CM6 Tlý XCEPCrKdTO) Ef)(J)TýM-tý Mlf)(11((Wi) &(Wý4U, 
TTIV (Im xv"ml nou Tatfitacla CTIMV lrf; rixTomý cyac. 
1. EiaTc: 6. I7W)amea44 7pdVizw 6, n ffX. Gja rZrTr 
07M. 1cci uc Ta Orpara Ktpf) #Taý; Cjz? j0qKl, va 
AvTpa, ý Li axavr*yrir-c aTvo EptoTjpaTtslt;? io. 
YIA'(xiK(l Li 
2. H6iToXpovtbvdaTr, 
3. Hoto chwi ro swd77r-ipd aaq; 
4. Hoto Ktjupa ma-m6cirr xv)q cKIpptiCri 
7rij1piaTepa nq a7r6qmq orm;, 
ci IIAý: OK 
Li NA 
Z] K KE 
ci ý: YNAEIIIEMOý: 
AIIKKI 
AAAO avä(pcpr) 
Elpti(bo-mxtiwoffrIvevOriaxovmxoftrriTrrovzavr6ora4; xo. ZinKd: 
Apia-apa--- --Acýid 
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Appendix 3: study 3 questionnaire English version 
Dear Friend 
I am Spyridoula Ntani and this questionnaire is part of my doctorate research in Social Psychology. The 
completion of this questionnaire takes about 15 minutes. Please, answer the following questions. There are 
no right or wrong answers. Thank you for the time and effort for completing this questionnaire. I hope you 
will enjoy it. 
Imagine a distant planet that is inhabited by many countries. Thargelia and Nardella are two of those. The 
two countries are neighbours. Thargelia and Nardelia are equally powerful countries. The two countries 
are involved in a long lasting conflict. The two countries dispute an area along their boundaries. Both 
countries have claimed the possession and exploitation of this area since many years. Although the two 
countries are not openly at war, the conflict destabilises the area and undermines the development of both 
countries that invest the biggest part of their annual expenses for arm expenditures leaving other important 
sections underdeveloped. The two countries decide to enter in negotiation rounds. 
Imagine that you are a Thargelian and )vu share the feelings and thoughts that the Inhabitants of 
TharqeIA3 have about the outconye of the negobabons Please answer the fig1lowing questlons as a 
1. What in your view is the reason of the conflict: 
much 
The character of Nardellans 12345 
777e politics of 777agelians 12345 
The politics of Natdelians 12345 
, rnteivw&w of bý#dpartiw 12345 
2. How possible is that a solution will be reached: 
3. What do you think is the percentage of the inhabitants of Thargelia that want a solution to the conflict? 
6. The Tbargelians should make more compromises: 
neither agree 
I totally d1sagree I d1sagree neither disagree I qqTe I totally agree 7. 
--12345 
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7. How possible it is for the outcome to be negative for the Thargelians? 
not at all a fittle enough much Vely much 
12345 
8. Even though the outcome will not be positive for the Thargelians in the present, they will have the 
opportunity to benefit more in the future: 
neiffier agree 
I totally d1sagree I d1sagree neither dl-,. Wree I agree I totally 21ree 
12345 
9. In what percentage (e. g. 00/o-50%-50% or 24%-53%-23% etc) you think the following parties 
contributed to the initiation of the negotiations: 
7he 7hargelians 
7he Nardelians ....... 
7he inteff7abbnal commuf Mty ....... 
sum 1000/0 
10. To what extent do you think the Thargelians are in control of the situation. 
not at all a fittAe enough much very much 
12345 
11. How much do you think that the Thargelians trust the Nardelians. 
not at all a lltde enough Inuch vely Inuch 
12345 
12. If the following actions are important to be taken from the Thargelians in order to continue the 
negotiations, how safe would you think it would be for Thargelia to take them: 
not at all a fitde enough much Vefy much 
a. 7he 777aW11; 3ns as an indication of good W11 
wiffidraw their &vops #mn Me dNmded area 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. 777e Thargellans stop any further afm 
expenditurav 1 2 3 4 
C. 7he 7hafgelians Aýrnore pfmocative actons 
taken by the haroLelians that alm to show off ther 1 2 3 4 5 
power 
d. 777e Margellans encourage the co-operabon In 
other areas in order to attenuate the deýree of 
conflkt 1 2 3 4 5 
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Use the following adjectives to describe your country Thargelia. Circle the number to indicate the extent to 
which the following adjectives characterise Thargelia. Thargelia, my country is: 
not at 311 a httfe enough much very much 
1. ProgressIve 2 3 4 5 
2 Democtabc 2 3 4 5 
3. Civillsed 2 3 4 5 
4. Conservative 2 3 4 5 
S. c4atabst 2 3 4 5 
6. Bureaucratic 2 3 4 5 
7. Organised 2 3 4 5 
8. Powerful 2 3 4 5 
9. Gvd in Health, Education, SPOal SWWCeS 2 3 4 5 
10. Respectful of Human RIghts 2 3 4 5 
11. Successful 2 3 4 5 
12. Close to belng a penlect place to live 2 3 4 5 
13. Open to the reception of1mmigfants 2 3 4 5 
Use now the following adjectives to describe the inhabitants of your country Thargellia. Circle the number 
to indicate the extent to which the following adjectives characterise Ove inhabitants of Thargellia. The 
Thargellians are: 
not at aH a fittfe enough much very much 
1. Educated 2 3 4 5 
2. Rellglous 2 3 4 5 
3. Understanding 
4. IndIvIduallstic 
Pollfe 'M F. " 2 3 
6. Independent 
7. Matenalistic 2 3 4 5 
8. AggressIve 2 3 4 5 
9. Self confident 2 3 4 5 
10. Tra&Lý, Ofnvl 2 3 4 5 
11. Cold 2 3 4 5 
12. COMPe17t7Ve 2 3 4 5 
13. Co-opera&ve 
14. Organ1sed 
15. Unfnendly 
16. Sociable 2 3 4 5 
17. Tolerant 
18, Ambitious 
19. Family onented 
20. Hosoltable 
21. Demociatfe 
22. hard-worlang 
23. Successful -7- 2 3 4 5 
24. Trustworthy 
25. Wffi a sense of honour 
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Desaipion of NA RDELL4 and its inhabitants 
Use the fbilowing adjectives tD describe Nardelia. Circle the number to indicate the extent to which your 
believe that the fbIlowing adjectives characterise Nardellia. Nardelia is: 
not at all a little enough much very much 
1. Progressive 2 3 4 5 
2. Democrat7c 2 3 4 5 
3. OvIllsed 
4. Conservatwe 2 3 4 5 
5. capitala 2 3 4 5 
6. Btire3tiCrd&C 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Organised 2 3 4 5 
8. Powerful 2 3 4 5 
9. Goodin Health, Educa&on, Swat saroces 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Respectful of Human Rights 2 3 4 5 
ill Successful 2 3 4 5 
12. Close to being a perfect place to live 2 3 4 5 
13. Open to the receptron of Immigrantg 2 3 4 5 
Use now the following adjectives to describe the inhabitants of Nardelia. Circle the number to indicate the 
extent to which you believe that the following adjectives characterise the inhabitants of Nardellia. The 
Nardellians are: 
not at all a little enough much very much 
I. Educated 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Religious 2 3 4 5 
3. ufxýerstandlng 
4. Indl v1duallsbc 
5. Polite 2 3 4 5 
6. Independent 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Matenallstic 3 4 5 
8. Aggressive 2 3 4 5 
9. Self confident "MOR, M- 2 3 4 5 
. 10. Tradmondl 3 4 5 
11. Cold 3 4 5 
12. COMPet7t7Ve 3 4 5 
13, co-Operative 
ýjwaj 
wx 2 3 4 5 
14. Organtsed 2 3 4 5 
15. Unfnendly W 1 2 3 4 5 
16. 56clable 
17. Tolerant 
18. Ambit7ous 
19. Family onented 2 3 4 5 
20. Hospitable 2 3 4 5 
21, Democratic 2 3 4 5 
22, Hard-wor*tng 
23. Successful 
24. Trustwotthy 
25. WIth a sense of honour 3 5 
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There are many reasons that make some of the inhabitants of Thargelia to feel insecurity about the 
outcome of the negotiations. Some of these follow in this section. Please, circle the number that matches 
your opinion using the variation of the scale given, in order to show how far the following factors would 
make you, as a Thargelian to be insecure about the fact that your country enters in negotiations with 
Nardelia: 
not at all a fittle enough much very much 
1. The NamL-Aans do not Seow willh9g to Pevl-c-e 
their positbns and withdraw some of their 
demands 12345 
2. The Nardelians 4nore Me ULCe and continue 
to be aggressive and to demonstrate &A-ir 
power 12345 
3. The Nardelians are unctv&ed so one cannot 
be sure what to expect from them. 12345 
4. The Nardellans do not keep the dgreen? entS 
they have signed with other countries so we 
do not have reasons to believe that thev will 
keeo their agrearnents now 
12345 
5 777e Nardelkms vOlate basic human riýghts so 
we cannot expect anything better from them 
in blie intemationalaffaits 12345 
6. 777e Nal-auians will always take "lons in 
order to harm us 2345 
7. The hardel5ar is are u1pedktabk 12345 
8 The filandelians do not -seem to be co- 
operative In other areas and that Is evidence 
of what we can expect from them now 12345 
9 7he Nardelians are the kind of people that 
will cheat You if ffiey have blx-- chance 2345 
10. 7he Nardellins do not hesitate to break fvIes 
of intemational law in order to achieve their 
goals 12345 
11, 7he hardelians have more SuPpOrt fn7fn the 
big powers 2345 
12. The Nardelians have many intemdlPrOblems 
that can change ffieoolitical s1tuation In the 
country so we cannot rely on them 12345 
13, 7he Narde1jins do not have Me experience 
and the knowledge to conftibute effidýendy 
to the f esolution of Me alýý 1234S 
14. The hardellans would lie vary easIly to 
saWy their own Interests 12345 
15. 777e hardelians are tsekss 12345 
16 The NardeIA3ns are not afraid of any 
sanctions if they do not keep the agreements 12345 
17 The Nal-afelijns use ffie aigis in order to 
soAee internal prubkYns 345 
18. The political leaders of Nardelia are 
incapable of IbIlowing a consistent polky SO 
we cannot be sure that bFA-y will live up to 
Me,,, - 
12345 
144 3 
Alow amwer the followng qLestions 
2. What do you think makes Thargelia powerful? 
not at all a fittle enough much very much 
Its army 2 3 4 5 
Its strategIc geographIcal posloon 2 3 4 5 
Its pokbcal orgaf Wsadon 2 3 4 5 
Its fact that its votce In Internabonal organ1sabons Is 
powerful 2 3 4 5 
Its economy 1 2 3 4 5 
ILS Culture 1 2 3 4 5 
Its populabon oLonsýty 
, -JEW" 
1 2 3 5 
The support it has from big povers 1 2 3 4 5 
The solidarity amongst its inhabitants 
3. What do you think makes Nardelia powerful? 
not at all a fittle enough much very much 
Its &7W 1 2 3 4 5 
Its strategic geographtcal position 1 2 3 4 5 
Its political organisadon 1 2 3 4 5 
its fact that Its volce In internat7onal organ1sabors Is 
powerful 1 2 3 4 5 
ltsý economy 2 3 4 5 
Its culture 4 5 
its populabon density I, 
I MMI 2 3 4 5 
777, - suopovt it has from big powers 2 3 4 5 
The sofidanty amongst & Inhabdants 2 3 4 5 
4. How long you think the conflict exists? 
5. To what extent you think you answered as Thargelian? 
6. Which countries do you think 
are similar to Thargelia as it 
is described in the text? Can 
you think of at least three 
countries? 
7. Which countries do you think 
are similar to Nardelia as it is 
described in the text? Can 
you think of at least three 
3. 
8. Does the description 
resembles any relationship 
between countries you know? 
Can you give some 
examples? 
b. 
C. 
b. 
c 
1. 
c 
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Personal questions 
This part of the questionnaire concerns personal information. It is important to answer all the questions of 
this part. Be sure that the information you disclose in this section, as in all sections before, are confidential 
and they will not be used for any other purpose apart from this research. For each of the following 
questions chose or write the appropriate answer: 
1. You are: 6. Do you belong to any ethnic group? ff 
yes please state: 
man Ll 
woman Ll 
2 Howoldareyou7 Z Are you a british citizen? ff not what is 
your nationality? 
3. What do you study? 
4. Which political paity expresses your 
opinions at best? 8. please wfite here any commentF yo 
Li Labour 
ij Conservative 
u Liberal democrats 
Lj Other (please specify) 
5. Did you rind the questionnaire 
interesting? 
Lj Not at all 
L3 A little 
L3 Enough 
Lj Much 
U Very much 
ha ve concerning the issues you were 
asked to discuss in this questionnaire: 
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Appendix 3b: study 3 questionnaire Greek version 
Ayonqý (piArVE 
AiMpal Inupl6bt)Aa NTijvl7 Kal t7 napot)oa E; ocuva anoTEAcil qE uv 77K4,; ou Ep ia nAolo, XPO; rq PE 17 P YOu 1; CTO /0 
TOU L5150KrOPIKOO J"U 0777v KoIVOJVIK[7 WU)(oAoy7a -v76Xo<, 77K Elval j7 KaTapol7o77 Twv oXraEtov aval-ima ac 
Kpa777 H cu1jnAi7p&uq Tou FpwT77jjaroAoy7ou anarm yvpw uTo 15 AcnTa napaKa4w anavqpE pE npooro)(17 
UTIIý napaK&a) EPWTf)9, cA;. AEV Ufl6, O)tOUV awaTt(- 4 Adgoý, amv77)avC. IE Eu , yaplanb y1a To Xmvo Kal Ttj 
, 5160tO ovu va cq4irTaoXvý- or auri7v mv cpcuva EAnKw va 7nflpck amnjoono 
4)CIVTdCFOU tVCIV PCJKPrV6 I-IXCIVIýTQ rlOU KOTOIKEiTOI ar16 6io(popE: q X(opF-q. H OapyqAiO Kai q NapbqXia Eivai 66o 
an6 auTtq. 01 66o X6)pEq ouvopEOouv aTo X6pTq. H E)op"ia Kai 9 Napbilxio Eivoi To i6to ioXupic. (., )q 
x6pEq. 01 (56o x6pF-q Ppioxovroi cyE pa"xp6via piýkrj. H pi)krl EoTkKEToi y6pw On6 TFJV OP(PIOPl)TQ(Yq PlOq 
nF-pioXi)q oTo E60(PlKd 06VOPO RAW 660 X(OP6V rIOU Q K(TrOA Kai okionoil`10ý Trjq? AEK61KEiTOI Kai on6 Tlý 660 
X6VEq EbCd KGi nokA6 xp6v, a. nop6xo nou oi 6t)o x(i)pEq 6EV Opi(YKOVTOI GFE OVOr, (Tl) (16PPOkrl, rl pl)krj 
anouuvmvýEi 6Aq Tqv nEPK)Xl) Kai unoO6, knEl Tqv avdnTUkrl T(L)V 660 XWp6v noU ý06EOOUV TO PEYOXOTEPO 
ptpoq Tou ETi)(Tiou npoonoAoyiapo6 Touq ra Tov EkonXiolj6 Touq cKpovovToq 6XAOUC,, (jilpaVTIK06q TOPEiq GE 
unoavdrrrukq. 01660 X6)pEq GrICKPQGýOUV va PPOUV PIO A60`11 OrTq plýkq Kai kEKIVOýN (51(lrlpOYPOTEUTIK06q 
yopmq. 
OaV7VOVU IMAK --mul 04pyfjAMC KG1 OUWPIýEaal ToK npqflArVt7T1qpoL< nou vxoOouv ol Ka7olKol T77( 
00poi0( OXCTIKä IJE T, 7V iKfl0077 rWV &af7paW07-et)Ucwv 17apaKoA(i) af7aVTOUC OT/( 17t7paKÜT(, t) 'PWT170'-ri( 
AK Kä7»OIKK nx eaoY-7AiOd; -' 
flou nloT£üElg äT1 wFiÄ£Tol f) PAFA-' 
noAb Ai>V Aiyo 0, OK£TÖ noAb näpo noALý 
-rro, yapax7ýpa 7wv eapy77Äkew 12 345 
1To; (opaK7ýpa Ta)v Nopt5t7Äki)v 12 345 
IMV noÄmKj Twv oapKßkov mw 12 345 
ITi7 v noÄ / Twý Tw v Nap&ß ki) v12 345 
Im v napipßüm "v XWPW v12 345 
2. nü)g oýioÄoyEiý Tqv nfoavöTqTo va ßpF-G£i pia Äüaq: 
00/0 25% 50% 750/6 100% 
3. FIOIO nIOTEÜElg äVGITO n0000T6 TWV KOTOiKWV Tqg Oap"iaý nou etA ouv va F-nfÄu0F-i q p«q; 
(r/b 25% 50% 7511/o 100% 
4. noionioTEüF-ig Eivoi To re000TÖ TWV KOTOWWV Tqý Nopöq, \ioý nou 0tAouv va i: niÄu0F-i q p«q; 
00/0 25% 50% 75% 100% 
5.01 Napör! lAioi (XPEMUV VO KÜVOUV nF-piaaäTEpF-ý unoXwprýoF-iý: 
OüTE Uuwwvüý 
ýývaýanöÄuro gLO£Wvüwý oürc öLoywvüý u wvaý -ýPwv(ý 
anöAUTO 
1234 5 
147 
6.01 OOPYFýÄIDI 0gEiAOUV VO Kävouv nF-pioa6TF-pF-g unoXwpfptw,: 
oüTE uuU4PWV4b 
ýýw vw ar7öÄ uTo i51wwvw oö Tzc 610ýpw vaý oupgwvü) uuWwvüý anöAuTo 
7--- 12345 
7. rlöao niGovö nurF-üF-ig F-ivai To anoTtAF-opa vo F-ivat F-ig ßäpor, Twv GopyrlÄkov; 
n0A Ö Aiyo AiýV OPK£TÖ noA0 
--2T0 
noAu 
12345 771 
8. KJ OV OKÖpq q GapyrIXio PYFEJ QIPKOPLVFI OTO nOPÖV 00 t)(£l TqV EUKülpi0 VO KEpäiaEi n£picrcröTtpo aTo 
ptÄAOV: 
OüTE OUU(PWVüý 
anöAUT0 
34 
9. YLE Ti noaoaT6 (n. X. 0%-500/o-500/o A 24%-53%-230/0 K. T. Ä. ) nio-nüaý auvtßoÄov oTo va opXicrouv oi 
öionp(IYPCITEÜ(JEIý; 
01 6ýapyýÄloi 
....... 
01 Nap»loi 
....... 
H 6icOvý<, Koivö7777-a ....... 
60polmo 100% 
10. Kcrr6 n6oo nion6aq oi OapyýAioi tXOUV TOV tAEYXO TQq KOT60TOGnq; 
noA6 Ai Aýý OPKIETO noAu f 76po noA 6 
12345 
11. n6cro nicrrE6EIq E4jnicrrE60VTOI 01 GOPAX101 Tour, Nop&ýAiouiq; 
nOA0 Aý2 Aiyv gaý noA 6 ndpa noA t; 
12345 
12. Av oi napaK6TW EVtpyElEq OE(t)PWVTOV GnPOVTIKLý YIO Tn (YUVtXlCfq TWV bionpaypaTEOGEwv n6Go 
aaWAic, niaTEOEiý Oo qTov yio -rq OopyrIXio vo npoXWý(Ya cr'ou-rtq: 
ROAÖ AiV0 
0.01 Lýý»PYIÄ/01 (LK ýV&et7 Kt7Ä17ý' OiýAIIOTK 
Of70UUPOUV 7-0 OTpaTö TOU( anö mv 
aIJ(P'Oß, 7 rOÜIJcv17 17C, 010, r) 1 
P. 0/ 616prtk4Acv f70wvOvv 714- 7-Oil<- UZ 
vio EýonÄioliö 1 
y 01 eappýAVI rßcpo, 6Äitxxv enA5eize, < 6thqjfK 
nou yivovTai ono ny nAcupa Twv Nap6fMAwv 1 
6.01 OapyýAIOI EV190, OPÜVOUV TT7 UUVrpyt707ý7 UE 
ÖÄÄOU( TCýKi( 17pOKEIIJCVOU VO PCKWOUV TOV 
EVT0U17 TWP«IN 1 
Aiyo a. PKETtj noA6 n6pa noALý 
4 
234 
234 
3 
349 
gcpiypoq4 r« OAPMAL41 Arat Ywv iraWaaw r« 1 
XP#7U#10f70U7OLr TO nOßGKOTW C/7i0, 'Tt7 Y" Va ncpiypowcK T77)«, 4w oov, m eapyj7Äia. KÜKA(i)Ut TOV 47P/Oýý 
nou avnuToorei uM yvüV, 7 oou pa To Kam nooo KöOc cm ano -ro ei7i0c7-a)(apaxTqpiýouv n7 eapro'Aiia. H 
, Yü)PO, V0u 17 
e0, OYfßi0, C/VOI. * 
floAt; Aiyo Airo OPKET6 noAt; mipa aoAt; 
1. npOOLTCtMK4 2 3 4 5 
2. J17, UOKPOWý 
3. noA1770; "17 3 4 5 
4. -Suv'MP1777Ký 3 4 5 
5. Konff"077KO 2 3 4 5 
6. rpO(POOKPG77Ký 2 3 4 5 
7 OPWVWPZV17 2 3 4 5 
8. AUVG7ý 2 3 4 5 
9. W KOAd K&VWWO, -cl(fAQYJCUnK# KOI 
UYDOVOPIK4 Opý&&)M 2 3 4 5 
10. 
-rZ#cTal To avL9p&)nlvu JtKala)pow 2 3 4 5 
11. EninlXlylevq 2 3 4 5 
12. lXc&v &a 15ovIK6 pZpaý va ýD KavDý 2 3 4 5 
1.?. 2 3 4 5 
X)017Ull»f701gUC TWPO TO nOpaKO7W "7i0CM YW Vt7 [WPI)MIXK TOUdý KL7TO1K0L4dý TIK j«Le00ý* UOU TIK 
eapy4AitK KüKAwue Tov apioljö nov avTuwij(ei u777 ywÄiu, 7 uou y" To KaTo nooo KäOe iva anö To enjOeTa 
)(t7paKT77piýOUV TOUý'Kt7TO1KOW M( e0,0y0Aig7dr 01 e0,0r4A1Olf £tVI7I. ' 
nok; Aiyo Aiyo OPKE71i iyok; n6pa noAt; 
1. /bAnxViva 2 3 4 5 
2. Qp17crKEu61jrvo1 2 3 4 5 
3. EXOUV KOTOV61M 2 3 4 5 
4. ATOulurZ4- 2 3 4 5 
5. EUYEWKO( 2 3 4 5 
6. A vEýdp Ti7 Tol 2 3 4 5 
7. YAla* 
S. EUEZVM01 5 
9, E)(ouv niar, 7 ON JUVdWC TOK 2 3 4 5 
10, Eival nloToi uný napoMoa; ToK 2 3 4 5 
11. 2 3 4 5 
12. A vrayw vto-nKoi 2 3 4 5 
13. -FUV4OydO7W 2 3 4 5 
14. OPYGVWnKOi 2 3 4 5 
15. EX60ixd 
16. Kol vw vlKoi 2 3 4 5 
17. A vDmKd 
18. 3 4 5 
19. KoAdomoyrva6p)(g, 3 4 5 
20. (PA64vot 2 3 4 5 
21. AnUOK&rnKa 
22. EOY077KOl' 3 4 5 
23. Ent7uMAdm 
,I 
ARM 3 4 5 
24. Aool 4jn1cwcOvrK 2 3 4 5 
25. OIA677pvl 1 2 3 4 5 
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XP, 7U#Jonoi17uc TO rAapal(aTw EMOCTO YV va fgEpWpt7WEK M Nap67A1a KÜKAwut TOV 6PO/JÖ ROU aVT1070«CI 
OM VVWP'700u)qa TO KaTaf70UOKÜOC£Vaaf70 TaC, 7i0eTa)(apaK777pKouv T, 7 NapOi7Aia. HN«pJqAio, eival 
f(i)pa-. 
noAt; Airo Airo apxerci noAt; adpa noki 
1. npoo&LmKo 2 3 4 5 
2. JIPOKOGTIKý 2 3 4 5 
3. nownop&q 2 3 4 5 
4. FUV'rq, 0,777Ký 2 3 4 5 
5. KonjlrOkanKo 2 3 4 5 
6. I-POWIOKPOVKý 2 3 4 5 
7. OPYOvwjuZvl7 2 3 4 5 
8. AUVO7ý 2 3 4 5 
9. Me Ko, 44 Kolvwvmý, Emal&ntmKo Kai 
UWOVOUIKý Cpy6VW077 1 2 3 4 5 
10. LeficTal To avOpu)n1vo, 51Ka1tbuaTo 2 3 4 5 
11. En1nX, 7pivfj 2 3 4 5 
12. FVE66VZVGIJOVIKOIJZP04ýVOýVKGVEIý 2 3 4 5 
13. AioAr4orflvvnoJo)(dperovoortiýv 2 3 4 5 
Xp17u11"noi17oE 7WPG M f7OpaKa7W EMOCTO W Va MplypaWIC TWý Ke7701KOU( Tip; NqpJ, 7AW. KOKA(da, ' 
Tov oplolj6 nou amarol)(cl o7i7 yvwpl7 ovu y/a To KaTa nooo KdOc cm ano Ta EniO, -Ta)(apaKTj7piCouv Touc 
K19TO&OUI; T771; NOPJJ7AAMq. Of NapJdAiot civar 
noAi; Aiyo Aiyo OPKET6 noki n6pa iyok; 
1. /70A/77OP44M 2 3 4 5 
2. l9pl7CKCU61JEVO1 2 3 4 5 
3. EXOUV KGTOV6rjM 2 3 4 5 
4. A ToploTZ4ý 2 3 4 5 
5. EUYEVIKOi mm, M-" 2 3 4 5 
6. A vcý6p 7 77 Tot 2 3 4 5 
7. YAlOT14* 2 3 4 5 
8. EUCýfarMOI 2 3 4 5 
9. Exouvn1an7ong; &vqýroW 
10. Eivol nlomio, 774ýnopaMmý rot< 2 3 4 5 
11. wu%pa 
AAI 2 3 4 5 
12. AvraywvfOT7KOi 2 3 4 s 
14. OpyovwrIKoi 
16. KolvwvlKoi 
17, AV&MKO( 
18. OIAWOI 
19. KGAoi OIKOYCVDOP)(-rq 
20. OIAAýývot 
21. df2WKOOnKOi 
22. Epyt777KOi 
23. nlTu E xqpim "qm I 
MR. 
24. Aoot 4unlcmmývfK 
25. OM677pol 
)50 
YnapA-ouv na4Aol AoWl nou 1covouv KanoAoK and 7oK KanwoK 77K OapyqA/CK va vKboouv avocroArla y1a 
Mv tK#ooi7 7wv i5lanpoypoTEOmov [4wK67w AkoovTal Kamm an' auroK KikAwuE Tov aplopu nou 
GVT1070orCl 0777 YPWIJ17 OVU)(PW#-VW1WVTOIý 7K l5X7KLfA6Mk TrK KAWKaý- nou &vrral, pa va &iýviý noao ol 
napaKano nQpO? t? V7; f7ý' Oa ! KOVOV W&O (A C OORVIjAJO Va #AAAEJIý' OPV)7 T7K6 T77 V EiGOJO 7-17iý )(Oýoa( OOU TC 7) 
OapMAia,; GTliý Janpaypomucanc 
170AÜ Äiy0 AiYO apAtE7-ä 170AÜ RäpO 170AÜ 
1. 0/ Nap»fol & ý"v0VW1 i51aTtofjpiva VO 
avaotwm0ouv -ri( ozoaý rový- Kai mg Kövouv 
Uf70)(WP4Otl( 12345 
2 01 NapöýAioi icaTonaTouv Mv cKcfupeia Kai 
UUVC)(1ýOUV TK /7pOKAt/0rEK K(71 ERA5Ei&tý' 
6ÜV(7, Uo( 12345 
3 OV Nap3ýÄiot eivoi anoÄino-rot Kai )i' auro 
&v pnopei va neppim Kam( rinoTo KaAti 
an'auToüý- 12345 
4. 01 NapöýAioi Jev Mpoi)v uuplxwvit( nou 
i)(ouv unoypöWct pe äMeý-)(4oed; erAquiwi< 
i5ev i , YOUPC 
AÖYV VO 17UTiqVUVf n(LK 00 
TJ7Pýoouv n; 0, UU(Ptov'; 5ý; TüýOO 
123 
5 01 NOP61Ä101 170paß«OUV 07Vor£KÄ5,7 
(7V0p(i)niV0 451K0K41t7T17 OPO &V jUMPCI V(7 
17C, OIIICVCI KL7VCli; Kffl KMilrep0 0n0 i7UrOi, 14; 
OTO LYK0V4 07nylaTt7 
1234 
6 01 NapMÄioi növra oa npoßgivouv ae 
evi, oycieý- nou i)(ouv uav o7rýre va pg- 12345 ßÄüqvuv 
7. 01 Nap»vi eivat ai7MMtffwt 12345 
8 Ot NapMÄloi & (XiVOVTt71 0rUV40V0U4U01 Org- 
ÜÄÄOU( TOPEI( KI OUTO EIVt71 CV&-IKTIKO TOU TI 
, Ul70,00UJJ, r VO nE, 011JEVOUIJE an0 OUTOLO( Tü)pa 
9 01 Ni7pMAiot effli ävopwm mu Oa om n7 
eCýOWV PE 777 Vf 7p(, ÜT#7 EL«t7$9i0 124 
10. 01 NapöjAýoi &- öiur«ouv vo 
K(7Tt7OTPUMYýUOUV KOVÖVCý'(51C0VO« &K0iOU 
17P0KEIPEVOU VO 17payP0T0nO1I7UOUV rOUý- 12345 
UTö)(0u( Tou( 
ll. 01 lvqo&Mioi e»Xjv PE)uAülwo linour40v(0 
anö TKP£Yiiie( i5L41dyleK 12345 
12, 0/ Nap6ýÄioi iyouv t7oÄAö eutorepiKö 
17"ÄýpuTa nou jinopei VO L7VO7PZWUV T#7V 
170ÄfriKý KOrt7UTt7077 aVä /7äU(7 U77yp17 OPO 
1234 
d5EV 1J17qPOUU, - Vt7 flOUIýÖlJa0TE U, - OU TOUAý 
13. 01 NOP64Ä101 JEV g; (OUV r17V C1JnCipb Kal M 
YVÜýM VO U£1146äÄOUV 07-OV 0W7-i£4e0pOnKj 
L7VTIJJ£7ýýf 7ffl UK KOTÖOTOUtK 
12345 
14. 01 NapöýÄjoi noÄü ei)KoÄa Oa ýÄcyav W4ua7-a 
av auTö -ýun17peTot)ore TO uupg*ov TOW 12345 
15. 01 IVOP»101 C/Vt7/ 0V1M7V01 12345 
16. 01 NapöýAioi Je (poßoüvTai Ti( Kuptbui( nou 
UUVEI7ÖYETt7117 Pf7 Tý, 0170-9 Tü)v UUP9WVK£ýv 12345 
17 01 Nap6fßioi ypi7o7l»i7oioüv n7 Mýq 
n, ooiccipiwu va avT4U£Mwßuouv cowwp«a 
RpOßÄtilOTt7 
12345 
18. H noÄ frxý 7yco7ig T, 7ý- Nap&Mjä( cival 
L7V1K0V9 VO OKOÄOUOI)OEJ IJIO OTOOCM 
/WÄ fTIK17 ei7opcva< JEV linopoupe va E#JOOTE 
UIYVU, 001 R«' 00 (7VrOf7Effl0OUV Oln( 12345 
uflo, ypcüýUCK Tou( 
3) 1 
Anovrl7cE T&W oný nopoKorw Epw T17oDC. 
1. rl6m 6uvwý niamkiý F-ivoi, 
o. q E)opyqAia: 
noA i) n6pa noký noA6 Aiyo AýJjq 9PKýT 
2345 
n Nop6rlAio: 
noA 6 A4V noA Lý ETO- noAt; G 
345 
2. -ri vopiýpq aupMAXEi aTq 56vapq qq OapynAiaQ 
noAO AiW Aiw OPKET6 
0 OTPaToc MC 23 
H C-rpGTi7y7Kj T17<&eM 23 
To 6TI 0 A6yK n7qiXEI IcXO o-n4; 451EOvEA; opWv6m4ý 1 
MAL) 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
ndpo noAi) 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
3.1-1 vopi4iý aupMAAEj a-rq 66vapq Tqq NapbqAiaq; 
noAi) Aiyo Aiyo OPKETd 
* arpar6,; TIN 
'k 2 3 * arpoTqymo Tqý- Wcq 2 3 
* na4l 77K4 r/7o; opydvwal7 1 2 3 
To dn o Myaý ripýtXv 1c)(0 cnýJIEOvvýopWv4ýmý 1 2 3 
H olKo voplo n7C 2 3 
0 noknoý* r/74; 2 3 
To ycW voC 6n dvol nuKvvKo roiK, 7jdv, 7 2 3 
To 6n unoowpi4ý-Tal an6 dAAEý-, 5uvquE1(- 1 2 3 
TO J77 WOWEI GMIM4*7 Ov6AA= OWK XOIaKOK Mý 1 2 3 
noA6 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
ndpo noAi) 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4. noia nion-6aq Eivai Q 616PKEIO TnC PeMq 
I Xp6voq 5 Xp6via 15 Xp6via 30 Xp6via >50 Xp6vta 
5. KaTd n6oo nicyn-6@q nwq an6v-rqaEq oTiq napandvw EpwTýaaq wq OopyýAioc; 
0% 25% 500/0 75% 1000/0 1 
6. MnopEiq vo GKE(PTEiq TPCIý 7. mnopEk vo CFKEqMk TPFEIý 8. You Oupýv n nopanbvfj) 
X6VF-q nou va TOIPOýOUV X6VFq nOU VO TOIPI6(OUV nEplyplao TQ ClXt(YQ Kdnoiwv 
aTQv nEpiypoO Tnq OTIJV nEplypCKPý Tflq xw*v; noKov; OapyrlAiaq; Nap&jAioý; 
a. 
, 6. . 
8. A 
Y. Y. Y. 
)52 
)POOWIFIxil; EPW 771oriv 
AuT6 TO TPýPO TOU EP(L)Tnparokoyiou a(popd npoa(, )nlKtq nAnp(xpopiEq. Eivai GnPOVTIK6 va anavTq, (niý OE 
6AEý Tlý EPWTýCTElq OUT06 Tou Tpýpa-roq. No ciaoi fkpoooq nwý oi nkrlpo(popiF-q nou 6ivEiq aE ouT6,6f)Wq KOI 
(YE 6AO To npOnyO6pEVO TPýPOTO TOU EPWTnPO'TOAOYiOU F-ivoi on6)iuTo EpniOTEUTIKtq Kol 6F- 00 
XpncyiponoirlOo6v nopd y)a Tnv riopo6oa tpEUVO. Y-E KOpi6 nEpin-rtwq 6E Oa GOU WQOEi Va YpdtpElq TO 
6vopd crou. rIO K60E pia on6 flý nOPOK6TW EPWTAOEIý MPOKaký 616AEkE TQV oMv-rrpr) rIOU TOipidýEi oTQV 
mpiwwaý cyou. 
1. Eidal: 7. flapaKaAa) yp6qjE 6, Ti oX6kiy -c , 
Xv4; 
OXETIK0 JIC M 49ipiYTd7 ROM 0'01/ 
Av-rpaq Li (qTJj8qK-- va 0170VTj0Vq aro 
FuvaiK0 Ll EPWT, 71WlToA6y7o- 
2 1l6oroXpovt; )vEiorai; 
3. ri anou6d, (vog 
Tpýpa: 
4 17oio avoi To cnoyyEAlia Twv yoviwv 
aou; 
MnTtp(]: 
nOTtpaý: 
5 17olO KOP110 1710TCUE14ý 17W4; EK(PpdCEI 
IYA 17piOTEPO Tloq 01761PEIC aOU; 
6.1760ro cvcvlavipov . 
804KCC To 
EPWTIjYOTOA6YIO; 
o Ka06Aou 
Ll MtTPIO 
0 APKET6 
u nox6 
35) 
Appendix 3c: study 3 questionnaire Turkish version 
Merhaba! 
Ben Ernre Ozgen ve bu anket ýalqnasi Sosyal Psikoloji alaninda yaptjoim doktDra ara5tirTnamin bir 
parýasidir. Anketi doldurmak yakla5ik 15 dakika sijrmektedir. L(Afen a5aoidaki sorulan cevaplandinniz. 
Bu sorulann do§ru veya yanli§ cevaplan yoktur. Bu anketi doldurmaya zaman ayirdiginiz ve i; aba 
gbsterdiýiniz iýin be5ekkijr ederim. Umarim siz de zevk duyamniz. A54idaki bolumde, venlen ifadelere 
katilip katimadioiroza karar vermeniz isterimektechr. LUtfen terahinize uyan rakarni daire igne aliniz. 
Lutfen, Ttwgelya ve Nardelya adlanndaki iki hayalt tike araqndakl &Ailen adatan apOdakl meft 
okuyunto. - 
Ozerinde birpl< ulkenin vatanda§larjrun Va. 5adjoi uzakta bir gezegen hayal edin. Thargelya ve Nardelya 
bu ulkelerclen ikisi olsun. Bu iki Olke birbirlerine kom! 5LAur. Thargelya, Nardelyadan daha gOigifid0r. 
Bu iki Olke son zamanlarda bir anla! 5mazlioa cltjýrntj§tur. Iki ulke, smirclaki topraklarin bir kisminda 
anla5mazlik ya5amaktadir. Ikisi de bu topraklann mulkiyetim ve kullanimmi talep etmektedir. Bu iki bike 
aýikýa sava5 halincle olmasalar da, bu ania5mazlik, s6z kc"usu topraklarda huzursuzluk yaratmakta ve 
her iki bike de yillik har-camalannin bCiy(jk bolumunu silah harcamalanna ayinp di6er onemli alanlarin 
geli5mesini g6z ardi ettioi ion kalkinamamaktadir. Bu iki bike mOzakere turlan ba5latmaya karar venr. 
Bir Margelyall oAafq&4vmzu ve Inwakerelerden pkacak sofxtý71ar de Mph olarak 777argelya 
vatanda, 51annIn duygu ve ak*uncelenry paýfttr#lfvo hayal ed1n Luffien, aWldakl sordan blr 
Thargelyak olarak cevaplandlnn: 
1. Sizce anla5mazliklann nedeni nedir? 
hlý- blraz yeten kadar (Ok (ok fazla 
Thafgelyalllann karakttyi 12345 
lVardelyall1arIn karakten 12345 
TtAwgelyalllann polinka-9 12345 
NardelyahlarIn polltikasl 12345 
lVuncu partilenn m&dahalesl 12345 
2. Bir ýbz(jme ula5ilmasi olasfliýi nedir? 
0/00 %25 %50 %75 %100 
3. Sizce Thargelya vatandaVannn yuzde kNi anlaýazhoin bir ýbztjrne kavu5masirv isbyor? 
%0 %25 %W %75 %100 i 
4. Sizce Nardelya vatanclaýanmn yUzde kag anla5mazlioin bir gbzCjme kavLr4masin istiyor? 
1 %0 %25 %50 %75 %100 
5. Nardelyalilann daha uzlaýaa olmalan gerekir: 
ne katlliyorum 
kesInlikle katllmlyorum kablmowum ne k. ýum katiliyorum kesInfikle katdlyorum 
12345 
6. Thargelyalilann daha uzlaýrnaci olmalan gerekir: 
ne katdlyorum 
kesinllkle katllmlyorum kablmlyorum ne katAfrayorum kabllyorum ke-slnllkle 
2345 
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7. Sonucun Thargelyalilann alehne olma olasiliÜi nedir: 
ýý az ihbrwlie buyuk AbtwIle 
kesinlikfe olaiwz olabilir olabilir 01abilir kesinlikle olir 
12345 
8. Sonuý §u an pn Thargelyatilann lehine geli§meyecek olsa da, Thargelyaltlar gelecekte daha KazanýIi 
ýikacaklar: 
ne kaNyorum 
kesinlikle katllmiyorum katilmiyorLm ne katilnvyorum kathyoran kesinlikie katiliyorum 
12345i 
9. Asaoidaki taraflann, m(rakerelenn ba5latilmasina y(jzde kaý (Orn. O/oO-%50-%50 veya %24-%53- 
%23 gibi) katkilan olduounu du§unOyorsunuz: 
Thargelyablar ....... 
Nardelyablar 
Uluslararasl tvplduk ....... 
Top(am %100 
10. Durumun ne 61ýude Thargelyaltiann kontrolonde olduounu du§(jnuyorsunuz: 
Ný blraz yeten kadar pk pok buyuk o1gude 
12345 
11. Thargelyal flarin Nardelyalilara ne kadar guvendioini dij! 50"orsunuz? 
hig blraz yrý kadar gok gok faz1a 
12345 
12. Asaoida belirblen adimlarin, Thargelyablann muzakerelere devam edebilmden iýin onemli adimlar 
olduou dOýOnUlOrse, Thargelyablann bu adimlan atmalarirmn kendilen iýin ne kadar gmenh olduounu 
&ýOnijyorsunuz: 
a. Thargelyablann, lyt rwyederinin g6s&mXsi olarak 
anlaýFmazllk yapnan bcilgeden askefientw 
b. Thargelyablann daha faz1a s1lah harcamasl 
, vapmayl 
dLrdurmasl 
c. Thargelyalllann, Nardelyalilann kiAroci gijý 
gostenlenni gormezden gdmesi 
d. Thargelyalllann ý, atsmaan boyutunii hafiftetrnek 
amacl ile dijer alanlarda da iibirlilint te, 9v7k eünesi 
blraz yeten kadar pk pk faz1a 
2345 
4 
4 
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THARGELYAW17 M Vatandd Vlatyntn #ze#iArAwf 
Olkeniz Thargelyalyi tanimlamak iýin lutfL-n a5a§idaki sifatlardan yararlar-or-oz. Thargelya'nin bu sifatlan 
ne 61gude ta§idj§jrv gostermek ion uygun g6rdU§ijnOz rakami daire i igine aliniz. Benim ulkem Thargelya; 
hlý blraz yeten kadar pk pk faz1a 
1. Kalklnfmkta olan 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Defwkr, 3tlk 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Medem 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Tutucu 1 2 3 4 5 
5. KapItallst 
, udmim 1 3 4 6. Surokrat7k 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Duzenll 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Guýlu 1 2 3 4 5 
9 Whk E#lbm ve Sosyal Hizfmt Alafdannda 10 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Insan Haklanna SaygIll 1 2 3 4 5 
11.8afaI711 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Yaý; amak Apn neredeyse mukemmel 1 2 3 4 5 
13. C76V alfwya avik 1 2 3 4 5 
5imdi de ulkeniz Thargelya' nin vatandaVanni ta nimak ign lutfen a5a6idaki sifatlardan 
yararlaniniz. Thargelya vatanda5lannin bu sifadan ne blýude tai! ýdioini gostermek iýin uygun 
g6rdCj6Cjn(jz rakami daire iýine aliriz. Thargelyalilar, 
hiý biraz yeterl kadar pk pk faz1a 
2. D1ndar 
3. Anlay*11 1 2 3 5 
4. Blreycl 2 3 5 
S. Albar 2 3 5 
6. Ba#lrmlz 2 3 4 5 
7 mai*byatp 2 3 4 5 
8. SaIdIrgan 2 3 4 5 
9. Kendlne g0venen 2 3 4 5 
10. Gelenekp 1 2 3 4 5 
11. -Wuk 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Rakabetp 1 2 3 4 5 
13. lfbiffik! pi 
14. Duzen# 
15. Dijý; manca 2 3 4 5 
16. Sosyal 2 3 4 5 
17, ,I Tolefansh 2 3 4 5 
18. HIrsh 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Aikm baOll 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Misafirperver 2 3 4 5 
21. Derwkratlk 1 2 3 4 5 
22. Calqkan 2 3 4 5 
23. Bafanh 2 3 4 5 
24. Gtivendir 2 3 14 5 
25 Mizah duygusu 
_qdi 
vnff 1 2 3 4 5 
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Nardelyaýi tanimlamak iýin Utfen a5aoidaki sifatlardan yararianiriiz. Nardelya' nin bu sifadan ne 
olýude taýjdi6jno g6stermek igin uygun gbrdOoOnuz rakami daire iýine aliniz. Nardelya; 
hg7 blraz yeten kadar (ok pk fa. -la 
1. Kalkjnrwkta olan 2 3 4 5 
2. Detwkrarlk 2 3 4 5 
3. Medeni ow 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Tutucu 2 3 4 5 
5. KapItalist 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Burokratik 2 3 4 5 
7. Duzenli 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Guý-lu 2 3 4 5 
9 Sa J&m ire Sosyal Hmmt AlwYalyrda I _411k, 
EA 2 3 4 5 
10. Insan Haklanna Sayglll 2 3 4 5 
11. Bafanll 1 2 3 4 5 
12 Ya, -amak g7in neredeyse mukernmel 2 3 4 5 
13. C76! p alfmya Kik 1 2 3 4 5 
5imdi de Nardelya' nin vatandagann tanmlamak iýin lutfen a5aeidaki sifadardan yaradaniniz. 
Nardelya vatandagaririin bu sifadan ne ölýüde ta5idiöini göstermek iýin uygun gordujunuz rakami 
daire igne aliniz. Nardelyalitar; 
hýc blraz yeten kadar cok cok faz1a 
I. E#MfnVj 
2. Dlndar 2 3 4 5 
3. Anlay4; 11 2 3 4 5 
4. 
R-f 
Blreycl 
wI,,, , R. '' ,I Rýl 1 2 3 4 5 
5 Klbar 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Baýlrmlz 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Maddlyatp 5 
8. SaIdIrgan 1 2 4 5 
9. Kendwe gOvenen 
10. Gelenekp 1 2 3 4 5 
11. So#uk JIM 1 2 3 4 5 
12. RekabWi 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I$bitYlk; i '- li IN, 
ffil 
. 
N-M- 2 3 4 5 
14. Duzenfi 2 3 4 5 
15. Dd$fnanca -la 
m W-1-1-swipm-, "1"'1 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Sosyal 2 3 4 5 
17. Toleransli 2 3 4 5 
18. Mrsh 4 5 
19. Aileye baOll 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Mlsafirperver 
21. Demokradk I s ON wl"M ME Oft 1 2 3 4 5 
22. ' 011,5kan 1 2 3 4 5 
2 Basanll 2 3 4 5 
24. G&venifir 2 3 4 5 
25 Mizah duygusu gefisiwý 2 3 4 5 
357 
Thargelya halkinin bir kismirwn mOzakerelerden gikacak sonuýlar hakkinda guvensizlik duymasinin pek 
gok nedeni bulunmaktadir. DuyLAan endi5elerin bir kismi aAida belirtilmi5br. LUffen, bir Thargelyali 
olarak dkewin Mardelya ile mdzakerelere ba5lamasi konusunda a5aoidaki faktbderin sizi ne olýude 
endi5eye du§urecLOine ili*n gorWeririze uygun ddýen rakami daire igine aliniz. 
hgý 
I. Narddyalilar dlxvmlanrv tekrar gdzdef7 
geptmeye ve bav Isteldennden vazge§meye 
pek istekll g6runmuyorlar. 
2. Nardelyablar mutarekeyl gcrn7ezden gellyový- 
saldIrgan tavIrlanry ve gw gosterdennI 
surduruyofYar 
3. Nardelyablar medefm ollwyan 
tnsan1ard1r; orVatdJn her sey beklerivr. 
4 Nardelyablar d1jer tilkelerle lmzaladiklan 
anlaýmalara sadlk kalmlyoffar pmdi 
blzlmklne sadlk kalacaklanna Inarmama 1ý0 
hlý bir sebep yok. 
5. Nardefyablar, temel Insan haklanlv Me Wal 
edlyottar; uluslararasi phsmalarda da bu 
konuda onlardan daha Jr bir tavir 
bekleyefneyiz. 
6. Nardiý, Iyaltlar her zal? 7an b1ze zarar verecek 
hareketferde bulunacaklardlr 
7. Nardaýyalllann ne zafnan ne yapacagf belll 
olmaz. 
8 Nardelyablar dl#er alarilarda 1, -. blfYl4lf7e 
yana. ýwnlyodar; bu da onlardan rx- 
bekleyebtlecejImizin bir moesl. -oostL 9. Nardelyablar fitsam bUsalar sýv a4anodan 
vuracak ltwnlafdlr. 
10. NaroWyalllar kendl ama! ýIanna ulaýtwk iýin 
ultslararasi kanudan Aal atmakta hoý- 
tereddut etmezler 
biraz yeten kadar 57ok ý7ok faz1a 
2345 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 
5 
5 
4 
11. Nardelyablar buyiA gWerden ý7ý deste* 
allyorlar. 1 2 3 4 
12. Nard6fyalllanj kendl ulkelenndekl slyasl 
durumu deol5trebIlecek pk sayida /ý- sorunu 
var, - bu nedenle onlara guvenemeyiz. 1 2 3 4 
13. Nardatyalllann, kl7. vn ýOzumune 114kin yetevh 
ka&ida bukrablleceldm denepmlen ve 
bllgllen ), fok. 1 2 3 4 
14 Narddyalllar kendl pkatianfy gozetrnek 1§71n 
gayet kolay yalan soyleffer. 1 2 3 4 
15. Nardelyalilar ise yaramaz arsanlardr 1 2 3 4 
16. Nardý? Iyalllar ad4malara sadlk kalmamalan 
hafinde kar; w1q,, Facak1Jn yapt7nmlardan 
korkmazlar. 1 2 3 4 
17 Nanlelyablar kdz i! r soniYanni oomk Vn 
kullarmyolYar. 1 2 3 4 
18. Nardelyann -9yasl fideden tutark 
bir pokUka 
1zlemekten aclz(er; Bu f waLmle 
sorumluluk(anf7l yenne getrnp 1 2 3 4 getrnneyeceklerInden em1n olama)qz. 
5 
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Sýfw/ /Offi en a, -. VAofakl sorularl cevaplandInniz 
1. Sizce: 
u. Thargelya ne kadar gijý10 
hic blraz veten kadar cok cok fazla 
2345 
Nardelya ne kadar gbýkj 
blraz yeten kadar fok fok faz1a 
2345 
2. Sizce Thargelyayi gOýIij yapan kimdir? 
htý- btraz yeten kadar pk §-ok faz1a 
Ordusu 2 3 4 5 
Strate, ffk cografl konun7u 2 3 4 5 
Siyasi ddzeni 1 2 3 4 5 
Uluslararasl organlzasyonlarda gj: jC1jj Nr soz hakkInA7 
olmasl gerýýJ 1 2 3 4 5 
Ekononvsi 1 2 3 4 5 
Kulturu 1 2 3 4 5 
Nufus yo#unlu#u MR 1 2 3 4 5 
Buyuk guý-Ierden aldljt destek 1 2 3 4 5 
Vatanda$larl arasindaki dayanl$ma 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Sizce Nardelyayi guýluj yapan kimdir? 
hiý- blra, - yeten kadar pk pk fa, -Ia 
ordau 1 2 3 4 5 
Stratejik cografi konumu 1 2 3 4 5 
Slyasi dtizenl 2 3 4 5 
V1, VS1, ar, ar. a9i OfgJnAzagyoNjrda gWAI bw sW, hikk#; Ao 
olmasl ger; -ej1 2 3 4 5 
Ekonon? lsi 2 3 4 5 
Kulturu 2 3 4 5 
ftfus yo#un1q4u 1 2 3 4 5 
B&yuk gu; lerden aldljl destek 1 2 3 4 5 
Vatandaflarl arasindaki dayanqma 2 3 4 5 
4. Sizce anlaýniazliklar ne kadar surer? 
1 yll 5 yll 15 yll 30 yd >50 yll 
5. Bu anketi ne ölýüde gerýek bir Thargelya vatanda$i gibi cevaplandirdi4inrzi düeünüyorsunuz-) 
960 %25 %50 %75 %100 
6. Sizce hangi Ukeler burada 7. Sixe hangi Ukeler burada 8. Verden tanmiar bildiÖiriz 
anlatilanThargelya'ya anlatilan Nardelya' ya herharigi iki Üke arasindaki 
benziyor? En az üý Uke ismi benziyor? En az üý Uke ismi 
verebilir misiniz? verebilir mis! Nz? 
b. r b. b. 
ili5kiyi animsabyor mu? 
Ornekler verebilir misiniz? 
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Anketin bu kisminda ki5isel bilgiler yer almaktadir. Bu bOlCjmde ve dioer bolumlerde verdi6iniz bilgilenn 
gizli kalacaoindan ve bu ara*tirTna dpnda baýka hýbir amag ile kLdlanilmayacaoindan emin 
olabilirsiniz. LUtfen, apoidaki her soru iýin uygun olan cevabi v5aretleyiNz veya yaziroz. 
1. Cinsiyetil7iZ. - 6. Lutfen bu ankette g6rikylerinizi 
befirtmeniz Igin dne sdrdlen konular 
erkek ile ilgift dijydnceleriniz varsa 
bayan J befiftiniz. 
A KaV yayindasiniz? 
S. Hangi konuda e4itim almaktasiniz? 
9. Sizin goruyanuze en uygun styasi 
parti hangisidir ? 
LI Igi 
u Muhafazakar 
cl Liberal demokrat 
1: 1 Di6er (Ldtfen belirtiniz) 
10. Anketine kadarilging buldunuz ? 
Li Hig 
Ll Biraz 
L3 Yeteri kadar 
Ll ýok 
Ll ýok fazia 
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Appendix 3d: questionnaire texts 
Imagine a distant planet that is Inhabited by many countries. Thargelia and Nardelia are two of 
those. The two countries are neighbours. Thargelia and Nardelia are equally powerful countries. 
The two countries are Involved in a long lasting conflict The two countries dispute an area along 
their boundaries. Both countries have claimed the possession and exploitation of this area since 
many years. Although the two countries are not openly at war, the conflict destabilises the area and 
undermines the development of both countries that invest the biggest part of their annual expenses 
for arm expenditures leaving other important sections underdeveloped. The two countries decide to 
enter in negotiation rounds. 
Imagine a distant planet that is inhabited by many countries. Thargelia and Nardelia are two of 
those. The two countries are neighbours. Thargelia and Nardelia are equally powerful countries. 
The two have been recently implicated in conflict They dispute an area along their boundaries. 
Both countries claim the possession and exploitation of this area. Although the two countries are 
not openly at war, the conflict destabilises the area and undermines the development of both 
countries that Invest the biggest part of their annual expenses for arm expendituires leaving other 
important sections underdeveloped. The two countries decide to enter In negotiation rounds. 
Imagine a distant planet that is inhabited by many countries. Thargelia and Nardelia are two of 
those. The two countries are neighbours. Nardelia is more powerful than Thargelia. The two 
countries are involved in a long lasting conflict The two countries dispute an area along their 
boundaries. Both countries have claimed the possession and exploitation of this area since many 
years. Although the two countries are not openly at war, the conflict destabilises the area and 
undermines the development of both countries that Invest the biggest part of their annual expenses 
for arm expenditures leaving other important sections underdeveloped. The two countries decide to 
enter in negotiation rounds. 
Imagine a distant planet that is Inhabited by many countries. Thargelia and Nardelia are two of 
those. The two countries are neighbours. Nardelia is more powerful than Thargelia. The two 
countries have been recently implicated in conflict. They dispute an area along their boundaries. 
Both countries claim the possession and exploitation of this area. Although the two countries are 
not openly at war, the conflict destabilises the area and undermines the development of both 
countries that invest the biggest part of their annual expenses for arm expenditur-es; leaving other 
important sections underdeveloped. The two countries decide to enter In negotiation rounds. 
Imagine a distant planet that is inhabited by many countries. Thargelia and Nardelia are two of 
those. The two countries are neighbours. Thargelia is more powerful than Nardelia. The two 
countries are involved in a long lasting conflict. The two countries dispute an area along their 
boundaries. Both countries have claimed the possession and exploitation of this area since many 
years. Although the two countries are not openly at war, the conflict destabillises; the area and 
undermines the development of both countries that invest the biggest part of their annual expenses 
for arm expenditures leaving odw important sections underdeveloped. The two countries decide to 
enter in negotiation rounds. 
Imagine a distant planet that Is inhabited by many countries. Thargelia and Nardelia are two of 
those. The two countries are neighbours. Thargelia Is more powerful from Nardelia. The two 
countries have been recently implicated in conflict. They dispute an area along their boundaries. 
Both countries claim the posse on and exploitation of this area. Although the two countries are 
not openly at war, the conflict destabilises the area and undermines the development of both 
countries that invest the biggest part of their annual expenses for arm expenditures leaving other 
important sections underdeveloped. The two countries decide to enter in negotiation rounds. 
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0ow6oou Ivav paKprv6 nhaAnj nDU KaTOIKerrai an6 M(poý X6pEr, H Oapyqhia KCII rl Napbilka 
Eivai Wo an6 auTk 0 56o x6pEg ouvop6ouv aro Xbpnl H 0opyrihia Kai n Nap6rjMa dVQl TO i8lO 
ICYXUpil; GK X6PEr, 01600 X6pEq flpl0KOVTCA CFE PaKpOXp6WO P)FA H p6FA wn&ýEml y6pca an6 
TrIV GP(PICJIIýý P04; MPOXt GM EbGqXK6 Gýwpa Twv btýo Xcop6w noti I'l KaTDX6 KCII aý10ndfjoý 
Tnq 61EK&KdTal Kai an6 Tiq 660 XCOPEq E&I) Kcu noXA6 xp6via. nap6Ao nou oi 66o X(bpEq bEv 
ppiaKov'rai ore avoiXr6 c6ppaýrL rl PeM ormouvrovii; m 6Aq Try nEpIOXI) KCI unoBbAnEl TrIV av6rTruFA 
TCOV Wo X(, )p6)v nou ko6E6ouv To pEyaA6TEPO ptpoq Tou crepou npounoAoyiojJ06 TOUq VICI TOV 
gor0jap6Touqa(p6vovraqWou(; arlmvriKo6qTopdqcx unoav6rrrul; rý a 66oX6pEq 
ano(pacirpuv va Ppouv pa Mon crrn PI)FA KCM 4KivoCiv 6ianpayparamKc)6q yOpour, 
(DavT6oou Lvov poKpiv6 ri, \crATnnOU KaT0IKdMl an6 N6(popK XcBpEr, H E)apyrIWIa KCII n Nap6nMa 
civai 66o, on6 ouTk 0i 60o, Xd)peq ouvopc6ouv orro Xliprrrý H 0opyqM0 KCIn NCIPWia ENGI TO MO 
icrXupic. (, )q X(BpEr, 01 Wo X(Bpe4 optOrIKav np6aWTu ot PIVA. H piM ECM6ými y6p(j) an6 TrIV 
appicpýTncn paq ncpioXýq am E5aqK6 cy6vopa -rwv 66a XcopcBv nou n KaToXI) Kai ciýonoin0l) Tnq 
61EK61KE! Tal Kai an6 -nq &)a )eopEr, nap6Ao nou oi Uso X(bpEq? 5cv ppiommai (m avolrý wppoýi n p6grl cnocruvTovji; m 6k) Tnv mpicxý Kai unogbMm Tnv ovbrTruFA Tcav 56o Xwp6v nou goU6ouv 
Tcbpa To pEyc6\OTF-po p4)K Tou rri)wu ripoUnDAoyiorpo6 Touq yia Tov 4orthiop6 Touq aqeVovTaq 
Wour, CrIpaVrIK061; TCjJdq CIE urioav6rwuýn. 01 Njo, X6M arapacirpm va Ppouv pia Man c; Tn 
pi)ý Kai kEKivo6v 5ionpayparELMKOCJI; y6pOUr. 
cDavröaou kVGV IJCIKPIV6 rIAGerl r10U KaTOIKEiTcii ari6 bb(popeg X(ýpFr, H 00pyrIAICZ Kai rl NapöqÄia 
eivai Z5üo an6 au-r&, oi büo x(ýpf4 cyuvopFüouv crro XäpTtl H NapÖnki0 KcrriXEi pia nio icrXupA 
Otorl andi TrIV GapyrKIG. 01 ÖÜO Xd)PF4 ßPiCYKOVMI 0£ PCIKpoyp6vio pAýrl. H pAýI co-näýLTai yÜpcü 
an6 Triv (ili(picrßencrn piag nEpio)(Ag OTO EÖ(](plKä CÜVOPCI TWV ÖÜO XC0p(liV nOU ti KOTOXfý Kai 
aýonoinMý Trlg 51£Kbl KEiTGI Kai arib -nr, Wo X(ýPS; EM Kai noxhö Xpdma. riapöxo nou oi büo Xd)pg 
U-v ßpicrKovTai cE avoiXTA c)üppaFfk ri p* anootwmiiýu Nul Tqv nF-plOXA Kai Uno0Una Triv 
avbrrruFA Twv öüo Xü)priv riou Zoöcüouv -ro pcyaÄüTF-po liLpor, Tau crAmu npoünoÄoyiapoü Toug 
Yla TOV EýonAiap6 Toug cKpiý%vvTag Wour, oqpavnKoüt; Tqjdg ce unDavänTuFn. 01 Wo Xcbpg 
anWoaiýDuv va ßpOUV PCI Mall UM Pe Kai ZEKivoÜv bionpaypaTeLmKoÜg yÜpou(; 
(DGVTÖOOU NCIV PGKpiv6 riAavfn noU KcrMK£iTai an6 btäWPF4 Xeüpt4 X(bp£r, H Oapyr-ýi-a Kai 0 
Ncipörlga Eivai büo an6 aurtr, Ch Wo Xd)pg auvopaýouv crro XäpTo. H Napönkia KaTLXEi pa nio 
icrXupi Gkaq an6 TW Oapynga. Ci büo X(4pig ßpt9qicav npöuqffla oF- pfKrk H p* wnäZ£mi 
YÜPW Ondi Try apeaßýrqcrq picK MioXt'K am eM(piKä cÜvopa Twv Wo Xcopd)v nou q KOTOXA Kai 
aýonoirloA ITK &EI(ÖIK£iTCII Kai Orlb Tlg MO xeopw, nap&\o rm ci, aüo xeapag &-v ßpi(*ovTcx oF- 
OVOIXffý OýJPPGFJJ, rl Pbl OrMAWIDViiýB Mq TrIV MIOXA KOI UnoOMna Triv CVärrrUgri TwV ök 
Xwp(ýv nou ýoöaüouv Td)pa To ijfflNýrF-po pkpor, Tau npoünoÄoyiapoü TOUý YIG TOV egonh101J6 TOU9 
aq)ývovrag ä»our, aqpavnKOÜg TOPEig CIE unc>avärwuýq. 01 Wo Xxbpg ancxpcioiýouv va ßpouv pia 
Äücq aTrl pAJýl Kai ZFKivoÜv bionpaY1JaraMKOÜý YÜPOU(; 
(DavTäaou ivav poKpiv6 riAcivýrrl nOU KOM1KärC11 cff16 bläwffl Xeüpei; H E)cipyrk\i(1 Kai q NapÖrlMa 
civai büc) an6 auTir, 01 bÜo XCopig mNopaýouv am Xäprin H E)Qpynki0 KcrriXai pa nio tuXupi 
Gkaq an6 TrIv NapörlMa. 01 büo Xcbý ßp; uKovTat ot poxpoXpÖvin p*. H p* wn«Erai yÜpw 
an6 TrIv op(piaßATr)aq par, rw4mo)(r'K oTo EM(pKä drý TWV 61310 Xtüp(ýV r101.1 rl KcrroXA Kai 
aýorloirlaý Trlg 51£KbiKEiTCII Kai anö Ti; Wo Xd)pg Eb(b Kai noAÄä Xp6via. riap6Ao nou ot aüo XcbpF4 
5F-v ßpicwovTai ciE avoiXrA aüppch rl p* anoawroviiýEI Mq Trlv nFplOXA Kai uno06AnF-1 Trlv 
avänTuFA Tov büo Xcopcbv riou ZOÖEÜOUV TO IJE: YCIÄÜTEPO ýJkPOC, TOU Er? POU flpoünoxoylqjOü TOUg 
yia Tov goriAiaii6 Toug W? yovrag Wour, oqpavriKoüi; TopEig cm- unoavänTuýq. 01 büo Xj)pE4 
ano(paaiiýouv va ßpouv pa AüM M p? h Km F. Ewoüv biarpfflcrramKoüý yýpour, 
oavTäoou kvav poKpiv6 Mav4M r`IDU KaTUKerraianö bi6Wpi4 XcýpEr, H Oapyrk\la Kai q Napöllma 
F-ivai büo an6 auTir, Ch büo Xeoý ouvop£üouv cyro Xäprrý H OUPVII? &iC1 KCrrkXD PO n10 IOXUP4 
Gion an6 TrIv NapörlMa. Ch büo Xeop£g ßpkGqKav np6a"To c£ pAFA. H p* F-Crriät, -roi yüpca an6 
TrIV op(picyßýrqM piaý nEpioxrK arra EÖG(pKä CýYMPCI TWV ÖÜO X(Op(bV r10U rl KCITOXA Kai aýionoin0A 
Trlg ÖIF-KÖIK£iTCII Kai an6 Tig ÖÜO XIý)PW, r10P6A0 nOU (X ÖÜO X(bp£g ÖFEV ßpiCKOVTOI OF- OVOIXrý 
aüppaFA rl pAFjl arK)ouvTaviiýa Mq T(IV nEPOA KCH unoOäÄM TriV avärrruFA Twv öüo Xwpcbv ilou 
Zobaýouv -hopa To pEyci, \ÜTFpo ptpor, Tau npoünoAnyiapoü Tout; yia Tov *rk\iapö Toug a(piývovrag 
ä»our. crqpavnKoüg Topäi; oF- unoavänruýq. 01 Wo X(bp£g arioqmoiýouv va ßpouv pia Äüarl crrq 
pAFA Kai ZEKivoÜv bianpcrypCrr£UT1K0Üg YÜPOUr. 
Üzerinde biMok ülkenin vatandagannin ya§adiöi uzakta bir gezegen hayal edin. Thargelya ve 
Nardelya bu ülkelerden ilds! olsun. Bu ild ülke birbirierine kom5udur. Thargelya ve Nardelya e§it 
gü51em sahip ülkelerdr. 13u ik! Ükerln arasinda ydlardan bed süregelen bir anla§mazlik 
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bulurirnaktadir. lki ülke, sinirdaki topraklann bir kisminda anlca§mazlik ya5arnaktadir. ikisi de uzun 
yillardan bu yana bu topraklann mUkiyetirl ve kLdianmini talep etmektedir. Bu iki Üke agk; a 
sava5 halinde olmasalar da, bu arda§mazlik, söz komisu topraklarda huzursuzluk yaratmakta ve her 
lki ülke de yillik harcamalanrin büyük bölümünü silah harcamalanna ayinp dioer önemli alargann 
geli§mesird göz ardi etijöi Kin kalkinamamaktadir. Bu lki ülke müzakere turlan ba§Iatmaya karar 
verir. 
Ozerinde biMok Ukerin vatandagannin ya§adiei uzakta bir gezegen hayal edin. Thargelya ve 
Nardelya bu Ükelerden ildsi olsun. Bu ild ülke birbirierine kom§udur. Thargelya ve Nardelya efit 
gü51ere sahip ijkeleridir. Bu iki Üke son zamanlarda bir ania§mazliüa dü5mü5tür. Ikl ülke, 
sinirdaki topraklann bir lasminda an[4rmzlik ya§amaktadir. Ikisi de bu topraklarin mü[kJyetini ve 
kullanimini talep etmektedir. Bu lki üke apkga sava§ halinde olmasalar da, bu anlaemazlik, söz 
konusu tDpraldarda huzursuzluk yaratmakta ve her iki ülke de yillik harcamalanrin büyük bölümünü 
silah harcamalanna aprip diöer önemli alargann geli5rnesird göz ardi ettiei Igin kaHunamamaktadir. 
Bu iki ülke müzakere tudan ba§Iatmaya karar verir. 
Üzerinde bi r; ok Ukehn vatarbd4anrxn ya5adiei uzakta bir gezegen hayal edirl. Thargeýa ve 
Nardelya bu Ukelerden ikis7i olsun. Bu ild ülke birbirierine kom§udur. Nardelya, Thargelyaldan 
daha güelüdür. Bu iki (dkenin arasinda yillardan bed züregelen bir anlaemazlik 
bulurinaktadir. Iki ülke, sinirdaki topraklann bir kisminda ania5mazlik ya5amaktadir. lkJsl de uzun 
yillardan bu yana bu topraldann mCAkiyetirg ve ktdiarvmirn talep etmektedir. Bu ikJ CÄke a; ik; a 
sava5 halinde olmasalar da, bu ardfflazbk, söz konusu topraklarda huzursuzluk yaratmakta ve her 
iki ülke de yilljk harcamalannin büfük bölümünü silah harcamalanna ayinp diöer önernli alardann 
geliemesirg göz ardi et: Uöi iýIn kalkinamamaktadir. Bu iki ülke müzakere turlan b4atmaya karar 
verir. 
Ozerinde biMok ülkeNn vatandaganrän ya§adiöi uzakta bir gezegen hayal edin. Thargelya ve 
Nardelya bu (Akelerden ikisi olsun. Bu ild ülke birbirierine koff4udur. Nardelya, Thargelyaldan 
daha güiglüdür. Bu iki Uke son zamanlarda bir arda§rnazliöa dCj5mü§Wr. lki ülke, sinirdaki 
topraklann bir kisminda arga§maztik ya§amaktadir. lkisi de bu topraklann mCdkiyetiri ve kLdlarämini 
talep etmektedir. Bu lki ülke apkga sava§ halinde ofmasalar da, bu arda§mazlik, söz konusu 
topraklarda huzursuzluk yaratmakta ve her iki ülke de ydlik harcamalannn büyük bölümünü silah 
hartamalanna ayinp diÖer önemli alanlann geli§mesin! göz ardi ettiel l; in kalkinamamaktadir. Bu iki 
ülke müzakere tudan balatmaya karar verir. 
Ozerinde biMok Ukerin vatand4anrxn ya§adiöi uzakta bir gezegen hayal edin. Thargelya ve 
Nardelya bu (Akelerden ildsl olsum Bu Ild ülke birbirierine korr*udur. Thargelya, Nardelyaldan 
daha güglüdür. Bu iki Cikerün arasinda yillardan bed züregdm bir anlaqmazlik 
bulunmaktadir. Ild ülke, sinirdaki topraklann bir lasminda argci5maztik ya5anaktadir. Ildsl de uzun 
yillardan bu yana bu topraMann mCdldyetiri ve ktilariffurv talep etmektedir. Bu lki Cdke agk; a 
sava5 halinde olmasalar da, bu ariaemazlik, söz konusu topraklarda huzLrsuzluk yaratmakta ve her 
ikt ülke de yillik harcamalannn büyük bölümünü silah harcamalanna ayinp dioer önernli alanlann 
geli§mesirg göz ardi etbZj i; in kallunamarnaktadir. Bu iki ülke müzakere turfan baýIatmaya karar 
verir. 
Ozerinde biMok Ukerin vatar)d4annn ya5adi* uzakta bir gezegen hayal edin. Thargefya ve 
Nardelya bu (dkelerden ikisi olsum Bu ild ülke birbirierine koni§Wur. Thargelya, Nardelyaldan 
daha güglüdür. Bu iki (Ake son zamanlarda bir ardaffl: dioa dü5rnü5tür. lki ülke, sirirdaki 
topraklann bir losminda arga7nazlik yafflaktadir. lkisi de bu topraldann midkiyetird ve kLdlarimini 
talep etrnektedir. Bu ild ülke apkp sava5 halinde olrnasalar da, bu ardaýmazlik, söz konusu 
topraklarda huzursuzluk yaratmakta ve her lki Uke de pilik harcanialanrvn büyük bö[Crnünü silah 
harcamalanna ayinp diüer önemli alanlann geli§mesird göz ardi ettiel 15in kallunamamaktadir. Bu ild 
ülke müzakere tudan baýatmaya karar verir. 
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Appendix 4: chapter 7 factor analyses 
Table 1: factor analysis of the Items that constituted the SDO scale 
Items Descriptives Factors 
Mean SD Com. Factor I Factor 2 
Increased social inequality 4.33 . 69 . 612 . 780 We should do what we can to equali5e conditions 
in life 4.20 . 67 . 552 . 708 Equality should be our ideal 3.94 . 88 . 559 . 704 Equal incomes for everybody 4.04 . 83 . 488 . 698 There would be fewer problems I we treated . 695 
people equally 4.23 . 84 . 492 Groups should be given an equal chance in life 
4.24 . 68 . 531 . 667 It would be good if groups were equal 2.62 . 90 . 509 . 640 No groups should dominate In society 3.64 1.03 . 264 . 495 Fewer problems if some groups stayed in their 
place 2.89 . 99 . 585 . 765 Groups must be kept at their place 2.84 1.06 . 545 . 738 Groups must stay at their place 2.08 . 90 . 575 . 716 Some groups are inferior 2.20 1.10 . 429 . 648 Some groups on the top some on the bottom 
2.08 . 97 . 559 . 626 Step on other groups 2.22 . 99 . 585 . 568 
it's an right that some groups have more 
chances in life 1.83 . 87 . 411 -. 439 . 467 
Sometimes violence is important 1.83 . 97 . 172 . 294 Descriptives 2.26(. 64) 4.04(. 57) 
Cronbach's a . 84 . 80 
A total of 47.71 % of the variance was explained. Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis, Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Rotation converged in 3 iterations 
Table 2: factor analysis of the Items that constituted the attachment to the nation scale 
Items Descriptives Factors 
Mean SD Com. Factor I Factor 2 
I support Greece no matter if right or not 
2.41 1.01 . 582 Jef I support my country's decisions simply because 
they are my country's decisions 
2.25 
. 
89 
. 
593 . 749 
It's anti-Greek to criticise Greece 1.94 . 
87 
. 
524 . 724 
We should not crificise our country as others 
have done 2.40 . 
83 
. 454 . 667 
Greece is always right 2.07 . 
75 
. 
437 . 851 
If you dont support Greece you are not Greek 
2.82 1.16 
. 
530 . 651 All decisions of my country are ethical 2.63 . 
94 
. 
346 . 553 
If other countries disagree with my country. I 
wouldn't necessarily support my country 
3.03 
. 
94 
. 
309 -. 550 
1 disagree with some decisions because I care 
4.04 . 76 . 619 . 783 1 crftise my country because I care 3.82 . 91 . 615 . 779 We should try as hard as we can for a positive 
change 4.20 . 74 . 560 . 719 Those that love Greece try their best to solve 
problems 3.91 . 90 . 478 . 653 1 express my love to my country and I support 
positive change 4.01 . 70 . 408 . 637 Some of my country's choices hurt me 3.69 . 81 . 371 . 601 Sometimes I go against dangerous decisions of 
my country 1.83 . 97 . 179 . 379 Descriptives 2.37(. 60) 3.84(. 53) 
Cronbach's a . 83 . 77 
A total of 46.70% of tho variance vwas oxplained. The itorn *%* should akwys try to change things in Grooce" 
was not Included in the analysis because it did not share any communalities with the rest of the Items (. 000). 
Extraction method: Priricipal Components Analysis. Rotated method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, 
Rotation converged in 3 iterations 
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Table 3: factor analysis of the items that constituted the distrust explanations s 
items Descriptives Factors 
mean SID Corn. Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
They are unpredictable 2.57 1.19 . 776 . 816 They Wit cheat on you if they have the 
chance 2.64 1.18 . 729 . 798 They will always take actions to haffn us 
They would lie easily to satisfy their own 
interests 2.73 1.20 . 593 . 682 They do not seem co-operative in other 
areas 3.28 1.11 . 621 . 581 . 495 They are useless 1.68 . 95 . 656 . 564 . 542 They are uncivilised 2.42 1.15 . 555 . 540 . 487 The political leaders of Turkey are 
incapable 3.11 1.06 . 704 . 895 They have many internal problems 
3.01 . 91 . 629 . 678 They do not have experience and 
knowledge to handle a crisis 
3.30 1.07 . 622 . 433 . 633 They use the crisis to solve Internal 
problems 2.81 1.13 . 423 AM Are not afraid of sanctions 2.33 1.02 . 597 . 483 Do not seem willing to revise their 
positions 3.05 1.05 . 710 . 731 Ignore agreements and are constantly 
provocative 3.69 . 91 . 593 . 689 Violate basic human rights 3.50 1.10 . 745 . 526 . 584 Do not keep agreements they signed 
with other countries 3.39 1.12 . 759 . 462 . 413 . 516 They break rules of international law 
3.01 1.04 . 565 . 466 . 511 They have more support from big 
powers 3.09 1.05 . 676 . 502 Descriptives 2.41(. 91) 2.90(. 75) 3.22(. 86) 
Cronbach's a . 89 . 75 . 81 
A total of 65.15% of the variance was explained. Extraction method: Principal Components Ana"s, Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Rotation converged in 26 iterations 
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Appendix 5a: factor analyses of the description of the state 
Table 1: Greek sample factor analysis of the in-group description 
Descriptives Factors 
Items Mean SD Com dem/tic organiscd calmialist 
Respectful of human rights 3.14 1.21 0.755 . 
840 
Democratic 3.20 1.05 0.605 
. 
777 
Civilised 2.66 1.21 0.637 
. 
755 
Open to the reception of irnmigrants; 3.20 0.94 0.574 . 
740 
Close to being a perfect place to Ilve 2.85 1.11 0.6(X) . 621 . 
43X 
Progressive 2.88 0.88 0.509 
. 
546 
. 
454 
Conservative 2.50 0.93 0356 454 
Powerful 3.26 1.12 0.799 
. 
848 
Organised 3.03 0.97 0.666 
. 
809 
Successful 3.05 0.95 0.649 
. 
744 
Good in health, education, social services 2.95 1.16 0.571 . 
6-56 
Bureaucratic 3.28 1.13 0.778 
. 
842 
Capitalist 3.15 1.13 Oý742 
. 
819 
Means and SDs -139(. 
77) 
-',. 
22(, Hl) 2.4)4(. 62) 
Cronbach's a 0.84 0.80 r . 
47K** 
A total of 63.40% of the variance was explained. Extraction metho& Principal Components Analysis, Rotated 
method Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, Rotation converged in 4 iterations 
Table 2: Greek sample factor analysis of the description the out-group 
Dk=riptives Facwt, 
Items Mean SD Com. tictn'tic succ1ul capitalist 
Democratic 2.63 0.89 0-727 . 840 
Respectful of human rights 2.43 1.09 0.769 . 833 
Civihsed 2.70 (Y89 0.662 . 728 
Open to the reception of immigrants 2.40 1.12 0.504 . 696 
Close to being a perfect place to live 2.25 0.93 0.534 . 634 
Progressive 2.58 0.86 0.563 . 578 A74 
Powerful 3.22 1.08 0-812 .8 73 
Organised 3.02 0.98 0.669 . 777 
Successful 2.90 0.98 0.653 . 771 
Good in health, education, social services 2.65 0.94 0.555 . 472 . 553 
Bureaucratic 3.15 1.09 0.749 . 86.5 
Capitalist 3.16 1.11 01.45 
ý424 . 
701 
Conservative 178 0.99 0.388 . 611 
Mean and SID of the factors 3.11(. 91) 2.69(. 78) 3.04(. 73) 
Cronbach's a 0. X4 O. N0 0.62 
A total of 63.62% of the variance was explained. Extraction methodý Principal Components Analysis, Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, Rotation converged in 5 iterations 
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Table 3: Greek-Cypriot factor analysis of the in-group description 
Desciriptives Factots, 
Items Mean SID Com sucelful dern/tic capitalist 
Respectful of human rights 3.04 1.05 . 
599 
. 761 
Civilised 2.95 1.04 
. 561) . 740 
Democratic 2.92 0.90 
. 620 . 717 
Close to being a perfect place to We 2.76 1.19 . 625 . M2 . 408 
Open to the reception of immigrants 2. % 1- 23 . 498 . 586 
Progressive 2.77 0.98 
. 406 ... 529 
Conservative 2.86 0.97 . 371) 
Organised 3.17 1.03 
. 
791 . 848 
Powerful 3.28 1.10 . 7oo . 839 
Successful 2-93 1.04 -755 . 424 . 74S 
Good in health, education, social service 3.01 1.20 . 
688 . 731 
Capitalist 2.51 1.17 
. 
720 838 
Bureaucratic 2.53 1.01 
. 621) . 749 
k4eans and SID 191(. 67) 11(. 88) 2.57(ý93) 
Cronbach's a 0.77 0.85 r . 376** 
A total of 61 -90% of the variance was explained. 
Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis, Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, Rotation converged in 6 iterations 
Table 4: Greek-Cypriot factor analysis of the out-group description 
Factors 
Items Mean SI) Com. dern/tic s ucc. /Ful capitalist 
Respectful of human rights 2.66 1.21 . 
699 
. 
834 
CAose to being a perfect place to live 2.48 1.16 . 
691 
. 
803 
Democratic 2.74 0.98 
. 
639 
. 
709 
Open to the reception of immigrants 2.61 1.11 . 
526 
. 
701 
CIvII(sed 183 0.98 397 
. 679 
Powerful 3.14 1. ()() . 
711 
. 831 
Good in health, education, social services 2.80 1.09 . 793 . 461) 75.5 
Organised 3.06 0.97 
-607 
724 
Progressive 2.74 0.98 
. 
544 . 66.5 
Successful 278 1.01 
. 
583 . 6.53 
Bureaucratic 2.69 0.98 . 691 . 816 
Capitalist 171 L 17 
ýW . 
740 
Conservative 2.98 95 
. 
510 . 644 
Means mid SD 2.65(. 04) 2. ()1(. 7()) 2.93(. 77) 
Cronbach's a 0.83 0.81 0.62 
A total of 64.03% of the variance was explairied. Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis, Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, Rotation converged in 6 iterations 
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Table 5: Turkish sample factor analysis of the description of the in-group 
Dý, scriptivcs Factors 
Items Mean SI) Corn. succ/fiul dern/tic capitalist 
Successful 2.93 1.20 0.805 . 89.4 
Close to being a perfect place 2.65 1.39 0. ") . 879 
Organised 2.98 1.20 0.764 .87; 
Qvilised 
-3.05 1.14 0.780 . 968 
Good in health, education, social services 2.85 1.27 0.751 . 8.54 
Respectful of human rights 2.70 1.22 0.761 . 853 
Democratic 3.01 1.17 0.769 . 84.5 
Powerful 3.58 1.16 0.670 . 679 . 455 
progressive 2.93 1.01 0.562 . 576 . 479 
Open to the reception of immigrants 2.42 1.25 0.4W. . 478 - 462 
Capitalist 2.72 1.20 0.62-3 . 777 
Conservative 2-60 1.16 0.673 . 786 
Bureaucratic 3.06 H4 0,508 . 452 AN . 
548 
Mean and SD of the factors 2.1)5(. 95) 2.72(1.20) 2.90(. 82) 
Cronhach's a 0.93 r 0.07 
A total Of 69.09% of the variance was explained. Extraction method: Princip2l Components Analysis, Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, Rotation converged in 5 iterations 
Table 6: Turkish sample factor analysis of the description the out-group 
Descriptives Factor, 
Items Mean SD Corn. dcoutic succ, fid capitalu'l 
Democratic 2.50 0.98 0.797 . 861 
Civilised 2.50 0.98 0.670 . 
78.5 
Close to being a perfect place to live 2.11 1.02 0.664 . 
719 
Respectful of human rights 2.33 1.05 0.532 . 7W) 
Good in health, education, social services 2.83 1.15 0.770 . 639 601 
Successful 2.68 1.09 0.695 . 621 5ý-, 
Powerful 2.97 1.16 0.661 . 741 
Open to the reception of immigrants 2.63 1.24 0.572 . 7.? 2 
Progressive 2.46 1.10 0.554 . 676 
Organised 2.77 1.04 0.644 498 . 611 
Bureaucratic 2-93 1.11 0.718 . 818 
Conservative 3.02 1.20 0.588 . 739 
Capitalist 3.07 1 24 W714 . 677 
Mean and SD of the factors 2.54(ý87) 2.70(03) 
Cronbach's a 0.88 0.77 0.83 
A total of 66.04% of the variance was explained. Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis, Rotated 
method: V2rirn2x with Kaiser Norm2lis2tion. Rotation converged in 6 iterations 
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Table 7: British sample factor analysis of the description of the in-group 
Descriptives Factors 
Items Mean SI) Corn. SUCC/ful de"I'lic capitalist 
Successful 3.48 0. % 0-703 
. 
811 
Good in health, education, social services 3.39 L11 0.741 
. 
782 
Powerful 3.50 1.09 0.6% 
. 
778 
Progressive 3. (6 0.9.3 0.622 727 
Organised 3.50 0.92 0.550 
. 
676 
Close to being a perfect place to live 2.66 1.18 0.663 
. 
642 A58 
Respectful of human rights 3.40 1.15 0.7912 . 819 
Democratic 330 1.04 0.677 
. 
713 
Civdised 3.52 0.86 0.647 
. 
710 
Open to the reception of immigrants 2.69 1.09 0.545 . 
709 
Bureaucratic 2.93 0.87 0.646 SWO 
Conservative 3.00 0.71) 0.434 
. 64.5 
Capitalist 2 87 91 592 -. 410 . 632 
Mean and SID of the factors 3.27(. 77) 3.24(. 79) 2. ()4(, 62) 
Cronbach's a 0,84 0.75 0.54 
A total of 63.78% of the variance was explained. Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis, Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, Rotation converged in 5 iterations 
Table 8: British sample factor analysis of the description the out-group 
I)cwrirAives 
Items Mean SI) Cont. Suce/ful dent/tic , pt., j,, j 
Successful 3.08 (). 94 0.716 . 836 
Powerful 3.30 1-13 0.637 . 768 
Progressive 3. (X) 0. % 0.613 .W 
Good in health, education, social services 3.09 1.02 0.617 . 730 
Organised 3.16 0.96 0-607 . 727 
Democratic 269 0.82 0334 . 454 
Respectful of human rights 2.72 0.917 0.734 . 838 
Open to the reception of imrnigranft 2.41 IAX) 0.732 . 828 
Close to being a perfect place to live 2.13 0.94 0.510 . 683 
Civilised 2.89 0.90 0.680 . 516 498 
Conservative 2.88 0.97 0.632 
. 
789 
Capitalist 3.2-3 1.04 069% . 748 
Bureaucratic 3.00 0,86 0.441) -596 
Mean and SD of the factors -3.044 ý 73) 2.55(. 74) 3.04( TA) 
Cronbach's a 0.82 0.74 
A total of 61.21% of the variance was explained. Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis, Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, Rotation converged in 5 iterations 
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Appendix 5b: factor analyses of the description of the people 
Table 1: Greek sample: Factor analysis-the members of the in-group 
Items Mean 
Duscriptnes 
SI) Com. warm 
factor 
,, 
mWtnt- "Tipctitive traditional 
Democratic 3.34 1.03 
-687 . 788 Hospitable 1.43 1.09 . 735 . 786 Sociable 3.30 . 
95 . 616 . 768 Educated 3.12 . 
85 
. 
579 
. 7? 6 
With a sense of honour 3.25 1.09 . 679 . 720 
Trustworthy 2.97 . 9-1 . 
641 
. 676 Tolerant 2-75 1.02 . 453 . 664 
Unfriendly 2.32 . 
97 . 656 -. 657 . 421) Cold 2-24 1.07 . 
689 _654 AS7 
Understanding 2.91 . 92 . 
492 
. 638 Co-operative 3.07 -91 . 
572 . 630 
Polite 3.11 . 
86 . 
581) 
. 62 7 
Successful 3.20 . 
82 
ý 
616 . 762 
Organised 3.13 . 
94 . 
592 
. 725 
Hard-working 3.48 . 
89 
. 
585 
ý 713 
Self confident 3.59 84 . 449 . 642 
Independent 3.17 . 
97 . 408 . 4.59 
Materialistic 3.20 1.14 . 631 . 770 
Individualistic 2.79 1.07 . 610 . 715 Competitive 3.20 . 
99 
. 
673 
. 712 
Aggressive 3.13 1.00 . 
598 
. 636 
Ambitious 3.76 . 
95 
. 
537 47() J.? S 
Religious 3.16 . 
98 
. 
642 
. 
78.5 
Traditional 3.43 _94 . 
721 
Family oriented 148 X) 56_; 486 
Descriptives 3.17(. 73) 3.34(A4) 3.00(. 84) 3.31(. 84) 
Cronbach's a 0.92 0.73 0.75 
_0.62 A total of 59.77% of the variance was explained Extraction method Principal Components Analysis. Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Rotation converged in 6 iterations 
Table 2: Greek sample: Factor analysis-the members of the out-group 
Items Mean 
De"A-fipfiVCS 
SI) Corn. 
fact or-., 
Warm competent competitive traditional 
Hospitable 2.71 . 
93 
. 
680 
. 
816 
With a sense of honour 2.71 1.02 . 695 . 816 
Democratic 2.75 1.08 . 
760 
. SAN 
Tolerant 2.45 . 
98 
. 535 . 726 
Trustworthy 2.38 . 94 620 . 
720 
Co-operative 2.67 . 
89 
. 
544 717 
Understanding 2.62 79 . 
542 . 704 
Sociable 2.91 . 86 . 496 . 
701 
Polite 2.78 . 81 . 549 . 6.55 
Family oriented 3.06 . 94 . 
551 . 587 AN 
Unfriendly 1.15 1.10 . 584 -. 
554 
. 
504 
Educated 2.59 94 . 604 . 
5.53 
. 440 
Organised 3.09 q1 . 656 . 
769 
Successful 2.91 97 . 
503 . 706 
Competitive 3.36 . 93 . 578 . 
662 425 
Independent 2.95 1.06 . 575 . 640 
Ambitious 3.59 1. (X) . 
52-1 . 628 
Hard-working 3.25 . 
89 . 506 ý418 . 
488 
Aggressive 3.09 . 
92 . 
719 .8 73 
Materialistic 3.21 1.02 . 
725 . 810 
Cold 2.89 1.03 . 
553 . 60.4 
Individualistic 2.91 . 
99 . 
548 . () 03 
Self confident 3.55 1.02 . 
576 . 4; s .5 74 
Religious 3.26 1.03 . 
619 . 816 
Traditional ". 50 1.01 . 
748 . 808 
Descriptives 2.66(. 70) 3.16(. 72) 3ý(M. 86) 3.37(. 95) 
Cronbach's a 0.91 0.77 0.79 0.570* 
A total of 61.81 % of the variance was explained Extraction metho& Principal Components Analysis, Rotated 
metho& Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, Rotation converged in 5 iterations 
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Table 3: Greek-Cypriot sample: Factor analysis-the members of the in-group 
Items Mean 
I)Lscriplives 
SD comý Warm 
Factor's 
ýwnl conservative co titive 
democratic 3.25 1.12 
. 
739 
. 821 
polite 2.95 HY) -745 . 811 
with a sense of honour 3.10 1.20 . 660 . 805 
religious 3.05 1A) . 673 . 80 
trustworthy 2.83 1.15 . 677 ý 795 family oriented 3.28 1.06 . 
599 
. 739 hospitable 3.36 1.2-1 . 734 . 739 
educated 195 0.89 . 639 . 737 
understanding 2.98 (). 99 . 
580 
. 620 
hard-working 3.48 1.17 . 
504 
. 614 
successful 3.09 1.10 -536 . 597 
unfriendly 2.40 1.10 . 087 _589 . 
984 
Tolerant 2.83 . 
97 
. 
380 . 525 
organised 3.25 1.06 . 632 . 
7.16 
ambitious 3.44 1.03 . 
534 . 718 
sociable 3.14 0.97 . 
770 
. 482 . 
711 
co-operative 3.09 1.03 . 662 . 498 . 643 
independent 3.13 1.13 . 473 . 538 
cold 2.40 1.12 . 652 . 764 
self confident 3.52 10) . 627 698 
traditional 3.47 0.99 -628 . 618 
competitive 3.35 1.05 . 691 . 545 S07 
materialistic 2.89 1.17 . 
685 
. 
794 
aggressive 2.94 1-22 . 
740 514 . 67/ individualistic 2.62 1.14 . 
537 
. 627 Descriptives 3. (k(. 76) 3.08(. 73) 2.9.1(. 90) 3.18(. 74) 
CronbacKs a 0.912 0.70 0.72 0.74 
A total of 63.16% of the variance was explained. Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis, Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, Rotation converged in 6 iteration 
Table 4: Greek-Cypriot sample: Factor analysis-the members of the out-group 
I )CIAript i%'CS Factors 
Items Mean SI) Com. Warm Competent comlvti%-c traditional 
Polite 2.81 1.15 775 . 858 
Hospitable 3AW 1.19 . 
752 . 841 Darnocr2tic 2.95 L 14 . 76S NJ3 
Co-operative 2.81 1.06 . 677 . 809 
Understanding 2.70 1.02 . 
6(X) . 779 
Trustworthy 2.54 1.17 . 
770 . 77' 
with a sense of honour 2.85 1.22 . 679 . 7ý?. 4 
family oriented -',. 
21 1.10 
. 
6(A 
. 
714 
educated 2.53 1.05 . 
689 . 691 
sociable 2.89 1.10 . 
550 
. 684 
tolerant 2,68 1.10 . 
582 
. 634 independent 2.97 1.01 . 530 . 606 
unfriendly 2. % 1.28 . 
659 -. 455 . 421 441 
self-confident 3.52 LOI . 679 . 729 
organised 3.32 1.04 . 552 .6 73 
ambitious 3.25 1.14 . 
576 . 666 
competitive 3.16 1.13 . 650 . 
5s/ 
successful 3.16 0.98 . 
513 
. 
413 . 574 
hard-working 3.42 0,96 -576 . 
517 . 
546 
materialistic 3.00 1.20 . 748 . 856 
individualistic 2.98 1.20 . 
709 A12 
-827 
aggressive 3.09 1.08 . 488 . 600 
religious 3.12 1.15 ý 
716 . 748 
traditional 3.30 1.06 . 688 . 
691 
cold 2. % L24 . 
600 
. 
455 - 536 
Descriptives 2. ". 84) 27(. 7 1 1.04(97) 3.14(. 89) 
Cronbach's a 0.93 0.74 0.78 0.57 
A total of 65.14% of the variance was explained. Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis, Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, Rotation converged in 7 iterations 
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Table 5: Turkish sample: Factor analysis-the members of the in-group 
Descriptives Factor% 
Items Mean SI) Corn. Warm conce/vc com )Ctcnt Corp VC 
successful 3.37 1.22 769 . 831 
organised 3.07 1.17 . 
731 
. 826 hard-working 3.41 1.19 . 753 . 818 democratic 3.16 1.18 
. 
731 
. 764 
understanding 3.02 1.16 . 
717 
. 7,58 
sociable 3.05 1.14 . 
630 
. 747 
educated 3.02 1.08 . 608 . 
746 
independent 3.36 1.24 . 
567 
. 745 
self confident .,. 
58 1.16 
. 638 . 740 
polite 2ý94 1.21 . 
790 
. 726 
trustworthy 3.36 1.24 . 662 . 666 
co-operative 2.87 1.12 . 299 
aggressive 2.41 1.32 . 671 . 760 
unfriendly 2.21 1.39 . 645 . 744 
cold 2.11 1.08 . 470 . 667 
materialistic 2.74 1.27 . 
564 
. 
627 
tolerant 2.65 1.11 . 
532 
. 488 -. 
503 
traditional 3.18 1.01 . 
804 AX) . 797 
with a sense of honour 3.01 1.23 . 
624 
. 609 family oriented 3.59 1.24 . 
572 
. 
418 . 595 
hospitable 3.49 1.31 . 
747 -. 52, ) . 5.53 
individualistic 2.56 1.21 . 708 . 418 . 721) 
competitive 3.34 1.36 . 594 . 618 
ambitious 3.49 1.22 . 601) . 
449 
religious 2.88 . 98 . 658 . 453 . 418 -. 457 
Descriptives 3.14(. 96) 2.58(. 53) 3.27(. 'X)) 3.11(. 77) 
Cronbach's a 0.94 0.60 0.75 0.50 
A total of 64.37% of the variance was explained Extraction methoCL Principal Components AnalYSIS, Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, Rotation converged in 29 iterations 
Table 6: Turkish sample: Factor analysis-the members of the out-group 
Items Mean 
DescrirAivcs 
SI) Com. Warm 
Factors 
com1wtitive tr3dil ional rehaiý)u_s___ 
successful 2.66 1.20 . 
796 
. 
962 
educated 2.68 1.12 . 
725 
. 
833 
hard-working 2.88 1.06 
. 
757 
. 
783 
polite 2.35 1.05 . 
644 
. 
781 
understanding 2.37 . 
98 
. 
605 
. 
740 
independent 2.90 1.24 
. 
616 
. 
7? 6 
organised 2.61 1.16 . 
703 
. 
708 
Democratic 2.62 1.14 
. 
511 
. 
6.57 
Sociable 2.52 1.04 
. 
523 
. 
622 
self-confident 3.25 1.16 . 
548 
. 
536 
. 
5(X) 
tolerant 2.08 1.13 A(W 
. 
48.5 
Co-operative 2.40 1.16 
. 
272 
. 
480 
Competitive 3.38 1.18 
. 
662 753 
ambitious 3.50 1.10 . 
551 
. 
693 
individualistic 2.96 1.27 
. 
482 
. 
662 
materialistic 3.46 1.21 . 
486 
. 
644 
aggressive 3.2-1 1.30 . 
650 
. 
587 -. 532 
cold 3.01 1.20 . 
641 
.5 
76 424 
Unfriendly 3.21 1.28 
. 
586 
. 
527 
Family oriented 2.75 1.09 . 
676 
. 
772 
Hospitable 2.30 
. 
97 
. 
721 
. 
771 
trustworthy 2.25 1.13 
. 
743 
. 
45S 
. 
69.5 
With a sense of honour 2.38 1.11 . 
442 
. 
422 
. 
45 
traditional 3.15 1.14 
. 
722 
. 
806 
religious 2.80 1-07 . 
643 
. 
74.4 
Descriptives 2.61(. 78) 3.25(. 82) 2.41(. 83) 2.97(ý%) 
Cronbach's a 0.91 0, ? A) 0.77 r . 
374** 
A total of 60.44% of the variance was explained. Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis, Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, Rotation converged in 6 iterations 
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Table 7: British sample: Factor analysis-the members of the in-group 
Items Mean 
Descripfives 
SD Com. Wann 
I'acton., 
COM/tive eomrwtent 
_ 
traditianal 
Polite 3.46 1.04 
. 
719 
. 7.58 Understanding 3.2-3 1.06 . 726 . 7.56 Tolerant 3.05 
. 95 -583 . 679 Trustwo, " 3.50 
. 93 . 
650 
. 659 Individualistic 3.26 1.0-3 
. 500 . 646 Co-operative 3.27 
. 
98 
-645 . 641 Sociable 3.36 
. 95 . 
637 
. 616 . 470 Hospitable 3.39 1.01 809 
. 610 . 
528 
Democratic 3.25 1.05 
. 
554 . 602 . 411 Organised 3.53, 
. 88 . 575 . 578 . 447 Independent 3.46 L02 . 598 . 542 . 509 Competitive 3.30 1.00 . 629 . 733 Self-confident 3.37 .% . 
592 
. 707 Ambitious 3.76 -81 . 592 . 67.5 Aggressive 2.73 1.14 . 731 4 In. . 669 
Materialistic 2.95 1-11 ý55 , 
11 
. 
592 
Successful 3.46 . 
95 
. 
724 
. 708 
Unfriendly 2.00 . 
91 
. 680 . 
463 -. 60.1; 
Hard-working 3.78 . 
73 
. 
540 
. 602 Educated 3.32 . 95 . 
685 IF99 
Cold 2.22 L04 
. 621 _501 _565 With a sense of honour 3.72 . 99 . 535 . 518 Religious 3.11 1.0-3 . 659 . 79.5 Traditional 3.41 . 80 . 564 . 446 . 702 Family oriented 3.54 1.00 . 
602 
. 669 Descriptives 3.33(. 74) 3.2-1(. 74) 3.00(. 65) 
_; - 
1(. 72) 
Cronbach's a 0.90 0.78 0.78 0.78 
A total of 62.81% of the variance was explained. Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis, Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation, Rotation converged in 8 iterations 
Table 8: British sample: Factor analysis-the members of the in-group 
Items Mean 
IXALripfivus 
SI) Com- Warm 
Factors 
com/tive competcra traditimal 
Aggressive 3.53 1.02 . 
745 - 748 
_ 
Tolerant 2.51 . 98 . 
694 . 736 Understanding 2.54 . 89 . 669 . 746 
Competitive 3.66 . 96 . 
651 - 733 
Cold 3.05 1.11 . 
532 -. 704 
Hospitable 2.72 . 
98 . 6(A . 626 . 
482 
Trustworthy 2.44 
. 
98 
. 
670 . 621 
Unfriendly 3. (X) 1.07 . 
477 -. 6 L? 
Co-operative 2.66 1.02 . 
528 
. 6(M 
Polite 2.60 . 
99 
. 
666 . 603 Self-confident 3.53 
. 
93 . 6(W -. 573 Materialistic 3.38 1.04 . 
640 _567 
Sociable 2.74 . 93 . 
4% . 519 Successful 3.15 . 98 . 
718 
. 835 Educated 3.06 . 
93 
. 728 -. 439 . 822 Organised 3.17 . 92 . 
555 
. 688 
Hard-working 3.38 . 
94 
. 
595 
. 615 
Ambitious 3.65 1.00 . 
7(X) . 48.5 
Family oriented 3.01) . 
94 
. 
735 743 
Traditional 3.18 
. 
96 . 627, 707 With a sense of honour 3.26 1.19 . 534 . 663 Religious 3.00 
. 
93 470 
. 606 Democratic 2.8.1 . 91 ý 
562 
. 429 Individualistic 2.98 1.0-3 
. 681 . 739 Independent 3.16 1.06 . 661) . 674 Descriptives 2.62(. 66) 3-27(. 71) 3.06(. 70) 3.05(. 70) 
Cronbach's a 0.89 0.80 0.73 r . 576** 
A total of 64.07% of the variance was explained. Extraction method: Principal Components Analysis, Rotated 
method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Rotation converged in 7 iterations 
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Appendix 6: real world in-groups/out-groups and conflicts 
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Table 1: names of the countries Qiven for the in-arou 
Greek Greeký iqts_ 
___ 
Turkish British Total 
P+ p- V P+ P1- p= ___ P+ _ p- p= ___ _ P+ _ _ p- __ __ p= _______ P+ _ p- p= 
Afghanistan 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 6 4 2 9 8 
Africa 5 5 
Arab Countries 1 1 1 1 
Argentina 1 1 1 1 
Asia 1 1 
Australia I 
Armenia 1 1 
Bulgaria 1 1 
Bosnia 1 2 1 
Botswana 1 
Cambodia 1 1 
Canada 1 
Chechnya 1 1 4 2 3 
China 1 1 1 1 4 2 2 6 3 2 
Czech republic 1 1 
Cuba 1 3 1 1 4 
Cyprus 1 
Cyprus Greek 2 10 7 8 12 6 1 1 1 2 11 25 14 
Cyprus Turkish 1 9 2 1 9 2 
Egypt 1 1 
Eritrea 1 1 
Ethiopia 1 1 
EU 1 1 
France 3 1 2 1 2 1 1 4 7 2 8 
Georgia 1 1 2 
Ghana 1 1 
Germany 5 2 2 5 3 6 1 18 6 
Greece 9 25 22 2 3 1 5 1 1 16 28 27 
Holland 1 1 
India 2 2 4 1 5 2 3 7 7 
Iran 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 3 1 6 6 
1 raq 3 6 3 2 3 2 11 4 4 11 4 6 32 14 
Ireland North 1 1 1 4 3 
Ireland South 1 1 
Israel 3 2 3 4 1 1 10 4 3 4 9 16 7 15 
Italy 1 1 2 
Japan 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 
Jordan 1 1 
Kosovo 1 1 
Kurdistan 2 1 3 
Kuwait I 
Lebanon 1 
Malaysia I 
Middle East 
Mexico 1 
Morocco 1 
New Zealand 1 
Nigeria 2 2 
Pakistan 4 1 2 1 3 2 8 1 
Palestine 12 3 1 1 12 2 5 5 1 30 10 
Peru 1 1 
Romania 1 1 
Russia 5 2 1 1 1 7 2 4 2 1 17 5 3 
Serbia 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 
Skopja/FYROM 2 2 
South Africa 1 1 2 2 1 
Spain 2 1 2 3 
Syria 1 1 1 1 
Tibet I 
Third World 1 1 
Turkey 10 1 3 5 1 2 7 10 9 1 1 22 13 14 
UK 11 1 3 8 20 6 11 2 10 22 3 19 
Ukraine 1 1 
USA 24 2 2 13 1 2 24 6 16 10 57 5 20 
Yugoslavia 1 5 1 1 2 2 7 1 
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Table 2: names of the countries given for the out-qrou 
Greek Greek-Cypnot Turkish British Total 
P+ p- p= P+ p- p= P+ P- p= P+ p- P= P+ p- p= 
Afghanistan 4 1 2 1 4 3 8 1 6 
Albania 1 1 1 1 1 
Africa 3 1 1 1 5 1 
Arab Countries 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Argentina 2 2 
Asia 1 2 1 2 
Australia 1 
Armenia 1 1 6 2 7 2 
Belgium 1 1 
Bulgaria 1 1 3 1 1 3 
Bosnia 1 1 3 
Canada 1 1 
Chechnya 6 1 1 7 1 
China 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 
Croatia 1 1 1 1 
Cuba 3 1 3 6 
Cyprus Greek 3 2 6 2 1 1 2 10 5 1 
Cyprus Turkish 3 4 3 4 
Egypt 1 1 
Ethiopia 1 1 
EU 1 1 
France 2 1 1 1 1 2 5 3 3 2 5 7 9 
Germany 5 1 1 2 2 5 4 1 13 6 
Gibraltar 
Greece 5 1 2 2 4 1 6 1 11 2 9 
Holland 1 1 
India 1 3 2 1 5 
Iran 3 1 2 1 3 4 3 9 1 6 
Iraq 7 3 6 1 1 21 7 10 6 8 44 8 16 
Ireland North 1 2 5 1 2 5 
Ireland South 1 1 1 1 
Israel 1 14 2 2 10 3 4 4 5 7 28 8 
Italy 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 
Japan 1 2 1 2 2 1 3 4 2 
Korea 2 1 2 1 
Kurdistan 1 1 
Kuwait 3 3 
Lebanon 1 1 
Mexico 2 2 
Morocco 1 1 
Pakistan 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 
Palestine 8 2 1 2 14 4 1 6 25 1 11 
Portugal 1 1 
Russia 1 5 2 5 2 4 6 1 5 18 3 
Serbia 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Skopja/FYROM 1 1 1 1 
Spain 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 
Syria 1 4 1 4 
Turkey 10 25 20 8 11 8 8 2 2 3 26 37 33 
UK 1 6 2 1 2 12 7 2 21 5 3 40 16 
Ukraine 1 1 
USA 3 21 1 3 9 4 1 18 6 2 26 9 9 70 20 
Yugoslavia 2 2 1 3 1 
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Table 3: examples of conflicts g iven b y the participants in the three po wer conditions 
Greek Greek-Cy priot Turkish British Total 
P+ P- pý P+ p- pý P+ p- P= P+ p_ P= P+ p- P= 
Africa 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Former Yugoslavia 1 2 1 2 2 4 
Greece-Albania 1 1 
Greece-Macedonia 1 1 
Greece-Turkey 24 24 26 1 4 3 3 8 1 1 28 32 35 
Cyprus 5 7 3 5 7 3 
Turkey-Cyprus 4 10 3 13 10 9 3 1 17 23 13 
Turkey-Kurdistan 2 1 1 2 2 
Turkey-Armenia 2 1 2 1 
Turkey-Syria I 
Israel-Egypt 1 1 
Israel-Jordan 1 1 
Israel -Palestine 8 12 1 1 15 12 3 8 10 4 31 35 8 
Israel-Syria 1 
UK-Afghanistan 1 1 
UK-Northern Ireland 1 4 2 1 4 
UK-Germany 1 1 1 1 
UK-Falklands. 1 1 1 1 1 1 
UK-France 1 1 
North-South Ireland 1 2 9 1 2 9 
North-South Korea 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
USA-Afghanistan 8 2 2 3 1 8 5 3 
USA-Cuba 3 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 
USA-East 1 1 
USA-Europe 1 1 
USA-Gulf War 1 1 
USA-Indians 1 1 
USA-Iran 3 1 3 1 3 
USA-Iraq 6 8 1 4 2 18 13 5 6 11 3 34 34 
USA-Islam 1 1 2 
USA-Palestine 1 1 
USA-Russia 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 
USA-Serbia 2 2 2 2 
USA-Wodd 3 1 5 8 1 
USA-Yugoslavia 2 1 1 2 2 
Russia 2 1 1 2 
Russia-Chechnya 5 3 1 5 3 1 
Russia-Germany 2 2 
Russia-Georgia 1 1 
France-Germany 1 1 
Italy-Germany 2 2 
Second World War 2 2 
Spain-Gibraltar 1 1 
Spain-Morocco 1 1 1 1 
Iraq-Kuwait 3 1 3 
Iraq-fran 1 1 2 1 1 4 2 
China-Korea 1 1 
China-India 
China-Japan 1 1 
Peru-Venezuela 1 1 
India-Pakistan 2 5 2 1 3 4 4 8 5 
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